NOTES ON (Classified) EXCHANGE OF PETROLEUM DELEGATIONS FOR A THREE TO SIX MONTH PERIOD.
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP62S00346A000100050051-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 28, 1998
Sequence Number:
51
Case Number:
Content Type:
REPORT
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25X1X1
No 'es on US-USSR exchange of petroleum delegations
for a -three to six month perio .
Knowledge of US petroleum technology has been almost completely avail-
able to the USSR through open technical publications and patents. Gz rtain
confidential company information, mostly in the processing field, could be
adequately safeguarded from the USSR delegation, as it is now from competitors.
Therefore, the gain to the USSR delegation of technical knowledge would be
small, and would not be greatly enhanced by a three to six-month tour com-
pared to a one-month tour.
The actual application of recent advances in petroleum technology
would undoubtedly be of great interest to the USSR delegation. The tour
should enable them to apply such new methods and techniques more quickly and
successfully in the USSR petroleum industry.
The USSR delegation would
presumably have a carefully selected list of'high priority targets on recent
developments in the US petroleum industry. The length of such a list would
be limited by the size of the'-delegation and the length of time it remained
in the US. For the same size of delegation, a three to six-month tour would
provide a substantial advantage over a one-month tour, with respect to the
application of recent technologic advances in the US petroleum industry.
2. Economic
A complete array of economic and operating statistics on the US
petroleum industry have been published for years, and have, of course., been
readily available to the USSR. With respect to such statistical data, there
is no gain to the USSR delegation., either on a one-month or six-month tour$
except the possible satisfaction of checking the validity of such data. As
the Russians frequently re-publish some of these US data without questioning
their validity,3t appears doubtful that anything relating to economic or
operating statistics of US petroleum industry would be an important target
of a USSR delegation*
Ite. yin 1't'f/sr
is in oil-well drilling. The Russians have-aeveloped`the turbodrill and
ec s
O.Y. It is believed that a USSR delegation touring the US petroleum industry
would be assigned the task of discovering the reason for the high over-all
productivity in the US industry compared with the USSR industry. A good example
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use it exclusively in hard-rock drilling. USSR published data (verified by
US tests) show the turbodrill will penetrate hard rock two to three times
faster than the conventional rotary drill used for hard rock drilling in the
US . However, rotary drilling crews in the US drill twice as rruch hole per
rig-month in hard rock drilling, as USSR turbodrill crews. This presents a
real problem to the Russians, and one they probably do not fully understand.
Statistically, the reason is readily explained. "Down time's or enforced
idleness waiting on supplies, equipment or labor arstitutes 42 percent of
#be eight percent for a US crew. Time out for repairs, accidents, and mis-
cellaneous are also much higher on USSR than on US operations. The net re-
sult, according to a USSR statistical compilation, is only 10.7 percent of
the total time given to actual drilling in the USSR compared to 56.5 per-
cent in the.'
if a team of experienced USSR oil-well drillers or drilling foremen
who were well trained technically and in eco mmis, spent three to six months
vi,siting.co ntract drilling rigs in the US they would discover the basic under-
lying reason for the US drilling industry compared to that of the USSR. The
reason is, of course, competition and the incentives inherent in competitive
capitalism. These competitive techniques and incentives, if applied to the
USSR industry (of course under the guise of Communism) would quickly increase
USSR productivity and over-all effectiveness.
25X1X1 ain 25X1X5
3 , CIA has in almost all sectors and
economic aspects of the Soviet petroleum industry. 25X1X5
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25X1X1
-A US petroleum delegation visiting the Soviet Union for a period of
three to six months, by concentrating at both the Ministerial or equivalent
level, and by intensive surveys of Soviet field operations, could magnify
compared to a visit of only one month. The areas
SECRET
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SECRET:
Availability of US Industry Personnel
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Th has advised the CIA that
25X1A5a1
qualified personnel can be made available under sponsorship of the -
25X1 A5a 1 to staff a US petroleum delegation to tour the USSR
for a.period of one month. Such personnel would be oil company officials
loaned for this purpose.
It is not believed that the foregoing arrangement would be feasible
for a period of 3 to 6 months. To staff such a delegation would require
hiring consultants or other available personnel, and the question of
financing such an undertaking would be pertinent.
459 4-W
It appears that a 3 to 6 month tour in each country for an exchange of
US-USSR petroleum delegations would result in some net gain to the US but
on a lesser margin than on the original proposal for a one-month tour.
It is suggested that the one-month tour be carried out as planned. If, as
a result of that tour, it appears desirable to exchange delegations in
selected phases of the petroleum industry for a longer period, such
exchanges can thenbe arranged.
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