RESPONSES TO DCI QUESTIONS REGARDING 10 SEPTEMBER MEETING IN THE WHITE HOUSE RE IDEALIST COVERAGE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500030027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: November 19, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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Responses to DCI Questions Regarding 10 September
Meeting in the White House Re IDEALIST Coverage of
Cuba
.19 November 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
REFERENCE : a. COMOR Minutes, 1 September 1962 Meeting
(TCS-13349-62)
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b. Memo to ADCI from Chairman, COMOR, Dated
4 September 1962; Subject: "Cuban Requirements"
(TCS 13350-62)
c. Memo for the Special Group from
Cuba"
copy -Lo of 10
Dated 11 September t:
"Reconnaissance of Cuba"'
d. Memo for ADCI from Chairman, COMOR, Dated
9 September 1962; Subject: "Next U-2 Mission over
You have asked for replies to the following seven questions. We are taking
the liberty of utilizing the question and answer method for our response:
(1) 0: On whose initiative was the 10 September meeting called?
A: The 10 September meeting held in Mr. Bundy' a office followed a
special meeting in the White House Situation Room relating to other
Cuban matters. General Carter, as the ADCI, presumably was
advised by Mr. Bundy's office of the necessity for a separate session
on U-2 Cuban coverage. This office advised by the DD/R of the
requirement for the meeting and the necessity for the presence of
someone from this organization. A subsequent check with General
25X1A Carter's office, Mr. Bundy's office, and does not reveal
on whose initiative the meeting was sought; presumably only Mr. Bundy
would have the answer to this.
NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
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(2) Q: Exactly what CIA tracks wer
developed.
teed? Explain how they were
A: A single small map was carried to the White House nesting con?
taaining a portrayal of a single U-2 mission which was designed to
cover those COMDR targets derived from a COMDR meeting of
1 September 1962 which was called to view the results of the Cuban
mission (No. 3088)) flown on 29 August which accounted for the
initial SAM sites. The map as carried to the White House also took
into account the intelligence derived from U_2 mission No. 3089,
flown on 5 September which located four SAM sites in the Las Villas
province. This mission was a combination of overflight and peripheral
as drawn by the Operations Division of OSA. It penetrated Cuban
territory over the Isle of Pines and proceeded in counter-clockwise
direction south of Las Villas and Camaguey Provinces, overflew
Orientie Province west of Guantanamo, turning east of that base to
cover the suspect SSM installation at Banes, and than proceeding
northwestward along the north coast of Cuba, exiting just east of the
SAM site complex to the west of Cayo Coco. This mission was drawn
up by the Operations Division, OSA, on 6 or 7 September, and had
the White House meeting not occurred, it would have been the route
flown to fulfill our second Special Group approval for Cuban over-
flights for the month of September, the first of which was executed
on 5 September. The primary purpose of the mission was missile
search, and the primary target. thereof was the Banes area where
earlier photography had not baaen conclusive regarding the suspect
SSM installation discovered there.
Q: Exactly what changes were made in the submissions?
A: Based upon the objections of the Secretary of State to extended over-
flights of Cuban soil in the light of the discoveries of 29 August and
5 September, the single mission drawn on the map carried to the
White House was broken up into four missions. Only two of these
overflights were ultimately performed; one was the so-called Isle of
Pines mission which was later flown to include overflight of the
Zapata Swamp, and the mission finally flown on 26 September against
Banes but including Guantanamo prior to reaching Banes. That
portion of the original 10 September mission between 79 and 81 degrees
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west which had been designed to stay outside the known SAM sites
at Las Villas was subsequently stricken from the flight planned in
that area and finally flown 5 October. Again, because of the
insistence of the Secretary of State, that portion of the flight planned
for coverage in overflight of the south coast of Orientie Province was
also deleted from the mission of 5 October which was redirected
peripherally.
(4) Q: On whose instructions were the CIA flight plans prepared and presented
to the 10 September meeting?
A: OSA's instructions to prepare a map to take to the White House on
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10 September came from the DD/R and also from Mr. Knoche, who
asked that the chart carry the latest SAM sites plotted thereon.
Again it is pertinent to state that planning for the next Cuban mission
following that of 5 September began literally the day before when a
paper was sent to General Carter drawn up by the Chairman of COMOR,
requesting his approval for a mission which would "cover those areas
of the Island which were not photographed because of weather (on
preceding missions) or because the range did not permit". (Refer-
ence b.) Reference b. was a direct outgrowth of Reference a. which
was the minutes of the COMOR meeting of 1 September 1962. OSA's
only understanding of the purpose of the 10 September meeting was that
it was to consider further Cuban reconnaissance in the light of the loss
Imission 127 in the Far 1/ast on 8 September.,
(5 Q: On whose authority was the decision made to stay away from the SAM
sites?
A: Following the discovery of the SAM sites on 29 August GSA,
operational planning, began to study the future coverage of Cuba,
taking into account the presumed vulnerability of the U-2 to the SA-2
missile. This naturally dictated a change in our method of operation
which until 29 August had called for coverage of Cuba restricted only
by the weather. Changes were made in the mission profile to permit
achieving greater altitude by lightening fuel loads and relying on
refueling after exiting Cuban territory; plane were made to shift the
base of operations from Del Rio to McCoy Air Force Base, Orlando,
Florida, again to permit achievement of maximum altitude and
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and greater numbers of missions with less pilot and mechanical
fatigue and flight lines were studies for short penetrations on a
north-south axis in and near SAM sites calculated to reduce the
exposure of the U-2 in known areas where SA-2 missiles were
emplaced and by their shortened duration. to make it more difficult
for missile crews to get into a firing posture.
At the 10 September meeting, while there was no direct confrontation
over flying directly over SAM sites, there was a good deal concern
on the part of the Secretary of State as noted in Reference c. with
regard to Cuban overflights as opposed to peripheral coverage. The
eion outlined on the map carried to the White House was a com-
bination of overflight and peripheral, and as events have subsequently
shown had it been flown as planned, it would have covered a number of
SAM sites which were then either in place or in the process of being
situated. The Secretary's concern over violations of Cuban air space
was directly related to his stated desire to continue Cuban reconnais-
sance but in such a manner as to preserve "our rights to fly over
international waters" and thus presumably avoid a direct violation
in the event of an incident which would muddy the Cuban and Russian
waters. In the course of this meeting, General Carter several times
made the point that once Pioneer missile search coverage was in hand,
we would be coming back to seek approval for other U-Z coverage
which would retrace our steps over known SAM sites. However, he
was unable to obtain from anyone pFsent a conclusive point of view
on the wisdom or folly of doing Just this.
{6 Q: What caused the delay in carrying out the four flights approved at the
10 September meeting?
A: Hight at political authority on the morning of 11 September approved
two additional missions which were to be added to the one remaining
for the month of September following the mission of 5 September.
On 13 September Mr. Bundy interpreted highest political authority's
approval to include the entire number of four missions discussed at
the 10 September meeting. From 10 September on Cuban weather
could best be described as generally bad, which is normal for that
time of year. After 10 September, our first apparent break in the
weather came on 17 September at which time Mission 3091 was flown
against the Iskis of Pines and was totally unsuccessful due to unforecast
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cloud cover. The next weather break came on 26 September when
Mission 9093 against the eastern Orientie Province and the highest
priority Banes area (as noted by COMOR in Reference d.) was flown.
The Isle of Pines mission was then successfully flown on 29 Septem-
ber as Mission No. 3095. The southern peripheral Mission 3098 was
finally flown on 5 October and the last of our four permissions,
Mission 3100, was finally launched successfully on 7 October. OSA
Headquarters was in a continual alert briefing situation from 10
September (and earlier) up through the fourteenth of October when
Mission 3101 was flown under SAC. CIA operational criteria which
calls for Category II or better weather, i. o., less than 25 percent
cloud cover, were employed throughout the period 10 September
through 14 October. There was no occasion when mechanical trouble
prevented the carrying out of any of the four flight al pproved at the
10 September meeting. Since 14 October, it is a fair statement to
say that SAC U-2 coverage of Cuba has progressed necessarilly in
many instances under weather conditions far less deesirablee than
those which were faced by OSA during the critical days from 10
September to 14 October.
(7) Q. Were Cuban flight plans ever shown to members of the Special Group?
A: By the summer of 1962 Cuban U-2 reconnaissance had become so
routine that flight plans were never submitted to the Special Group
along with our monthly CIA Air Activities Forecast. This was not
always the case; however, for in late April 1961 immediately after
the Bay of Pigs trouble when Cuban reconnaissance was resumed,
:a~TD\0~3 1 1TL''l~Gceh'clilslst on seeing a visual presentation of the
missions proposed, and such a book was created and forwarded to
T 0 - IS13\OJem over General Cabell's signature.
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- DDCI
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IsjLaprrpor~
JACK C. LEDFORD
Colonel USAF
Assistant Director
(Special Activities)
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ILLEGIB
10 - RB/OSA
Distribution:
1 - DCI
2-DDGI
3 -ER
4 - DD/R
5 - AD / OSA.
6 - DAD / OSA
7 - OD / OSA
8 - INTEL/OSA
9 - SRS/OSA ILLEGIB
DAD / OSA: JA Cunningham,
ILLEGIB
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