DEFINITION OF ATOMIC ENERGY 'RESTRICTED DATA' AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00631R000200100037-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 4, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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C) l.~ n 1.t~t F f" 4 June
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Definition of Atomic Energy "Restricted Data"
and its Relationship to Intelligence Information
1. The term "restricted data" was defined in the Atomic Energy
Act of 19+6 to be all data concerning the design, manufacture, or
utilization of atomic weapons; production of special nuclear material;
or the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy,
unless declassified by the Atomic Energy Commission.
2. There has long been a difference of opinion between this
Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission as to the impact of this
definition on information pertaining to atomic energy matters. We
have contended and believe our contention is compatible with the
intent of Congress that the purpose of the act in surrounding
"restricted data" with special precautions was to protect information
arising within this country and susceptible to control by the
imposition of legal restrictions in order to prevent access thereto
by any.foreign power without specific approval as provided in the
act. The Atomic Energy Commission on the other hand has interpreted
the statutory definition to apply to all information from whatever
source as "restricted data" so long as it applies to atomic energy
matters unless declassified by the Atomic Energy Commission. Under
this definition, all information squired by this Agency from foreign
souls comes under the limitations imposed by law on "restricted data"
unless specifically cleared by the Atomic Energy Commission. This
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would prohibit exchange between ourselves and foreign intelligence
agencies of information relating to foreign atomic energy programs
unless declassified by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Deputy
Director (Intelligence) has stated that this restriction seriously
C.v~ et a ed; ` ~^^
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impairs the acquisition of foreign intelligence information on
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foreign atomic developments which is deemed necessary for the
national defense and security.
3. The matter has recently been under discussion as a result
of a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 19+6 (Committee Print,
May 21, 1954, H. R. 8862, S. 3323)? In this bill the definition of
"restricted data" is substantially the same as that in the earlier
bill, starting off "The term 'restricted data' means all data etc."
We suggested amending this to read "The term 'restricted data' means
all United States data etc." The Atomic Energy Commission has
refused to accept this change on the grounds that since they are, by
interpretation, responsible for handling all information from what-
ever source as "restricted data," they could not comply with this
responsibility if our change were adopted. We contend that since
foreign intelligence information on atomic matters is not susceptible
of control, it cannot be considered'restricted data" in the true
sense. The Atomic Energy Commission's lawyers admitted that we are
handicapped in our intelligence function by their interpretation of
the law and state that they are willing to adopt a solution that will
satisfy both sides. So far no agreement can be reached on wording
to achieve this purpose.
4. The following solutions are presented for discussion:
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(a) A solution most satisfactory to the Central Intelligence
Agency would be to have the Atomic Energy Commission reconsider its
interpretation of the law to arrive at what we believe is the correct
interpretation, namely, that ',restricted data" can be construed to be
only such information as arises in and remains under the control of
the United States. We believe that such reconsideration is unlikely
Fe ?csc&I
or if undertaken would result in a re?ucal of the earlier definition.
(b) A solution along similar lines would be to present the
question of interpretating the present wording of the statute to the
Attorney General for an authoritative ruling controlling on the
Executive Branch. The Atomic Energy Commission's lawyers say they
are willing to refer the matter to the Attorney General. We have
no knowledge of what prior consultation they may have had with the
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Attorney General on their present definition, buttiwould undoubtedly
take compelling reasons to convince the Attorney General that he should
overrule the agency with substantive jurisdiction in the field,
particularly in view of the close relationships between tha Agency
and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
(c) If interpretation is not fusible, we believe a
solution satisfactory to CIA could be achieved by amending the
statutory definition of "restricted data" to read, "The term 'restricted
data' means all data determined by the Atomic Energy Commission to
concern the design, manufacture, etc." This would require positive
i inaction before the limitations would be imposed and would give us,
with proper consultation with the Atomic Energy Commission, consid-
erable freedom in handling foreign intelligence information. The
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Deputy Director (Intelligence) informs us that this would meet
their needs. The Atomic Energy Commission, while not stating that
they are opposed to shah a change, state that it would be opposed
by the Department of Justice as it would greatly complicate the
criminal prosecution of anyone violating the laws on disclosure of
"restricted data." This problem includes highly technical questions
of proof in which, of course, the Department of Justice is the
finaltaab er for the Executive Branch, but in our opinion if put
to the test the present language would require approximately the same
elements of proof. However, objectively, no such amendment could
be achieved without the approval of the Department of Justice.
(d) The Atomic Energy Commission's lawyers have suggested
a special exemption for intelligence activities, but they have not
committed the Commission itself to this wording. In effect, it
would take the chapter of the act on control of information (Chapter 12)
and in the General Provisions Section, SEC. 11+6., would add the
following language: "The provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed as restricting or limiting the gathering, correlation,
evaluation, and communication of information concerning the atomic
energy programs of other nations as authorized by the heads of the
Government agencies performing intelligence activities." The
Deputy Director (Intelligence) feels that insofar as this exemption
conflicts with the Commission's interpretation of "restricted data,"
there is lack of clarity as to what precisely can be done with the
if
information involved. Even/this wording were deemed acceptable by
the Deputy Director (Intelligence), the query remains whether it would
be advisable to subject such language to debate in the Congress with
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the possible consequential revelation of intelligence sources and
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel
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SEC. 116 G TE PROVISIONS, -r
a. Sections 1141, 142, 3)43, and 144 shall not exclude the
applicable provisions of any other laws, except that no Governmnt
agency shall take any action under such other laws inconsistent
with the provisions of this section, The provisions of this Chapter
shall not be construed as restricting or limiting the gathering,
correlation, evaluation, and communication,of information concerning
the atomic energy programs of other nations as authar;y Zsd-by-4he- --heads
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