Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 4, 2001
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040047-0.pdf193.93 KB
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File* Approve For e a e,2PA1/ P 7-0 Appendix III. P nT :'v",L DEFENSE OF T' ~ t;' ?T :J STATES t'ViTHIN THE A,E,ti!i~u OF TriE T;~LE L, U.S.C. ;., S 7''3 .... .;.1`; UJIZ [HE i 1.\ SVLt'~ On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union startled thU~" Yc4 l5i nth' the -ann6iu~66it6nt. that they had successfully placed into orbit an earth satellite with a weight of 184 pounds. This was followed on 3 November 1957 by another earth satellite with a weight of 1120 pounds. The immediate impact throughout the world was tremendous and dramatically pointed out the scientific potential of the U.S.S.R. at a time when all eyes were focused on the U. S. and our widely publicized failures to launch an earth satellite of a minimal size. These successes have not only raised the stature of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world, but have forced the U. S. into a position of ever greater effort to counteract the dramatic achievements of the U.S.S.R. Though widely publicized as an example of the peaceful and beneficial aims of the Soviet Union, it is known that this program is based principally on the initial success enjoyed in the ICBM programs. The two programs are complementary. One contributes directly to the other and success in either advances the date when 25X1D other more difficult space experiments could be attempted. The earth satellite was nominally a part of the IGY program, yet little significant data has been made available to the other IGY participants. 25X1 D The U.S.S.R. has publicly stated that their foreseeable objective is manned space travel on an interplanetary scale. Though this goal lies in the future fundamental space programs are in progress. Another widely publicized objective of the Soviet Union is the development of a technique to recover a satellite. This is another mandatory step in the program for manned space flight. Since the U.S.S.R. has publicized their interest in this particular program, it is probable that it has been given a high priority and that preparations are well advanced at this time. A recoverable satellite launched at TYURA TAN! on an azimuth of approximately 1000 will follow an orbital path parallel to the VLADIMIROVKA-LAKE BALPIIASH range which appears to be missile related. but whose activities have een satisfactorily explained. VLADIMIROVKA also has a close tie-in with MOSCOW/RAMNSXOYE and current activities suggest the testing of air-to-surface missiles or experimental aero- dynamic vehicles on a secondary range. If the second conjecture is correct, the program has definite manned space travel application. Approved Fo 20/a 61 S 40 PS .~G - 0 7 q,,j' - r r?a2_-_ of _,. -pngaw Approved For Release IV27 : . A;FO 7POAQOQ 00040047-0 _ t ' . I - i CHESS Scientific breakthroughs are being achieved at a rate which would have been considered fantastic a mere five years ago and are still difficult to assimilate today. The Soviet Union, with its demonstrated scientific ability and highly developed security system, could have achieved technological and scientific breakthroughs in fields which the U. S. has not even investigated fully at this time. It is important that any such evidence not be overlooked by the intelligence cormnunity. All major installations which cannot be explained satisfactorily must be viewed with an eye to the future and leads pursued until a satisfactory explana- tion is reached. Currently the installations at MOZEkYSK, VALDAY, MALAYA SAZANKA, and probably OLENYA must be considered within this category. Their very existence poses a threat to the U. S. in light of their probably weaponry role of an unex- plained type. The same collection techniques that exist for the ICBM programs are available against the space program. Additionally there is a network of tracking stations throughout the world which can assist in gathering data transmitted by space vehicles. These stations unfortunately provide only after-the-fact data. As with the ICBM program., the only means of gathering data with a reasonable assurance of success in a short period of time is the CHALICE program. With the improved camera configuration and prior coverage for comparison, much intelligence can be obtained from recoverage of important targets. With proper coordination a flight over the TYURA TAM rangehead should provide details of the space vehicle configuration, handling techniques, propellants utilized, and guidance facilities required. Coverage of VLADIMIROVKA and the down-range stations should provide sufficient details to relate the range to a specific activity. The installations at MOZHAYSK and VALDAY are probably operational at this time. A study of the activity present at the time of overflight could well reveal the purpose of these installations. Coverage of OLENYA should reveal its true relationship to the other installations. Coverage at MALAYA SAZ1iA should reveal its relationship to the others and activity noted should explain its apparent variance with the others listed above. It is recommended that all of the targets listed above be covered by CHALICE aircraft in the following priority: I. TYURA TAM and outstations as shown on the attached map. II. VLAD131IROVICAA and the outstations as shown on the attached map. III. MOZHAYSK and VALDAY. IV. MALAYA BATANKA and OLENYA if not explained by recoverage of MOZHAYSK and VALDAY. I CHESS 2 Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA000500040047-0 5 // 4, .