VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 11-7-55: SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACK ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS AND FORCES THROUGH 1 JULY 1958, PUBLISHED 23 JUNE 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000300010015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 20, 1956
• Content Type: STUDY

Approved For Release 2000 11RgA-RDP61-00549R000300010015-6
IAC-D- 100/7
20 March 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through 1 July 1958,
published 23 June 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross
Capabilties, for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and
Forces Through 1 July 1958, tt published 23 June 1955, was noted by
the IAC on 2:0 March 1956 (IAC-M-234, 20 March 1956, item 5 a).
25X1A
Approved For Release 20 E l lA-RDP61-00549R000300010015-6
 Approved For Release 200 kk4ij
~I IA-RDP61-00549R000300010015-6
IAC-D- 100/7
20 March 1956
Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through 1 July 1958,
published 23 June 1955
From a strictly intelligence standpoint, we are unable to test
the validity of most of the specific estimates made in. NIE 11-7-55.
On the other hand, such evidence as we have concerning the Soviet
long-range bomber and air base development programs tends to
confirm the general trends indicated in that estimate, and no im-
portant evidence has appeared to invalidate any of its major conclu-
sions. However, new intelligence on such Soviet weapons programs
as guided missiles and submarines suggests that the USSR might
give greater emphasis to those weapons systems in initial attacks
on US and key US overseas installations and forces, even though it
would still rely primarily on manned bombers through mid-1958.
This new evidence has been taken into account in the preparation of
NIE 11-56, and is especially reflected in our estimate of Soviet
capabilities for the latter part of the period covered by the new
estimate.
Approved For Release 2Q#I?IE7CIA-RDP61-00549R000300010015-6