PROPOSED U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM FOR CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500020005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 20, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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USIB-D-41.5/14
(COMOR-D-2/20)
20 August 1962
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Proposed U-2 Reconnaissance Program for China
On instruction of the Chairman of the United. States
Intelligence Board, the Commit'wee on Overhead Reconnaissance
has prepared the attached paper for consideration of the Board.
The paper reviews the needs for U-2 reconnaissance of strategic
targets in Communist China as well as the needs for coverage of
the Taiwan Straits area, a matter of particular current concern
to the Secretary of Defense. 25X1A
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Subject Paper
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PROPOSED U-2 RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM FOR CHINA
1. On 27 June 1962 the United States Intelligence ..-oard
cons '.erect. and approvest comprehensive overhead photo reconnaissance
requirements for Communist China including targets of strategic
interest and targets of immediate concern to the North Vietnam and
and Fcrr-_'osa Straits situations (See USIP-D-41.5/6; COI,,'-OR-D-2/Lt).
This was prepared by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance by
direction of the United States Intelligence Foard and in 'pursuance of
a request by the Secretary of Defense for the preparation of such a
progra.nn. The requirements program was then noted at a meeting of
the Special Group.
2. Subsequently, the Special Group considered a s u'. stantive
review of the situations in Communist Chinp., North Vietnams and C 41 a
and the contribution which overhead reconnaissance had made to au
a;opreciation of the situations in those areas. This review (see
vO&:~OR-I)-60) was prepared by the DDI/CIA and concurred in
the COMOR. On 30 July the Special Group approved the followi.a,
China missions for August-
a. One mission over North East China...
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b. One mission in late August over the
Formosa Straits area. (Requiring Justification)
c. One mission over South China.
d. One mission over North Vietnam.
3. The following is a status report on U-2 reconnaissance
since 26 July (the occasion of the last appraisal of U-2 reconnaissance
results over China):
a. Mission 123 over the Straits area was
carried out in the best weather which we have had available.
since the beginning of the Straits crisis, although even that
was confined to certain areas which did not permit
comprehensive coverage of the targets simultaneously.
Mission 125 was conducted over most of
the remaining targets which still remained after the
earlier Northeast Mission 112. This photography was
processed in the sand a full analysis has not yet been
completed.
c. Since April, because of adverse weather
conditions, there has been no coverage of South China
even though missions were authorized.
d. )Because of bad weather there has been no
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mission carried out over North Vietnam since the once a
month approval by the Special Group on 2 August.
4. The Special Group has approved in principle
several sorties to cover strategic targets in China. The understanding
was that subsequent to the Northeast China mission the COMOR
would present the requirements for an additional mission or missions.
This has been done and is set forth at Tab B.
5. The Special Group has also approved in principle a
mission over the Straits area in late August, it being understood
that specific justification and approval would be required. Subsequently
the Secretary of Defense has raised his requirement and has
recommended weekly coverage of the Taiwan Strait area. The COMOR
has considered this requirement and its; recommendation is set
forth as Tab A.
6. The Director of Central Intelligence, in requesting
COMOR to prepare this paper, has requested an outline of a six-
month program. As of this date this is accomplished in the presen-
tation in Tabs A and B. COMOR recognizes that such a program
must be validated from time to time and therefore must be subject
to continuing review.
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7. The following summarizes the proposed program for
U-2 reconnaissance over China for the next six months:
September: One mission to cover the Szechwan Basin.
One mission to monitor the Taiwan Strait area.
October through February:
One mission a month to achieve complete
coverage of strategic Communist
Chinese targets and to meet the
requirements for periodic updating.
One mission a month to monitor the
Taiwan Strait area.
8. In addition, in order to achieve complete coverage
of the targets in South China and North Vietnam on a bimonthly
basis one mission each month will be required over each area.
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TabA
Proposed Use of U-2 Reconnaissance
over the Taiwan Strait Area
1. The Chinese Communist military buildup in the
Foochow Military Region was reported during the first two weeks
of June. Furthermore, it now appears that the units are more
widely dispersed within the Foochow Military Region than originally
believed. Photo coverage has not yet been able to detect the con-
centration of military strength in the Taiwan Strait area nor
disclosed preparations for an assault against the offshore islands.
It has thus far from all sources not been possible to determine the
extent nor the intent of the reported deployment. It is possible
that photography of areas suggested but not yet covered will
provide data on the deployment.
2~ In considering the use of the U-2 to meet our needs
in the Taiwan Strait area, it is recognized that even daily U-2
coverage would not provide the early warning which this Government
desires. In addition, it should be noted that processing and readout
of U-2 photography in the field requires
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Tab A
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Swatow to San Tu Bay.
on the order of 30 hours. The U-2 can provide a base of information
with regard to air, sea, and ground forces and installations. So
far such a base has not been procured of the coastal area from
Once a b s.e is established, it is the view of the
COMOR that U-2 photography can be usefully employed in two
a. A comprehensive periodic mission which
might be on the order of once per month, and
b. A limited or comprehensive mission
prompted by information obtained from collateral
sources or in particular by
photography.
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Tab A
4. Recommendation: That approval be given for
a. Immediate coverage of the following
areas (which in good weather might be covered in
a single mission):
(1) The coastal areas from Swatow to
San Tu Bay on a single mission;
(2) Inland. areas for search of
military deployment and any land lines
in the Foochow Military Region.
A mission once each month to
cover the Taiwan Straitt area comprehensively
as a means of periodic check-up (approval for:.
each month would be by means of the CIA Monthly
Forecast).
c. A limited or comprehensive mission
prompted by information from collateral sources,
(approval for this would be by means of a special
action of the Special Group.)
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Tab B
Justification for Strategic Mission: Szechwan Basin
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1. In COMOR-D-Z/18, forwarded to USIB on 25 June
1962 as USIB-D-41. 5/6, COMOR noted that the Secretary of Defense
had directed that a comprehensive photo reconnaissance program
against selected objectives in China be developed and implemented
at the earliest possible date. On 19 July the Director of Central
Intelligence presented a review of the results of U-2 reconnaissance
on China and recommended that: "We proceed immediately with
coverage of the remainder of the strategic targets in Northeast
China, completing the task about one-half done by the very
will probably
accomplish this. Next it is recommended that the highest
priority targets in Central China not previously photographed,
principally the Szechwan Basin, be covered. It is possible that
achieved under optimum conditions, could
accomplish this and thereby complete initial coverage of all
the highest priority strategic targets in China. "
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Tab B
In view of the recoverage of Northeast China by
the next most important strategic target area in
Communist China is the Szechwan Basin. This area includes the
Yangtze River from Chung King to I-Pin and the Min River from
I-Pin to Cheng Tu. This area is considered highly suspect for
nuclear energy production because of the availability of electrical
powers water, and industrial support. In addition, there are a
few suspect military targets of priority interest, on which we.
have no base photographic coverage. As a bonus, it should be
noted that the southern portion of this area contains a few
important military targets associated with Chinese Communist
support to a North Vietnam buildup.
3. Recommendation: That a mission be approved
for coverage of the S:zechwan Basin at the earliest opportunity
in September.
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