ESTIMATE OF SOVIET BLOC HIGH ALTITUDE INTERCEPTION CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200240011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: January 2, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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2 January 1958
MEMORAIWtJM FOR:
Special Assistant to the Director for Planning
SUBJECT:
Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception
Capabilities
REFERENCES:
I.
T.S. 158851 dated 25 February 1957
2.
DRAFT #3 Memorandum dated 2 October 1957
1. Our previous estimates on this subject were presented in the
referenced memoranda. It is our intention in the present paper to
deal primarily with significant differences in estimates made now as
opposed to the early 1957 date of the earlier estimate.
Early Warning Detection and Tracking
2. On the basis of evidence largely accumulated or assessed in the
last six months of 1957, we conclude that detection and tracking of
intruding aircraft are assured throughout the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the
following possible exceptions:
a. the central Siberian area bounded by the Arctic coastal
strip on the north, the Urals on the west, the Trans-Siberian
Railway on the south, and the Pacific Maritime Provinces on the
east. We have very little information on which to make a firm
judgment on this region.
b. the area east of Tashkent and south of the Trans-Siberian
Railway extending into central China. In this case, our judgment
is to some extent based on radar density and reaction to overflight.
The former area is largely devoid of critical military installations and,
therefore, may remain relatively free of radar for some time. We do not
expect the latter area to remain for long in its present near-radarless
state.
Electronic Aspects of Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI)
3. Our previous estimate that the Soviets are fully capable of GCI
has to some extent been strengthened by recent information. Soviet height
finding capabilities appear much improved in many areas of the USSR withs
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SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
the introduction of ROCK CAKE height-finding radars fairly widely throughout
the area covered during 1957 overflights. We believe there is no longer
any reason for the Soviets not to know the altitudes at which Project
operations have been conducted. Two new types of radar (STRIKEOUT,believed
to be used with ROCK CAKE, and a modified TOKEN) should improve Soviet
EW/(SCI capabilities. We continue to believe that the Soviets have adequate
airborne intercept (AI) radar for use in interception vehicles.
Interceptor Aircraft and Air-to-Air Missiles
As in the previous estimate, we have ruled out the possibility
that rocket boosted or high altitude research aircraft might represent a
threat.
5. Considering that the Soviets in Jiuly 1956 were given firm warning
of what to expect and round themselves at that tine unable to cope with the
situation, we believe it highly likely that they would begin to modify one
or more types of interceptors to obtain one with increased altitude
capability. We have noted for some time Soviet interest in high altitude
flights (up to 60-65,000 feet) by military aircraft though no evidence
points to a specific modification program. Combat ceiling capabilities of
four advanced Soviet interceptors are as follows: MEG-17 - 59,000 feet;
MIG-19 - 61,000 feet; FACEPLATE - 61,000 feet; FITTER - 60,000 feet. Using
the MG-19, for example, in about a year delivery of a modified version
able to reach a combat ceiling of 68-70,000 feet would be possible. Thus,
with July 1956 as a starting date, delivery of such aircraft would be
expected to begin as early as July 1957. We believe that the threat from
such modified aircraft using simple armament is increasing rapidly in
critical areas of the USSR and throughout 1958 will represent the principal
physical hazard to operations. We emphasize, however, that this capability
is little more than marginal and, bearing in mind the Al and GCI problems,
luck will have to be on the side of the Soviets to carry out an interception
by this means.
6. As lesser possibilities, we have considered (a) use of MIG-17 or
MIG-19 aircraft at 55-60,000 feet as vehicles for launching air-to-air
!missiles from a "pull up" attitude; (b) use of supersonic interceptors
"zoomed" to 70,000 feet or more, also for AA missile attack; and (c) use
of nuclear warheads in air-to-air rockets. By the "pull up" technique,
missiles might be launched so as to intercept targets up to about 68,000
feet, using stockpile missiles, or much higher using specially designed
missiles. Primarily because of the complexities of the GCI, AI and missile
T. S. 164$25
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SUBJECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
guidance problems involved in such an attack, however, we believe kill
probabilities would be low, although not negligible, during 1958. The
"zoom" technique likewise has many inherent difficulties and the
probability of successful use depends heavily on the mnber of aircraft
which can be so employed. The technique involves essentially accelerating
a supersonic interceptor, such as FACEPLATE or FITTER, to maximum speed
at combat ceiling of about 60,000 feet and in an energy climb going to
altitudes of probably 70,000 feet or more. Techniques for this purpose
are difficult, but not impossible, to master and we would expect the
Soviets to utilize maneuvers such as this. For several reasons, we
consider use of air-to-air rockets with nuclear warheads, though possibly
effective, to be unlikely.- Internal political. considerations would render
their use unlikely over populated areas, but they could conceivably be
effective over such targets as Kapustin Yar or other test ranges. We have
no information of such Soviet development. It is within their capability
although protection of the pilot for such a high altitude attack might be
difficult. We have discussed these possibilities in the belief that Soviet
desire to accomplish interception would cause them to attempt any method
which might lead to successful interception.
7. Summarizing the various possible hazards from aircraft and AA
missiles, we believe that time is running out for operations at 70,000
feet or less, and possibly somewhat above this level. A stiffening of
defenses, first around the key targets, can be expected from now on. We
likewise believe that we can expect to see Soviet aircraft operating at
or near the altitudes employed by the Project vehicle. We believe, however,
that the chance of successful Soviet. interception is low, except as
otherwise noted herein, and will continue to be so throughout 1958.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
8. As we pointed out previously, we believe that the Soviets would
find it difficult to operate the present Moscow surface-to-air missile at
70,000 feet and above, and we do not believe such missiles will pose a
serious threat to operations before the middle or close of 1958.
9. Beginning with 1959,. however, we believe the Soviets will introduce
a SAM missile with considerably increased altitude,and range capabilities.
This missile will appear first in the. Moscow region, where an extensive SAM
launching complex of about 60 sites exists now, and possibly also around
Leningrad where similar launching facilities are under construction.
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S1 JECT: Estimate of Soviet Bloc High Altitude Interception Capabilities
Areas of Special Consideration
10. We continue to believe that in the environs of Moscow the
Soviets would employ the most advanced techniques of which they are
capable and, accordingly, we consider this to be the most hazardous area
for operations. It is particularly true of this area that the chances
of successful operation increase, with increase in altitude.
11. We believe that the region east of Stalingrad (Kapustin Yar -
Vladimirovka), where we know that missile development of many types,
including surface-to-air, is conducted and which is adjacent to
experimental aircraft testing facilities, is also one in which Soviet
intercept capabilities may be high. No other areas, with the possible
exception of Leningrad, are known to rank with these two insofar as
surface-to-air missile countermeasures are concerned.
Concluding Remarks
12. In sum nary, we believe that:
a. detection and tracking of the vehicle are virtually assured.
b. specially designed aircraft capable of operating at or near
70,000 feet are now, or shortly will be, available to the Soviets
in limited numbers. These aircraft could possibly conduct successful
interception at or near 70,000 feet.
c. the combination of Soviet interceptors, using "zoom" and
"pull up" techniques, and air-to-air missiles now poses a growing
threat around highly sensitive target areas.
d. SAM missiles, now deployed around Moscow and possibly
Leningrad, will have a low kill capability versus the Project
vehicle up to early 1958, but this capability will increase and
could become serious by 1959.
e. many of our highest priority targets must now be considered
defended areas against operations conducted below 70,000 feet.
13. We suggest that operational planning take into account the change
in the picture which we have outlined above. It appears that some
sacrifice of "take" may be necessary to preserve the operation. It may
become necessary to make more frequent changes in course in order to throw
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off interception. )tore careful selection of routes to and from target
areas may also be required. We believe some such changes will be
necessary if chances of interception are to be minimized.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
Distribution:
Cys 1-6
- Addressee
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Project Chrono
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- AD/Si
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- Extra copies
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