NSC SEMI-ANNUAL SUPPLEMENTARY STATUS REPORT ON THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP61S00750A000700070044-8
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RIPPUB
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T
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11
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December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 21, 1998
Sequence Number: 
44
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Publication Date: 
March 2, 1954
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REPORT
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CIA 36337-e Copy No.A2 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61 S00750AqOZgO1q!9 ft8~F.inal) 2 March 1954 NSC Semi-Annual Supplementary Status Report on the Foreign Intelligence Program 1. Attached is a copy of subject report as re- produced by the National Security Council Secretariat. 2. This report is based on IAC-D-55/6 (Second Revision), 10 February 1954, as modified by the IAC at its meeting on 16 February (See IAC_M_141, paras. 2 and 3). Secretary Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750A080UOY~g%4ffinal) 2 March 1954 TOP SECRET C,, AP roved For Release 2001/08/17 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA000700070044-8 February 19, 1951+ Pat 8 - THE FOREIGN INT#L GEP?CF ROGR (Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee) (This report states the most significant changes which occurred during the period June 30 - December 31, 1953; it supplements the full report on the status of the program on June 30, 1953, issued as No. 9, NSC 161,) , Pace I. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. Coordination . . . 3 III. National Estimates . . . 3 IV. Political, Social and Cultural Intelligence . ~+ V. VI. Military Intelligence . . . . . . . . . , . Economic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . 5 VII. Scientific and Technical Intelligence . . . 5 VIII. Psychological Intelligence . . . . . . . . 5 IX. Basic Intelligence . . . , . . . . . . . . 6 X. Warning of Attack , . 6 XI. Collection . . . . . . 7 XII. - Support and Collation Facilities . 10 I. OBJECTIVES 1, National Security Act For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Governmental departments and agencies in-the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-- -- NSC Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750100607R90d4-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750AM7d 9OD.-8 (1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national security; (2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intel- ligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence re- lating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Prov}A.,gd, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions.: Provided furth, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental Intelligence: And_nrovied,f t r, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; (4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council de- termines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally; (5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct. 2. NSC 162/2 h 10: Develop and maintain an intelligence system cap- able of : (1) collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warn- ing of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world; (2) accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic, and subversive courses of action affecting U. S. security; (3) forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on U. S. national security. N SCAq }0v?d fZe8?ase 2001/08/174.CIA-RDP61S00750A00M06 B5$ Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61SO075OA96F R -8 II. COORDIATO T 1. When the IAC agencies concurred in the last re- port (issued as No. 9, NSC 161), they pointed out that the effects of budget cuts then recently imposed on intelligence activities could not be assessed at that time. Since then, the agencies have experienced the effects of budget re- ductions and have been endeavoring to meet the situation by shifting assets or curtailing activities considered to be least urgent from the viewpoint of immediate require- ments. The effect of this curtailment has not been com- pletely apparent during the period under review. The most serious effects of budget cuts have been felt in the col- lection activities of the Foreign Service and even these are being met, at least partially, by alternative activities. 2. Collectively, the agencies at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, have developed a suggested list- ing of categories of intelligence. activities as an aid to the Bureau in its proposed budgetary analysis of intel- ligence programs. This analysis should, among other re- sults, aid the agencies in their continuing appraisal of the costs of the foreign intelligence program. 3. Two Director of Central Intelligence Directives were issued, and one revised, with the concurrence of the IAC, during this period. DCID 7/1 establishes procedures for insuring that all non-governmental individuals offering foreign intelligence information are referred to CIA for exploitation in accordance with NSCID-7. DCID 3/5 refines procedures for the production of national intelligence estimates. DCID +/2 was revised to include, in the priority list of critical national intelligence objectives, Soviet and Satellite capabilities and intentions for conducting clandestine attack by mass destruction weapons. III. NATIONAL F,IP 1. During the period of this report, the IAC approved 19 national intelligence estimates. These estimates have been increasingly responsive to the requirements of the NSC Planning Board. For example, in large part as a result of the needs of the Planning Board for intelligence sup- port in the formulation of policy, 6 national estimates were produced dealing with the Soviet Bloc. In addition, the NSC concern with the emergency situations in Korea and Indochina resulted in the production of one estimate on the former area and 3 on the latter. NSC 5kk~rbvt&ftr Release 2001/08/17:3CIA-RDP61S00750"7 -A~4-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750"V7 8 4-8 2. The IAC undertook 2 pioneer-type estimates during the period of this report. The first was a general esti- mate of the world situation over a 2-year period. This was published in the third quarter of 1953. The second esti- mate deals with the implications of increasing Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities on the policies of selected non-Communist courntries, This estimate is scheduled for publication in the first quarter of 1954. Both of these estimates are designed to provide intelligence support for NSC broad, long-range planning. 3. Another current effort is designed to relate more directly the work of collection and research activities to the needs of the policy makers for national intel]igence. At the direction of the IAC, the Board of National Esti- mates is preparing recommendations for revising directives on national intelligence objectives. IV. POLITICAL, SOCIAL ?ANI CUL TI A IN'JELLIGENQ The quality of analysis by the staffs producing political, sociological and cultural intelligence has been fully maintained and even improved. In part, the pressure of demands on reduced staffs has been met by a stepping- up of the long-term trend toward the merging of economic, political, and sociological analysis in dealing with in- dividual intelligence problems. V. MILIT,Aa IN' ELLIGENQE 1. General Currently, the Intelligence Community is seeking to exploit fully presently available intelligence techni- ques, both in production and in collection. Nevertheless, coverage remains inadequate in critical areas, such as: enemy war plans, early warning of attack, order of battle, enemy localized military and para-military intentions, military equipment development and production, guided mis- siles, tactical atomic weapons, and technical and scientific military developments. Substantial improvement in the military intelligence field will depend largely upon the increase in the scope and effectiveness of all intelligence collection operations and the development of new collection techniques, now being explored, against military intelligence targets. 2. Qperatlonal Inte1ige nce The best source of intelligence concerning enemy units in Korea was cut off by the signing of the Armistice. NSC 5 4i ppovp F orelease 2001/0%/h : tlA-RDP61S00750U0f 7ES44-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750AQQ0gPjMj-8 Insufficient intelligence is available on the movement or location of Chinese armed forces. The augmentation of U. S. intelligence personnel in Viet Nam should result in some improvement in reporting from that area. 3. largetir}g Initial production of target materials for the highest priority Air Force targets is almost complete for the U.S.S.R. and is progressing satisfactorily for the Satellites and approach areas. Only about one-half of the comparable materials for highest priority Navy (all-weather) targets have been placed in production. VI. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE 1. The recent revisions of economic policy and plans in the Soviet Bloc countries have led to an increase in the flow of Soviet and Satellite data on production, trade, and consumption, a considerable amount of which has been in absolute terms. These new data should permit improved estimates on rates of development and trends in particular sectors of the Bloc economies. 2. Intelligence needed for enforcement of economic defense measures has been improved during the last six months by the operation of interagency organization to (a) provide rapid collation and analysis of intelligence on illegal transactions with the Soviet Bloc, (b) speed the dissemination of intelligence to appropriate action agencies, and (c) improve the receipt of information on priority requests to the field. VII. SC IENT IF iC_ AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE Phe bases of estimates of Soviet progress in the field of atomic energy have improved in that recent addi- tional scientific data have been receiv VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE 1. Progress has been made in inter-agency coordina- tion of psychological intelligence through panels and working NVSC 5 'Qv .fbr Release 2001/085175: CIA-RDP61S00750W7ggMl4-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750j~M07a 4-8 4 groups for such operations as the Operations Coordinating Board activities in support of Ambassador Lodge in the U.N. 8th General Assembly. 2. Further progress has been made in refining re- quirements for field collection facilities so that their reporting will emphasize subjects such as rumor, minute personality details, and opinions, which are pertinent in Psychological intelligence. 3. The IAC has established, on a temporary basis, a Resistance Intelligence Committee to coordinate the pre- paration of studies of anti-Communist resistance and re- sistance potential in the Soviet Orbit. IX. BASIC INTF'LL IGENCE 1. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) now complete represent one-third of world-wide coverage, most of which is on the JCS high priority areas. 2. Increasing emphasis is being given to revision of published NIS under the maintenance program, and to the production of Chapters I (Summary Brief). 3. The NIS Committee has authorized a survey of all NIS users for guidance in the long range development of the Program. The survey is now being conducted by the several IAC agencies. X. WARNING-OF ATTACK 1. The enemy's choice of the type of attack and the origin of his attack greatly affect our early warning capa- bility. For early warning of air attack, we are largely dependent on radar and forward observation stations in lieu of "inside" sources which in the past have frequently been available for warning that an enemy was about to decide to go to war. However, generally our advance warn- ing largely depends on the sifting of masses of material in our search for those indications of enemy activity which suggest that they are taking measures to implement a decision to attack. We are exploiting all available sources of information and constantly striving to develop new and improved means of detection of attack. 2. In October 1953 the IAC established an ad hoc com- mittee to review, in the light of the present international situation, the mission and operating procedures of the IAC Watch Committee. Progress has been made in revising the "mission and functions" of the Watch Committee, including detailed methods of operation and nature of support. NSC 51+Oa4pr ,96 F?r Release 200tfO6l77-:.CIA-RDP61S007"BopQpff(gR 0044-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61SO07504QA0 XI. COLLECTION 1. The Foreign Service 25X1X4 if4-8 The flow of informa- tion from the Iron Curtain areas is deficient, but this dificulty stems from limitations imposed by the Orbit governments rather than from lack of field resources. In other areas, there has been a significant drop in the quantity of materials received, but there has not yet been noted much basic change in the quality of current political, sociological, and economic reporting. There have been interruptions attributable to temporary dislocations of personnel. In addition, deficien- cies have been noted in the following fields; ,a. Peripheral reporting on the European Satellites of the USSR. J. Reporting of a background and analytical nature. r. Biographic reporting. d. Procurement of publications other than re- gular subscriptions, particularly from London and Rome. Meanwhile, progress has been made in providing the field with guidance instructions in political and economic fields; most important posts have been covered ex- cept in the Latin American area. In response to instruc- tions, worthwhile contributions are now being received from most posts in support of psychological intelligence activities. 3. OversQQs Commgnds Overseas commands continue to be a primary source of information on Communist armed forces. The cessation of 25X1X4A NSC 51+07, Part 8 - 7 - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/1 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA000700070044-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/17: CIA-RDP61S00750A0007( qP0 f$,ET hostilities and loss of contact with enemy forces in Korea has,of course, resulted in a sharp decline in the flow of information on North Korean and Chinese forces. 1+. Aerial Reconnaissance Recently, the Armed Services have been enabled to take more advantage of their reconnaissance capability. This capability continues to improve; research is progress- ing in various fields of reconnaissance techniques. It should be recognized that this capability must be exercised within the framework of policy considerations of other than an intelligence nature. The photo interpretation capability is improving, though it is still short of being completely satisfactory. 25X 1X7 Additional Central Asian transmitters are being mnnii-nrar 6. Foreign Radio Broadcasts a. Monitoring Coverage of Central Asia and the Baltic states, previously reported as being less than desire is being substantially improved Propaganda An_avsis A new series, "Radio Propaganda Reports " , was initiated to meet the requirements of estimating offices and psychological warfare activities for more numerous and more specialized propaganda studies on substantive intel- ligence problems. 7. Foreign Materials and EouiBment Collection of Soviet Bloc items from both overt and covert sources continued to increase and was substantially NSjpo~d FBARRleese 2001/08/17 -Clik-RDP61S00750A0001OQ0{ TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/17 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA000700070044-8 higher than for the comparable period in 1952. Items of captured enemy material obtained in Korea prior to the end of military operations are being analyzed and should provide a flow of intelligence information over the next year. Im- proved methods for the collection and exploitation of such material in any future active theaters of war are under intensive study. Of special interest has been the technical exploitation of Soviet airdraft, communications,equipment, and machine tools. the implementation of NSC 1b9 rias been znhilatieu. c~)nln'+U NSC 66/1 has been supplemented by NSC 169, which provides a basis for a considerable expansion of pro- grams concerned with monitoring of Soviet jamming and related 25X1X4a 9. 25X1X4a As a result of economic reporting from Pfloscow has shown an appreciable improvement. Expansion of this program to include the Satellites is underway. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2001/08/17 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA000700070044-8 NSC 5407, Part 8 - 9 - Approved For Release 2001/08/17 : CIA-RDP61SO075OA0007O00 T 10. Foreign Languagg.Publications Guidance of the collection of foreign language publications by the Foreign Service has been strengthened by assistance from CIA, as has the Washington processing and distribution of such publications. The assignment of XII. P T AND COLLATION JPZILITIL 1. Library t e Lexical inventories for most of the languages of intelligence interest, and annotated lists of intel- ligence serial publications produced by some of the member agencies, have been prepared. 2. InduUtri i Infor,~m o i Indexing by tabulating machine methods to speed the analysis of data is two-thirds complete for the Soviet Union. Coding and indexing of end-product references was recently begun for East Germany, with China to follow. 3. Foreign Radzo Fie, uci,; envy Usage File Under authorization of NSC-169, CIA is esta- blishing a "clearing house" for the collection, maintenance, and evaluation of data on foreign usage of the radio 25X1D0a spectrum. A central file of radio frequency data collected established and maintained, Analysis 'and evaluation of the information contained in this central file will be under- taken, and the results made as accessible as is consistent with the best interest of the Government. 4. Extern Res arch The External Research Staff, Department of State, is stepping up its function of apprizing the Intel- ligence Community of economic, political and related re- search on foreign areas sponsored by foundations, universi- ties, and individual scholars. It is preparing periodical inventories of similar research sponsored by the Federal Government and reports on research on psychological and unconventional warfare. The EIC has compiled an inventory of govern- ment sponsored external economic research projects on the Soviet Bloc for the period January 1, 1952, through September 30, 1953. NS6p5 d FPAPeleRse 2001/08/17: f4-RDP61S00750A00(7M0~~