COORDINATING COMMITTEE RECORD OF DISCUSSION ON ITEM 1565 - COMPUTERS, ELECTRONIC 8TH DECEMBER, 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00647A000100060012-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 5, 1960
• Content Type: MIN

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Januaryr 5th, 1960
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COCOM Document No. 3715.65 B
COORDINATING COMMITTEE
RECORD OF DISCUSSION
ON
ITEM 1565 - COh
ffUTERS, ELECTRONIC
8th December 1 59
Present: Belgium (Luxembourg), Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States.
References: COCOM Documents Nos. 3750, 3700.1 and 5, 3715.00/1, 3715.65/1
to 3, W.P.1565/1, 2 and 3.
1. The CHAIRMAN, in opening the second round of discussion on Item 1565,
reminded the Committee that they had to study two widely-differing proposals,
one submitted by the United Kingdom Delegation and the other by the United
States Delegation, both of which were set out in COCOM Document No. 3715.65/1.
The Chairman hoped nevertheless that the Committee would reach speedy agreement,
as it would be regrettable if the old definition had to be retained.
2. The UNITED STATES Delegate supported the Chairman's remarks and
stated his authorities' view not only that the current definition of Item
1565 should not remain unchanged but that its improvement was an urgent
necessity. The Delegate recalled the statement he had made, as sot out
in COCOM Document No. 3715.65/1, when submitting his authorities' proposal.
He then drew the attention of the Committee to two documents (COCOM
3715.65/2 and 3715.65/3) submitted by the United States Government to
assist the Committee in its consideration of Item 1565. He told the
Committee that the first of these studies was based upon generally
available information and especially upon Soviet-published data on the
status of Soviet computer production, which, because of its repeated
admission of serious production difficulties, was very significant. The
second document was based, he said, upon both covert and overt information
gathered and evaluated by United States and other computer exports who
had visited the U.S.S.R. and studied Soviet computer production. It also
contained classified information about United States computer production and
use. These two documents showed, according to the United States Delegate,
that electronic computers should be embargoed because they met the agreed
criteria. They were used primarily for military purposes; they were in short
supply in the Soviet Bloc and they contained unique know-how which could helf,
the U.S.S.R. to overcome its serious lag in computer production.
The United States Delegate said that over 4,000 digital computers
had haen built in his country, most of them more sophisticated than those
produced in the U.S.S.R. Today about 2/3 of these computers (by value)
were used for military purposes. In the beginning of United States
computer development, during the early 1950's, a far greater proportion
was used for military purposes. Today the Soviet Union was in a position
analagous to that of the United States at that time. It had built only
400 digital computers, and because of the theory requirements of modern
military weapons and warning systems undoubtedly used the overwhelming
majority of them for military purposes. This was not surprising, for the
Soviet Union had military problems very similar to those of the United
States because of its geography and since the levels of scientific knowledge
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in the two countries were roughly similar, the U.S.S.R. followed the same
pattern in solving its military problems as had the United States. Moreover,
since Soviet civilian, use of computers lagged greatly behind that of the
Free World and especially the United States, and since two-thirds of the value
of digital computers in the United States was devoted to military applications,
it must be evident that Soviet use was also predominaihtly military.
The United States Delegate pointed out that Soviet published
statements alone confirmed the opinion of computer experts that a shortage
of these crucial instruments existed in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This was
also attested by Soviet efforts to purchase such equipment in the United
States and from European producers.
The valuable production know-how gained by Free World firms during
years of costly development was also lacking in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
Although agreeing that Soviet theoretical accomplishments were often on
a par with those of the Free World, the United States Delegate maintained
that there was a critical difference between theoroticd knowledge and
series production. He recalled, as an example, the case of one internationally
known computer manufacturer who had access to the reliable components of the
entire Free World and who, despite a superb plan for an advanced computer, had
worked for years without yet producing even one working prototype. Under
these circumstances, the United States Delegate felt It would be highly
unwise to sacrifice the significant advantage now enjoyed by the Free World
in the availability of electronic computers.
3. The UNITED KINGDOM Delegate said. that his authorities had given
careful study to the United States proposal but they found it unacceptable
because it would place business computers under embargo. He commended
to the Committee the proposal put forward by his Delegation, which, as
he had explained in tho discussions on the 17th November, provided the
embargo rules most appropriate to the case of digital computers, other than
those which would remain subject to embargo by Item 11 on the Munitions
List. His authorities believed that the analogue computers at present
embargoed by Item 1565 could Safely be freed.
The Delegate noted that there was abundant evidence of the emphasis
currently placed on the development of industrial automation in the U.S.S.R. -
a development which was not in conflict with the security interests of the
West.
The Delegate then stated that the memorandum submitted by the
United States Delegation contained a groat deal of very useful and highly
interesting information. The United Kingdom Delegation, nevertIP loss,
did not fully share the conclusions reached by the United States
Delegation. By way of example, the Delegate asked leave to quote from
the Report published by a United Kingdom technical mission which had
visited the Soviet Union in May 1959 and had drawn the following
conclusions: "Viork is in progress in laboratories in the Soviet Union
on most of the parts of the field of industrial control system development
and on most of the distinctive classes of device that are known to lus in
process of development in Britain.... There is considerable activity
on control in the stool industry, particularly in the development of
integrated process control simulators, both to guide the design of
multi-variable control systems and also to operate as part of such
control systems. Work is also well ahead in tolemetering, (for example, as
applied to the control of long gas transmission pipelines), and on the
control of electric power systems with long transmission lines. This work
is mainly on similar lines to work in progress in the United Kingdom .....
The groups in Britain for research and development in civil applications
of automatic control are very much smaller than those now existing in the
soviet Union, and the contrast is still greater in respect of expectations
for the near future. We have the impression that in a few years the
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application of automatic control in Soviet industry will have overtaken
that in the United Kingdom..... There is little evidence at present on
which to judge how good the Soviet engineers will prove to be in this
further stage; but it is acknowledged that their present level of achievement
in basic theoretical work is high, and in other fields initiative has not
been lacking.....'
The Delegate stated further that while the British team was in the
Soviet Union they had encountered a similar mission from the United States
who had expressed the following view: "The U.S.S.R. are at the same level
of logical design and organisation inside the computer as the USA. At the
same time we do not consider that we have seen any development idea that
we should like to exploit in the USA."
4. The GERMAN Delegate said he had listened with great interest to the
statements made by the United States and United Kingdom Delegates. He felt
that the divergencies of view stemmed from the difficulty of establishing
cut-offs as between the strategic ap-)lications of computers and their
civilian ap,-)lications. He noted that the United States document which
had been quoted did not refer to automatic control in industry. The Delegate
stated that his authorities would hope for a precise and unequivocal
definition based on technical characteristics, so that it would be possible
to recognise at once which equipment was under embargo and which free, it
being understood that equipment designed for automation should be free.
5. The FRENCH Delegate fully shared the United Kingdom Delegation's
view as to the value of the Soviet equipment and also the United Kingdom
experts' view, which recognised the United States advance on the U.S.S.R.
but at the same time admitted that Europe lagged behind the U.S.S.R. The
Delegate asked why the Committee had to retain an embargo on equipment
which was technically less up to date than the Soviet equipment.
6. The CHAIRMAN considered that it would be advisable to keep separate
on the one hand the aspect "theoretical development", whether in the U.S.S.R.
or in the West, and, on the other, the aspect "Soviet Bloc shortage where
the production of computers is concerned".
7. The FRENCH Delegate emphasised that the Committee's reviews were
based on three criteria and that he for one did not consider that, in
demonstrating that the Russians wore at least as far advanced as the Free
World, the Committee went beyond the boundaries of the problem they had to
resolve. The Delegate loft it to his expert to refute some of the
arguments put forward by the United States Delegation in the document to
which they had referred. As to the strategic part played by computers,
while recognising that some categories of computers were designed essentially
for military equipment and that it was gwiite normal that such types of
computer should be under embargo, the French Delegate nevertheless stressed
that in fields as varied as those of automation of machine-tools, automatic
railway traffic control, weights and measures, research on stability of
dyeing processes, and - a peaceful use above all others - the development
of colour films, the U.S.S.R. relied for their purely civilian needs on
the astonishing possib4ities of computers. Such types of special computers,
however, needed to be completely recast before they could be used for other
purposes, and even if the effort were attempted, they could not operate in
the climatic and mechanical conditions imposed upon war material. For those
reasons, the French Delegation would be unable to accept the United States
proposal, which passed over in silence the civilian uses of these machines.
8. The UNITED STATES Delegate expressed the wish~to answer some of the
remarks just made. In the first place, ho hoped that no confusion existed
as between what was covered by the Munitions List and what was interesting
the Committee at present, namely computers which could be used for two
purposes, and which operated in normal climatic conditions. With reference
to the United States exports v &o had visited the Soviet Union, the Delegate
explained that all of them were University professors, and that, moreover,
they had not visited any computer factory but only a certain number of
works using this equipment. Finally, as to the comparisons which had been
drawn between European and Soviet technolo and production, the Delegate
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emphasisod that the United States experts had stated that the West had nothing
to learn from the Soviet Bloc and that the latter, on the contrary, were
endeavouring to import all the European equipment they could obtain.
9. The GERMAN Delegate said his authorities had welcomed the United
States proposal because it constituted a step towards a clear and precise
definition likely to enable control departments to determine without too
much difficulty what was covered by the embargo and what was not. They
noted that the United States proposal covered all types of computers
manufactured in Germany during the last ton years. The Delegate had
observed also that the United States Delegation considered as strategic
what other Delegations believed to be devoid of any strategic significance.
He noted lastly that, starting from the same facts, the United States
Delegation and the United Kingdom Delegation reached different conclusions.
The German Delegate stated that no one denied the essential part played
by computers in the field of guided missiles. The United States recognised
that the nuclear programme of the Russians was as advanced as their own,
i.e., much more advanced than the European programme. With reference to
the United Kingdom proposal, the German Delegate stated that for countries
which had developed their own production later, a definition based on a
time cut-off was not very appropriate. The Delegate believed that the
solution to the problem might be looked for in the direction of "operating
speed". In the meantime, the current definition would be retained, the
Committee recognising that it was not satisfactory and that the question
merited fresh study. The German Delegate also recalled that in the previous
July the German Delegation had proposed to the United States Delegation a
discussion on this item.
10. The ITALIAN and NETTERLANDS Delegations associated themselves with
the German proposal to adjourn discussion on Item 1565 until Governments
had had the time required to submit new proposals. The Italian Delegate
added that his authorities considered that the United States proposal,
in endea*rouring to construct a technical definition (see COCOM Document
No. 3715.65/1) constituted the most reasonable method of approaching the
problem.
11. The CHAIRMAN stated that the conclusion to be drawn from the
discussion might be along the following lines: "The definition of Item
1565 remains as at present, but the Committee considers that this is a
provisional solution, and that in the course of next year, without
waiting for the 1960 review, they should make a special effort to reach
a unanimously agreed solution based on technical data which - to use the
German Delegate's expression - could be followed without ambiguity by the
departments responsible for applying the control system".
12. The UNITED STATES Delegate agreed with the Chairman's summary. He
wished to assure his German colleague that the definition proposed by the
United States Delegation had not been designed to embargo all computers
manufactured in Germany. Referring to the divergencies in the evaluating
of Soviet Bloc production, the Delegate stated that, as far as the United
States were concerned, the figures he had quoted were based on information
which was more or less confidential. The United States Delegate continued
to believe that the Bloc was a long way behind the Western world both as
regards the quality and the level of their production. The Delegate had
been happy to take note of the statements by the German and Italian Delegates
regarding the United States proposal. Before the debate was brought to a
close, the Delegate wished to conclusion to draw the attention of Governments
to the donsequences of retaining the current definition. He felt that,
pending the working out of a new definition, the Committee should, with
all the emphasis at their command, urge the various Governments to be
extremely prudent, and not to seek to benefit from the retention of the
current definition in order to increase their exports to the Bloc and thus
contribute to the strengthening of the Soviet computer potential.
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13. The UNITED KINGDOM Delegate stated that his authorities still
thought that the proposal they had submitted represented an undeniable
progress as compared with the present situation. They would endeavour
once again to examine the matter from the technical point of view, while
expressing the hope that their original proposal wouldnat be abandoned.
CONCLUSION: The COMPS?ITTEE agreed provisionally to retain the current
definition of Item 1565, until such time as it would be possible
to work out a now definition on the basis of the various
proposals already submitted or to be put forward in the
near future.
S E C R E T
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