GENTLEMEN,

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000200080015-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 12, 2001
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: August 26, 1957
• Content Type: LETTER

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DRAFT
26 August 1957
Gentlemen,
Our object in this presentation is to outline for you significant
intelligence of critical value to major national intelligence objectives
that we anticipate will result from the coverage of certain Soviet targets
which are within the range of U-2 aircraft. Whereas we are vitally
interested in coverage on SAC-type targets and the eventual preparation
of folders thereon, this is not the objective of our briefing today.
All of the principal targets we will discuss fall into those areas of Soviet
strength that have been determined by the National Intelligence Community
to be the most significant in its ability to strike at the United States.
These are: The Soviet guided missile system, the Soviet long
range bomber force, and Soviet nuclear energy production system.
Our present intelligence on all of these critical Soviet capabilities
still contains major areas of ignorance. A significant quantity of our
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existing information on these strengths is fragmentary, and, consequently,
our present estimates admit to significant margins of error.
US defense plans and budgets to support them involve vast sums
of money and, admittedly, based on information having these significant
margins of error. Accordingly, such plans and budgets can be materially
affected by reducing the margins of error.
A few examples of the state of our missing information will point
up this matter. Thus, until ten days ago, we had no observation of any
Soviet GM efforts though we have from other intelligence sources had
knowledge of perhaps a couple of handred firings on the KAPUSTIN YAR
range. We have had no information regarding launching pads, erection
and handling equipment, guidance installation and equipment, test stands,
fuel storage, and other associated launching devices. Data on these items
are essential for any firm statement as to the size, type, and pay load
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of missiles, guidance systems, and types of engines used for propulsion.
At TYURA TAM, we have shown here developments bearing on
these questions in a relatively new range still under construction and
thus far reliably known to have fired at least twice. The overcast on
the far oblique in this display obscures our ability to identify what is
suggested, namely, all of the equipment and possibly missiles related
to actual launch though there is clear and convincing evidence bearing
upon the support elements. We intend to go back if possible to clarify
the launching site at TYURA TAM. It is our expectation that comparable
coverage of KAPUSTIN YAR w auld be extraordinarily rewarding in
establishing for the first time a set of basic data against which further
intelligence coverage from all sources could lead us to improve signifi-
cantly our estimates on the state of the GM art in the Soviet. This.
photograph on TYURA TAM leads some experts to suspect that the
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Soviet is two years ahead of our current estimate of their progress.
Let me illustrate further possibilities in narrowing our margins
of error in two other critical fields, namely, atomic energy production
and long range bomber capacity.
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