(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040047-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 47
• Content Type: REPORT

*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*
Approve For e a e,2PA1/ P 7-0
Appendix III. P nT :'v",L DEFENSE OF T' ~ t;' ?T :J STATES t'ViTHIN THE
A,E,ti!i~u OF TriE T;~LE L, U.S.C.
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On 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union startled thU~" Yc4 l5i nth' the -ann6iu~66it6nt.
that they had successfully placed into orbit an earth satellite with a weight of
184 pounds. This was followed on 3 November 1957 by another earth satellite with
a weight of 1120 pounds. The immediate impact throughout the world was tremendous
and dramatically pointed out the scientific potential of the U.S.S.R. at a time
when all eyes were focused on the U. S. and our widely publicized failures to
launch an earth satellite of a minimal size. These successes have not only raised
the stature of the Soviet Union in the eyes of the world, but have forced the U. S.
into a position of ever greater effort to counteract the dramatic achievements of
the U.S.S.R.
Though widely publicized as an example of the peaceful and beneficial aims of
the Soviet Union, it is known that this program is based principally on the initial
success enjoyed in the ICBM programs. The two programs are complementary. One
contributes directly to the other and success in either advances the date when 25X1D
other more difficult space experiments could be attempted. The earth satellite
was nominally a part of the IGY program, yet little significant data has been made
available to the other IGY participants.
25X1 D
The U.S.S.R. has publicly stated that their foreseeable objective is manned
space travel on an interplanetary scale. Though this goal lies in the future
fundamental space programs are in progress.
Another widely publicized objective of the Soviet Union is the development
of a technique to recover a satellite. This is another mandatory step in the
program for manned space flight. Since the U.S.S.R. has publicized their interest
in this particular program, it is probable that it has been given a high priority
and that preparations are well advanced at this time. A recoverable satellite
launched at TYURA TAN! on an azimuth of approximately 1000 will follow an orbital
path parallel to the VLADIMIROVKA-LAKE BALPIIASH range which appears to be missile
related. but whose activities have
een satisfactorily explained.
VLADIMIROVKA also has a close tie-in with MOSCOW/RAMNSXOYE and current
activities suggest the testing of air-to-surface missiles or experimental aero-
dynamic vehicles on a secondary range. If the second conjecture is correct, the
program has definite manned space travel application.
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_ t ' . I - i CHESS
Scientific breakthroughs are being achieved at a rate which would have been
considered fantastic a mere five years ago and are still difficult to assimilate
today. The Soviet Union, with its demonstrated scientific ability and highly
developed security system, could have achieved technological and scientific
breakthroughs in fields which the U. S. has not even investigated fully at this
time. It is important that any such evidence not be overlooked by the intelligence
cormnunity. All major installations which cannot be explained satisfactorily must
be viewed with an eye to the future and leads pursued until a satisfactory explana-
tion is reached. Currently the installations at MOZEkYSK, VALDAY, MALAYA SAZANKA,
and probably OLENYA must be considered within this category. Their very existence
poses a threat to the U. S. in light of their probably weaponry role of an unex-
plained type.
The same collection techniques that exist for the ICBM programs are available
against the space program. Additionally there is a network of tracking stations
throughout the world which can assist in gathering data transmitted by space
vehicles. These stations unfortunately provide only after-the-fact data. As with
the ICBM program., the only means of gathering data with a reasonable assurance of
success in a short period of time is the CHALICE program.
With the improved camera configuration and prior coverage for comparison,
much intelligence can be obtained from recoverage of important targets. With
proper coordination a flight over the TYURA TAM rangehead should provide details
of the space vehicle configuration, handling techniques, propellants utilized,
and guidance facilities required. Coverage of VLADIMIROVKA and the down-range
stations should provide sufficient details to relate the range to a specific
activity. The installations at MOZHAYSK and VALDAY are probably operational at
this time. A study of the activity present at the time of overflight could well
reveal the purpose of these installations. Coverage of OLENYA should reveal its
true relationship to the other installations. Coverage at MALAYA SAZ1iA should
reveal its relationship to the others and activity noted should explain its
apparent variance with the others listed above.
It is recommended that all of the targets listed above be covered by CHALICE
aircraft in the following priority:
I. TYURA TAM and outstations as shown on the attached map.
II. VLAD131IROVICAA and the outstations as shown on the attached map.
III. MOZHAYSK and VALDAY.
IV. MALAYA BATANKA and OLENYA if not explained by recoverage of MOZHAYSK
and VALDAY.
I
CHESS
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