CIA'S ROLE IN THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000500140016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 9, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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OCT 1S&3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Programs Evaluation
SUBJECT : CIA's Role in the National Reconnaissance
Programs
EC RE
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1. From the first thoughts of the U-2 Program, which began its
fermentation in late 1954, Dr. Edwin Land, who was then Chairman
of Project 3 - Technological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense
Mobilization, prepared a paper which recommended to the Director
of Central Intelligence that CIA undertake an overflight activity of
the Soviet Union. The Land Panel agreed that there were many
reasons why the activity of overflights was appropriate for CIA.
Because no statesman, as Land put it, could run the risk of provoca-
tion towards war and for the Air Force to engage in a program of
.that sort would seem rather dangerous, the Panel recommended
that CIA, as a civilian organization, undertake a covert program
of selected flights. Thus from the very beginning, CIA's role in
the program was to lend an unaggressive and unmilitaristic nature
to overflights. It was this philosophy, conceived in early days, that
has prevailed to the present and has retained for CIA the jurisdiction
for overflights of denied territories. The validity and appropriate-
ness of this philosophy was put to test following the 1 May 1960
incident. The USSR attempted, feebly at first, to link that action
to the Pentagon, but it soon had to content itself to air this issue
in the arena of a spy trial. Although world opinion may have been
mixed regarding the propriety of such an activity, few measured
that action in the realm of a war-like gesture. Hence, the fact that
CIA was behind the U-2 program protected the United States Govern-
ment from official renunciation for a militaristic or aggressive
action. It is not proposed here and now that the Air Force does
not possess the capability to conduct a U-2 program of its own
any more than that precept was challenged in late 1954. What was
true at that.time remains equally valid today, namely, if the United
States Government wishes to engage in overflight activities over
denied hostile territory, it had best equip itself to minimize attribu-
tion to an official act of the United States Government, particularly
through the mechanism of one of its armed forces.
NRO review(s) completed. SECE1
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2. We are rapidly approaching operational readiness of the
OXCART program. Can we properly retain for that program CIA's
jurisdiction which was established for the U-2 program? Again it
is conceded that the United States Air Force ably retains an in-house
capability to conduct such a program. If, as planned, the OXCART
vehicle is launched I land returns to that base following
overflight with the aid of aerial refueling, the security measures
which will be required are minimal and well within the capability
of the United States Air Force. No intelligent person will contest
that technically the Air Force possesses a capability at least equal
to CLA to manage and carry out such a mission. The sole reason
for CIA's involvement can only be predicated upon the necessity of
the U. S. Government to avoid an international incident perpetrated
by one of its members of the armed forces. Again, the Powers
case points up the wisdom of the pilot being employed by CIA, thus
relegating the incident in international minds to the accepted practice
of espionage among nations.
3. One thing, however, which cannot be overlooked in the develop-
ment and management of any reconnaissance activity is the successful
cloak of security which CIA can enwrap a program. Again, we can
point to the U-2, which even though exposed following the 1 May 1960
incident, has been successfully employed in continuing overflight
reconnaissance without breach of security or national embarrassment.
The OXCART program, tremendous in scope, has been a masterful
achievement in protecting the knowledgeability of that program. We
think it is a fair statement of fact that CIA is without peers in the
U. S. Government in security success.
4. In attempting to measure the role which CIA can play in the
reconnaissance programs of the Government, let us look at the record
and achievements which CIA. has accomplished. We are all well aware
of the U-2 program, which took 9 months from contractual go-ahead
of the U-2 until its first flight, and some 10 months after the first
flight operational units had been deployed overseas and the first
overflight of the Soviet Bloc countries had been accomplished. The
OXCART program took 26 months in preliminary studies and an
additional 29 months before the. first aircraft was completed. Two
months later the first flight was achieved and 6 months following
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that first flight the aircraft reached Mach 2. Comparing this achieve-
ment to the Air Force's B-58 and B-70 programs, the B-58 took 32
months in preliminary studies and an additional 50 months before their
first aircraft was completed. One month later the first flight was
accomplished and 8 months following that the aircraft reached Mach 2.
T}}e B-70 program, which already has spent more money than the
OXCART, KEDLOCK programs combined, took 38
months in preliminary studies and an additional 69 months have passed
since contractual go-ahead and the first aircraft has yet to be com-
pleted. It is not difficult to suggest on reviewing these statistics that
CIA might take justifiable pride in its management of aircraft develop-
mental programs, as well as to infer that possibly CIA methods and
attention given to developmental programs might have a "leg up" on
those of the standardized Air Force approach. Additionally, let us
look at the satellite programs. In July of this year the Air Force
produced its first picture recovered from satellite photography. This
is some three years after CIA accomplished its first successful sat-
ellite reconnaissance. The contributions and achievements which CIA
has given to our national reconnaissance program certainly attest to
the strong possibility that CIA is, in fact, a leader in our national
reconnaissance effort. In the face of this history it would seem
criminal to divorce this Agency from further participation in this
field.
5. With the advent of the National Reconnaissance Office and the
machinations which transpired since its foundation, we now find CIA
virtually severed from engaging in reconnaissance activities other
than those such as IDEALIST and OXCART which it has sired from
the outset. With the National Reconnaissance Office and Staff primarily
manned by Air Force personnel, who are apparently oriented and
dedicated to the extinction of CIA's role in the national reconnaissance,
a bright future does not loom for CIA. This is especially true when
one considers that funds for the conduct of the National Reconnaissance
Program are controlled by these same Air Force people. CIA has
experienced to date the subjugation of its activities and endeavors to
the whims and desires of those DOD personnel controlling the National
Reconnaissance Program funds. It is readily recognized that the
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National Reconnaissance Program has achieved little in the proper
organization of our reconnaissance efforts, but more readily has
lent itself to continuing skirmishes and harangues which has driven
CIA and the Air Force further apart from mutual cooperation. The
fact that we are now on our third or fourth NRO.Agreement confirms
that little has been accomplished towards the desired goal of that
organization. In an effort to salvage that organization, CIA has
recently designated a Deputy Director/NRO who finds himself now
ignored and circumvented in the decision making of that Office.
Many will agree that it is noble and righteous to attempt to organize
all the reconnaissance efforts of the U. S. Government under the
management of a single office. Parochialism and petty jealousies,
however, have prevented the fruition of any meaningful organiza-
tion. It is submitted, and I think rightly so, that CIA and the
Department of Defense have gone too far in the establishment of
the National Reconnaissance Office to gracefully withdraw without
further severing the interface so necessary between CIA and the
Department of Defense in our national reconnaissance efforts.
6. Should the DCI in an effort to streamline CIA's budget, look
with some disfavor at the prospect of huge sums of monies necessary
to conduct satellite and aircraft reconnaissance programs being
charged against the Central Intelligence Agency, it is recognizable
that he would welcome such an instrument as the National Reconnaissance
Office to bear the brunt of the financial burden for the national recon-
naissance programs. Contemporaneously, however, with such a settle-
ment the question arises as to how CIA can relinquish control of the
'funds for such a program and at the same time insure that the national
reconnaissance effort will be conducted according to the combined
desires of the United States Intelligence Community. Short of nominating
a CIA employee as Director of the National Reconnaissance Program,
there are a few avenues left to the DCI. A possible solution would be
for the DCI to call upon the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board to review the National Reconnaissance Program and make rec-
ommendations to him relative to its organization, composition, manage-
ment, funding, and responsibilities. Should the FLAB recognize the
need for CIA's. active participation, if not managerial role, in our
National Reconnaissance Program, the Director's defense of an en-
larged budget, such as reconnaissance programs necessitate, could.
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readily look to the recommendation of the FLAB and the requirement
that CIA manage and control these programs in behalf of the entire
intelligence community. The Purcell Panel which recently reviewed
future satellite reconnaissance operations at the request of the DCI
pointed out in its summary to Mr. McCone that "the compact and
competent management organization, under which the present op-
erational systems were developed, we believe has contributed
largely to the past success of the program. The Panel did not
consider at this time the effect of recent changes in the manage-
ment structure (i. e., the arrival of the NRO). It recommends,
however, that this subject be continually reviewed to ensure that
clearness of focus and purpose, originally achieved, has not been
diffused. " In our interpretation then, in these words the Purcell
Panel paid tribute to the CIA reconnaissance efforts and at the same
time expressed their hope that the NRO would not jeopardize or alter
the success which CIA had achieved to date.
7. One fact of life which cannot be ignored is that CIA over the
years has demonstrated a policy of austerity in the funding and per-
sonnel manning of its reconnaissance endeavors. We have manned
units at our various detachments with far fewer people than would
SAC under similar circumstances. The utilization of "skunk works"
in our contractors' facilities, as well as the philosophy of contracting
and monitoring of our programs has greatly contributed to a com-
paratively "bargain price" in all our endeavors. Although the Director
by transferring our reconnaissance programs to DOD may effectively
reduce the budget of CIA, he might very well by this action contribute
to the increase of the overall Federal budget by submitting our austere
programs to the enlarged spending and over-manning of the DOD.
8. A final point which should not be overlooked is the modus
operandi which CIA employs in not only the conduct of its reconnaissance
programs but in the management of its research and development activ-
ities. The entire CIA operation is now in concert with the highest
security practices and covert principles. Although this attribute was
not a major consideration when the U-2 program was earmarked for
CIA, the vast experience and finesse which CIA has amassed in the
conduct of covert reconnaissance operations should make it an odds
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 on favorite as a candidate for future national reconnaissance activities.
We feel relatively safe to suggest that the Air Force, in organization,
tradition and temperament, cannot compete with CIA in this regard.
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Distribution:
Copy I. - DD/Programs Eval.
2 - DD/NRO (G. Kiefer)
3 - AD / OSA
4 - JNMcMahon
(Extra) 5 - RB/OSA
JNMcM
(9 Oct 6.3)
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