REPORT OF DCI AD HOC PANEL ON STATUS OF THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040042-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: November 14, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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14 November 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Revert of DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the
Soviet ICBM Program
1. This Panel, consisting of the below membership and meeting
at your request, has reviewed available evidence relating to the
Soviet ICBM propene. We have also reviewed the Guided Missile Intel...
ligence Committee (OMMC) report on this subject, dated 5 Noveeber 1958,
and have diecussed their report with the OMIC members.
25X1A
2. Based on the foregoing, this Panel has concluded that:
a. The Soviets have a high priority ICBM program initiated
some years ago. Their test program currently appears to be about
12 Months ahead of the US ICBM:test program. For want of hard
facts on the extension of this test program into Operational
eaVeletlity, it is only safe to assume that this twesiftorwrill
carry forward for the next few yeare.
b. The OMMC report, including the footnotes, is, IA general,
as good an overall estimate Of the situation as can be made at
this time, in View of the quality and quantity of the available
evidence. However, a few remarks are warranted.
0. The ONIC report, including the footnotes, sets forth
variations of viewpoint regarding the date of the ICBM IOC,
(initial operational capability), ranging from the latter part of
1958 to the latter part of 1959. While neither extreme can, at
thie time, be ruled out as being incorrect, the Panel believes that
currently available evidence will support no more precise a statement
than the following:
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"The Soviet IOC will. probably occur sometime during 1959.
While we cannot discount the possibility that this IOC mdght
yet be estataiehed in 1958, we believe this possibility degraded
by reason of the small nuMher of test firings to date.
d. The important date to be established is not considered to be
the IOC (for in terms of military significance a few
not important) but rather the date when .the Soviets have in being
force armed with at least a hundred ICBMs. In this
area, intelligence is alxoonon7":exi-Vatent.everthelesas
on such associated evidence as does exist, and on the basis of the
complexities of the task to be accomplished, we believe the Soviets
could buna toaweapens system capability with about 500 missiles
1 tars:116.1962, although, with over.ridixig priority and success in their
test and production program, such might be accomplished as early as
mid-1961. Assuming the mid-1962 date as their goal for this particular
number of weapons, an operational force with about 100 weapons could
probably be in existence by late 1960 or early 1961.
e. In view of the significance vhich. the status of the Soviet
ICBM program has to the national security of the United States, we
find the caumIttty and quality of the total evidence available to be
dangerously unsatisfactory. In particular is this situation true
reganiimeariXemee on production facilities, training and. deployment.
This statement also applies with equal validity to evidence on the
/REM family (700 and. 1.100 n.m,) of ballistic Wadies, 'Which can
probably now be employed to the great disadvantage of ourselves and
Allies throughout Europe, England, North Africa and Asia.
3. This Panel recommends that all practicable actions be taken on an
urgent basis to improve the intelligence collection system to *here it can
supply adequate amounts of data relating to the Soviet ICBM program. In
particular, neans must be found to obtain evidence on Soviet production
facilities, training and deployment actions.
a. All collection Should be vi
example:
vigorous
resear Wee overcome e increasing ficulty 25X1D
collection.
b. Recognizing the difficulties in cc:mart epeeattenr,?) thq Fl.
neverthelese suggests that more of such activities be specifically
focused on the task of' Obtaining evidences on long range missile
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production, training activities, and deployment activities, and
that strong support be given to nev covert techniques.
Co Additional recommendations viii be supplied to you in
personal discussion.
4. On balance the Panel believes that collection must be more
vigorously pushed, that the risks to U.S. security of not obtaining
adequate information on the Soviet IMP:oven exceed the current
risks inherent in utilization of certain collection techniques. We
believe that it is becoming increasineyharder to obtain evidence
and all method should be exploited -while still usable.
cc DDCI
DDI
25X1A
Chairman
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