CURRENT INADEQUACIES AND SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN US ANTARCTIC RESEARCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00680R000200190053-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: May 12, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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CIA/BR G/I 59-30
12 i?,ay 1959
!*MORAMD H VU Rs Legislative Counsel, Office of General Counsel
Current inadequacies and suggested improvements in US
Antarctic Research
RMRE' Er Bureau of the Budget Letter to Mr. Dulles, dated 27
April 1959
The views and conclusions included in these cam ants have evolved
out of (1) observations Bade syr ce 1955 in the c~jurse of Age--cy representa-
tion on the OCg Working Group on Antarctica, arxd (2) continuing intelligence
production for the DCI and the 3CB on Soviet Antarctic activities. In
the course of this production it has sometimes been necessary to make
comparisons with US activities in order to - rovide some judgment on the
significance (political, iailiLary, econoreicl) of Antarctic research to
the USSR.
The historical preeminence of the VS in the Antarctic area is being
challenged today by the UBbk -- not in the usual cold-war type of
activities but with a well-organized, systematic, and aggressive scientific
prok,ram. Soviet motivations in Antarctica are both scientific and
political. So-fist scientific entry into Antarctica is a logical
extension of its long-standing polar research in the Arctic and is
generated by the expander Soviet study of the earth as a whole. There
is also direct evidence that Soviet scientific activities are being
undertaken for the improvement of the Soviet political position in the
Antarctic area. The estimated long-range consequences of these objectives
and associated activities are two-fold. First, the systematic collection
of scientific data on the Antarctic will contribute significantly to
the Soviet study of the whole of interrelated, world-wide physical
phenomena. Their objectives in this are to improve Soviet prediction
of harmf,l occurences of nature, increase their ability to modify and
control some of these, and to locate and develop all possible forms of
natural resources. The military implications of these objectives are
that, gig any relative degree of equality in the weapons system
design, eupro lacy may come to that nation which has gained better knowl-
edge and control over the physical environment. Second, the Soviets are
developing -- politically -- another opportunity to demonstrate the
superiority of the comarunist system through its science, and to establish
an interminable right to participate in the political control of a large,'
if as yet uninhabited, portion of the southern Hemisphere. Whereas US
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T: Current inadequacies and suggested improvements in US Antarctic
Research
rights prior to the IOT (1957-58) have been based largely on exploration
adventures and military exercises, the Soviets have made and will continue
to make significant impressions on world opinion with outstanding scien-
tific results from their Antarctic activities. It would follow from
this that future 05 activities must continue at a level to (1) produce
equal or greater accrual of scientific data in the long-range coWetition
to increase mastery over the physical environment; (2) maintain historic
US prestige among the peoples of the Southern Hemisphere (particularly
Latin America which is deeply concerned with the Antarctic))- (3) prevent
Soviet subversion of the administration and control of Antarctica; (14)
prevent any military use of a build-up in the area; and () maintain
specific US rights in certain minimum specific areas of Antarctica which
could be claimed, should such course of action be adopted. The following
comments on the specific t?pics are based on the above considerations.
1. On the determination of an appropriate level of effort o! US
activities: There appear to be deficience's in the. US effort, both in
topical scope and in area of activity.
a. As a minimum, US effort should be expanded in Western Antarctica
since this appears to %w the most favorable area with respect to
access, altitude, ane gmology. Since the US has had no activities
in Palmer Peninsula since the Ronne Expedition of 19147, it would
appear that at least summer-mason glaciological and geological
operations should F a extended from Byrd Station into this area.
Seamen of these could be wanted through small, portable buildings
that would fly the Uc fli-g and thus serve scientific and political
purposes as well.
b. US rights can be further strengthened by expanding the areal
extent of US activities through a program of air-hopping of scientists
aad portable stations to areas not covered by traverses or station
activities.
c. Current Department of Defense policy excludes any logistic
re-supply of Wilkes and gllsvorth Stations under any circumstances.
Accordtngl, these have been leased to the Australians and
Argentinians, respectively. In the event, howsver, that Wilkes
were to be given up by the Australians, it would be desirable to
modify the present Defense policy by a stand-by plan to re-occupy
the station with US scientists. This would prevent its possible
occupation by the US;R or another Bloc power (Poland was brought
into Antarctica for the first time in January 1959 by being given
Oasis Station by the USER).
SEhE I
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 Sanitized -Approved Foee` a CIA-RDP62-0068OR00020,0190053-9
SUUJECTI Current inadequacies and suggested L-Aprovements in US Antarctic
Research
d. A serious deficiency in the terminated US IGY program as well as
in the current post--IOT program is the absence of oceanographic surveys.
(Soviet oceanographic surveys to date extend almost around the
entire continent). A specially reinforced vessel would make possible
a systematic oceanographic and hydrographic survey program, of
significant value to basic science. Such a vessel would also provide
important military as well as psychological advantages. We anticipate
that the Soviets will ultimately introduce the atomic icebrealer
and scientific submarine into their Antarctic research. Each would
cause a grave impact upon the peoples of the Southern Hemisphere,
e. The absence of any extensive US topo aphie mapping of Antarctica
despite more than three decades of intermittent activity is a serious
deficiency -- political and scientific. While such mapping was
excluded under the US IGY program, the Soviets have undertaken
extens-1-ve mapping which now covers a coastal zone between 400E and
]46?E. They have also pushed to establish an international program
in which they have offered to map a third of the area. It has long
been proposed by US dentists and others that the US systematically
map extensive portionss,, chiefly siestern Antarctica? at lzl,00J,000.
The scientific need is (1) to establish the topography, geology, and
glacial characteristics of Antarctica; (2) for tae geodetic study of
the size and shape of the earth (included in the Defense proposed
20-year geodetic program, but of low priority); and (3) eventually
essential to polar-orbit satellite tracking. Politically, mapping
is nep.ded to (1) provide the best tangible evidence of US activity
and topographic knowledge of an area; (2) evaluate and delineate
areas of importance to the US; and (3) use in any possible future
resolution of claims disputes.
2. On the development, coordination and financing of US activities:
a. The feeuitf 1, creative development of US activities in Antarctica
over the P1st three years has been seriously hampered by the fact
that dcmii nt control -- fiscal and logistic -- has been vested in
the M. Navy which (1) has had no substantive scientific interest in
ta area, and (2) has been forced to finance activities out of ceiling
defense funds for an activity which has a comparatively low military
priority, As a consequence, all planning by the Working Group
repeatedly has developed into a tense, negative climate dominated by
the conviction of the suecresive Navy representatives that all other
Departments gather at the Working Group to spend Navy funds which are
being diverted {roe higher priority defense requirements. Such a
W3-
SEC E.T
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yU3JECT: Current inadequacies and su,tgested improvements in tS antarctic
hesearch
climate has of necessity frustratr;?d a constructive exploration and
interchange of ideas and methods to develop and implemen4t a balanced,
suitable proms It has been particularly difficult in the formula-
tion of long-range objectives and programs, since avy representatiw a
have alway felt constra ned by the fear of overcomasitaent into an
unknown b.xdgstarr f iture. This in particularly serious since the
seasonal nature of Antarctic operations requires the loudest possible
lead?ttms for program planning w id implementation.
be A further complicating factor lies in (1) the mysterious cost
determination system employed by US Navy procedure s and (2) the
complete abser:se of meaningful cost account-n& of past operations.
This has proved to be a source of such suspicion that navy uses cost
estimates to scuttle programs which otherwise would not be eltMn ted
by substantive debate.
Sh cost of i liavy operations hl. s been frequently emphasised
sennel who have been in Antarctica. It is also evident from
ace comparisons with Soviet operations. For exa le, in Deep
Frecfe a I"V (1 i=>"`~ ) the US Nary allocated 2700 officers and men and
8 ships including b ice-breakers, 2 cargo sups, and 2 tankers.
The Soviets at their peak season have used a mLxLmux of 60(0 men and
3 strips, one ice--reinforced (for ice-forcin; , cargo, passenger,
and scientific research), one cargo-paasengr, and one refrigsratur
vessel. Part of this disparity in m a:power is due to the military
T/O system of staffing which may be futlyr warranted under battle
conditions but has no place in peacetime pursuits. The Soviets
se scientifie peso r4l for manual labor at peak unloading
periods. This disparity in costs has two serious implications:
(1) high t logistic costs place an ).nvarranted limitation on the
Level of scientific operations, thus reducing the effectiveness
of t efforts, and (2) the Soviets are in a better competitive
pore'} t'a on sines their efforts are relatively leas burdensome fiscally.
d. Since the termination of the 1GY (31 December 1958), the
scientific planning and eoordiniti a or 05 Antarctic research has
been taken well in hand by the National. Science Foundation through
its Antarctic Research Jffice, Its Interdepartmental Comimittt-* for
Antarctic Research, and the CannAtt ee on Polar Research of the
National Acadss4r of Sciences, As this established mechanism owns
to be developing with promise, little woui d be gained by establishing
a Coraission which as a concr pt is as arietruated among the
scientific community dues to the fear that it would tend to mix
scientific and political considerattons. Science might then
-4-
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?U&1! 'T: Currexet inadequac es and suggested i pro'vewnts in tl Antarctic
Research
become subverted by political considerations aid lose, its objectivity.
Moreover, sire* the F already is responsible for coordinating basic
research, a Commission would become an additional channel which
could interfere with effective plarsrting mad operations.
3. Jn the a+-.tbo=is of providing and financing logistic supports
a. A basic requireownt for tae strengthening of U Antarctic opc atd oonsa
and increasing the rate of scientific and political benefits i .d
be the eliadnation of the Depertmeent of Defense from its dominant
logistic and fiscal activity in operations. The conti=xed
presence of military personnel and equipment nay well become an
increasing source of eabaras rzt to the US us it tries to r+ strict
the use of Antarctica to e.ftt3. purposes. Since U& Antarctic
operations are designed ri as rily for scientific purposes, it is
unsound to obscure these costs within the defense area of the
goner t. Moreover, by the elimination of high-cost ailitsry
uperatio s, a greater return of scientific results voui.d follow
fran a given unit of investarente
b. The , reatest probleass are to (1) develo22 a budget procedure
independent of the Department of Defense, and (2) provide a means
by which a civilian Antarctic operations unit can be organized to
fund and ~andertske operations an the lee cuntJnQkt. Jne posai'~.,lee
approach could be t c enabling legislation that would per ait
a nose-profit orgyeni' ation (e.e., American o r*pbical society, New
York) to submit beset requests to Congress for continental operations
funds; t its vy operats one could be limited to delivery only of ,sect,
eegaipm et, and supplies to the continent -- the systems now a apl.ayed
In the Arctic. Special tending procedures wood t,* reequtred since
the National Science foundation is not engaged in field operations,
but it would seem unaccessary to require the establishment of a
Commission solely for funding and sea-su?:=ply operations.
4. a depositing and cataloging of Antarctic records
The stional Science Foundation and its ! cientif# c Information
Office can be expected to provide a c trali ed data center on tins
Antarctic. The National Archives already serves are a depository for
seeps and rel itod materials.
5. 'an special interests of the A,cts
a. The A en y is interested in the development of the fulleit
possible ewe arge of scientific personnel, particularly with the
'US'SR, to include if possible year-rte resident exchanges at all
Soviet Antaretic stat`.ona. This would facilitate not only the
SECRET
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Current inadequacies and suggested isprovenrents in US Antarctic
Research
monitoring of Soviet activities as such, buy would yield intelligence
on Soviet polar operations, personnel, capabilities, and equipment
that might not be accessible in the Soviet Arctic.
b. The Agency is also interested that provisions are aiadd for an
equitable exchange of scientific reports, data, maps and charts among
all participants in Antarctic research, and particularly with the
USSR which has been notorious in withholding such information on
the Arctic Basin as well as other areas.
25X1A9a
CIA member, Working Group
on Antarctica
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