SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62S00545A000100090085-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 85
• Content Type: REPORT

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Soviet Economic Development
The outstanding fact about the Soviet economy is its continued
rapid growth. The traditional twin priorities -- investment
in heavy industry and military preparedness -- have recently been
joined by the consumer welfare program, with its emphasis on
housing and agriculture. However, the shifts in resource
allocation have had only a small, although perceptible, impact
on economic growth.
Al's W L !, .'S i, r' dt4'
f
"
`
h
Soviet gross national product
h
as been growing nearly
twice as fast as that of the United States. Currently Soviet
GNP is about 40 per cent that of the United States, but consumption
(or what the consumer gets) is only about 25 per cent of U.S. levels.
The USSR, by restricting consumption and concentrating on priority
objectives, is able to challenge this country in important fields.
In terms of resources available for national policy purposes,
which is to say for research, defense, industrial development,
and foreign aid, the aggregate Soviet effort approaches that of
the United States.
Military Expenditures
Ads far as military expenditures are concerned, we believe
that the Soviets are spending about 170 to 180 billion rubles a
year in total, compared to their announced expenditures of from
90 to 100 billion rubles. Our study of military pay and allowances,
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military construction costs and production costs leads us to
believe that the so-called "explicit" Soviet defense expenditures
cover only about 55 per cent of what total outlays must be. Very
substantial outlays are buried under other headings in the Soviet
budget. (Chart III)
growth
Because of the rapid/of the Soviet economy, military ex-
penditures could riseAto a level of about 220 billion rubles,
or 40 billions more than at present, and still represent the
same percentage of gross national product. (Charts I and II)
Chart V shows the estimated breakdown in broad categories
for 1950, 1957, and 1962. The respective categories include
the following:
Military personnel - expenditures for 1) pay and sub-
eistence of all full time members of the Soviet army, naval,
and air forces; 2) the militarized components of the MVD-
JOB; and 3) subsistence for reservists on active duty.
Other personnel - expenditures for 1) civilian employees
of the Soviet Ministry of Defense; 2) pensions for retired
career military personnel; and 3) those payments to reser-
vists met by their places of employment while they are on
temporary active duty.
Research and development - all outlays for military research
and development, including product development.
Materiel - all other outlays for Soviet military programs
and activities.
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Industrial Development
Soviet industry, since the end of the Fifth Five Year
Plan (1951-55), has reported slightly lowered annual rates of
growth. Probably attributable, in part, to errors in planning
which created an imbalance between capacity and production goals,
especially in the basic materials industries, the slightly reduced
current rates of growth probably will persist into the forth-
coming Seven Year Plan period (1959-65). Additions to production
capacity in the basic materials industries, which fell considerably
short of planned goals in 1957, Probably will not be great
A4.11 WlnA.~I
enough in 1958 to correct the imbalancesA which apparently had
been developing since early in the Fifth Five Year Plan period.
Therefore, continued efforts in this direction will be necessary
beyond 1958. Furthermore, the greatly expanded housing program,
achieved.in 1957 and repeated in the plans for 1958, will continue
to draw investment resources away from industrial investment,
at least during the early years of the Seven Year Plan period.
The possibility of rising investment costs and a slower rate of
increase in the size of the industrial labor force may also
operate to keep industrial production at slightly lower growth
rates than enjoyed in the past.
Substantial overfulfillment of the unusually low planned
increase in total industrial production in 1957 brought the
reported actual rate of growth close to that achieved in the
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preceding year (Table 1), but the announcement of a planned
rate of increase for 1958 nearly as low as the 1957 planned rate
suggest that the Soviet planners may have some doubts about the
possibility of overfulfilling the 1958 goals by as great a margin
as in 1957. However, if the 1958 goals were to be overfulfilled
by approximately the same degree as were those of 1957 as seems
likely based on first quarter results, growth rates would be
close to those originally contemplated in the now superceded
Sixth Five Year Plan. It should be noted that the reported actual
growth rate of producer goods in 1956 and 1957 is virtually as
high as originally contemplated, but that of consumer goods is
considerably below the original Sixth Five Year Plan rate,
thereby reducing the likelihood of consumer goods-production
reaching the 1960 goals as originally scheduled. In spite of the
abandonment of the Sixth Five Year Plan as a whole, statements
have appeared recently in the Soviet press reaffirming the intention
of reaching or exceeding the 1960 goals for some producer goods .1/
Such statements, of course, should be viewed in the context of
probable substantial shortfalls in other producer goods, which have
lagged seriously in 1956 and 1957.
* ORR has calculated a Soviet industrial production index employ-
ing official production data when available, official prices, and
value added weights based upon official labor force and capital
stock figures. The resulting trend closely confirms the trend of the
official Soviet index, although the annual rates are somewhat lower
than the official Soviet rates throughout the period measured.
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Table 1
Soviet Industrial Production
Annual Rates of Growth
1951-55
1956
1957
1958
1958-60
Average
Annual Rate Needed
Annual
Increase
Plan Actual
Plan Actual
Plan
to meet Original
1960 Goals
Total Industrial
Production
13.1
10.5 10.7
7.0
10.0
7.6
10.7
Producer Goods
13.8
na 11.4
7.8
11.0
8.3
11.2
Consumer Goods
10.5
na 9.4
5.9
8.0
6.1
10.6
Industrial Reorganization
The reorganization of industry carried out by Khrushchev in
1957 has apparently gone along well. The abolition of the branch
of industry ministries and the substitution of regional Councils
of National Economy, or sovnarkhozy, was expected to create con-
fusion and hamper production, at least during a short-term
transition period. However, industrial production in the first
quarter of 1958 rose 11 percent compared to the first quarter
of 1957. This rate of increase was slightly higher than the
annual rates for either 1956 or 1957?
The 1957 decentralization of operational decision making,
as opposed to top policy decision making, was a sharp acceleration
in a trend which began in 1954. The food and light industrial
enterprises were among the first transferred from All-Union status
to Republican ministries. By 1956, less than half of total
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industrial production remained under all-union ministerial
control.
Gosplan has emerged as the most important economic planning
organ, with responsibility for specifying current operational plans
as well, as long run future development programs. Also temporarily
merged into Gosplan are the central marketing and supply organs
formerly part of. the industrial ministries. These continue the
direct allocation of important materials within the economy, pend-
ing the overhaul of the supply system, one of the major goals
of the reorganization.
Where before there existed neither effective mechanisms nor
responsible agencies to assure regional coordination of planning,
the new sovnarkhosy, together with the revitalized republic
Gosplans, are performing integrated regional planning, as well
as administration. At the enterprise level, greater freedom
appears to have encouraged individual managerial initiative
and resulted in improvements in efficiency.
Agriculture
The report of agricultural accomplishments in the 1957
plan fulfillment report, as in the 1956 report, contrasts much
of the current performance with that of the undistinguished
agricultural year 1953 -- a practice which obscures the fact
that agricultural production in the drought year 1957 was dis-
appointing to the Soviet leadership when compared directly with
1956. The grain harvest in 1957, although above that of 1953,
was considerably below the 1956 level and probably below that of
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the more normal year 1955. Milk production in 1957 is reported
to have exceeded the 1960 goal for yield per cow -- three years
ahead of schedule -- but apparently there were not enough cows
to permit total milk production to increase as rapidly as in
1956, or as rapidly as originally contemplated in Khrushchev's
milk and meat program. Meat production apparently increased at
a more rapid rate in 1957 than in 1956, but it too failed to keep
pace with the rates implicit in the original milk and meat goals.
Adverse weather conditions in 1957 and underfulfil]ment of
perennially unrealistic goals obscures the fact that the rate of
growth of Soviet agriculture has risen significantly from the
exceedingly slow growth rate of the Stalin era, when agricultural
output barely kept pace with population growth. The average
annual increase of about 7 percent achieved by Soviet agriculture
since 1953 equals or exceeds the performance of any other agricultural
economy over a short period of time. Although perhaps as much
as half of this annual rate of increase can be attributed to the
non-recurring impetus to growth provided by the "new lands" program,
there is some likelihood that the USSR will be able to sustain a
rate of growth in agriculture sommW above that of the Stalin
era. Capital investment in agriculture is continuing at an
unprecedented rate and much of it is being directed toward in-
creasing output by such means as reducing harvest losses and im-
proving the timeliness of field operations.
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TheAplan for 1958 calls for a 17 percent increase in gross
agricultural production, which is a considerably higher rate of
growth than generally achieved in past years and high relative
to the scheduled rate of increase in inputs in agriculture. As
such, successful fulfillment of the gross agricultural production
goal in 1958 may depend to a larger extent than usual upon highly
favorable weather conditions.
The 1958 plan calls for delivery of 165 thousand tractors
to agriculture compared with 145 thousand in 1957, and 135 thousand
grain combines compared with the delivery of 128 thousand in 1957,
suggesting that the input of machinery and equipment to agriculture
in 1958 will continue at the high levels of the past several years.
The trend of agricultural production beyond 1958 may be affected
favorably by the new emphasis upon a more efficient organization
of agricultural inputs. The contemplated reorganization of the
Machine Tractor Stations over the next few years will shift a
considerable amount of capital, skilled labor, and management
inputs from the Mrs to the collective farms, with the expressed
hope of obtaining a larger agricultural output from a given quantity
of inputs. Under the new system, the amalgamation of most of the
factors of production under the control of the Kolkhoz manager
and the consequent reduction of the area of conflicting aims of
the MTS director and the collective farm manager could result in
an overall net gain to the agricultural effort, even though there
may be some sacrifice of flexibility in resource use and a less
intense use of skilled workers.
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Foreign Trade
Soviet foreign trade has been increasing significantly
ever since the death of Stalin. Over 70 percent of USSR trade
turnover is still with other countries in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
of which China has been the largest single country. However, Soviet
trade with the free world has increased 300 percent since 1950,
as against an increase of 120 percent in its trade with other
Bloc countries.
Approximately 75 percent of Soviet trade with the free world
is with industrial countries, principally Western Europe. The
largest imports from this area are ships and machinery and equip-
ment. We expect that the upward trend in imports of machinery
will continue. Recently, there has been considerable Soviet
interest in the purchase of plants to manufacture consumer goods,
such as artificial fibers and textiles.
At the same time, Soviet capabilities to export metals,
such as aluminum, tin, zinc, and ferro-alloys, is increasing.
We expect that sales of these metals will increase as well as
those of petroleum, as a new means of acquiring the foreign exchange
to pay for imports of machinery. In fact, the USSR in the next
ten years may well become a major supplier of such products to
Western Europe.
This seems particularly likely when Khrushchev's 1972 goals
for certain commodities is examined. Take, for example, petroleum.
The Soviets plan to produce between 350 and 400 million metric
tone, approximately that of the United States at present. A crude
calculation of USSR domestic consumption by that time shows that
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2 million barrels a day could be available for export. This
compares with about a million barrels a day being consumed by
all of Western Europe at present.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Activities in Underdeveloped Areas
one of the principal characteristics of current Soviet
policy is its stress on underdeveloped countries, in an effort
to estrange them from the West and lay the groundwork for
growing Soviet influence. In the needs of the new and under-
developed countries of Asia and Africa for help in industrial-
ization, the Soviet sees opportunities for influencing these
states by providing assistance and by encouraging them to use
Communist techniques. One of the principal Bloc weapons, has been
the so-called "trade and aid" campaign, offering both arms
and technical and economic aid on liberal credit terms.
By the end of 1957, the USSR and its satellites had extended
credits and grants of nearly $2 billion to underdeveloped countries.
In addition, there are now several thousand Bloc technicians
in these countries. While the total of Communist aid, economic
and military, does not approach ours, they have concentrated on
centain countries where they feel they can make the greatest im-
pact - Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, Indonesia, India, Yugoslavia,
Ceylon, Burma and Cambodia. In these countries over the past three
fiscal years, the aid program of the Bloc, including Communist
China, has been greater than our own. Since the end of 1957, aid
offers to Yemen have been stepped up sharply. In return, the Bloc
has been willing to accept otherwise largely unsaleable raw
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material surpluses, an appealing feature of its program.
We have also seen a sharp increase in Sino-Soviet trade
with the underdeveloped areas, which has been moving forward at
a rate of 25 percent a year. This is to say that 1957 trade
was about 50 percent higher than 1955?
The Soviet leaders are probably pleased with what they
regard as their success to date, and will almost certainly
intensify their efforts in this field. This program is now
administered at the highest level in the USSR, the State
Committee for Economic Relations, which is directly under the
Council of Ministers. The USSR has the economic resources
for a considerable expansion in its trade and aid program. Its
extensive stocks of obsolescent arms will permit it to capitalize
further on the desires of many underdeveloped countries to
strengthen themselves militarily.
European Satellites
Introduction
Until 1953, the satellite economies grew rapidly under
the Soviet-imposed heavy industrialization policy. At the same
time, living standards were seriously depressed. Disturbances
in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1953, and in
Poland and Hungary in 1956 have combined to force a more realistic
policy on the Communist leaders.
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The ruthless draining of the Satellite economies that
occurred in the days of Stalin Nwvw* been checked. Industrial
growth has been cut sharply and general welfare received more
attention in the attempts to bring popular discontent under control.
During 1956 and 1957, the USSR committed itself to extend $1.2
billions in credits and aid, and cancelled an. additional $1.5
billions in debts. Largely as a result of this aid, the
Satellite economies have recovered from the recent crises.
Living Standards
A good deal of our recent research on the European Satellites
has been concerned with economic factors affecting stability. Of
the various economic factors the
most obvious and important one is living standards. Difficult
as it is to measure and evaluate changes in living standards in
the Satellites, it seems safe to say that there have been gradual,
though in some ways highly selective, improvements .nee 1953,
whereas living standards were stagnant,or deteriorating in every
.4- *
Satellite except lies Germany in he early 1950's. The reversal
of the earlier trend clearly is important, but the following
considerations suggest that living standards remain a threat to
the stability of these countries:
(1) Living standards remain low compared with (a)
what the Satellite populations expect as a result of their
sacrifices since the war and the repeated promises of
government and party leaders, (b) what is necessary to
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offset even partially the widespread dissatisfaction of
the people with other features of the system that has
been imposed on them, and (c) average standards of living
in Western European countries, to which the populations
have been exposed increasingly in recent years.
(2) Current living standards for the average person
are not appreciably above the immediate prewar peak in
any Satellite. In some Satellites, they may be somewhat
below both the immediate prewar peak and an earlier post-
war peak.
(3) A disproportionate share of recent gains in
consumption has gone to farmers as a consequence of the
necessity of raising procurement prices for agricultural
products. Urban workers, whose hostility constitutes
the principal internal threat to the regimes, have (except
for selected groups, such as miners in certain countries)
received much smaller benefits.
(4+) Despite small over-all improvements in living
standards since 1953, there still are serious deficiencies
in the supply of food, clothing, and housing. The diet is
generally low in quality (though not seriously deficient
in terms of calories except in Albania) and takes a large
part of the average family income. Housing conditions
have been deteriorating in all of the Satellites, particularly
in the urban areas of Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. These
remaining ser Otis r'- jj en IPs- FT~ 068 '/~'B*MtO '085-4
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in determining popular attitudes than is the fact that
supplies of food and clothing have been slowly improving.
(5) The push to collectivize agriculture in many countries
may cause food output to be lowered. Of the total agricultural
area, Bulgaria has now socialized over 90 percent, Czechoslovakia
and Albania about two-thirds, Rumania over half, and the
Soviet Zone of Germany over 40 percent. The trend is up
in all these nations. In Hungary, it remains low, about 25
percent, and in Poland, of course, the trend has been
reversed so that only about 10 percent of the agricultural
area is still socialized.
POLAND
Recent Economic Policies of the Gomulka Regime
Since coming to power, the Gomulka regime has pursued economic
policies aimed at increasing living standards, laying the founda-
tions for a pattern of economic growth more in accord with Poland's
particular circumstances, and eventually creating a more flexible
economic system.
In pursuit of the first two goals, the Gomulka regime has
reduced investments in heavy industry, and military and adminis-
trative expenditures, raised priorities for agriculture and
housing, and obtained large foreign credits from the Bloc and the
West.
Some of the policies in support of the third goal are a
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clear departure from the Soviet pattern of economic planning and
management which bad predominated in Poland since 1949. The
most important changes to date have taken place in agriculture
where most collective farms have been disbanded. Changes outside
agriculture have been limited to a moderate growth of private
handicraft and trade, to the development of worker's councils,
and to some reduction in the amount of detailed State planning.
Basic reforms of the,planning and price systems, however, many
of which are patterned after the Yugoslav system, are scheduled
for 1959-60. These reforms would involve a considerable increase
in the autonomy of State enterprises and the partial substitu-
tion of profit incentives for planning orders.
Prospects for the New Few Years
The greatest economic threat to political stability in the
next 3 years lies in the probability that the rate of growth of
personal consumption (assuming no large new foreign credits) will
be much smaller than in any comparable period since 1953. Prospects
for increases in per capita consumption of quality foods, durables,
and handicraft products are good, but the very poor clothing
situation will probably improve little, and housing conditions
will probably continue to worsen. The regime will try to give
urban workers most of the benefit from increases in consumer
availabilities, but may not succeed in this, because of the power
of private farmers to bid for higher farm prices. Given the severe
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existing dissatisfaction of most of the urban population and the
effect of the October events on popular expectations, impatience
with low living standards is more likely to grow than to abate
in the next few years.
Even the moderate existing goals for increasing personal
consumption presume large investments in housing, agriculture,
light industry, and industries which provide inputs for these
activities (construction materials, artificial fertilizer,
agricultural machinery, systhetic fibers). Investments in these
areas are planned to be much larger in absolute terms and as
a share of total investments than in past years. Large reductions
in other investments would release resources for consumption in
the shortrun, but, particularly in the base of fuels, power and
basic materials, would eventually depress the rate of economic
growth. Of particular importance is the coal industry, where the
failure to create enough productive capacity during the 6 year
plan to meet increased domestic and export demands will have
to be made good.
Another factor depressing the growth of consumption is the
expected reduction in the availability of foreign credits, especially
after 1958. By 1960, it is possible that repayments of previous
foreign credits will exceed the balance of these credits available
to Poland. Since the recovery of coal exports will inevitably
be slow, and optimistic plans for extremely large increases in
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machinery exports are likely to be disappointed by strong competi-
tion in the underdeveloped markets and the poor quality of much
of Polish machinery, the balancing of Poland's foreign trade will
be very difficult and may even require cuts in investment and
consumption from present planned levels.
Substantial stocks of grains and other materials accumulated
during 1957 and the new U. S. loan greatly reduce the chances of
a serious economic crisis in 1958. Whether the Polish Government
will consider these resources to be adequate to risk proceeding
further with basic economic reforms cannot now be predicted.
However, it is clear that very large stocks are needed if the
elimination of compulsory agricultural deliveries is not to
cause a further rise in rural real incomes at the expense of
urban real incomes, at least in the short-run, and if an
industrial and distribution system allowing considerable autonomy
to individual enterprises is to operate smoothly. Present infor-
mation indicates that the Polish economic situation will become
increasingly difficult during 1959-1960, although much depends
on future developments in agriculture, the terms of foreign trade,
and foreign credits. Existing foreign credits will create a very
difficult repayment problem after 1960.
The planned pattern of economic development, with its reduced
emphasis on metallurgy and machinery, would tend to facilitate
to some extent a reduction in Poland's dependence on the Soviet
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Union, though not necessarily on other Soviet bloc countries.
On the other hand, some of the major Polish products which most
readily find a market in Western Europe (particularly coal) will
be in short supply over the next few years and it will take a
long time to create a substantial production of manufactured
goods saleable in the West outside underdeveloped countries.
Moreover, since the USSR has been purchasing a large part of
Poland's machinery exports, thereby supporting the machinery and
metallurgical industries, which in turn depend primarily on
Soviet deliveries of ore and parts, a significant decline in
the Soviet Union's share of Polish foreign trade over the
next few years does not appear likely.
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