NATIONAL PRIORITY OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS CHALICE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040051-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 51
• Content Type: MF

Approv
eh 00 ' 8/27 :CIA-RDP61 S00750A000500040051-5 w4w
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
TCS-4166-58 /
Copy 1 of 8 recd.
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee
SUBJECT: National Priority Objectives vis-a-vis CHALICE
I. A critical ( examination of the highest priority objectives for was.
t 6,49i9ei, ??-ame r o..& as reflected in the statement of require-
ments dated Z June 1958 has been completed, Ib - ae -' s takes} into
consideration the following factors: (~r~j
a. The time-factor urgency of the information.
b. The direct relationship of each highest priority objective
category to the degree of threat it imposes against the United States,
using criteria established for the determination of Highest Priority
National Intelligence Objectives.
c. The availability of information from other sources.
2. It is clearly evident
that ICBM requirements belong at the apex of the highest priority
structure over other missile weapon systems, nuclear weapons, and
long range bomber aircraft.
3. To enable the United States Intelligence Community to assess
the overall threat inherent in the Soviet ICBM program, consideration
must be given to information concerning (a.) deployment of operational
missiles; (b) research, development and testing underway; and (c)
relationship of ICBM research and development to future space weapon
systems.
4. The threat to the U. S. implicit in the Soviet operational inter-
continental ballistic missile is of an entirely new order of magnitude.
The gravitity of this threat reaches to maximum proportions as the
Soviets develop an operational capability in their ICBM program.
Continuing accurate knowledge of the progress of deployment of Soviet
ICBM's is requisite to :.determining the nature and magnitude of the
Soviet ICBM threat. The industrial and technical capability already
exists for the output of products involved in the ICBM weapon system;
DLE VIA TALENT
HA
in ~, s~~OET
Approved For ReIe 2Obi7 27 - CIA-RDP61 S00 00 40 ONLY
 Approved For Release 2001/081@2 C5 WTS00750AQ0500040051-5
Memo for Chairman, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (cont'd)
the USSR. should now be involved in the problem of determining precise
location and initiating construction of ICBM launch sites. Search photog-
raphy of the most likely operational deployment areas offers the potential
of obtaining locations and types of sites. It is possible that Soviet philosophy
on operational deployment may not be apparent until the first ICBM launch-
ing site has been discovered.
5. Information on the Soviet guided missile research and development
complex is considered critical. Technological changes are becoming so
rapid, so penetrating and in many instances, so contradictory, that the
direct and indirect results of the technological revolution tend to control
the nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Rapid obsolescence
of weapon systems increases the risk involved in committing large quantities
of resources to weapon systems which could be obsolete before ever being
effective. Reconnaissance may reveal further information on range heads
down range instrumentation and other facts concerning missile capabilities.
6. The Soviet program to develop astronautic vehicles and space
weapon systems is progressing at an alarming rate. Developments
toward mastery of space will be the focal point of international interest
and technological competition during the next decade. The SPUTNIKS
were the initial step into space and further strides can be expected in
this era of rapid scientific and technological advances. Progressive
developments leading to true space travel will result in vehicles having
a potential for military application as reconnaissance vehicles (manned
or unmanned), orbital bombers, and other space weapon systems. Recon-
naissance will establish a specific military application intended by the
Soviets and possibly the detection of developments which could give the
USSR a technological advantage in control and utilization of space.
7. Based on studies that have been conducted for the Intelligence
Community by certain advisory groups over the past two years, it is
evident that the U-2 offers the only means as reasonable assurance of
obtaining information on the Soviet ICBM... program. In the Strong
Committee report dated 13 December 1957, it was concluded that chances
varied from 5 to 10% for locating Soviet ICBM launch sites when conventional
collection methods were used without the benefit of aerial reconnaissance.
In the Highland Report dated 14 November 1958, it was concluded that the
risks in utilization of the U-2 appears to be smaller than the risks to the
security of the United States in not acquiring the needed data on Soviet
ICBM sites. A study being undertaken by the Critical Collections
HANDLE VIA TALENT
Approved For Release 2001/08/27: CIA-RDP61S00750, TM 51 S` EM ONLY
 Approved For Refill ase 2001/08/2TOPIA ~ 00750A~W500040051-5
Memo for Chairman, Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (cont'd)
Priority Committee at the present time, and scheduled for consideration
on 21 December, concludes that the greatest opportunities for acquiring
information on ICBM deployment will be present while sites under
construction and intensification and expansion of an overflight program
is a means of collection.
3 Incls
TABS "All$ ''B'',
and "C''
(not complete)
( Distribution:
1-Chinn ARC
2-OS1 'TCO
3-NAVY TCO
4-ARMY TCO
5&t6-Air Force TCO
7-OCI TCO
8-DD/I TCO)
u`~'- HANDLE VIA TALENT
Approved For Release 2001/08/27: CIA-RDP61S0077 ff P.T.EM A ONLY