(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000700020022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: OUTLINE

Approved For Release 2001/07/24: CIA-RDP61S00750A000#00020022-7
1 Background
a. Pearl Harbor and the impetus to fix the intelligence
organizations
b. Single agency versus recognition of a need for
departmental intelligence
C. Requirement leadership and evaluation--the require-
ment of a federal intelligence system
The Five Major Statutory Responsibilities of the DCI
a.
b.
C.
To advise on intelligence activities
To make recommendations for their coordination
To produce national intelligence
To perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence
agencies such additional services of common concern
as the National Security Council determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally
To perform other functions as directed
Origins and Meaning of the Term "Services of Common Concern"
a No precedent
b. The CIG Unit: "Central Intelligence Service" Unit
4. Restrictions on Establishing Such Services
a, NSC must direct
b. The IAC must approve
c_ The DCI has an injunction that the purpose of such
coordination for which the Act was drawn should be
primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental
intelligence structure and that primary departmental
requirements should be recognized and receives the
cooperation and support of the CIA
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5. Generalisations from Experience
That the major efforts of the DCI's recommendations
for the coordination of activities have resulted in the
establishment of services of common concern (these
now constitute the major portion of his total organiza-
tion)
b. That the DCI should so conduct and manage certain
other responsibilities as to permit their possible
evolution into services of common concern.
c. That with the assignment to perform services of
common concern there is a companion responsibility
to coordinate the activities involved (this responsibility
being distinct from the responsibility to recommend to
the NSC with respect to coordination).
d. That those activities which have been specifically
assigned by the NSC as services of common concern
have to date included both intelligence information
collection and support activities on the out hand, and
intelligence production on the other.
e. Factors which led to the assignment to the Agency to
perform services of common concern are:
1) The services were marginal, but not dispen-
sable. to the intelligence needs of individual departments,
and yet were recognized to be of value to the comprehen-
sure intelligence system.
2) Being marginal to individual departments. such
services might be adversely affected by limitations O;n'
departmental budgets and personnel ceilings and by com-
petition with other departmental programs of higher
priority.
3) Duplication of effort and danger of secui*y
breach were inevitable results of not performing the
service centrally.
4) The scattered efforts did not ensure that the
products would be available to all who needed the
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Those services of common concern which affect primary
d+ .partr.,nentat responsibilities the least have been the easiest
for CIA to administer, insofar as relations with the other
departments are concerned.
g. That it is not arrays possible or even desirable to establish
a service of common concern that is preclusive of other
agencies' participation in phases of the same activity.
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STATSPEC
00/C
a. Detail and why
b. State suggestion for investigation -- 1946
c. Coordination antedates the service of common concern
the importance of the central machine index of
sources
d. The committee -- means of advice
e. The license
a. Only directive which refers to paragraph four of the ACT.
b. Primary not exclusive
c. Smogs
Clandestine
a. Not preclusive. Recognizes need of theater for
operational purposes
b. Problem of agreed activities
c. IAC subcommittee for guidance
a. Not separate services of common concern but refine
ments of the contacts and collection responsibilities
Economics -- 1S
a. To produce economic intelligence not provided by
other agencies in their discharge of regular depart-
mental missions and assigned intelligence reaponsibilifes
and to fulfill requests of the IAC. This directive does
not clearly provide for an integrated approach to econ-
omic intelligence in the community and more needs to
be accomplished toward this goal.
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. Handling of Foreign Language Materials -- 16
a. Not considered a service of common concern
b. In development for five years -- importance of
post mortem on China
c. Other agencies not excluded from activity
d. The Advisory Committee as a condition as well as
an assistance
Possibly Emerging Services of Common Concern
25X1 B
a.
b.
c. OSl
d. Sovmat
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Conclusion:
26. At the outset, I theorized that the drafters of the National
Security Act could have solved the government's intelligence prob-
lem by creating a single intelligence agency to meet all the needs
of the government. That they did not is clear from the Act, and
why they did not is, I trust, evident from what I have been saying.
27. They did, however, create a new agency, and they gave
it the deceptive name "CENTRAL Intelligence Agency. " This is
a deceptive name because this Agency is central only in that it is
the center of an interrelated system of interdependent intelligence
agencies. It's leader. the DCI, is responsible for providing
leadership to the community in the highest sense. It is also
"central" in one other sense, namely: insofar as it performs
services of common concern, about which I trust we now know a
little more. A wider understanding of this limited character of
this Agency's "centralness" could do much to limit our own dis-
appointment that we do not do more and our friends' possible
concern that we do too much.
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