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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 8, 2002
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Publication Date: 
May 8, 1963
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Approved Fer,Release 2002/06/105!63-003435000500070094-7 25X1A J- 2670-63 Copy /'o of / o 8 May 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, OSA SUBJECT Project OXCART - Security Foreign Object Damage to Engines 25X1A 25X1A REFERENCE : Q 2631-63 dtd 30 Apr 63, To: DAD/OSA, Frm: C/SS/OSA, Subj: As Above 25X1A 1. As a result of the continued POD problems ~ 25X1A Assistant Security Officer, 25X1A OSA-.DD/R, on 1-3 May 1963, conducted a review of Security procedures in effect This memorandum is to record Security actions initiate and anticipated, and to record Staff discussions held during that 25X1A period. 2. The conclusions reached during these discussions are: (1) FOD has been somewhat corrected by installation of screens in the bleed by-pass doors; this correction has been one of degree; (2) POD may be considerably reduced by the installation of "flapper valves" within the nacelle area, designed to eliminate damage caused by reverse airflow of secondary air experienced during ground runs; and (3) POD is most probably attributable in some degree to laxity in the physical management of the flight test program 25X1A 25X1A I particularly in the areas of housekeeping, aircraft maintenance and quality control inspection procedures. 3. POD has been a continuing problemi -1 since June 1962. (Attachment #1 records a chronological. history of POD to date.) On 2 May engine #219 experienced major POD, after having been installed for 35 minutes in the left nacelle of Aircraft #121. Similar damage was experienced in the same nacelle on 26 April 1963 while engine #216 was Handle via 25X1.A 25X1A 0 Approved For Release 2002/06/10 SEC-REr63-00313A00050007001%it~a1 Sy$telii Approved For.Release 2002/06/10 $S6a]BT63-0031Q*000500070094-7 25X1A I--2670-63 Page 2 installed. During the interim, 26 April - 3 May, engine #216 had been installed (on 1 May) in Aircraft #126 and used as a "vacuum cleaner" without resultant FOD. As a result of the 2 May FOD on #219 engine, Project Headquar- ters directed initiation of a thorough investigation by a--`. appropriate componentsl . The Security Staff 25X1A was directed to investigate the possibility of Sabotage. 4. On 2 May 1963 the Chief, Security Staff/OSA, directed 25X1A the Security Officer, II to address 25X1A his full efforts to several specific areas of concern. The specific directives and the security actions taken to date are summarized as follows: a. Review access procedures to aircraft and consider maintaining access cog. tlho [ ecurity b-3:~f~ce has 25X1A in operation a long established compartmentation system. Individuals are granted access to physical areas within the Test Site on an "as needed basis." Currently there are six (6) aircraft in place, housed in two hangars. Approximately IIpeople require access to these han- gars. Access is authorized by the inclusion of a figure 1 on their security badge, which must be worn exposed at25X1A all times. On 2 May, the Security Officer, 25X1A 25X1A and discussed with the Base Commander, 25X1A ^, and Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, Vice President, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.., a possible reduction in the number of people having such access. It was unanimously agreed that present access standards are satisfactory. On 3 May it was decided that during non-working periods in the future, the Security guard assigned to the hangar area is to maintain a written log of all personnel enter- ing the hangar. b. Assure that Security Personnel are constantly alert topossible abataggee. Security personn are periodically re briefed on the necessity to be alert to saboteurs. As of 2 May a Security Guard will be per- manently assigned, on a 24-hour-a-day basis, to each hangar. It must be realized, however, that we are deal- iig with hangars large enough to house three Project Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : E 3-00313A000500070094-7 Approved F Release 2002/06/19$ FRFJP63-003Wi4000500070094-7 25X1A 0-2670-63 Page 3 Aircraft. The aircraft is, in itself, large and com- plex; while in the hangar it is often broken down for maintenance and the interior of the hangar often gives the appearance of a titanium jungle. At any given moment one guard could attend to about one percent of the entire hangar area. C. Encourage reporting to Security Office by key ty. contractor personne_L HUG #i~f'f personnel 01' any 1'ection an ullllstla coidLic y su or ina e eiriploYees is type of reporting' has been an est lisped SO 25X1A since commenced operation. Security 25X1A Officer solicits this type of reporting during EOD 25X1 br efings. In this regard, the cooperation with the 25X1A security Officer has been unanimous with one excep- tion, Lockheed. LAC Flight Test Management has consistently 25X1A refused to cooperate with Security Office in this regard. For example, (1) LAC is the only contractor firm 25X1A represented which refuses to permit periodic 25X1A Security rebriefings of personnel by to Security Officer; (2) the LAC Director of Flight Test recently 25X1A refused, upon request, to submit to Security Officer a copy of his critique of FOD; (3) during March- April 1963 a petition, listing several grievances con- 25X1A cerning facilities and signed by OLAC 25X1 union personnel, was submitted to Mr. C. L. Johnson; 25X1A neither .0 Security Officer nor Project Headquarters was notified of the discontent. d. Develop sources within the work force. Since LAC is the principal contractor involved, attention must be directed to that Company. Approxi- mately 75 percent of the Contractor personnel on Site are employed by LAC, and no difficulties have been encoun- tered with other Contractor personnel. The development of Confidential Contractor Informants is a delicate con- sideration; the potential labor-management conflicts resulting from such a program are somewhat prohibitive?25X1A On 2 May, Mr. C. L. Johnson discussed with 0 25X1A the possibility of integrating a Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : gI3-00313A000500070094-7 Approved Fo elease 2002/06/10 & 63-00314000500070094-7 25X1A 0-2670-63 Page 4 CI man into the LAC work force. The extensive area of activity would be extremely difficult for one man; indeed, five men would be a mere beginning. Conse- quently, consideration was given to developing long term, proven employees within the LAC group who have been formerly associated with this Agency. Development of these employees is, again, a delicate situation. Labor-management implications are serious. Consequently, the undersigned requested I , 25X1A West Coast Security Officer at LAC, to coordinate this technique with LAC Security. 25X1A To date has, on an informal basis, deve- loped three members of the LAC work force for this pur- pose. e. Review Security files of personnel having access 25X1A As was stated above, approximately "people at 25X1A have access, to the Vehicle. Information avail- 25X1A ,le to Security Officer indicated that a Secu- rity file review should commence with LAC Quality Control Inspectors as they are normally the last persons to closely survey the area of .n.terest. Furthermore, one 25X1A of the Inspectors, LAC, is the one 25X1A individual at II who has been described as a some- what disgruntled employee and rabble rouser. The files of all LAC inspectors (fifteen in number) were reviewed by Headquarters Security and Security with favor- 25X1A and employees, personnel who are normally in close proxi- mity to the Vehicle immediately prior to engine start, will be reviewed by Project Headquarters. At the request of Deputy for Technology%OSA, the LAC personnel currently assigned to the night shift will be reviewed. The files of the firemen, 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/06/10 :13-00313A000500070094-7 Approved Fo lease 2002/06/10 :W)C4U63-0031&000500070094-7 25X1A P 2670-63 age 5 f. Possibility of use of TV cameras in hangar areas. The extensive area to be covered and the mobility required; 25X1A in the opinion of preclude the use of TV or 25X1A 5. On 3 May 1963, a meeting was held at 0 to explore all possible causes of SOD. In attendance were the following: Project Headquarters 25X1A 25X1A Mr. John Parangosky 25X1A Burbank 25X1A 6. Detailed reporting of this meeting is available from Deputy for Technology. Corts:iderable discussion was devoted to the use of screens on the engine by-pass doors and the use of flapper valves against reverse air flow. Both fixes repre- sent possible solutions to FOD. The flapper valves should be available for installation in approximately two weeks. a. Consideration was again given to the possibility of sabotage. Consequently, the following actions were decided upon:25X1A (1) I I will determine the identities of personnel who signed the grievance petition men- tioned in paragraph 3c. above and submit the names to Project Headquarters for Office of Security file review. 25X1A (2) will determine the nature of the grievances and corrective action twkcn. Approved For Release 2002/06/10 :I ff 3-00313A000500070094-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/10 SECRE p?3-003113A000500070094-7 25X1A 12670--63 Page 6 b. Every effort was made to determine patterns on the FOD; there are none, However, the following factors pertain to 90 percent of the FOD: (1) FOD occurs dur- ing ground run; (2) FOD occurs during military power or above; (3) FOD occurs after some modification of the nacelle. The latter characteristic was proven by the history of Aircraft 121; and the history of Aircraft 121 25X1A +e-s to limit the geographical area of concern to 25X1#) engineer who resigned l reportedly because of his (1) The Flight. Test ?rogram I is 25X1A managed byl who, regardless of personal competency, pursue a dictatorial personnel policy and often irritate the hourly employees. 25X1A c. The most significant revelations at the 3 May meeting concerned the management, maintenance, and 25X1A inspection 25X1A by LAC atl 25X1A Operations- 25X1A 25X1A appalled at 25X1A 25X1A olicies and procedures currently utilized 1. the Director of Director of Materiel: Airframe Specialist/OSA; and II Engine Specialist/OSA, were unanimously t e careless approach of LAC. Among the significant revelations made were: disenchantment with LAC management policies 0 25X1A 25X1 (2) Indications of frictions within LAC Engi- neering-Supervisory groups and generally poor morale. (3) Contrary to Mr. Johnson's February 1963 statement that corrective action had been taken, LAC employees work in generally dirty environment. No corrective action has been taken to sterilize workers' clothing,, even though mechanics are working in most delicate areas of the aircraft, e.g. nacelle. It was SECRET Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500070094-7 will interview 25X1A 25X1A 25X1A Approved FoLelease 2002/06/10 $EC 63-0031 000500070094-7 25X1A -2670-63 Page 7 pointed out that in normal aircraft production, many precautions are taken along these lines, e.g., "bunny suit coveralls." (4) There are no standardized procedures for maintenance or inspection; each aircraft seems to be handled differently. (5) Work in the Spike-Control Area is carelessly done. This is a prime area of concern and suspect cause of FOD. The record shows that aircraft 123 and 124 have had little or no FOD because they fly with the Spike locked; others fly with movable Spike. (6) Definite absence of close supervision of aircraft crews. (7) Definite :Lack of check list procedures dur- ing maintenance and inspection. 25X1A It is the opinion of that the FOD problem 1 ::1 is predominantly one of basic housekeeping. Because of its persistent and recurs en-" characteristics, the possibi- lity of sabotage cannot bo dismissed and investigation will continue. However, the loss than effective maintenance and inspection procedures on the part of LAC have been allowed to persist throughout the duration of FOD. The problem has been slightly alleviated, in degrees, by the screen modifications; further improvements, perhaps only partial, hopefully will result from the flapper valve mod. 25X1A 8. It was the summary recommendations of that Project Headquarters immediately insist on a review and cor- rection of the LAC physical management of the Flight Test Pro- 25X1A gram at coincident, with continued intensive investigation of the possibility of sabotage. 25X1A Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : E 3-00313A000500070094-7 Approved Fq ,Release 2002/06/10$E(A 3-003 4000500070094-7 25X1A -.2670--63 Page 8 9. As you are aware action has been taken to implement this recommendation. 25X1A Chief,,,__,Security Staff O SA 25X1A cc: Director of Security OSA/SS:/mpr (8 May 1963) Distribution: Copy 1 - DAD/OSA 2 - DD/R 3 - D/Sec 4 - AD/OSA 5 - D/TECH/OSA 6 - D/FA/OSA 7 - AFIGO-S 8 - 0/DDCI 9 - SS/OSA 10 - RB/OSA I , PS/oSr4 Approved For Release 2002/06/10 :E3-00313A000500070094-7 Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500070094-7 TOP SECRE1- 25X1A` 1 2671-63 Copy /,W of RECAPITULATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, WEEK ENDING 8 KAY 1963 APPROVED PROJECT VEHICLE DATE TARGET COUNTRY BY DATE ACTION IDEALIST/ TACKLE 3 Missions U-2 April China Mainland to Special Group 4 April 1. South China requirem cover Szechwan still firm due to failure of Basin, Pao Tou, GRC-147. Aircraft at Missile Test Range 25X1C I Icame in commission and South China, as 7 May. necessary. 2. Subject to views of NPIC 25X2 and I is awaiting possible future targeting. COMOR does not recor;;rend recoverage of the Missile Test Range at this time. The present estimate is late June or July. The Szechwan Basin requires further study by COMOR. Weather in these area; was very poor during the period. 4 Missions U-2 April Sino/Indian Border Special Group 4 April No activity in this area dur- and ing the period due to lack of May 25X1 in the NEFA area. Aircraft being used in Lao;/North Vietnam area. 1 Mission U-2 May or North Korea Special Group 4 April Weather checked daily. Air- June craft out of commission until 7 May. (See Manchuria mission on Approved For ReleasQ'2M2/St fA-RDP63-00313A00050007009 ge 2) Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500070094-7 25X1 A TOP SECRET ge2271-63 PROJECT VEHICLE DATE TARGET COUNTRY APPROVED BY DATE ACTION IDEALIST/ TACKLE 3 Missions* U-2 April/ Laos/North Special Group 4 April Mission 3221 completed May Vietnam 1 May 63. Mission 3222 completed 3 May 63. Missic'n 3223 alerted for launch oz 3 May. Delayed daily thru 8 May due deterioration of weather. 1 Mission U-2 May Manchuria Special Group 4 April This mission planned to cover targets in North Korea and Manchuria. Mission GRC-150 approved for launch on 8 May 63. 2100Z. *Special Group approved on 2 May 1963 as many flights as necessary to secure adequate coverage of the North Vietnam area. Approved For Release 2002/06/~~I9f0313A000500070094-7- Approved For Release 2002/06/10 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000500070094-7 25X1A TOP SECRET 0 2671-63 Page 3 25X1A No activity during period of this report. OSA/OD/CC/ 25X1A cc: DCI ER DD/R DD/P DD/I SA/DDR DDP/SGO Distribution: #1 - DCI #2 - ER #3 - DD/R #4 - DD/P #5 - DD/I #6 - AD/OSA #7 - DAD/OSA #8 - C/OD/OSA #9 - SA/DDR x10 - INTEL/OSA #11 - CC/OD/OSA #12 - DDP/SGO #13 - D/FA/OSA #14 - RB/OSA rh (8 May 63) Approved For Release f 'V'L"U KEATRDP63-00313A000500070094-7