CIA/DOD MANAGEMENT RELATIONS PROBLEMS UNDER THE NRO CONCEPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500130021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2002
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: August 17, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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NRO REVIEW COMPLETED
E ORA BUM. TOR: Deputy
SUBJECT:
op
1 7 Ei3
or of Central Intel igence
CIA/ DOD Management Relations Problems
Under the NRO Concept
1. Ever since the advent of the U-2 there has
I* between the Central Iligirece Agency (CIA)
Mr Torte (usAT) as to which would control, manage, a
e covert reconnaissance over denied territory. The decision,
time of the V-2, was that such control and management would
rest with the CIA. The Inutar would provide logistical and administra-
tive support. The resulting roanagetrind structure during the U-2 era
resulted in a one-,1711MI show run by Mr. Richard M. Diesel*, who
controlled the entire project, including the development, the technical
direction, funding, contracting, security. and operations. Colonel
Geary wee in charge of providing the support of the Air Force
facilities, such as, bases, industrial equipment, fuel, transportation,
personnel, and all balm and ground support facilities, without which
the program could obviously not have been accomplished within the
CIA. The Air Force also furnished a majority of the funds. This
rnansgernent structure was ideal - Mr. Bissell lied control of all the
resources required, and reported to no-one 41.11:CePt Mr. Dulles, who
had in turn delegated complete freedom and authority to M. Siesehl.
with a requirement that be only be kept informed of major milestones
and events.
2. Sine. the U-Z, the appearance of additional and sohisticat,4
systems and their related functions has created a very complex
management situation. Instead of one reconnaissance system we now
have the U-2, its follow-on aircraft system the A-12, a whole family
of satellites, and gr ally enlarged related functions; such as, photo-
graphic processing, 1
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acting* rnerous new developn ent. ch are
under consideration or hsve been recommended by various sources.
This expanding arsenal of system., projects, programs, and functions
produced an expanding bureaucracy. Instead of * one-tr.an single
manager direction of the covert reconnaissance program, we have the
Special Group; DCI; DDCI; WNW; DD/S&T; AD/OSA; Director,
Program A, NRC); Director, Program 13, 'IRO; Director, Program D,
NW; Under Secretary of the Mr Forte; and MOD, all involved in
directing the covert reconnaissance plan.
3. As the covert reconnaissance activity grewf the NRC was
ed to provide a functional organisation 'which would control all
t reconnaissance systems and operations within the parameters
ational reconnaiesance plan. Such an organisation could be made
to work but requires one of two thing.; (I) a chief executive who has
the final decision in the assignment of functions and responsibilities
among the participating and competing groups, or, (2) by compromise
agreement by the groups on the division of functions. In the case of
the NRC) , neither of these two is evident. Attached is a listing of
major projects plotted against five major management functions.
Question marks depict areas of dispute and/or absence of any definitive
assignment of responsibility.
4. Such disputes have resulted in considerable confusion and
-down of the entire Nations./ Reconnaissance Plan because of the
amount of time and resources devoted to argument.
3. It is imperative that this condition not be allowed to continue.
The solution is really not difficult. Only two things are required:
there must be a broad policy decision made between the Secretary
e, the DCI, or the President. In this respect there are four
a. Make tb. NRO concept workable. Thi. will take
compromiae, mutual respect, prior consultation on matters
of substance, and getting together to agree on some logical
division of responsibilities.
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b. Disbawl the
and DOD act independenti
covert reconnaissance erste
? and let the CIA
sition and control of
c. Let the siteation continue as it is presently operating
and permit participating groups to maneuver and struggle for
power and control. Such a line at action is sometimes justified
because it provides competition. Vatter detailed consideration
this advaatageLa not likely to compensate for the inefficiency
and confusion which necessarily results from such an arrange-
ment.
4. Have the President assign the total covert reconnais-
sance function to either the CIA or the DOD. It should be
pointed out that in terms of pure capabilities the DOD could
provide all necessary functions, facilities, and other assets
to singularly carry out such an assignment. The CIA could not,
without assistance from the DOD.
miming that the broad policy decision is made to the effect that a
NRO is desired from a national standpoint then the second thing that must
be dons is to assign the projects. programs, and functional tasks to the
various program directors in a manner which will result in an accept-
able compromise between the CIA and. the DOD. Experience over the
past year has detneestrated the futility of attempting to *amigo these
responsibilities on a piecemeal basis.
6. If such a division of assignments is mad. there are several
al division of functions. I recommend the following as a departure
for *cession:
a. Give over-all management responsibility for all
satellite programs to the Director of Program A with adequate
representation on control boards and evaluation committees to
Program E. There can be little doubt that the present Director
of Program A has adequate facilities and know-how to perform
this assignment. H. reports directly and exclusively to the
D/NRO and this presumably would make him immediately
reeponsive to the requiretrents of the DCI.
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C.
eat with the r
developments
capabilities to lciude
intensifiers, etc., to Program B.
toted in 4.b. v
? field of covert
ch initial studies as
align int of the 17-Z, OXCART,
*.nsnt responsibility of !Director,
f. Coat ? moutagerneot reletione
Z *at presently adm.Irtistertd.
11- Aseign all maaagerneat fun photographic
processing, photographic supply procurement1 and photo-
graphic R&D to Director. Program S. This leould inclu.de
complete maaagemeat control of the Eastman facility and the
assignment of processing tasks to the Westover Air Force
facility. thi Suitlead Naval Processing facility,
as required to meet the National Reconnaissance elan.
t. Leave the satellite operations
Director. NRO.
J
Leave the air op.rotloe. c
B.
nder Director
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k. Cancel the TAGBOARD program. This program is
controversial,es Lockheed's over-all capability. threaten*
the security of the OXCART program, and has little operational
success probability because of multiple systeFkIs involved.
site other smaller projects or tasks1 such as,
night photography color photogralthy, etc..
heals clearly detain& reap:m*1MM** in those
areas of technical direction. operational control,
security, and budgeting
cc: D
AD/ OSA/ JC Ledfo rd
Distribution:
#1 & #2. - DDCI
#3 & #4 - DD/S&T
#5 - AD/OSA
RB /OSA
(17 Aug 63)
(w/att)
(w/ att)
(w/att)
(w/ aft)
jSigned) jack G. I,diford
JACK C. LEDFORD.
Colonel MAN.*
Assistant Director
(Special Activities)
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EsTioNS
A tachrrte t 12.
NR9 MANAGEMENT CAUSING
T BETWEEN PARTICIPATING GROUPS
chedules, a
a processing?
? develop rnat of better processing method.,
?
3 Who controls the scheduling
4. Who baa tschuical direction
satellite load area?
Who will have technical direction and operational control of
TAG
6. Who is responsible for developing capabilities
a.
b. Night Ptetogrspby
c. Color Photography
4.
O.
is responsible for implementing Purcell Panel
ns?
0 C RT follow-on elect
. What is the division of rnanag.m.nt raapoaslbUiti.s in the
schnical direction, operational control, escutty, coat ratting.
log *mons all the projects and programs under the NRO?
13. What are the budget and funding procedures within the NRO
and between its participating groups
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