DECISION ON PROJECT AQUATONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200010105-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: August 1, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP62600844R000200010105-6
/64 OSA
SUBJECT
1.
M
of Central Intelligence 1 August 1956
on Project AQUA TONE
? sat talus:, R.flscting the discussions and decisions of the
ask. since AQUA TONE operations were halted on 11 July, the
the present stet** of the Project.
a. Detachment A is at Wiesbaden in complete state of readiness
with four (4) aircraft operational. It has been advised that no missions will
be flews over denied areas until after 15 August at the earliest but in the
meanwhile Infrequent weather missions and certain test missions are being
flown over friendly territory. Work is still proceeding on a permanent base,
originally intended for this unit, at
b. Detachment B has completed training and its deployment to
25X1A Adana from will start on 13 Auglust. It should be fully op*
with four (4) aircraft at Adana by 25 August.
it. An advance Las vallable facilities at
25X1A and Plans are being completed
and sLr-lUt scheduled for a redeployment of Detachment A from Wiesbaden
to the Fax Last beginning about 21 September. (The same air-lift will be
ailed for the initial deployment of Detachment B and the redeployment of A.)
It is understood that the final decision to leave Detachment A in Germany
or redeploy it to the Far East will not be made until about 15 August and it
will remain in a stet, et operational 'miasmas* until that date. If redeployed
this Detachment should be operational in the Fax East *bout 15 September.
Ow
4. The assembly, equipping and tr of a third detachment
(Detachment C) is going forwerd on schedule at Most of its
senior personnel have already entered on duty an eight (S) pilots have been
recruited. The Detachment should be ready for deployment in the first half
of November.
e. As a result slippage in the development of the most
advanced C11112Mtritit and much of the electronics equipment, considerable
development remains to be does. The C camera cannot be expected to be
Tii-1434504"../
Copyj of 5
Approved For Release 2001/06/15 : CIA-RDP62600844R000200010105-6
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Approved For Rilease 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP62130084413000200010105-6
seh before the cad of the year and electronics system 14 will
operational until late winter. On the basis of present plans these
25X1Adevelopment rograms and some trainin activities will continue at
*brassy. Thereafter will be *hut down and the 25X1
velopment activities will be handled at an Aix FOI1Cie base.
25X1
Z. Docieione ReAuir d: By 15 August it will be necessary to decide:
a. Whether Detachment A is to resume operations in Europe.
be redeployed proznptly to the Far East, or remain inactive at Wiesbaden
awaiting a later resumption of operations or redeployment.
b. Whether Detachment B is to start active operation, from
t is operational, fly "probing miseions or remain inactive
a ter decisions.
or 15 August it would seem desirable to revieprocurementw
rograms in the light of the above decisions with s view to
ant and procurement no longer required for this Project.
would likewise seem wise to review the requirement for a
third detachment.
3.
as confide
on these Dacia
o
cIearly established and objectively stated circurns
determine the major policy decisions but which do
for the form and timing of these decisions.
What are here listed
d to be reasonably
s which in no way
clear implications
. U Detachment A is not going to be used in Europe either
at Wiesbaden or along with Detachment B at Adana, it ought to be put to work
as soon as pbesible in the Far East. U a decision is not made by 15 August
either to let it resume operations or to redeploy it, the opportunity for a
prompt redeployment would be lost and more time would be wasted to no good
purpose.
b. The or on which has been built up to carry out AQUA-
ONS has bean designed to conduct operations for a period of *lightly more
than a year. It is not a permanent organisation and is ill-adapted to the
task of maintaining in a routine manner a standby capability to be used in
the event of war or of unforeseeable sharp change in the political climate.
Its personnel, both civilian and military, have been recruited for short tours
of duty, assigned overseas on a TDT basis without their families, and every
IIC:'1"
Approved For Release 1
'20 1/08/151.141 -RDP62600844R000200010105-6
Approved For Release 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP62600844R000200010105-6
has been med. to develop the motivation for an intensivetemporary
undertaking. If the decision is made that & part or all of the capability that
has been developed is to be placed on a standby basis, with no prospect
of active use at any foreseeable time, the present organisation would lose
its moral., many of its best people, and its effectiveness.
c. Development and procurement are currently going forward
on a scale adequate to support three detachments on a fully active basis
for a continueui period of 15 months. Savings of some millions of dollars
(part of which would accrue to the Agency and part to the Air Force) could
be achieved by prompt cutbacks in those programs. Such cutbacks would,
however, prevent the development of the full capability originally planned.
Under the circumstances, failure to achieve any clear-cut decision as to
the *cats on which and the time period for which this capability wilt be
actively employed is bound to result in the waste of substantial sums as
well as the weeteful tying up of technical manpower which may be needed
in other National security programs.
4. It must be repeated that e ormed technical opinion
allows that existing reconnsiesance system less than a year before the
probability of interception of the U-2 aircraft starts to increase.
4. Crclueions: All of the above considerations argue powerfully
or of an attempt to secure reasonably clear-cat decisions on the future
Project by the middle of August. The broad decision that needs to be
a whether this capability is going to be used (a) against the USSR,
Inst China, (c) against the European satellites, or (d) not at all.
s difficult to believe that any facts not now available are required as the
basis for such a decision or that the passage of a few more weeks would
greatly alter an evaluation of risks to be incurred and benefits to be gained.
In particular it is difficult to see what good can come of "probing" missions
which will merely alert the defense and stimulate mere political protests
without accomplishing any really important purpose.
S. Proposed Procedure: In order to *eCute a dee on
that two kinds oi staff work should be done:
lieved
a. Tirst, a specific plan of operations should be proposed as
the desired course of action and the more sensible alternative courses of
action should be defined in equally specific terms so that a clear choice is
presented to the political authorities. A specific proposal has been prepared
Approved For Release 200T/ 5:'PlATADP621300844R000200010105-6
Approved For Release 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP621300844R000200010105-6
a plan or some f
over the highest pr
ctical purposes there are
Lesions over the
igence targets.
alternative co
stern USSR
is believed
es of action:
(I) Opsratloni limited to China and the Luropean Satelittes.
2) The placing of the capability on a standby basis.
. Second. the proposal should be staffed out with the interested
military authorities (the Air Force and the JCS) and with the Department of State
in the hope that it can be presented with their concurrence. To this end, a
military assessment of AQUA.TONE is being prepared by the Mr Force and
it is believed that support will be forthcoming both from General Twining and
from Admiral Radford on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. It had been hoped that
the Secretary of State's views could be obtained well in advance of 15 August.
6. dation.: It is strongly reco
ded:
? That the recommended plan of operations over the USSR
from the west, together with the two alternative courses of action, be presented
to the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity and the plan be modified
if necessary so as to obtain his concurrence or at least acquiescence.
b. That in the event of his non-concurrence in any further
operations1 steps be taken forthwith to turn over aU the assets of the Project
to the Air Force to be maintained as a standby capability.
this be
and the
. That in the event of hi. concurrence in a plan of operations
ted to higher authority as e. joint recommendation of the DCI
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.
cc: DDC1 I RIC
RMB:djm
l-DCI
2-DDCI
3-RMB Chrono
4-
5-Pro. Chrono (to be held in Proj.Dir. Files)
(
TO
SEC- F
Approved For Release 2001/08/15 :CIA-RDP621300844R000200010105-6
? ELL
set Director
25X1A