PROJECT OXCART - SECURITY (FOREIGN OBJECT DAMAGE TO ENGINES (Sanitized)(Sanitized) )

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500070094-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: May 8, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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J- 2670-63
Copy /'o of / o
8 May 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Assistant Director, OSA
SUBJECT Project OXCART - Security
Foreign Object Damage to Engines
25X1A 25X1A
REFERENCE : Q 2631-63 dtd 30 Apr 63, To: DAD/OSA,
Frm: C/SS/OSA, Subj: As Above
25X1A
1. As a result of the continued POD problems ~
25X1A Assistant Security Officer, 25X1A
OSA-.DD/R, on 1-3 May 1963, conducted a review of Security
procedures in effect This memorandum is to
record Security actions initiate and anticipated, and
to record Staff discussions held during that 25X1A
period.
2. The conclusions reached during these discussions
are: (1) FOD has been somewhat corrected by installation
of screens in the bleed by-pass doors; this correction has
been one of degree; (2) POD may be considerably reduced by
the installation of "flapper valves" within the nacelle area,
designed to eliminate damage caused by reverse airflow of
secondary air experienced during ground runs; and (3) POD
is most probably attributable in some degree to laxity in
the physical management of the flight test program 25X1A
25X1A I particularly in the areas of housekeeping, aircraft
maintenance and quality control inspection procedures.
3. POD has been a continuing problemi -1 since
June 1962. (Attachment #1 records a chronological. history
of POD to date.) On 2 May engine #219 experienced major
POD, after having been installed for 35 minutes in the left
nacelle of Aircraft #121. Similar damage was experienced
in the same nacelle on 26 April 1963 while engine #216 was
Handle via
25X1.A
25X1A
0
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installed. During the interim, 26 April - 3 May, engine
#216 had been installed (on 1 May) in Aircraft #126 and
used as a "vacuum cleaner" without resultant FOD. As a
result of the 2 May FOD on #219 engine, Project Headquar-
ters directed initiation of a thorough investigation by
a--`. appropriate componentsl . The Security Staff 25X1A
was directed to investigate the possibility of Sabotage.
4. On 2 May 1963 the Chief, Security Staff/OSA, directed
25X1A the Security Officer, II to address 25X1A
his full efforts to several specific areas of concern. The
specific directives and the security actions taken to date
are summarized as follows:
a. Review access procedures to aircraft and consider
maintaining access cog. tlho [ ecurity b-3:~f~ce has
25X1A in
operation a long established compartmentation system.
Individuals are granted access to physical areas within
the Test Site on an "as needed basis." Currently there
are six (6) aircraft in place, housed in two hangars.
Approximately IIpeople require access to these han-
gars. Access is authorized by the inclusion of a figure
1 on their security badge, which must be worn exposed at25X1A
all times. On 2 May, the Security Officer, 25X1A
25X1A and discussed with the Base Commander,
25X1A ^, and Mr. Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson, Vice President,
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.., a possible reduction in the
number of people having such access. It was unanimously
agreed that present access standards are satisfactory.
On 3 May it was decided that during non-working periods
in the future, the Security guard assigned to the hangar
area is to maintain a written log of all personnel enter-
ing the hangar.
b. Assure that Security Personnel are constantly
alert topossible abataggee. Security personn are
periodically re briefed on the necessity to be alert to
saboteurs. As of 2 May a Security Guard will be per-
manently assigned, on a 24-hour-a-day basis, to each
hangar. It must be realized, however, that we are deal-
iig with hangars large enough to house three Project
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Aircraft. The aircraft is, in itself, large and com-
plex; while in the hangar it is often broken down for
maintenance and the interior of the hangar often gives
the appearance of a titanium jungle. At any given
moment one guard could attend to about one percent of
the entire hangar area.
C. Encourage reporting to Security Office by key
ty.
contractor personne_L HUG #i~f'f personnel 01' any
1'ection an ullllstla coidLic y su or ina e eiriploYees
is type of reporting' has been an est lisped SO
25X1A since commenced operation. Security 25X1A
Officer solicits this type of reporting during EOD 25X1
br efings. In this regard, the cooperation with the
25X1A security Officer has been unanimous with one excep-
tion, Lockheed. LAC Flight Test Management has consistently
25X1A refused to cooperate with Security Office in this
regard. For example, (1) LAC is the only contractor firm
25X1A represented which refuses to permit periodic
25X1A Security rebriefings of personnel by to Security
Officer; (2) the LAC Director of Flight Test recently 25X1A
refused, upon request, to submit to Security
Officer a copy of his critique of FOD; (3) during March-
April 1963 a petition, listing several grievances con-
25X1A cerning facilities and signed by OLAC 25X1
union personnel, was submitted to Mr. C. L. Johnson;
25X1A neither .0 Security Officer nor Project Headquarters
was notified of the discontent.
d. Develop sources within the work force.
Since LAC is the principal contractor involved,
attention must be directed to that Company. Approxi-
mately 75 percent of the Contractor personnel on Site
are employed by LAC, and no difficulties have been encoun-
tered with other Contractor personnel. The development
of Confidential Contractor Informants is a delicate con-
sideration; the potential labor-management conflicts
resulting from such a program are somewhat prohibitive?25X1A
On 2 May, Mr. C. L. Johnson discussed with 0
25X1A the possibility of integrating a
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CI man into the LAC work force. The extensive area
of activity would be extremely difficult for one man;
indeed, five men would be a mere beginning. Conse-
quently, consideration was given to developing long
term, proven employees within the LAC group who have
been formerly associated with this Agency.
Development of these employees is, again, a delicate
situation. Labor-management implications are serious.
Consequently, the undersigned requested I , 25X1A
West Coast Security Officer at LAC, to coordinate this
technique with LAC Security.
25X1A To date has, on an informal basis, deve-
loped three members of the LAC work force for this pur-
pose.
e. Review Security files of personnel having access
25X1A
As was stated above, approximately "people at
25X1A have access, to the Vehicle. Information avail-
25X1A ,le to Security Officer indicated that a Secu-
rity file review should commence with LAC Quality Control
Inspectors as they are normally the last persons to
closely survey the area of .n.terest. Furthermore, one
25X1A of the Inspectors, LAC, is the one
25X1A individual at II who has been described as a some-
what disgruntled employee and rabble rouser. The files
of all LAC inspectors (fifteen in number) were reviewed
by Headquarters Security and Security with favor-
25X1A
and employees, personnel who are normally in close proxi-
mity to the Vehicle immediately prior to engine start,
will be reviewed by Project Headquarters.
At the request of Deputy for Technology%OSA, the LAC
personnel currently assigned to the night shift will be
reviewed.
The files of the firemen,
25X1A
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f. Possibility of use of TV cameras in hangar areas.
The extensive area to be covered and the mobility required;
25X1A in the opinion of preclude the use of TV or
25X1A
5. On 3 May 1963, a meeting was held at 0 to
explore all possible causes of SOD. In attendance were the
following:
Project Headquarters
25X1A
25X1A
Mr. John Parangosky
25X1A
Burbank 25X1A
6. Detailed reporting of this meeting is available from
Deputy for Technology. Corts:iderable discussion was devoted
to the use of screens on the engine by-pass doors and the use
of flapper valves against reverse air flow. Both fixes repre-
sent possible solutions to FOD. The flapper valves should be
available for installation in approximately two weeks.
a. Consideration was again given to the possibility
of sabotage. Consequently, the following actions were
decided upon:25X1A
(1) I I will determine the identities
of personnel who signed the grievance petition men-
tioned in paragraph 3c. above and submit the names
to Project Headquarters for Office of Security file
review.
25X1A
(2) will determine the nature of the
grievances and corrective action twkcn.
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b. Every effort was made to determine patterns on
the FOD; there are none, However, the following factors
pertain to 90 percent of the FOD: (1) FOD occurs dur-
ing ground run; (2) FOD occurs during military power or
above; (3) FOD occurs after some modification of the
nacelle. The latter characteristic was proven by the
history of Aircraft 121; and the history of Aircraft 121
25X1A
+e-s to limit the geographical area of concern to
25X1#)
engineer who
resigned l reportedly because of his
(1) The Flight. Test ?rogram I is
25X1A managed byl who,
regardless of personal competency, pursue a
dictatorial personnel policy and often irritate
the hourly employees.
25X1A
c. The most significant revelations at the 3 May
meeting concerned the management, maintenance, and
25X1A inspection
25X1A by LAC atl
25X1A Operations-
25X1A
25X1A
appalled at
25X1A 25X1A
olicies and procedures currently utilized
1. the Director of
Director of Materiel:
Airframe Specialist/OSA; and II
Engine Specialist/OSA, were unanimously
t e careless approach of LAC. Among the
significant revelations made were:
disenchantment with LAC management policies 0
25X1A
25X1
(2) Indications of frictions within LAC Engi-
neering-Supervisory groups and generally poor morale.
(3) Contrary to Mr. Johnson's February 1963
statement that corrective action had been taken, LAC
employees work in generally dirty environment. No
corrective action has been taken to sterilize workers'
clothing,, even though mechanics are working in most
delicate areas of the aircraft, e.g. nacelle. It was
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pointed out that in normal aircraft production,
many precautions are taken along these lines,
e.g., "bunny suit coveralls."
(4) There are no standardized procedures for
maintenance or inspection; each aircraft seems to
be handled differently.
(5) Work in the Spike-Control Area is carelessly
done. This is a prime area of concern and suspect
cause of FOD. The record shows that aircraft 123
and 124 have had little or no FOD because they fly
with the Spike locked; others fly with movable Spike.
(6) Definite absence of close supervision of
aircraft crews.
(7) Definite :Lack of check list procedures dur-
ing maintenance and inspection.
25X1A
It is the opinion of that the FOD problem
1 ::1 is predominantly one of basic housekeeping. Because
of its persistent and recurs en-" characteristics, the possibi-
lity of sabotage cannot bo dismissed and investigation will
continue. However, the loss than effective maintenance and
inspection procedures on the part of LAC have been allowed to
persist throughout the duration of FOD. The problem has been
slightly alleviated, in degrees, by the screen modifications;
further improvements, perhaps only partial, hopefully will
result from the flapper valve mod. 25X1A
8. It was the summary recommendations of that
Project Headquarters immediately insist on a review and cor-
rection of the LAC physical management of the Flight Test Pro-
25X1A gram at coincident, with continued intensive investigation
of the possibility of sabotage.
25X1A
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9. As you are aware action has been taken to implement
this recommendation.
25X1A
Chief,,,__,Security Staff
O SA
25X1A
cc: Director of Security
OSA/SS:/mpr (8 May 1963)
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DAD/OSA
2 - DD/R
3 - D/Sec
4 - AD/OSA
5 - D/TECH/OSA
6 - D/FA/OSA
7 - AFIGO-S
8 - 0/DDCI
9 - SS/OSA
10 - RB/OSA
I , PS/oSr4
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TOP SECRE1-
25X1A`
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Copy /,W of
RECAPITULATION OF AIR ACTIVITIES, WEEK ENDING 8 KAY 1963
APPROVED
PROJECT VEHICLE DATE TARGET COUNTRY BY DATE ACTION
IDEALIST/
TACKLE
3 Missions U-2 April China Mainland to Special Group 4 April 1. South China requirem
cover Szechwan still firm due to failure of
Basin, Pao Tou, GRC-147. Aircraft at
Missile Test Range 25X1C I Icame in commission
and South China, as 7 May.
necessary. 2. Subject to views of NPIC
25X2 and I is awaiting
possible future targeting.
COMOR does not recor;;rend
recoverage of the Missile
Test Range at this time. The
present estimate is late June
or July. The Szechwan Basin
requires further study by
COMOR. Weather in these area;
was very poor during the
period.
4 Missions U-2 April Sino/Indian Border Special Group 4 April No activity in this area dur-
and ing the period due to lack of
May 25X1
in the NEFA area. Aircraft
being used in Lao;/North
Vietnam area.
1 Mission U-2 May or North Korea Special Group 4 April Weather checked daily. Air-
June craft out of commission until
7 May.
(See Manchuria mission on
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TOP SECRET ge2271-63
PROJECT
VEHICLE
DATE
TARGET COUNTRY
APPROVED
BY
DATE
ACTION
IDEALIST/
TACKLE
3 Missions*
U-2
April/
Laos/North
Special Group
4 April
Mission 3221 completed
May
Vietnam
1 May 63. Mission 3222
completed 3 May 63. Missic'n
3223 alerted for launch oz
3 May. Delayed daily thru
8 May due deterioration of
weather.
1 Mission
U-2
May
Manchuria
Special Group
4 April
This mission planned to cover
targets in North Korea and
Manchuria. Mission GRC-150
approved for launch on 8 May
63. 2100Z.
*Special Group approved on 2 May 1963 as many flights as necessary
to secure adequate coverage of the North Vietnam area.
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25X1A
No activity during period of this report.
OSA/OD/CC/
25X1A
cc: DCI
ER
DD/R
DD/P
DD/I
SA/DDR
DDP/SGO
Distribution:
#1 - DCI
#2 - ER
#3 - DD/R
#4 - DD/P
#5 - DD/I
#6 - AD/OSA
#7 - DAD/OSA
#8 - C/OD/OSA
#9 - SA/DDR
x10 - INTEL/OSA
#11 - CC/OD/OSA
#12 - DDP/SGO
#13 - D/FA/OSA
#14 - RB/OSA
rh (8 May 63)
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