EDAC WORKING GROUP I, INTERNATIONAL EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEMS MINUTES 2:00 P.M., TUESDAY, SEPT. 17, 1957 ROOM 1207 MAIATICO
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S
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Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 6, 2000
Sequence Number:
74
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September 20, 1957
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WG I M-136
September 20, 1957
EDAC Working Group I, International Export Control Systems
2:00 p.m., Tuesday, Sept. 17, 1957
Room 1207 Maiatico
MDAC
Mr. Wight, Chairman
Mr. Tucker
Mr. Tollin
Defense
Mr. Carmody
State
Mr. Nelson
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Strong
Mr s. Rado
Miss Rector, MDAC, Committee Secretary
Agenda
Note a; Redefinition of Military Fuel Thickeners, ML Item 4b.
Ref. POLTO A-52, 8/14; WG I M-129
Note b; Instrument Landing Systems for Prague.
Note c; SKF Bearings, Item 1601.
Ref. Stockholm Desp. 233, 8/22; WG I M-133)
Note d; Special Task Group on Bearings Review of IL 1601/2601/3601.
Ref. WG I M-12) 25X6A
Note e; to Poland, Item 1305.
25X6A Ref. WG I M-132)
Note f: for Redefinition of Items Relating to Electronic Aviation
Equipment, Items 1501, 1509, 1517.
25X6A Ref. WG I M-126; WG I D-1501.1)
1. for Poland, Item 1820.
Ref. POLTO 484-.-97373'7-)
2. Criteria for Controls.
3. Defense Memorandum on Thermo-Nuclear Concept.
Ref. WG I D 78)
4. Austrian Phosphor-Bronze Blanks to Poland, Item 1650(d).
Ref. Vienna Embtel 738, 9 12 57
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Note a: Redefinition of Military Fuel Thickeners, ML Item 4b.
Ref. POLTO Am52, 87149 WG I Mm129 -
The Defense member promised to submit a report on this subject during the
coming week.
Note b: Instrument Landing Systems for Prague.
The Defense member reported that he expected to have a report by next week on
the new case involving ILS for Prague. The Chairman noted that Defense had been
provided with the only copy of the Treasury memorandum on this case, and requested
its return in order that it might be reproduced and copies given to the other members.
Note c: SKF Bearings, Item 1601.
Ref, Stockholm Desp. 233, 8/22; WG I Mm133)
The Chairman called the attention of the Defense member to the fact that the tech-
nical report which he had promised to submit to complete the record in this case had
not yet been received.
Note d: Special Task Group on Bearings Review of IL 1601/2601/3601.
Ref. WG I M.12
The Chairman requested the Defense member to make a report at the Group's next
meeting with respect to the status of the bearings review.
Note e: to Poland. Item 1305.
The Chairman called the attention of the Defense and Commerce members to the
fact that the technical report to complete the record in this case had not yet been
received.'
25X6A
Note f: Proposals for Redefinition of Items Relating to Electronic Aviation
Equipment. Items 1501, 1509, 1517.
Ref. WG I M- 126; WG I D$1501. 1
The Chairman requested the Commerce member to make a report at the Group's
next meeting with respect to the status of the Technical Task Group's review of this
matter, The State member reported that the - had been informed that we hoped to
have our information by the middle of September. 25X6A
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25X6A
-Tires for Poland, Item. 1820.
Ref. POLTO 484, 9777)
25X6A
The USDEL would be authorized to make no objection to the =proposal to export
to Poland 660 tires, valued at $24, 472.
The Defense member reported that after careful consideration of this case, tech-
nicians in the Transportation Corps and the Ordnance Corps, and their superiors,
could find no particular justification for objection to the shipment of the tires in ques-
tion, in view. of our Polish policy and statements in the MCOCOM document that the 25X6
tires will not be transshipped and will be used in the Polish civilian economy on
commercial vehicles.,.
The State member felt the case came within the policy for Poland, concurred in
the findings of Defense, and recommended approval. The ICA member agreed.
With respect to this particular case, the Commerce member stated that since
both State and Defense had indicated that the USDEL should be authorized not to object,
he would not be prone to interpose objection. However, we were approaching the point
where we should have more information and he thought that from now on we should
ask the country which came in with the exception request to present more cogent in-
formation as to how the case meets the criteria for Poland.
The Chairman recommended that the case be approved on the basis of the informa-
tion given that the tires were to be used in the civilian economy of Poland, that they
could be so used as had been ascertained in the previous case, and in light of the fact
that tires are a very expendable item and that 600 could be used up very quickly. With
respect to the Commerce memberts suggestion that more concrete evidence be obtained
as to the reasonableness and necessity for use in the civilian economy, the Chairman
thought that each case had to be dealt with on its merits and that such information
should be requested only in cases where it seemed really relevant and important.
2. Criteria for Controls.
A.< WG I D-76/lb (Defense Memo of 9/4/57); WG I D-76/,lc (CIA Memo of 9/6/57).
The Defense member was advised that it was the opinion of the other members
of WG I that CIA should not be asked to reappraise its studies until such time as policy
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guidance is received that the existing criteria may be changed or that the CIA studies
should be re-reviewed in anticipation of a possible agreement to change the-criteria,
B. WG I D-77 (MDAC Member's background memo analyzing development
of criteria).
The members expressed their appreciation to the MDAC staff member for
the preparation of this useful background document. The Chairman invited any mem-
ber who might wish to do so to submit memoranda commenting on or amplifying the
contents of this document.
The CIA member referred to the statement on page 8 of WGI D-77, reading
"CIA, in its Intelligence Review, . . . analyzes the criteria . . . and concludes that
the most useful achievement and objective of a trade control program is to inflict
political and moral stigma on the Sino-Soviet bloc. " He noted that CIA did not really
analyze the criteria, nor did they conclude that the most important achievement of a
trade control program should be exploitation of the political or moral stigma attached
to trade controls. Rather, he believed that what CIA wanted to say was that this was
an achievement of the program which had not been fully exploited because it was a by-
product rather than a declared objective of the trade control program,
The Chairman said he thought the CIA comments on the political achievement
of the trade control program went to the very essence of the whole concept because it
was stated throughout the first part of the CIA paper that the program had only a
slight or negligible effect from a military security point of view.
The Commerce member advised that Commerce had not had the document
long enough to give it considered analysis. In their preliminary analysis they had
found it a very interesting paper.
The State-:member advised that he too had not had time to give the paper in-
tensive study. It seemed a worthwhile document and focused attention on some very
important points through the years in economic defense. He felt that it pretty well
coincided with State's own interpretation of the criteria and the term "war potential".
C WG I D- 77/1(Cha,irman's draft memorandum on COCOM Listing Criteria).
This paper was distributed by the Chairman to the members for WG I
consideration at its next meeting. However, preliminary discussion indicated that
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the members believed that WG I activity in this particular area might be duplicative
of work being undertaken sirm ttaneously in the EC and therefore would want a direc-
tive from the EC to do so before giving serious or lengthy study to such matters in
WG Ia
3. Defense Memorandum on Thermo-Nuclear Concept.
Ref. WG I D-78
The Defense member was given the following advice;
25X6 (a) With respect to the first recommendation made by Defense in-the referenced
document, that the other WGI members believed it would be premature to approach
regarding its thereto-nuclear concept until the U. S. had completed its general
review of the strategic trade control program and determined what its policy will be.
(b) With respect to the second recommendation made by Defense in the referenced
document,. that the other WG I members believed it seemed to be inconsistent with
NSC 5704/2, Annex A. page 7, to propose to NATO that it consider the thermonuclear
concept for the purpose of advising COCOM regarding the military aspect of such a
concept relative to strategic trade controls.
(c) That the other WG I members would urge the Department of Defense to make
a study of the implications of the thermo-nuclear concept on the trade control program,
indicating what items would be covered by such a concept.
Discussion
The State member advised that State felt that the Defense proposal in the subject
document was very similar to the Defense proposal presented in WG I several weeks
ago at the --time the Group was discussing copper wire and He 25X1/ 2g
referred to the comments he had made then (see WG I M-429) that the timing was
premature because we were in the midst of making our own review of the lists and
would be considering various strategic trade control concepts which might be applied
in the future. State had therefore felt that the Defense proposal was unacceptable and
still felt the same way regarding both proposals made by Defense in the document now
before the Group.
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With respect to the second Defense recommendation, the attention of the Defense
member was directed to NSC 5704/2, Annex A, page 7, and he was informed that this
recommendation seemed to be irreconcilable with the policy decision that NSC would
not be asked to make any special review of the trade control question at this time.
The Commerce member referred to comments he had made when the Defense
member had previously proposed that the thermo-nuclear concept be discussed with
the UK, at which time he had suggested that it would behoove primarily responsible
agencies within the U..S. Government to decide what we would think would be the sub-
stance of the thermo-nuclear concept and then determine the extent to which we had
valid counteracting arguments. He recalled that the Chairman had remarked that he
thought part of this would be involved in one of the special interest studies which
Defense was to make. The Chairman noted that the special interest studies had not
as yet been.tr?ansmitted by Defense.
The Chairman reported that the general feeling in MDAC was very similar to the
views expressed by the Commerce member, and also that Admiral DeLany, after his
discussions with 1955, which was when this concept was first 25X6
mentioned, had requested Defense and AEC to make a study and to prepare a list of
items those agencies would think would be controlled if we should adopt this concept.
No response had been received to this request. It was MDAC's feeling that we should
determine our own thinking on what the concept would include and whether we could
agree with it, or what alternatives we would propose, before any approach was made
to who might already be fully prepared. He would think it preferable to 25X6
try to delay rather than instigate proposals on the part of any other governments until
such time as our own views were agreed and the U. S. could take the initiative in making
its own proposals.
The CIA member noted that this was a very complicated problem. It was not a
matter of the narrow thermo-rmclear concept. We should be thinking in-terms of the
modern weapons system. This was somewhat broader and took into account not only
atomic and hydrogen bombs, but also other form of warfare, such as chemical and
biological warfare, which were equally as effective in some cases as thermo-nuclear
warfare. There was also the question of missiles. CIA had taken some of these things
into consideration in its intelligence contributions but of course did not use this as the
solely limiting factor.
The Commerce member referred to the point made by an AEC representative at
one of the Group's meetings (WG I M-121) that the U. S. decision to participate in the
International Atomic Energy Agency might-have a fundamental impact on our controls.
This needed to be studied?to see how it might cause our efforts to be redirected. The
Chairman noted that AEC was to make a study of the relation of the security trade
control program to IAEA.
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4. Austrian Phosphor-Bronze Blanks to Poland
Ref. 9 12 57
25X1X
Item 1650 (d).
Embassy Vienna would be informed that the phosphor-bronze blanks it wished
to export to Poland were finished products which were not covered by IL 1650(d),
as the Austrians had believed they were, and therefore were not under control to
the bloc.
The Commerce member reported that a quick review of made
by BFC and BDSA, in which he believed a Defense technician had also-participated,
indicated that the phosphor-bronze blanks were a finished product and did not appear
to be covered by IL 1650.
Distribution
WG I
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