STAFF STUDY #16, 'U.S. POLICIES ON ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROLS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00084A000100160007-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: STUDY

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Staff Study #16, "U.S. Policias on Enforcement of Controls"
Anal si Probiemsand D',,iUciencies of enforcement (pages 10-16)
ino..nrnirng
The section of the staff study bearing the above title makes the fol-
lowing principal points:
(a) Multilateral problems and deficiencies:
(1) Negotiating diffi_c..lties and delays have been experienced (p. 10)
(2) Lack of PC enthusiasm for an enforcement program:
(a) Principally due to prevailing political climate in
r,urope (p. 10-11). This the most important factor
and likely to represent an increasing problem as
hope for coexistence grows. (p.10-11)
(b) Other causes for lack of e_.thusiasm: (p. 11)
(1) Fear of unevenness of "sacrifice" among PCs
(2) Emphasis on trade promotion
(3) Confidential nature of controls in some countries
(4) Understaffin enforcement entities and inadequate
indoctrination
(5) Reluctance to discuss mutual problems with U.S.
(6) Inadequate intelligence.
(3) Non-uniformity of controls among POs (p. 11)
(1i.) Inadequate legal bases for controls (p. 11)
(a) Inadequate sanctions to deter violators (p. 11)
(5) The China differential is the most active and troublememe
enforcement problem. (p. 12)
(a.) "There has been little evidence" that the PCs have
refrained from exp.rting to the European Bloc under
circumstances where "it was likely" the goods would
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(a) Multilateral proble:~s and deficiencies %cont)
(r)
The China differential (cont)
(b) "The quantity and value of knotan diversions to China
via the European Bloc Europe and Western countries
have been significant." (p. 12)
(c) Most IL/III ad China 6pecial List items no longer re-
quire licensing,except to 6hina (direct ?). IC/DV
applies only to Munitions, AE and IL/I and II. TAC
applies only to Munitions, AE and IL/I. These have
facilitated diversions to China. (p. 12)
(d) The China differential problem is the only one of the
five above that is "serious". (p. 12) Regarding it,
its nature plus the PC reluctance to any extension
of controls, makes it "most doubtful" that China
enforcement could be tightened. But our future course
of action depends on outcome of over-all review of
policy. (p. 12)
(1) - (Li.) Regarding items (1) - (fit) , above, "true can only point
out PC deficiencies as they occur and press for the
small modifications required to effect imprevements.(p.12)
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(b) Unilateral problems of U.S.: (p. 13-16)
(1) U.S. in role of international policeman, especially re non-US
goods:
(a) U.S. has been active, but our activity has been received
by PCs with mixed feelings and our ability to take ef-
fective action has varied from country to country.
Our admin. action is"at best only tolerated", especially
when local laws have not been violated. (p. 13)
(b) Ouery whether the expenditure of good will in this
pressure for en'orcement J s made "wisely or w astefully". (p.14)
(c) Re non-US origin goods, the most serious U.S. problems
come from embarrassment of friendly countries when we
expose inadequacies. (p. 14) Our future problem is to
be ore diplomatic in bringing pressure to persuade
our friends toward self-improvement. (p. 14)
(2) frdj Re US origin goods: (under controls)
(a) Jij Problem of U.S. item incorporated into another end
product, and problem of control of latter. (p. 14)
(b) Wt PD-810 (mentioned, but no discussion) (p. 14)
(c) Jjj Objections to U.S. Foreign S3,rvice investigations
as infringement of local soveri.egnty or violation
local commercial espionage laws (p. 14--.15)
0) U.S. controls over non-IL goods:
(a) Must distinguish between Po:=Itive List and GRO, the
latter being harder to justify when seeking international
cooperation but not to be ignored due U.S. political
reasons.(Conclusion: GRO items are a problem and less
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Possible Future 9.e rses of Action (p. 16-20)
The section of the s t off study bearing the above title makes the fol-
lowing principal points:
(a) "Unlikely that more than routine procedural modifications can be
effected in existing controls (without some drastic change in
overall control policy)." (p. 16) ithout a further downward
revision or a basic change in the differe tial levels, few PCs
will be willing to adopt more rigid enforcement measures.
(1) Extensive negotiations with PCs would only antagonize and
dissipate goddwill "required for more im,:ortant problems
not only in the econ. def. field but also in broader area of
.6/vv policy." (p. 16)
(b) What to do about U.S. export controls (assuming need for excons
continues indefinitely and little chance obtain much tighter or
broader international control?)
(1) U.S. excon can be improved. Present program represents
compromises due to: 16)
(a) administrative limitations; lack appropriately trained
investigative personnel for operations abroad, etc. (p.17)
(2) Improvements in U.S. excon program could be accomplished by:
(a) using additional especially trained personnel abroad to
supplement FSO's
(b) cope with TAC inadequacies by instituting system of
U.S.-approved f o warders who have signed agreements not
to accept instruction- to liver (p. 17)
(c) Require destination control n tices on all B/L and in-
voices (p. 18)
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(c) Advantages of tighter U.S. enforcement vs disadvantages
Pro: Con:
increased security and additional foreign criticism
less risk of diversion
probable complaints from
Congressional aT.-proval exporters
(maybe)
increased costs of operating
controls
(d) Advantages of present level of enforcement : policies and
procedures known arnci accepted by foreign govts, Congress, trade,
and public; they are reasonably efficient as a reasonable cost.
(1) "On balance it probably would be preferable to maintain
the s tdtus quo in U. S. enforcement policy pendin, some
major change in our overall economic defense policy." (p. 16)
(e) We can also continue our efforts to enlist non-PC cooperation
and participation in enforcement. 11,.18)
(1) This requires additional study of those countries. (p. 18)
(f) We should improve intelligence collection and ulLLssemination (p.19)
(1) Not the business of Foreign ,service to collect covertly. "An
expanded effort on the part of the Intel, collection agencies
in the field of Ltvl trade would undoubtedly bring forth an
increased volume of information." (p. 19)
(g) We should improve collaboration between U.3. element abroad (p. 19)
(h) We should encourage cooperation and multilateral exchanges of informa-
tion in handling of illegal :/4v transactions (p. 19)
(1) Support use of COCOM forum, and expand on interchange among
technical and enforcement experts of PCs. (p. 19)
other PCs and deemphasize U.S. (p. 19-20)
Encourage
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