ARGUMENT OF URGENCY OF AQUATONE COVERAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000500040193-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 193
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 CIA-RDP61SO075OA000500040193-8
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ARGUMENT OF URGENCY OF AQUATONE COVERAGE
1, In a military sense, United States national security is dependent
in large measure on the security of the Continental United States from
nuclear devastation and the maintenance of a net capability to deliver
nuclear blows on the USSR, Recent Soviet achievements in ICBM and
earth satellite development indicate that the state of the art in missiles
is highly advanced in the USSR. AQUATONE coverage of Soviet missile
test ranges indicates that the present scope and future growth potential
of the Soviet missile program represents, in the words of the GMIC F,
Scientific Advisory Panel, an "immediate and continuing perils' to United
States national security. National estimates of Soviet achievement of an
operational ICBM launch capability of ten missiles has been advanced from
1960 1961 to midis 1958 with a total capability of 500 ICBMs attainable by
the latter part of 1960.
2, Until the ICBM capability reaches the sizeable portions
indicated for 1960, it is presumed that long range heavy bombers and
submarines equipped with guided missile launchers would constitute the
major Soviet weapons systems for delivery of nuclear weapons against
the Continental United States.. Evidence on Soviet heavy bomber production
and deployment has suggested that the USSR has devoted only a limited
effort in this field, This suggestion is not conclusive primarily because
of lack of intelligence coverage of sites such as aircraft, plants, and
certain bomber bases which if covered would resolve uncertainties
regarding heavy bomber production,. A,associated question outstanding
is the possibility of a new generation of Soviet heavy bombers replacing
the BISON and BEAR, (AQUATONE coverage of 1956 contributed to
firming up United States estimates of Soviet medium bomber strength,
but this vehicle has not been employed systematically as yet on outstanding
targets of heavy bomber intelligence significance.) It may also be prew
sumed that Soviet submarines equipped with guided missiles will provide
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons launched against the United States
not only until 1960 but also after that as an auxiliary weapon to ICBM
operations,
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TAB C
3, Photographic coverage by AQUATONE of the listed targets
has a good chance of revealing highly critical information relative to the
current operational status and deployment of Soviet IRBMs and ICBMs,
Evidence from AQUATONE to date indicates the Soviets are
well advanced in short (75.300 NM), mid (650.+950 NM), and long range
(3, 500w5,; 000 NM) missiles. Analysis by United States experts of these
data indicates that the Soviet guided missile program is probably such
than
a, Short range missiles are now in the hands of troops and
are operationally deployed;
and
b. IRBM missiles are being provided for operational deployment;
c, ICBM missiles are in the mid or late stage of prototype
testing and, with some modification, could be used now operationally
n
Analysis of data has also suggested that the Soviet IRBM and ICBM program
is far enough along for operational bases to be either constructed,, in the
case of the former, or under construction, in the case of the latter.
4. It may be pertinent to point out here that a recent study of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee Subcommittee concerned with assessing
the problem of determining location of Soviet ICBM sites has determined
that these sites are most likely to be found while in the construction stage.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee Subcommittee also pointed out that the
likelihood of finding launch sites by means other than aerial reconnaissance
is low to negligible, Because of our current knowledg guided
missile program derived principally from AQUATONE to date 25X1 D
along with our deductions from recent satellite launchings, it appears
imperative that an aggressive reconnaissance program be initiated to
determine the location of IRBM and ICBM launch sites as well as another
look with higher resolution camera at the research and development
establishment located at KAPUSTIN YAR and TYURA TAM,
5, With regard to guided missile launch sites, we cannot today
in advance of a detailed study now under way advise on the specific targets.
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TAB C
It is our strong belief, however, that coverage of the highest priority
targets recommended in this paper (principally Areas 1, 3, and 11)
would constitute most likely exploration of launch sites. Better advice
on this question must await the conclusion of our study on guided missile 25X1 D
launch sites,, both IRBM and ICBM,
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