REPORT OF IAC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON EMERGENCY PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00634A000100130047-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: April 3, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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IAC-D-96/2
3 April 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Report of IAC ad hoc Working Group on Emergency
Plans
REFERENCE : IAC-D-96/1, 20 February 1956
IAC-M-232, 28 February 1956, item 6
I. Background:
1. In recognition of the probable impact of emergency situations
on the functioning of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) proposed that the IAC jointly
examine, for planning purposes, the problems associated with the
operation of the IAC in wartime or an assumed wartime situation. The
planned Operation Alert 1956 would providea preliminary testing ground
for tentative solutions for the problems identified below. The Working
Group was charged with
a. exsmjnAtion of the impact of war on the functions of
the IAC, and
b. identification of problems that may arise at Operation
Alert 1956, and recommendation of procedures for their solution.
2. At the 251st National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 9 June
1955, the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General,
the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission, noted the President's statement that future tests of the
emergency relocation plan should include a number of NSC meetings, with
a view to assuring that emergency relocation plans will enable the
Council, under wartime conditions, to meet frequently and function
effectively as the key policy advisory body to the President. (NSC Action
No. 112.-c).
3? On 13 June 1955 the President approved the NSC Emergency Relo-
cation Plan as expressed in NSC 5521. Paragraph 2.a. of this document
contains the following statement of assumption:
"Under wartime conditions, the President will utilize the
NSC to advise him on national security policies. The NSC will
be convened by the President intermittently, on such occasions,
and at such places, as he may from time to time elect."
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II. Assumptions:
1. As a result of the above two statements of emergency operation
of the NSC, the DCI has assumed that the NSC will continue to look to
him for national intelligence advice and support. He will continue to
look to the IAC as the top intelligence advisory body for national
intelligence in wartime as in peacetime.
2. The joint responsibilities of CIA and the Department of Defense
for the wartime conduct of clandestine activities are not within the scope
of this paper.
III. Discussion:
1. The integration of political, economic, scientific, and military
intelligence in wartime will continue to be accomplished in the form of
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In time of war, the main NIE
effort will be concentrated on:
a. specific requests from the NSC;
b. enemy potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities (excluding
targetting) and intentions, all three to include scientific, tech-
nical, economic, political and certain broad military aspects;
c. evaluations of the probable courses of action of uncom-
mitted countries;
d. evaluations of capabilities and requirements of allied
and/or uncommitted economies; and
e. timely estimates of probable post-war economic and polit-
ical situations in various parts of the world.
2. To accomplish these purposes the following modifications of the
present NIE mechanism activities are believed necessary:
a. There will be a greater number of special or "crash"
estimates covering specific wartime problems rather than broad
country estimates.
b. The speed with which NIE's are produced will have to
be stepped up, and geared to meet a large number of less com-
prehensive requirements.
c. The production of periodic (monthly or perhaps biweekly)
global intelligence reviews may be desirable broadly to outline
the global picture and make general short-term projections.
d. Intelligence estimates for post-hostilities planning
should be.on a; national intelligence level.
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3. Up to this point in the discussion, the Working Group has been
attempting to identify the types of action which the intelligence arm
of the NSC will probably have to perform in time of emergency. We believe
that if these concepts are sound, no policy matters with regard to
operational concept presently exist which need to be resolved by the IAC.
After examination of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCID) and the implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives
(DCID), we believe that our concepts are consistent with the policies stated
in those directives.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. The Impact of War on the Functions of the IAC: Our conclusion
is that the impact of war will have little if any effect on the respon-
sibilities of the IAC, subject to further clarification of the role of
the NSC in wartime.
Recommendation: That the IAC approve the above conclusions.
2. Assuming acceptance by the IAC of the preceding paragraph, the
following procedural and logistic problems are identified and, for planning
purposes, the following remedial action is recommended.
a. Location of IAC Meetings During the Initial Phase: Since
the first phase of hostilities is..envisioned as primarily military,
there is firm requirement for the military members of the IAC to
remain with their chiefs. As the flow of military intelligence
will represent the main source of information concerning the enemy
during this primary phase, it is logical that the chiefs of the
military service intelligence agencies and the DCI will play their
most important role during this period.
Recommendation: If relocation plans must be implemented, we
believe that meetings of the IAC should be held at or near the Alternate
Joint Communications Center (AJCC) during the initial phase of the
emergency.
b. Location of IAC Meetings During Balance of Hostilities:
As new situations develop after the initial phase which require
major policy decisions by the President and for which national
intelligence support is needed, the operation of the IAC will be
accommodated to the requirements levied on it. By this period
of the war, we believe that the IAC principals or their designees
could meet at a convenient location not necessarily the relo-
cation center of any one member but centrally located so that
minimum travel would be required.
Recommendation: That appropriate locations be established for
meetings of the IAC after the initial phase of the war. Action by
CIA, in consonance with over-all U.S. Government emergency plans,
for such establishment is recommended.
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c. Scheduled Production of National Intelligence Estimates:
Since the disruption of normal intelligence production activities
during the initial phases of the war must be faced, a reduced
intelligence production program stressing immediate critical areas
should be developed. There will be a critical requirement for
Special NIEs which will be supported primarily by current military
intelligence. Concurrently, there will exist a requirement for
NIEs'for those nations not yet committed to hostilities. As the
decisive phase in the war is reached, NIEs should again take
precedence over special estimates to insure adequate national
planning for the economic, political and psychological problems
of the final stages of the war as well as for the postwar era.
Recommendation: That the production of NIEs be adjusted
during the opening phase of the war to deal with the current
situation as first priority business; that NIEs on the uncommitted
countries be given second priority; and that when the decisive
phase of the war is reached, there be a reexamination of NIE
requirement with appropriate rescheduling.
d. Inter-Agency Participation in National Intelligence
Production: If the assumption is valid that the general procedures
of national intelligence production will be only slightly changed
for wartime operation, then the participation of representatives
of all members of the IAC will be required. These personnel should
have experience in the estimative process, and they should not be
burdened with general liaison responsibilities.
Recommendation: if relocation plans must be put into effect,
we recommend that CIA provide facilities for personnel of other
agencies while these personnel are working with the Board of
National Estimates on the preparation of NIEs.
e. Subcommittees of the IAC: Because much of the detailed
base upon which NIEs are constructed is the product of working
level liaison among the members of the IAC, we believe that most
of the IAC subcommittees need to continue to function in wartime.
Recommendation: That each subcommittee of the IAC which has
a wartime utility be instructed to prepare a wartime plan of
operation. Any subcommittee which feels it does not have a
wartime function should request corroboration of its opinion from
the MC.
3. Participation of the IAC in Operation In con-
nection with the operation of the IAC during Operation
have identified the followi we
ng problem areas and have recommended pro-
cedures for solution.
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a. A decision by the IAC needs to be made as to whether
during Operation Alert 1956 the community will
(1) play a simulated exercise,
(2) deal with live intelligence, or
(3) use a combination of both with live intelligence
taking priority.
Because only a small portion of the total staff of any agency will be
relocated, the live situation can be handled both in Washington
and with the facilities in the Relocation Centers, thus providing
a check on the remote operation.
Recommendation: That the intelligence community deal only
with live intelligence during Operation The subcommittees
should operate on the same basis.
b. Logistics: Each agency is charged with the operation and
maintenance of its own relocation center. Communications between
relocation centers whether electrical, courier, or transportation
is a common problem.
Recommendation: That each agency be res onsible for its
communications needs during Operation and existing
interagency arrangements be modified to fit dispersal requirements.
c. Liaison: As is implied in paragraph IV.2.d. above, there
are certain liaison problems beyond the participation in national
intelligence production. We believe that the exchange of liaison
officers is desirable based on experience in Operation
Recommendation: That the exchange of liaison officers be
agreed between agencies on a bilateral basis.
Chairman
Ad Hoc Working Group on Emergency Plans
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