IMMEDIATE PLANS FOR AQUATONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200010119-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 119
• Publication Date: July 18, 1956
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP62600844R000200010119-1
18 Jul
MEMORANDUM Director of Central intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Immediate Plans for AQUATONE
56
1. After some hours of reflection, I strongly urge reconsideration
of certain of the decisions with regard to AQUA TONE that were made in the
Director's office at the end of the afternoon on 17 July 1956.
2. I can not help wondering whether the purely political implica-
tion.? of an immediate and probably final cessation of operations in Europe
have been fully considered by the Secretary of State. As you are aware, it
will appear to the Soviet authorities that their protest accomplished its
purpose Literally within hours of its delivery. Is it really desirable to
demonstrate in this way both the closeness of our control over these opera
tions and our eXtreme sensitivity to a diplomatic protest even when no
evidence can be adduced in its support. Do we wish to demonstrate again
25X6 to1.1= as in the case of GENETRIX, that we will not
carry through projects of this sort in the face of a protest. I would think
that at a minimum one or two missions should be flown over satellite
territories and at least one penetration made into the USSR if only to avoid
what seems to me to be disastrous political consequences of a demonstration
of timidity, 1 recognize this is a matter for the Secretary of State. If he is
not worried of the political considerations or if he believes it is futile to
reopen this matter with the President, there is certainly no move that can
be made from this .Agency.
3. Your instructions to me of 17 July wer to continue the presently
planned procurement of equipment. I recommend that this decision be reviewed
and that I be authorized immediately to cancel contracts for the procurement
of (a) electronic system 4 which is advanced automatic ferret equipment,
and (b) additional B configuration cameras. I also propose to re-examine
our planned procurement of other items and will submit further recommenda-
tions for cancellation within the next few days. Frankly, I do not see how we
can justify the expenditure of funds for items that will not be ready for a
number of months simply in the hope the President's views will completely
change in the interim.
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4. With respect to the construction now in progress a
In Germany, I be love the Air Force should be advised that there is little
prospect we will ever wish to operate from that base so they may reach a
prompt decision as to the completion, modification, or suspension of work
now in progreis there. Although I believe it has already progressed so far
that they will probably carry most of it through to completion, there would
seem to be no justification for pressure to meet a deadline. In any event,
since the Air Force is our partner in this enterprise, I believe they should
be formally advised at this time of the changed outlook.
S. Although I do not recommend any modification at this time
of the decision to install a detachment at Adana as soon as that base is ready.
I would like to emphasize for the record the basis of that decision. The
fact of the matter is that there is very little likelihood of our being able
to penetrate the USSR from the south without detection. We have already
flown mission* over the Crimea and have been tracked more accurately
there than in Central Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that the only
prospect of being able to penetrate without tracking is for flights over the
Caspian Sea. Accordingly, if the President's present views remain sub-
stantially unchanged, we will never be permitted to operate from Adana.
Viewed in this light, the deployment of a unit to that location can be justified
only as a preparation for the contingency that the President will change his
mind in a few weeks time. I suppose this can be justified on the ground that
we have already spent some to little purpose
and we may as well spend a bit more on the off chance that things will change
for the better.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director
RMB:gjg (18 Jul 56)
Distribution:
Cy 1-DCI
2-DDCI
3 -
Dir Chrono
5-Proj Chrono (Hold in Admin Bldg)
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