ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CG/COCOM/CHINCOM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00084A000100140001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
CFEP DRAFTING GROUP
ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW
Staff Study No. 1
Draft of June 6, 1955.
Enhancing ,the Effectiveness f CGf COCON/CHINNCOM
This draft of Staff Study No. 15, dealing with the question,
"How should the United States attempt to advance the degree of unity
in, and the effectiveness of, the multilateral organization concerned
with security trade controls?", is transmitted for your use in con-
nection with the work of the CFEP Drafting Group on Economic Defense
Policy Review.
In compliance with the request of the Chairman of the
Drafting Group, the Executive Secretary, EDAC, is -providing repro-
duction and distribution facilities as a service to ft rther the work
of the CM Drafting Group.
Irving I. Kramer
Executive Secretary
Distribution:
CMDrafting Group
State Dept. declassification &. release instructions on file
CONFIDENTIAL.
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CFEPa TUFTING GROUP
ECONOM DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW
Staff Study No. 15
Draft of dune b, 1955
"Ii0'W SHOULD THE UNIITED STATES ATTEIU'T TO ADVANCE THE DEGREE OF UNITY
IN0 AND THE EFFECT IVF.NESS OF, THE MMT II.ATE W ORGANIZATION CONC 2U ED
WITH SECURITY TRADE CONTROLSI"
Many difficulties confronting the United States and other countries asso-
ciated in the CG structure for the past two years would have been avoided
had there existed an agreed philosophy +r justification for the system of
controls against which individual problems could be assessed. The authority
of such a "philosophlr" would depend on its success in reflecting the essential
objectives of trade controls in the light of the military, political, ecoaioanic,
psychological and moral aims of the Free World. In edditiasl, it would help to
make it possible for cooperating governments to explain its purposes simply
and convinciagdy to.dissident interests 'within their countries, With such an
over-all concept to govern CG operations, its week-tow-reek problems would
largely be technical,
Such a philosopl- does not now exist. The governments participating in
the CG oppose in varying degrees anything resembling economic warfare. In
contrast, the United States tends to favor measures as close as practicable
to economic warfare as offering the greatest opportunity to impair the Soviet
Bloc's industrial build-up. Certain concepts bridge this gap and are generally
acoeptable--(1) the Soviet Union is a potential aggressor; (2) it is in the
common interest of the West to hamper the yea Mkiptz Potent, a of the Soviet
Union; (3)
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Union; (3) any efforts to do so can only be effective to the extent that
they are uniform among as mazy important industrial and trading countries as
possible. We have built our trade control program on the basis of such
generalities, but even these have never been precisely defined.
Notvrithatanding lack of an agreed doctrine the United States, in fact,,
has been able an a pragmatic basis to obtain a reasonably satisfactory degree
of control over most of the items it considered particularly important.
Taever, today mein items the United States considers strategic are free of
controls and certain countries would like to see even a lower level prevail,
particularly towards China, The program today is at best static and more
probably is moving in the opposite direction from that which we desire. The
`,alterations of the group could probably be improved through greater bilateral
discussions of the reasons behind our policies-both broad and on specific
issues-and the expanded use of the exchange of experts between countries,
Inter-change of intelligence information, and the use of the CG for discussion
of broader economic problems of an East-West nature (e.g., Western coordination
before an ECOSOC or ECE meeting), These positive approaches should be kept to
mind and used wherever feasible, However, it would seem incumbent upon us to
accomplish a more fundamental strengthening if the effective operation we
desire is to develop, A basic doctrine which all PCs could accept and which
could accommodate the necessary strengthening we believe essential., therefore,
remains an essential requirement.
The CG structure has proved its desirability ands now that it is on the
"long-haul" basis, need no longer be considered a "temporary, informal eormuittee"
as it was during the initial days, Although there may have been no explicit
and conscious effort to do so, the change to the "long-haul" concept which the
CG made
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GG made last summer may well be construed as harmonizing GG with the long-haul
purpose of NATO. Our di1ffieulties in CG could be reduced by recognizing this
doctrinairely and instituticnallya
On the side of doctrine, it should be established that the complex of
factors recognized in NATO as contributing to security, are also directly re-
hated to the security objectives of East-West trade controls. NATO has came
to recognize that Atlantic Conmmmity security is the result, in combination, ofs
(F)
Arms build-up;
Economic growth of the West;
Increased domestic welfare of the Western populations;
Accepte ace of a common concept of danger;
Acceptance of the overriding necessity of Western economic
and political unity;
Frank recognition of the mutuality of Atlantic Community
interdependence which is expressed In:
1, Mutual self-criticism in the NATO An w.1 Review
Committee and elsewhere;
2. Sharing of resources, e.g. Mal
3. Reconciliation of differences by recurring
Ministerial Decision,
(G) Rejection of the "Simple Answer" to the problem, e.g. the
lbdrogen bomb,, reliance on air power alone, resort to
economic warfare, etc,
As to institutional change, the lack of Gin and Japanese membership
in NATO previously has seemed to make impra.cticzii. a r attempt to join the
NATO and CG together. However, now that Japan represents the only membership
obstacle, the
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obstacle, the problem is worthy of reassessment (the subject of a separate
paper) o
There is every reason to believe that at the very worst the United States
would at least be as well off in the trade control field as we are today, if
CG's aims could be directly associated with NATOVs, The system would beccce
more stabilized, have greater dignity and permenenee, and be an integral part
of the Western defense postured Whatever control level we might reach in such
a stabilization could not-be any lower than we would have to agree to maltilat..-
erally, regardless, and it is conceivable that under the guiding terms of the
NATO alliance, the less easily proved strategic items might be given the
benefit of the doubt. The other PCs presumably would also prefer proceeding
from broad nationally agreed principles of security to constant bickering.
often at very high leveler-aver what they consider to be relatively minor issues
when viewed from the broad perspective, For the short term, no major change
would occur by the adoption of in "an" 044,t'1
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oo
;
the-program could cease and the entire structure would conforao..uts or
downwards-with the rest of the defense posture of the A,,lantic Camrmmity,
When, and if, CG falls within the NATO cornce
t.
pt, we must recognize that,,
.,,
like Defense appropriations (which go up and down in response to changes in
some or all of the forementioned factors) East-West trade controls will do
likewise. But in so doing, they will be underlining the mutuality of the ;{arcb<
news faced by all the PCs0 To attempt to keep the controls isolated frog
changing conditions-either by the United States or other countries for difffor
ing reasons-would ultimately destroy the collective nature of the program upon
which its effectiveness basically depends,
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