PROPOSED EXCHANGES WITH THE USSR, 1960-1961.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62S00231A000100110042-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: May 1, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62SO0231A000100110042-6
Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO Chief, Industrial Division, ORfl
ATT 25X1A9a
FROM . Chief, Aircraft Branch, 0/I
suBJECT: Proposed Exchanges with the USS:;,, 1960-1961.
DATE: 1 Ma r 1959
1. Tooling for Production of Large Airframes
A. Length of tour from 2 to 3 weeks.
B. Exchange would include visits to production sites involved in
manufacture bi large aircraft. Much of the tooling techniques would apply
equally to the production of long range missiles. For example in the U.S.
the jigs for the Thor l:RBM at Douglas Aircraft are as big and massive ?,s
those from the DC-8 jet airliner.
2. Fabrication of High Temperature Materials for Aircraft Construction.
A. Length of tour from 2 to 3 weeks.
B. Exchange would include observing welding and forming of titanium
and other high temperature materials. High temperature materials are u;ed in
super-sonic aircraft and in space weapons. Techniques for fabrication would
apply to broad categories of super-sonic vehicles.
3. Sliecia.7. Purpose Machine Tools Used in the Manufacture of Aircraft.
A. Length of tour from 2 to 3 weeks.
B, Exchange would include observing operation of large spar mills,
skin mills and stretch presses. In the US such equipment is used in all air-
craft plants concerned with producing large aircraft. Although there is not
much evidence which suggests that the Soviets are using such equipment it is
believed that they must use modern techniques in order to produce high per-
formance aircraft. If they are not their aircraft may be considerably heavier
than has been estimated, which would effect performance especially the rwl.ge.
1-. All of the suggested changes probably would result in some technc.-
logical gain to the USSR, but the intelligence gain to the US would more than
off-set this. It is believed that the intelligence collected would enable the
US to better assess Soviet capabilities to produce long-range weapon carrying
vehicles.
5. It is expected that the US delegations would come from industry fur
the most part, with some lessor representation from technical colleges and
government agencies.
Approved For Release 2001/07/28 : CIA-RDP62SO0231A000100110042-6