ANTI COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SOVIET BLOC NORTH VIETNAM, PARTS II, B-B: III

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 16, 1954
• Content Type: STUDY

Sanitized - Approved
16 Odtober 1934
25X1A2g
is THE SMU
B.S.; III
a Sroi7.a
sole o
on actw
the capability of the
continue to do so.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 16
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHAIII EO TO: TS S C E;~ o R`VIEW DATE:
RUTH: HR 10.3
EVIEWER:_05656
n R`^ R
a=1
DATE:
istice guerrilla group3 :epreaented. a1 3t the
ra,t resistance in North Tietzme
entirely pro arnietice), ind
ups Leas b,-emit rapidly deteriorating fkiwi will
(in contrast to errilla warfare) presently capable of operr
Y tsta . The
to on a groups of ? tad men
e oepabi li ty
cl estine sabotage, evasion and e?ecr-=pe ar p*ycho
resist n,
it
Vietnamese
developing
:11a units. French .ttempts to organize cl?4estine
at :kd that per;
tri.? l people;
ups in or Vistas
e : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6.,..
o at
ion have failed.
00 natives euach rears, mostly
at the time of the armisti
v
tv exerer, unless the ser (+i ~
ar
du
which affords them sufficient protection
being Witted by routine Viet Ai,
Mrril a Sere
Upper Laos Was A~
strength in
7000, waver,
as the ono my,
and adjacent areas in
pidly deteriorating. In Juig 1954 guerril1-t
r*portedly disposed a folio =s$
T 11 B
Sanitized - Approved For, jqnA
,re Op sXat1n; in 5errft2l
ability to rein in th
COPY
3 NEU FROM T
1618
 Sanitized - Approved 0@- 1UNA 62-00865R000200040002-6
03-5 Ughia Lo (922-05* lO2-25
Rat River in a area ceded by Phong 'rho (1 22-23, Z
-430 it
. reportedly the boat guerrill"t force in Worth Vietnam.
or light planes. Their % rassin , tactics have been quite effective
wee ttalion Viet Miffs offensive in y
-059 1102-225) and Phong ly (N21-330 2102-05). Although
-15. 1107-2$), however, the people were of swill value
managed to retain its identity. It has radio
act with the
a rty there were some 300 or more ? ;s and Mans arountt
a, A Cre" of :bout 1,000 Red Thais on the .Yietnaam-Ioti n border
of Theah Sao (n9_40* 3i03-5o) .
A. A xi tely 600 uigs e.,.nd Moos east of Lao may.
f dot
riodicall.y controlled three 1`
1,200 Moos. Lolos and Laotians a,
ber of Thos northwest of Lang Son showing
operations. Their present statueisunknown.
' nd Wunge alone, the right bank of
into a guerrilla force.
coups have been evacuated to Laos by
Wiser key
d. be brought back into North Vietnam by air but
of ?rencb reluctance to break the rmistic*
oroes mainly constitute defensive holdi
. Waccept
14 on Lao Ie y (N22-20, 9103-38) in :3eptember 1953? they haver not
irtt offensive strike. The tribal people :gyres basically 'frid
a* a44 are desious of defending their home areas.
a attack small Viet Minh units, but will not even ha
e e&ttA
when the VIA Minh arrive in strength, men, omen, children
to the hills.
of the guerrillas are armed with out-sited equipment. Many are
old imiasle-boadin rifles; these are very affactiv
.bie for close ambushes. ?h,!*, tribaas have had considerable
03-20),
Black River.
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ouch bl,
is cilia are infantry, some
r for their weapons. Al thou
potential, albeit sa ll, is undsvelope. The
:t air reception, ratio oom inic'tion and In
n=:. itrip
venses of the guerrilla movement is low. Results
of troops Involved. The unit in -.re net loam tad.
sent no group has access to any principal
covering TVA hinh enpply lines into 1pper Lace
of a =issne;e zone than a serioue threat to en
. In spite of the owious vulnerability of the tens of thou-
supplies over isolated mountain trails, the
ef`it`eotive
vrlty
hard or
ai WWWRAC, their hour's, they have been used v. ry
,gely ineffective. 'since the guarrillo:s are
sir hose a r ea. The units re good trained and
ed by untrained tribal chiefs. They f
the vary limit
gely undeveloped sabotage poten
no organised sabotage potential exists in nth Ytet.
in northewet Tonkin hairs recovered some
ted behind eanemy ' ines. No escape a.
cps have carried out an information collection nu& re
too tightly controlled for the overt existent
lla forces.
5. ,
QWWTJII
*tuton. Ntt
contact has been a:inti.ined by radio. When erriUt units
ver follow the middle road of
e been aalaaso- t anihilated
lone, while some el nts ve ''one
ineffective, information collection hoe often
a. Most informatlo~
from direct observation*
>ad interro r tton of occasional
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war. The quality of information to often not good because of
co-trnlied personnel ?i thin mot ;
a not seem to have an adequate intalli,,*Ace
own tactical needs jas shown by the nvmb-,r of
been surprised by the Viet dinte
the Yi tnem tiox?,,.1 Polies and . ,e in 'North
s of agents in Viet Minh controlled territory ns
he Delta region which were heavily in filtrated by
n roo-orted that these a&
on of v
bred five hundred,
tions of the police will be subRt ti lly
ad environs,
the Police It
e Cathnlie
to the armistice a Catholic army of about ll,000 men
s the three major Catholic areas of the north- :: t D
.. After the signing of the armistice,
iled by
he sole Material supporter of the araq, removed them to the
lawl.&JIftong area. The current ereeabouts of this group is unknown,
above-mentioned Catholic d.iocssses there are over a million
Catholics.
a spletsly se
very little sup
constitute the northern fAction of Catholics
are highly respec
The Catholic arms had been very effective in b at
Vitt Minh
the ,r. However, if the army has been moved to the south#
probably have to b co
empts to win them over. This closeness of this
dislike for the 'diet Minh leads itself to possible clcndeatins activity
cL the lack of org .ni .,ational
bulk of thkn have been or will be removed
little contact with the south. Consequently
caeca from this group. The bisho xa in these Areas
by the C- tholice. Under their leadership mo t Catholics
of this large group of di `ident Catholics will
to passive resistance.
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 Sanitized - Approved For Reiamer CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
. v~fI6C,-
Lion is available on the na1t' b" a Of ourr"ent UMOV4Pu4
Ws l n rt p cif BAN .-n
to 1 o rahtp of reeist%ace in North
104,11 CO st Control ate $=e-6- curent tion mass
thus far, ftlmo ;.-
,Police and C i t I': rt,;
1. nta earedE oft Sk Ce in Lea
1. _.~..^r.ti'.
the Mist Miuh is North Yictaeue. TA addition tr
mat tier:
he Y.enah-su orted govoramout of South
ups. excerpt for anti-vuorrill oiler tioos,
port from Vietnamese emigre aroups whic
orted the Ho ahi Ptah mo em at.
i too
ess of countermca:sures weer peacetime con-
ctjve because more
be formed o$ the alimination of eubver3l + elements.
;Avert tiou and near -,llaatian
the rarity of the
casattr'1i.t ou of reports on domestic affairs ad external
ion It 4-4 the f olio t, an
r" etanc* f 4t1o w
lmpleaent .ti = of 1' we and regulations ro rdi internal
wwreill ace. T'hie
ec of all Individuals in the it one.
o. 'n`VeetL ation of aAti-gov ruaent Activities of YA,et eet &ad
taout North Viet.
A.
lines of co i ti n, aiJ.itary cantons
-6--
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 Sanitized - Approved For Rel a .GIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
rLr
O&M
ly t
UnAer this system each five to ten faai3.ies are troupe tode
e1tensibly to cooperate on inteeili, epee liact3,on. The ac
is to have the f ,lies keep a check on each ethers &ctivitiese %d
refit them to the iaU. Thus the Viet 4inh
.
e. stabliohmeat of a clandestine or, i,.eeition with an er.teneise
net in moo-Yietn ese areas to tab tenti l potential
st or ,patriot;
of of travel to and fr
on of the i it al informer oyote& among the population,
be Viet M
of of theViet )inha`a. The
to sub--committees whits initially directed Y
see region troops were unable to handle their responsibility
troops.
dons were withdrawn from the fe tee eacircl the
assigned to "liquidate the b fts* opeerati4 in
v c;3utr0], subversives activities art:
onto for poeeiblo future neutralization,
i- ation and report on follow gibers.
son in Viet t ,fit- te]4 territory to belong to
high Co orw.sted ae, Gentral Oommaitteee
r to oppose ' ench-sunorteed. suer
receives Its direction from Gen. w en Gia
Black Rivers. In $ rah 19,E approximately lo
as well as an increasIA"'; number of regional
idation" activities ; inet guerrillas in
i emu, Than Uyeen, of 4a3,7
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b.
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The i at promnt
tCWAfttion bit U to jw%o
b
(WA ,A jg4c b--e- eVacuaf-Pr/r - ALA /?cs)
co d materIA114 t t" *BOWA *I t
1-7
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 040002-6
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Vxd Oft" thww"vU
to create a UO"
v
" by bqjft the *Vim
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 Sanitized - Approvec.LQr Release : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
within a short period of t
VjL&tnm have b
~t be too io b
ON 0 if 't.. UkD
"gard to =017
A
as 81"rits, only
Viet
ill
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/ G -
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tI* 1(L 1+1 is
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 Sanitized - Approved FierlMuse : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
in !rth !ietnam, under cord
hinap will depend to a considerable extent upon the situation
101
outbreak of hctiiitiea and the amount of resistance
der cold war conditions. ! aus there has been
t opportunity to observe ress5.stince an
petwitbl even under o dating conditions., any present estimate of hot war
will necessarily be highly conjecture:
$ven k limited types of resistance as evasion and ceca
raining and information collection under conditions of Open
pport
are would be
whether andstirg groups are able to survive countermea u"ss
against them during the Co" war period, (b) the extent to which
d supply program during the cold war period.
reasonable degree of success in (c) the guerilla groups
invited guerrilla warfare capability.
re in a position to disrupt any major activity such as
all the gro
o, the Rhos, and possibly the n and fall located in the
columns along north-south routes troy Com-nist China
o' most guerrilla groups
e from their tribal areas Unite their effectiveness.
Lion collection can continue. !owes`
of limited value except for those groups
located
opted by open warfare; and, (a) the
itary action will be limited
o s_ ail scalp
and anbushes. Such a capability will depend al st
Ve Outside support in the fait of training "nd sup
groVs W= have no cap ility for gaining control over large t;
ps
aroas, to northern ?bnkin as the "diet nh did. in 'brli War TT from 1943
It is possible that existing groups can be utilised, in a clandea
hologic?sl warfare capacity to ap~rea
AvIgness Of groups to a ct ive1y resist will hinge upon the
which forces engaged against the Viet Nish are enjoying.
invader is
ftff" -s"1 `or1~teTfC-P 00865000200040002 6
~ + 27 1;2 --
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antiriet Minh elements a' a likely to do rothin to
USA Bch
Opposed to the Viet Minh are likely to jump on
&on in the. gvel' of Viet victories.
of reaistawo that can be. Welted wM depend, ..somewhat on
the regime preferring to wait for a turn in the tide of ear,
attacking forces. Here a distinction
the Vietnamese. The tribal pups
e for mW years and having been helped by the trench in
effort, could be most receptive to d'r'ench invaders.
other Vietnamese first and the `rench probably
ea probably acceptable to both are '.ais, Fil.ipi nos
olio Vietnamese are likely to prefer Prench
roups will be most effective it
of the regime, The bulk of Vietnamese population of North
looks upon the Viet 11M primarily as a nationalist ve-
,e has been successful in evicting the Fr
a domestic policy that i-- so un,
reaime~
nch,
is hope for
s the
is likely that the Vietnamese will continue to
th favor,
msibil.ity for initiation of war wouIl probably
resistance activities,
administer : d by Viet nan a e hi. ethnic Vietnamese
robably have the most ssl,utory effect upon,
nch-administer- d military goverment
nstrates
attitude from Its pre-aaxmiatice position, ft would still,.
st Vietnamese and could have an a=1verse
act ivi
epect for the energonce of resistance groups
crate for post-:war leadership In Tortb Vietnam,,
r see l kely to have little affect
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/3 -
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25X1A2g
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP62-0086
5RA0o 91 "Ir,
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
Its
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 Sanitized - Approved For R .fie . ? ? CIA-RDP62-00865R000200040002-6
FA'
Mon. At
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