VALIDITY STUDIES OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000300010022-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: December 8, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

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8 December 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Studies of National Estimates
1. On 26 April 1955 the IAC adopted a procedure for two
kinds of review subsequent to the completion of NIE's: an
immediate post-mortem on each estimate, and validity studies
after the lapse of an appropriate interval to determine how good
the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments
(IAC-M-194, 26 April 1955, Item 3).
2. In accordance with this decision, validity studies have
recently been undertaken on those estimates agreed by the Board
of National Estimates and the IAC representatives to be suitable
for such an analysis. The attached validity study of NIE 71-54,
"Probable Developments in North Africa, " published 31 August
1954, was noted by the IAC on 6 December (IAC-M-221,
6 December 1955, Item 3 c).
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8 December 1955
Validity Study of NIE 71- 54:
Probable Developments in North Africa,
published 31 August 1954
1. NIE 71- 54 for the most part remains a basically valid
estimate. Various paragraphs dealing with the current situation
and short-term developments are out-dated in many respects, but
to no greater degree than would normally be anticipated as a re-
sult of the passage of time. Most of the longer-range estimates
cannot be tested at this early date, but so far they appear to be
generally accurate.
2. Current developments are tending to confirm the key
estimates in NIE 71-54 that: (a) there would be a continued growth
in nationalist activity in all three North African areas; and (b)
France would probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first
in Tunisia and later in Morocco, but would not fully satisfy in-
creasing nationalist demands. As stated in the NIE, France has
sought to avoid concessions which would endanger its strategic
control or would destroy the privileged position of the settlers of
French descent.
3. However, NIE 71-54 failed to reflect adequately in
terms of timing two significant developments over the past year:
the early outbreak of nationalist violence in Algeria, and the
sharp acceleration of such violence in Morocco. The short-term
effect on Algeria of events in Tunisia and Morocco was not given
sufficient emphasis in the NIE. Moreover, lacking intelligence on
the development of the CRUA, a revolutionary faction within the
extremist wing of Algerian nationalism, we did not anticipate
violence on the scale of the November 1954 uprising in northeast
Algeria. With regard, to terrorism in French Morocco, NIE 71-54
did not indicate sufficiently clearly the likely short-term effect of
nationalist pressure on the French.
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IAC-D-100
8 December 1955
4. With respect to Libya, much of the background discussion
is still basically valid, although various details have become.out-
dated. NIE 71-54 correctly estimated such short-term developments
as successful conclusion of the US base agreement and increased
friction between France and Libya over the Fezzan. The longer-
range estimates might be worded somewhat differently if written
now, but we believe they remain generally accurate.
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