OVERALL REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000600050006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 7, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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MINCRANDUM Fat TER ASSISTANT DMRCTOR PCB OPERATIOBS
SWIM Overall Requirements for Propaganda Analysis
1. In response to your request this office has prepared the
attached study of Soviet Bloc intelligence requirements. It would
be highly useful to have thorough propagenda analysis on these sub.
jects in support of national intelligence estimates. The list is,
of course, illustrative rather than exhsustive and covers only the
key areas of the Bloc. Moreover, it was prepared from the point or
view of a consumer, and we recognise that some of the subjects might
not, at least in their present form, be suitable for promanda
analysis. We are snare that it requires a trained propaganda analyst1
to ascertain which topics can be most fruitfully studied. Finally,
we believe that promplumihismolysis operations need not be limited to
meeting such external requirements but should be a continuing element
in the intelligence process, independently analysing Bloc mass corn.
nunications, and constantly providing to consumers like 0/0 a self-
initiated flow or analyses.
i2. The wide use by the entire intelligence coneuntty of the
existing FBID monitoring or Soviet propaganda is ample indication of
the unquestioned value of this source in giving us insights into de-
velopmeats behind the Curtain. We believe, however, that the value
of this great mass of descriptive raw material is greatly enhanced
when analysed by experts and put into more finished form. The props-
)pada analyses which have been done by 0001311 Ps small analysis unit
have been extremely useful In the /reparation of SM.. Cases in point
are studies done for us on. Albania, Yugoslavia, Nast Germany, etc.
The very value or these studies convinces us that this source should
be more fully tapped. In our opinion propagenda analysis can turn a
i Soviet weapon -- their promo's& .- into a potent intelligence tool,
one all the the more urgently needed because the Soviet security systole
makes au intelligence data on this critical area so hard to come by-
and so sparse.
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-8601,
3. In our list of requirements we have sought to provide FWD
and FDD with the guidance necessary to focus their attention on current
and future problems of concern to the rest of the intelligence com-
munity. Norever, we believe that FBID should also be provided with
the moos to okra out retrospective studies designed to produce those
necessary background generalisations on Soviet propaganda behavior
which are essential to sound current analysis. For example, the im-
plicit generalisations upon which are based the conclusions of such
excellent studies as The Great Stalin Projects, and Nu_clearin
Soviet Frovspnda should be susceptible of further tat5i7i5d-iiRde-
ment. The e of such studies is a, major weakness which limits
the ability of propaganda analysis to provide sharp and coherent inter-
pretations. Therefore, we have included suggestions for such studies
in our requirements in the hope that FEID will be able, either itself
or through external research, to devote an increasing effort to building
up this indispensable background material.
k. In presenting these requirements we are aware that many of
them are already being partially met, insofar as resources permit, by
MID. We are also aware that every intelligence analyst on the Soviet
Bloc (in ONE, 0/CI, OIR, 0-2, etc.) is himself doing some degree of
propaganda analysis as part of his daily work. We believe, however,
(that the BAND studies and ethers have demonstrated conclusively that
the best propaganda analysis nust be done by trained experts with a
backlog of experience and with constant and ready access to all the
background studies and raw materials. In our opinion this can be done
effectively only by units such as 00/7EI1) and F.
SNSBMAN KSNT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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PROPOSED RADIRTII
MI
Fan PROPAGANDA ANALYSIS
I. reameenee e IS ON SMUT Turman AFFAIRS
(
Intelligence interest is focused upon the degree of control enjoyed by
the ruling group and on the domestic ;policies pursued by them insofar
as theee policies have a bearing on Soviet capabilities or intentions.
We believe light can be thrown upon these problems by answers to the
following qeestions:
1. What evidence is there in current Soviet propaganda theme (e. g.
the emphasis on consumer-goods production, the reliance on material
self-interest as a stimulus for worker productivity, the avoidance
of fear techniques) that a decision has been reached to relax the
tension that marked the Stalinist period, to reduce the tempo of
forced industrialization and to return to the normalcy of a more
conservative pace of economic activity?
2. What evidence is there that the regime has changed its trelitional
attitudes toward divorce, thrift, family pride, crime, eta.? What
are the trends?
3. Is the new regime adopting a policy of reassurance toward the of-
ficial and managerial class indicating an abandonment by it of the
fear-Inspiring personnel policy of Stalin and a decision to paws
its Nave' on the sturdy and the strong"?
4. Does there appear to be an appreciable change in the Amount and
content of self-criticism indulged in by the elite journels under
the meerregime an compared with the old? Are the targets of self-
Oriticiam being restricted or expended?
5. Stalin's nest writings offer a glimpse of the movement of ideas
going on in the Soviet ruling circles behind the facade of uni-
formity. What light can propaganda analysis throw upon the problem
of elitist factionalian the competition of "schools" of thought,
and the relevance of this phencomneet to the formulation of policy?
A careful study Of theoretical writings in economic journels from
the period of the Varga controversy to Stalin's article might pro-
vide an opening wedge into this problem.
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Di CV H Olt V
SEE= Nuf
4S ON SOVIET FEIGN POLICY
Intelligence interest is focused upon the extent to which any change
has been or maybe effected in Soviet foreign policy aims and foreign
policy techniqumeby the Nalenkav regime. From the point of view of
immediate Interest, indications of change with respect to current
areas at issue, e. g., Germagy, Austria, Korea, Indo-China, are de...
sired. him the long-rango point of view, indications of the abate..
meat of aggressive intentions, of the extension of the time table of
revolution, of a greater flexibility and adventurousness, eta., are
equally desired.
1. Does there appear to be any willingness on the part of Kremlin
leaders to ailment a more precarious situation of control in
Eastern Germany in exchange for a possible softening of Western
solidarity?
2. Can any light be thrown an possible changes in policy since
Stalir's time by a careful comparison of present and past policies
in specific areas, e. g., TUgoslavia, Iran, Turkey? nil a col-
lation with the events of the world political scene Illuminate
the extent to which any such changes reflect a new approach to
polities, a new lightness of touch, or reflect merely an adaptation
of old policies to changed conditions?
3. Is it possible to develop techniques of analysis to provide In-
ferences regarding the respective roles rived in the formulation
of policy by such factors as: (a) historical or traditional
Russian objectives; (b) the desire of leaders to ?Ontario and
consolidate their personal power positions; (c) ideological
motives; (d) considerations of national security?
4 What light can propaganda analysis throw on the Soviet concept of
"national security"? Do the Kremlin leaders conceive of it to
consist primarily in the consolidrtion of their territorial and
power base, or do they conceive of it in more relative terms as
consisting in the manipulation of the balance of power and the
undermining of the strength of the free world?
What is the Soviet estimate of US intentions? For example, does
the Soviet leadership really attribute aggressive intentions to
NATO, to the US base polio,/ If eo, especially with respect to
the latter, does the Soviet leadership believe the threat an im-
minent one?
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4mir SIZRE'T Noe
6. Nbat is the Soviet attitude regarriing the legitimate sphere of
America's national interest?
7. What is the Soviet estimate of economic activity in the Nest,
and What is the probable Soviet estimete of the effect of eco-
nomic developments on Western capabilities and policies? Is
there a. difference in the treatment of this subject by mass media
amd elite communications?
8. Is there evidence that the new Soviet leadership believes that
it can etinately obtain all of its objectives by political vier-
fare alone? Aar example, is it possible to infer from Soviet
propaganda the conception which the Soviet leaders hold of non.
Communist peoples' susceptibility to Communist propaganda, mili-
tary pressure, conciliatory gestures, etc.? Are there any impli-
cations, with respect to this question, in the tailoring of
propaganda to particular audiences?
INTELLIGCUCE PR
a; 0,
43 ON SOVIET BLOC MILATTOUS
A. &MN!
1. The character of the Satellite populations, their possession
of independent standards of criticism, their memories of
freedom, etc., present problems for the Satellite propagandist
which are not present in the USSR itself. If, as a conse-
quence, Satellite propagable is more oriented toward combatting
such incipient sources of discontent, an analysis of their
output may provide valuable evidence on:
a. The state of popular morale (For example, do reassurance
themes regarding agricultural dislocation, living
standards, etc., provide insights on this problem?)
Ix The attitudes of the ropolation and/or elites with re.
'peat to their relationship with Moscow. To what extent
do the attitudes of the Satellite populations have to be
taken into account by the local regimes in determining
how far they can go in cutting them off from the outside
world? Do these attitudes constitute a restraint in any
way upon Soviet actions in the Satellites?
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c. The extent to vhieh Satellite populations identify them-
selves with a socialist community distinct from the West
or the extent to which they oontinue to identify theme
selves with the greater European corm:unity. For example,
what has been the reaction of the Satellite populations
toward the West? To what extent do influential groups
or segments of the populations attach importance to the
espousal by the West of non-recognition of permanent
Soviet control of the Satellites?
2. In what important respects does Soviet policy toward indi-
vidual Satellite countries differ from Soviet policy toward
the Satellites as a whole? For =ample, how do the Comma-
mists amount for the continuation of personalized power in
some Satellites, while others, e. g.? Czechoslovakia and
Hungary, have adopted the principle of collective leader.
Ship?
3. TO what extent have developments during the past year (4. g.
Berlin riots, now economic policies) affected: (a) Satel-
lite morale and the reliability of Satellite armed farms;
CO Soviet views concerning the reliability of the Satellite
populations and armed forces in the event of war?
it. Is there am evidence of tension or conflict within the
Satellite Communist parties? Do deviationist or splinter
elements exist within their ranks? If so is there auy
evidence upon which to estimate their significance?
5. TO what factors have the feilmres of produotion plans been
attributed in the Satellites? Inferences may be possible,
in this connection, with respect to popular attitudes or
leader evaluation of popular attitudes.
H. ?Or Fast
1. $ino-Soviet Reletleps
a. To 'what extent is China a model for "national liberation
movements" in Asia? What are the Chinese assertions and
the Soviet treatment thereof, and what is the treatment
of this question by North Korea, DRY, and other Asian CP' g?
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t4 What evidence is there regarding Mao Tse-Tung's doctrinal
independence? In particular, what is the Soviet treatment
thereof?
c. What evidence can propaganda analysis provide on the
problem of Sino-Soviet foreign policy coordination, and
the degree of China's strategic initiative? For example,
are there evidences of lack of coordination in propaganda
treatment of policy moves, as, in the past, the invasion
of Korea in june 1950 and the UN Menon Resolution episode,
November - Deeember 1952? Is there evidence bearing an
whether either partner appeared, or appears, more .anxious
that the Korean war be closed out, or that a Korean po-
litical conference convene? What is the evidence bearing
on whether China, in dominating Korean negotiations, is
speaking primarily for iteelf or as a front man for the
USSR?
d. What light can propaganda analysis throw an the problem of
Chinese sensitivity to Soviet primacy/ tut evidence is
there of Chinese official or public chafing at Soviet as-
sertions of primagy, or at Soviet influence in China? For
example, what is the significance of apparent injured
Chinese pride at MC demand that the USSR be a party to a
Korean political conference?
e. Ilhat evidence is there on the question of primacy in Sino-
Soviet-North Korean relations? (In particular, whet is
the evidence from Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean state-
ments bearing an the question of which factor appears to
carry the greater weight in dominating North Korean life:
the physical presence of Chinese military and civilian
personnel, or Soviet dominance of the NK Party and gov-
ernment?)
f. What evidence can propaganda analysis: provide on the
question of Sino-Soviet economic relations? For example,
what Is the Chinese and Soviet treatment of the "socialists
Character of China's economy; of the question of the de-
gree to which China meet lift itself by its own bootstraps;
of Chinese dissatisfaction with the quantity or quality of
Soviet economic aid and advice?
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g. What evidence is there bearing on the question of Soviet
or Chinese primacy in the direction of the Japanese
Communist Party?
2, Internal Chinese Problems
a. What are the shifts in domestic economic policy? How are
they prepared? How are they explained? What inferences
are possible?
bo. What light can propaganda analysis throw on intra-government
and intra-party discipline and the significance of purges?
c. What is the evidence of passive resistance, particularly
on the part of students and the peasantgy?
3. Viet Minh Problems
a. What evidence is there of internal purges, and of the de-
gree of prominence accorded HO Chi-Minh?
b. What is the evidence of EN independence of strategic
action, and of the degree of Chinese influence and direction
in the DO?
IV. INTELLIONCE PROBLEMS ON sons? =MKT
1. Are there indications of change in strategic military planning? An
examination of all media focused on the significance, with respect
to war planning, of the resent shifts of the Soviet command may
help to illuminate the tenor of present strategic thinking. Spe-
cifically, does it appear that the Soviet oommand emphasises de-
fense, retaliation, or aggression?
2, While our intelligence on Soviet troops stationed on the periphery
of the Bloc is relatively good, we know very little about the ef-
fectiveness and morale of divisions in the interior. Will an
analysis of propaganda directed to the troops in the interim,
similar to the radio Volga analyses, throw light on this problem?
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3. What are Soviet attitudes toward the rearmament of Germany? We are
not interested here in Soviet state policy, but in psychological
attitudes. Does the historic dread of Gernan military night still
prevail, or has the experience of victory in World War II buoyed
up Russian confidence to the extent of permitting them a freer and
more adventurous policy in Europe? What inferences, bearing on
this problem, are permissable from commentaries such as the 19 De.
camber 1953 talk by Frankenhurg?
A. What is the effect of nuclear weapons upon Soviet military planning?
What does Soviet propaganda output indicate with respect to the
state of Soviet nuclear develo.-.nt (cf. the Nazi propaganda about
secret weapons in World War II ? What does it indicate with re-
spect to Soviet concern over nuclear warfare? What is the propa-
ganda practice? What significance may we attach to changes in
practice?
5. How does the USSR estimate the deterrent power of NATO? US ground
forces in Europe? US air power?
6. Are there any new doctrinal comments upon the role of war as an in-
strument for the attainment of Communist objectives?
7, What is the Soviet estimate of the relative ability and resolution
of the West and of the Bloc to wage a global war? To intervene in
local wars? To endure a war of long duration? To undertake an
atonic war?
8. To what extent does Soviet propaganda stress the need for civil de-
fense training, etc.? What does this indicate with respect to
Soviet concern over the imminence of war? Over the threat of US
air attack?
V. INSTRUMENTAL STUDIES AND GENERALIZATION PRODUCING RESEARCH
We recognize that no one can predict ahead of time what generalizations
about Soviet propaganda behavior are going to look like, and we are
persuaded that only those who continually handle propaganda material
are in a position to set useful problems for testing. The instrumental
studies which we propose here therefore have in most cases been provided
for us by the analysts of FBID or been approved by them as feasible
projects for study.
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1. What is the pattern of the evolution of global propaganda compaigns?
2. What is Radio MOseow's audience? There is evidence that at various
times it is taking to the masses, to the Western elite, to the
burgeoisie, to the left intelligentsia, to party workers, to party
elite (at home and abroad).
3. What are the typical responses to major Western initiatives? (Note
the similar patterns of response to Eisenhower in April, to Churchill
in May, to Eisenhower in Decanter.)
A.. What importance should be attached to the identities of commentators?
Who introduces the lines? Do some get special briefings, have spsoial
subjects, etc.?
5. What is the allocation of propaganda functions in the Bloc? What is
the allocation of functions in comment on new developments? What are
the differences, contradictions, anticipations?
6. What are the characteristic tactics in offsetting propaganda defeats,
embarrassments (e.g., Soviet withdrawal from Iran, the Tito defection,
the aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Greek guerrilla defeat,
the Olympics fiasco, the 'Satin Forest investigation, the Berlin air-
lift, election defeats, etc.). Various patterns may emerge which will
gauge the Soviet estimate of the character and degree of defeat.
7. What are the typical propaganda techniques? When and why do they
use silence, avoidance, counter-attack, and diversion?
S. To what extent does Soviet propaganda directly reflect the estimates
of the elite rather than, or in addition to, his propaganda tactics?
While of extreme difficulty, even partial answers to this question
woad have tremendous value. For example, the peace offensive fol-
lowing Stalin's death, the whole period from late December 1951 on
with growing emphasis on disunity, the decline of aggression, the
initiation of the East-West trade effort, and the German proposals
in &roll might provide subjects for study bearing on this question.
9. What evidence regarding Sino-Soviet relations can be developed by
a study of Mbecowle Mandarin beam? For example, textual compari-
sons to identify and verify evasions, sensitivities, etc., may
throw light on this problem.
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10. What generalisations can be developed regarding war time Soviet
propaganda behavior? What are the characteristic patterns of re-
sponse to stress, etc.?
11. What generalisations can be developed by a detailed historical
study of the Nasi-Saviet Pact (Where we have the highest capability
in view of the German documents)? Comparison of overt propaganda
with hidden policy shifts would probably provide spocific keys and
general insights on the connection and confluence of propaganda
with political policy and estimates.
12. What generalisations can be developed bye systematic study of other
first-hand insights into Soviet modes of operation, e. g., Itgoslav
observations, Western contacts with Stalin, and others during the
wars defector reports, etc.?
13. What generalisations can be developed bye. retrospective study of
all previous analyses for the prrpose of extracting implicit and
explicit generalisations for continuous testing?
14. Vbat generalizations can be developed by a study of the relationship
of elite to maps communications? The Soviet-Chinese treatment of
Mao might provide a case study to illuminate this general problem
area.
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