SUGGESTIONS RE THE INTELLIGENCE VALUE OF AQUATONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200020017-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 1999
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 17, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

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TOP SEC ET
17 July 1956
MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director
SUBJECT . Suggestions re the Intelligence Value of
AQUA TONE
In balancing the value in intelligence returns potentially available
from AQUATONE operations against the possible damage to U. S. inter-
national relations, it is important to consider these returns in their proper
light. First, it is of utmost importance to differentiate in our minds, and
to cause the Russians to differentiate in theirs, between AQUATONE-type
operations and reconnaissance by military aircraft. As a covert intelligence
operation AQUATONE has merely substituted high altitude vehicles and
precision observation and memory equipment for more prosaic modes of
transportation and the eyes and memory of an agent. The operation is
intended and designed to provide the U. S. with an understanding of the
capabilities of the Soviet Union, its current intentions, and its long range
objectives. AQUATONE operations are not intended to be the counterpart
of the target-spotting function of military reconnaissance which is an
immediate prelude to hostilities.
The second important aspect of the results of AQUATONE opera-
tions which must be considered stems from the objectives just stated. The
length of the missions that can be carried out inside the USSR, the wide
variety of areas and subject matter that can be covered in any one sortie,
make the AQUATONE intelligence system one which is capable of studying
a culture rather than one solely designed to cover specific targets.
There can be no doubt of the value in terms of our national security
of the photographic coverage obtained on 4 July 1956 of five of the seven
highest priority targets specified by the USAF. This mission was indeed
timely in that it revealed no heavy jet bombers at any of the five bases
covered, even though current intelligence estimates dictated the presence
of regiments of such bombers at at least two of these five bases. There
can also be no doubt that the coverage obtained at Leningrad during the same
mission was of great importance to the Navy and covered some of its highest
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priority intelligence targets.; The new ways at at least one submarine
yard, the fitting of an additional cruiser of the Sverdlov class (possibly
for missiles), as well as the location and size of military port installations
were certainly useful if not essential in preparing estimates of Soviet naval
capabilities. Likewise, the Army installation at Bykhov and the associated
training grounds in the vicinity was important new information for G-2. The
northern shore line from Leningrad westward and southward can fill a
current critical need in connection with the determination of potential
amphibious landings on Russian soil in the event of war.
But a full review of the 4 July mission yields results of much
greater significance than these so called "highest priorities" intelligence
targets. For the first time we are really able to say that we have an under-
standing of much that was going on in the Soviet Union on 4 July 1956. This
understanding comes from observation and knowledge which even a person
unskilled in the photo-interpretation art can achieve. We are no longer
dependent on an "estimate" or a "judgment" or an "assessment" of what
the situation is. We now have a cross section of a part of the entire Soviet
way of life for that date -- their military installations, their farms, their
irrigation systems, their factories, their power systems to feed the
factories, their housing for the people who run the factories, their recreation,
their railroads and the amount of traffic they carry, their scientific accomplish-
ment at least in the field of electronics, the port activities for both civilian
and military persons in Leningrad and other ports on the Baltic. We know
that even though innumerable radar signals were detected and recorded by
the electronic system carried on the mission, fighter aircraft at the five
most important bases covered were drawn up in orderly rows as if for
formal inspection on parade. The medium jet bombers located at the bases
were also neatly aligned and not even dispersed to on-field dispersal areas.
We know that the guns in the anti-aircraft batteries sighted were in a
horizontal position rather than pointed upwards and "on the ready". We know
that some harvests were being brought in and that small truck gardens were
being worked. These are but a few examples of the many things which tend
to spell out the real intentions, objectives and qualities of the Soviet Union
that we must fully understand and appreciate if we are to be successful in
negotiating a lasting peace for the world.
It may well be that the absence of heavy bombers from the bases
covered during this first and subsequent missions only means that the
estimated number of bombers might still be correct but that the bombers
are stationed elsewhere at installations yet to be discovered. It may well
also be that the failure of fighter aircraft at the many fields overflown to
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scramble to seek out the intruder and the failure of the anti-aircraft guns
to rise to the ready is an expression of strength on the part of the Russians --
strength borne of knowledge of what we are up to. It may also well be that
the other specific indicators of military capability which we might search out
in the photography obtained could be used to cast doubt on the understanding
we are seeking to accomplish. But these alternatives appear to have doubtful
validity. While we must grant that, in the week of operations permitted to
AQUATONE, only a relatively small area of the Soviet Union and, therefore,
a relatively small part of their culture was examined, the sampling appears
to be good. Broad coverage of the order of 400, 000 square miles was obtained --
possibly as much as 15, 000 square miles of detailed coverage was accomplished.
Even though all of this area was in the portions of Russia we should know most
about from other sources of intelligence, many new discoveries have come to
light. Airfields previously unknown, army training bases previously unknown,
industrial complexes of a size heretofore unsuspected were revealed, and so
on down through a long list of various types of significant activities. More
than 130 airfields can be identified inside the Soviet Union and more than 60
urban areas can be examined from photographs now available from AQUA TONE.
Yet there is a huge area included in the Urals and beyond about which we know
even less from other intelligence sources and which may really hold the key
to the understanding of the Soviet Union that we seek.
To bar the United States from reaching this understanding through
overflights of the critical regions of the Urals and eastward could well be
tragic. Five operational missions have already proven that many of our
guesses on important subjects can be seriously wrong, that the estimates
which form the basis for national policy can be projections from wrong guesses
and that, as a consequence, our policy can indeed be bankrupt. In this light,
the danger to our international relations appears to be far greater if we do
not carry out the AQUA TONE plan than if we do carry it out, having laid
sufficient ground work to assure that the interpretation of the activities is
as an intelligence operation rather than as a reconnaissance prelude to
hostilities.
T'4 SECRET ,,4
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