CIA ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00939A000100010004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 10, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
TO : Acting ADSO
FROM : TRS
SUBJECT: CIA Organization and Functions
10 January 1949
1. The recent CIA Organization Charts, dated 1 January
1949, contain only one statement that may have a direct
bearing on the future of OSO Training. On page 6, under the
functions of the Personnel Officer, item no. 4 reads:
Provides training and indoctrination for CIA
employees as needed.
2. If this statement is broadly interpreted, the
Personnel Officer, CIA, would have authority to assume
jurisdiction over all or part of the training now conducted
by OSO Training. This move could be made to appear most
logical, particularly since OSO has the only training or
indoctrination program in CIA run by a reasonably well=manned
and efficient staff. Furthermore, OPC is now faced with the
problem of building up a Training Staff from nothing to a
staff orally predicted to become larger and more complex than
OSS Schools and Training. Since OSO Training is in a very
real sense the custodian of OSS training materials and know-
how, OPC must, for some time to come, lean on OSO Training,
not only for basic indoctrination in the techniques of
clandestine operations but also for training in the specific
techniques applicable to OPC activities.
3. My guess is that the OSO-OPC training needs will be
at least ninety-five per cent of CIA's total training and
indoctrination requirements. It would seem reasonable,
therefore, that if OSO and OPC can work out a mutually
agreeable training program, the Director would not favor a
shift of OSO-OPC training responsibilities to the Personnel
Officer, CIA. A proposal for a joint OSO-OPC approach to
this problem is outlinedbelow.
4. Before presenting a proposal for OSO-OPC training,
I should like to comment on the relationship between Personnel
and Training in an intelligence agency. In the typical U. S.
Government agency, "training" is considered a function of
the Personnel office. This training, at the most, consists
of a short orientation course which covers the essential facts
concerning the organization and functions of the agency.
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This is followed by on-the-job training, generally supervised
by the Personnel Officer. An intelligence agency needs
orientation courses for all its employees, particularly in
order to cover the securMy aspects of the work. (Except
for brief security talks, this is not now being done for all
of CIA.) However, the operating units of an intelligence
agency require intensive and extensive training in objectives
and techniques--both for offensive and defensive purposes.
This training can be done best by men with field experience
who understand the broad principles that underlie secret
intelligence work. Training, therefore, by its very nature
belongs in a close relationship to Plans and Operations, not
to Personnel or Administration. The relevant comparison,
organizationally speaking, is thus to the Armed Services,
approach to training, not to the typical government bureauts.
Another point in connection with the relationship
between Training and Personnel in an intelligence agency
should be made. Personnel will look "good" or "bad" in
direct proportion to the effectiveness of its recruiting
and placement actions. Training, at least 'as we see it in
OSO Training, has a real responsibility to evaluate students
and to recommend proper placement. Our evaluations must set
a high standard and must be independent judgments. If placed
under Personnel, Training would inevitably be under pressure
to soften its judgments.
5. The above paragraph may simply be flogging a dead--
or non-existent--horse. However, whether or not an effort
is made to shift Training to CIA Personnel, the OSO-OPC
training problem will remain until the extent to which OSO
and OPC collaborate on training matters is determined. The
proposal that follows is simply a rough outline. If it meets
with your approval and the Directorts, I would be glad to
work out the details.
6. Proposal for OSO-OPC for OSO-OPC Training:
a. The Director, CIA, would delegate the responsibility
for all CIA training to the ADSO.
(Note 1: Security indoctrination could remain
the function of the Chief, Inspection and Security.
Similarly, the Personnel officer, CIA, could be
given the responsibility for indoctrination of
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assumed by OSO if given administrative support by
CIA Personnel. )
(Note 2: A precedence for this can be found in
the present CIA Organization. OSO 'provides world-
wide communication security and support for all of
CIA.... 11)
b. Under the ADSO's direction, the Chief, TRS,
woull organize his staff along these lines:
(1) An Executive Officer, responsible for
administration of training facilities and areas,
budgets, records, and other necessary administrative
support, administrative training, language training,
and liaison with other agencies on training
matters.
(2) A Deputy for Intelligence Training. (Primarily
for OSO. )
(3) A Deputy for Operations Training. (Primarily
for ?PC. )
(4) A Deputy for Covert Training. (For both OSO
and OPC, though security of both would be
carefully guarded.)
c. In order to have adequate direction from both
OPC and OSO, the Chief, TRS, would be advised on training
requirements, objectives, and plans affecting training
by a committee comprised of the chief planning officers
of OSO and OPC and by one other representative from each
Office to be appointed by the ADSO and the ADPC. These
members, preferably, would represent the operations
staffs of each Office. (If the over-all CIA indoctrination
responsibility is added, the Director, CIA, should also
appoint a member to this advisory committee.)
d. In addition to the above committee, TRS would
further be aided by Training Liaison Officers appointed
from the various components of OSO and OPC to handle
liaison with TRS and to assist the Deputies responsible
for Intelligence, Operations, and Covert Training in
matters of concern to the component Branches and Staffs.
(This system is now working most effectively within
OSO.)
e. Budgetary and personnel allocations could be made
by OO and OPC, if necessary, on the basis of estimated
training loal.s.
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f. With the above organization and with adequate
advice and support from OSO and OPC, TRS could present
a pattern of training somewhat as follows:
(1) Administrative Training, both HQ and Field
for those in OPC and OSO who need either or both
types.
(2) Basic Orientation for all clerical and
administrative personnel who are not directly con-
cerned with operations.
(3) A Basic Course for OSO and OPC personnel who
need to understand the basic principles of clandestine
operations. This course would be a prerequisite to
advanced training in OSO and OPC techniques and
objectives.
(4) Advanced OSO Courses, similar to those now
given, would be run under the direction of the
Deputy for Intelligence Training. OPC students
would be admitted to these courses by special
permission and would not attend sessions of interest
only to OSO.
(5) Advanced OPC Courses would be given under the
direction of the Deputy for Operations Training.
Since many different types of operations are
envisaged for OPC, many separate schools will be
required. However, since training in some of the
OPC techniques will be needed by some OSO personnel,
this training could be arranged, subject to security
considerations as established by OPC.
(6) Covert Training will be needed by both OSO
and OPC. Since this type of training requires the
most secure handling of training sites, transportation,
contacts, etc., as well as tailor-made programs for
each student, it will be best to have all covert
training supervised by one man who would have the
right to call on instructors from operations (OPC)
Training,and Intelligence (OSO) Training for
assistance in specialized subjects.
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7. No elaborate justification for placing the CIA
training function in OSO should be required; however, by way
of summary, the following points should be recalled:
a. OSO has a continuity of experience behind it from
OSS days to the present. This experience, on the training
level particularly, includes propaganda, sabotage, weapons,
guerrilla warfare, and maritime operations, as well as
intelligence and counter-intelligence.
b. Unified control and direction of training will
be more effective and certainly more economical. It is
certainly more logical to build on an already effective
training staff than to recruit and train another staff
from scratch.
c.. OPC, essentially an action office, will expand
or contract as the cold war waxes hot or cools. Thus
it would be preferable in calmer times to have only a
skeleton training staff interested in direct action,
but also to have possibilities for rapid expansion.
d. CIA should have only one point of liaison on
training matters with outside agencies, including foreign
intelligence services, for security reasons, if not
simply for the sake of good administration.
e. In the event of war, CIA will require many and
varied training establishments both in this country and
overseas. If not under unified control and direction,
CIA, within its own framework, will be competing for
instructors, supplies, space, etc.
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f. In the present cold war, both OSO and OPC need
forward-base training facilities to handle, usually in
foreign languages, the training of non-American person-
nel for intelligence procurement and direct action.
This type of training could best be handled under the
direction of a single training staff in Headquarters and
by a single training authority in the field.
.E. The fact that OPC and OSO operational techniques
have more in common than otherwise should be clearly
recognized. True as this is in peace, it is more true
in time of war. There is a further advantage in
sharing common training, whatever the ultimate separation
of operations may be, in that a mutual understanding of
objectives and techniques will lead to smoother working
relationships. Or, to put It another way--as we found
it true in OSS--there is considerable advantage in
wearing the same school tie.
8. In conclusion, I should like to point out that my
proposals as outlined here are made in the sincere belief
that OSO Training is capable of expanding sufficiently to
handle OPC and OSO training needs. I also believe that this
move would be in the best interests of CIA as a whole. If
my proposals are presented to the Director, I should like
him to understand that I am not seeking to improve my ovrn
position; on the contrary, I have repeatedly requested an
overseas assignment and have been promised one as soon as I
can be replaced. However, I do feel that, because we have
not been self-promoting in OSO Training, our real potentialities
and progress are not recognized outside OSO. We would welcome
an opportunity to hold an open house soon and invite the
Director and his chief staff officers to inspect our training
facilities and to meet our instructors. If you feel that
this is advisable, we would be most happy to plan such a
program.
(Note: Three memoranda, recently prepared by me for
COPS may be of relevance to this paper. They are:
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0* A rogram or the Training of OPC
Instructors by 0S0/TRS
Copies of these were given to Mr. Angleton.)
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