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Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
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September 11, 2003
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May 29, 1959
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25X1 D L Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 -Approve or R se 2003/12/.18: CLA-RDI 0313A0(00600030040-9 This doenmert cortai;.s infermatien referring to Prej ,At U~ UCE SITUATION ESTIMATE for PROJECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1960 and 1961 USAF review(s) completed. TOP SECRET CHAL-0676 Cy pf_ o 1 Junes 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003 '1608tfAtIP63-061 3A0006U0030040-9 I Introduction 1. Purpose 2. Background and History II Intelligence Requirements 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Target Selection Task Targets Relationship of Targets to Forces Corollary Tasks III Concept of Operations 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Employment Mission and Mission Planning Utilization Primary Mission Capabilities Maintenance and Support Control Sortie Rate Support IV Relationship to Other Forces 25X1 2. Pro Hostilities 3. Hostilities Enclosures 1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 or Overflights 2. Utilization of Bases 3. Aircraft and Equipment Assignment 4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours CHAG-O676 Cy(ofjj I dune 195S TOP SEC Rim ET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/1 2 C -00813A000600030040-9 BEET I INTRODUCTION a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of project operations during the FY 19606-61 time period. Due to current events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document will be utilized as a conmon reference and/or,departure point for all concerned consistent with the aboves b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the basis for justification of the budget. As such it will be reviewed and revised as necessary and no later than 1 September 1959 in order that it can again become the basis for budgeting and long range planning for FY 1960 and 1961: This to include operational effectiveness, the formu- lation of policy, tactics and techniques and the determination of operational and R & D requirements. c) In addition, revisions will be made consistent with the latest technological advancements, the current political and economic situation, and new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national security, in order to provide timely and effective guidance for any follow-on program. c) To provide the capability for relatively safe overflights, the Lockheed U-2 was developed in 1955. Built into the UU2 was an altitude capability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered almost certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically interfere. Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could not intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they might have a limited capability of tracking the U?2 with radar. This assumption later proved to be correct except for the overly optimistic anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited." It is reasonable to assume that the Soviet capability to intercept will increase .of airborne platforms. the country. All of the studies validated the requirements, emphas d the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recommended the uti' ation various studies were performed by the most capable scientific group 2. BACK AND HISTORY a) At the time the Soviet Union and its satellites denied normal access to its territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of intelligence became readily apparent and the requirement was of the highest priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated the need for prompt and aggressive action in order to obtain a capability which would satisfy the' intelligence requirements. b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government P REGRET CHAT,-0676 Cy 6 of_ yi- 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 TOP SECRET during the period under discussion. However, as can be seen by reference to Enclosure 1, there is still significant overflight utility remaining in the existing U-2 capability throughout this period. As further pointed out in Enclosure 1, the probability of loss is considered slight9 especial- ly if certain selected target areas, which are suspected to have more advanced defensive equipment, are avoided. The use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception with minim an ground time as pertains to the U-2, would greatly impede any efforts of the Soviets to employ special techniques and equipments against the U-2. By critical selectivity of target areas and flight plan routes, the U-2 will be able to continue to operate throughout this period with virtual physical immunity at the beginning, to operations on a calculated risk basis at the end of the period. d) Diplomatic protests which the USSR'has made as a result of the AQUATONE operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make it imperative that Project CHALICE operations be conducted in such a manner. as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was considered to have been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a flight which, although it did not violate a third country, did fly into its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. During the interim, a total of 20 penetrations were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplo- matic protest from any source. Recorded reaction to these flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances, aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. It was further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal evidence of overflight by U. S. aircraft as it had in the cases of both the 1956 and 1.958 protests. It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplomatic measures. In both protest cases, high U. S. political authority directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The reaction to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout this period and will be taken into consider- ation for planning and when submitting proposed overflights for political approval. e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 - 5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin, termination, etc., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official protest .This would also allow for more plausible U. S. denial. TOP SECRET CHAL-0676 Cy, of-Ly 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18: CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For ReleL ?2003/12/ PPC T3-00413A000600030040-9 II INTELLIGENCE REQUIR7'1ENTS 1. TARGET SELECTION Intelligence requirements for penetration flights by Project CHALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which is com- posed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Requirements encompass the fields of photographic intelligence, electronics intelligence, and communi- ations en e e recuirements are coordinated with r Conso 1'' 4:110 1''1 lidate ge s s established priorities reflect the composite views of all the agencies represented on both committees and, as such, represent the consensus of the Community as a whole. Targets and priorities per c are reviewed by the committees and revisions are made based on the most current intelligence available from all sources. 2, TASK Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for reliable inform matl:on on the present and future Soviet capabilities for such an, attack. Such information is also critical to our national defense policy and plan- ning; During the past three years limited CHALICE coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable information on which we have based our estimates of the Soviet capabilities foxes unclear attack. At the present time, there is an urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas known to be, or suspected to be, associated with the three major elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability of the nuclear threat). a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the status of the Soviet ICE4 program, an inherent threat of overriding magnitude, Studies over the past two years by the U. S. Intelligence Community have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet IC4s. Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic support for fixed sites and test sites are prime search areas for this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deployment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production. Coverage of the most suspect production facilities may help to confirm this.* I lagreed that the most critical question was guided missiless, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to distinguish between IRR and ICS4. Further, they rate research and development and production as much higher than deployment at this time since evidence on Q these would permit a judgment of whether there was indeed a threat in d existence; their thinking does not put deployment as at all probable nooy~ in the case of the ICBM and not "most critical" to look for in the case`"' of the IRBNI. TOP SECRET CHAL-0676 Cy G ofd 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/1 2~OP g~13-00313A00 600030040-9 -4- b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth in the following paragraphs. . (1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear powered or conventional aircraft. Our need is to determine the possible modification of existing craft, construction of new ballistic missile submarines, and employment of both. CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering the ques- tions on production, characteristics, and employment of submar- ines capable of launching ballistic missiles. (2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recognized as a fact, although this capability is less critical to the United States than the ICEM. It constitutes an immediate and, continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage offers the best known means to answer the question of what is the deployment concept and should assist with information on the capability of these weapons, as well as their production. (3) The Soviet heavy bomber force today possesses an immediate nuclear threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than CHALICE has provided a fairly accurate measurement of the magnitude and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage has served to confirm and augment this intelligence. However, we! also have evidence that the Soviets are developing a follow-on bomber aircraft which may replace the present bomber force. In order to establish the status and magnitude of the Soviet effort in the heavy bomber program, to,clarify the interrelationships of this and other Soviet weapons delivery system, and thus to gain a more accurate measurement of the overall Soviet nuclear threat, both. present and future, it is also critical that we cover certain key Soviet bomber bases, bomber production sites, and R & D facilities. (4) In addition to knowledge of Soviet delivery systems, infor- mation on the production of fissionable materials is essential to an accurate and positive measurement of the Soviet nuclear threat. Khruschev's recent statement to the effect that the USSR has, or will shortly have, enough'nuclear weapons stockpiled to permit them to stop producing fissionable material for "military purposes" is basically at variance with our estimates, although we concede an immediate Soviet capability to launch a devastating nuclear at`t'ack against the United States. However, we do not have suffi- cient information to gauge whether the Soviets have, or are producing sufficient fissionable material in order: CHAL-O676 Cy,L~of~ 1 June 1959 TOP SEC r-T Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : 4313A000'600030040-9 (a) To provide the required nuclear warheads for air defense; (b) To mount a sustained attacks (c) To arm all or a great portion of their tactical weapons with nuclear warheads. 25X1 D 25X1 D CHALICE coverage of one production area has enabled us to make a reason- ably accurate estimate of the plutonium and U-235 production from this, location. Coverage of the remaining key production sites can supply us with information for an estimate of the production of fissionable material at this time and can also permit a projection of production for three or more years. Such information has never been obtained through other collection methods and, in addition to its critical urgency for estimates of immediate Soviet capability, indications of a program out of all pro- portion to our estimate of Soviet needs would be a most significant indication of possible Soviet intentions and of inestimable use for political maneuvering, as well as military planning. 3. TARGErS Photographic objectives (targets) to fulfill the needs outlined above are as follows: 4. RELATIONSHIP OF TARGETS TO FORCES Four of the 30 highest priority targets set forth above are located in the 1'ar.East, 12 lie-in Central Russia the remaining 14-'tnrkets lie in Western USSR and would be accessible from either Adana Germany. All targets could be obtained with a minimum of 14 penetration missions, assuming favorable weather and successful equipment operation. 5. COROLLARY TASKS Valuable intelligence by-products also can be anticipated as a result of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed. Route photograph can be expected to yield significant details of other Soviet air installa- tions, transportation systems, industrial facilities, IHBM and ICBM. Deleted because of the high classification it would impose on thevera7l document. This would restrict its use and defeat the purpose for which it was intended. The target list can be obtained from Project Intelligence as Enclosure No. 5. TOP SE T HA~ f76 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 "i rune 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 TOP SECRET -6- installations, and other economic and military targets'which could be of a significance only slightly less than the information we anticipate on primary objectives. One of the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be derived from future exercise of the CHALICE capability will be an increase in our knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities. Fairly precise data on the general deployment and characteristics of Soviet defensive electronic sites in otherwise inaccessible areas can be obtained through the capability of CHALICE equipment to detect and record electronic intelligence data. This increase in knowledge will result in a firmer base for operational plans that involve employment of our nuclear strike force, It should also be noted that exercise of the CHALICE capability over otherwise largely inaccessible areas of the USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely unknown but highly significant nature. As a specific by-product, CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which accurate radar navigation and target charts, and radar prediction plates can be cony, structed. It is also anticipated that this photography will permit resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is so essential to the successful destruction of enemy targets by guided missiles. III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1. EMPLOYMENT a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained in the ,form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and above all, airborne collection equipment. In order for Project CHALICE to have maximum capability,. permanent overseas bases will be maintained in Europe at Adana, Turkey, and in the'Far East at Atsugi, Japan. b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary to carry on continuing research and'development, and, for further perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow-on aircraft will not be available for approximately 18-24 months every appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capability as per- tains to aircraft performance. As pertains to primary mission capabilities, product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the end products, In order to offset "end product" degradation due to increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained. Therefore, the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (North Base) will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-20 TOP SECRET CHAL-0676 Cy_-Lof ~ 1 June :1.959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18T. my plt ~313A000600030040-9 f9 I c) The facilities will be maintained throughout this period for testing or and other special equipments designed and/or developed for CHALICE, GUSTO and other unknown but sensitive projects that require special and/or expedited handling. The lack of other facilities and/or high costs of providing new facilities have resulted in the assignment of such projects to this facility. d) Due to insufficient information concerning the vehicle, the exact specifications for a new base to support the follow-on vehicle are .;not known. It is felt that funds will be required in the second ;half of the Fiscal Year for construction and/or improvement of runways, hangars, shop facilities, office buildings and living accommaodations, in:order to support the GUSTO project.. ii : The support of the facilities at will be required 'ror-.the entire period. Increased activity due to the follow-on program, product improvement of CHALICE, and the special projects mentioned in para,c above will have to be provided for. f) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (licl #2) g) As a means of more efficient support for ferrying or brief staging operations, a proposal to install a mobile maintenance capability in a C-130 has been developed by Detachment B. Feasibility has :reduced to a considerable degree support requirements formerly levied on staging bases. This system of mobile maintenance has been sufficiently exercised to permit an accurate appraisal: of its effects on our current concept of staging operations. h) (1) As of 26 May 1959,`program approval has been granted for the modification and installation'of the J-75 engine in four (4) U-2 aircraft. Preliminary flight teats of the clean airplane give a first apps tion to the expected altitude increase over an aircraft equipped with the J-57. This approximation and extrapola- tion of prior slipper tank configuration data is as follows: Initial Midpoint Terminal It is expected that a slight range degradation will be experienced. W/O slipper tanks With slipper tanks (compared to clean J-57 aircraft) WP SECT T CHAIr-0676 Cy-6-of 1 June 19J9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 25X1 25X1 Approvec(For Re ease 2003/12/18: CIA-RDP63-g0313A0b0600030040-9 TOP SECRET (2) It is believed that a minim= of six aircraft should be modified to the J-75 configuration for the following reasons: (a) Provide for deployment of two operational aircraft to Atsugi. (b) Provide for deployment of two operational aircraft to Adana. (c) Provide two aircraft at Edwards AFB. One to be held in operational ready status for overseas deployment; the other to be used as a test bed for further flight tests. (3) The assignment of two J-75 equipped aircraft to the over- seas locations will provide following benefits: (a) Adequate in place operational capability to perform overflight missions employing fast stage concept of operation. . (b) Provide sufficient aircraft to maintain pilot profi- ciency. (c) Establish adequate logistic requirements and stock levels to maintain mission capability within the respective theatres of operation. (4) The two aircraft at Edwards AFB will provide an operational spare that could quickly be ferried to either theatre of operation. The sixth aircraft would be used for continued research and develop- ment. (5) In the event only four aircraft are modified it is recom- mended that they be deployed in following manner: '(a) Two aircraft to Adana. (b) One aircraft to Atsugi. (c) One aircraft to Edwards AFB. (This aircraft to be used for continued research and development.) 2. MISSION AND MISSION PLANNING a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the 's National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are~Pt,ated: 1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial reconnaissance of the USSR and the USSR satellite countries in order to obtain adequate TOP SEC# ET CHAL.-0676 Cy.-L-of-4 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/ 00313A000600030040-9 and timely intelligence consistent with the provisions men- tioned in Section Il: "Intelligence Requirements," 2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial reconnaissance on a world-wide basis in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the U. S,, as well as safeguard the internal security of the U, S. b) All of the foregoing has dictated a substantial change from the Project's initial philosophy of operations which envisioned an intensive program of overflights (as many as 30 sorties per month by each of the three detachments) over a limited period of time. The concept which has evolved from experience during the past three years and which will be followed during the period will, feature careful selection of highest priority objectives and prudent application of all measures to minimize the probability of a protest., c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory, allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, more extensive use of staging bases will be required in the future. In addition, it can be assumed that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period. It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking capability and in such a manner as to create maximum difficulty for positive tracking, Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort will be made to avoid the involvement of third countries (specifically, Soviet satellite nations) either by overflying them on penetration or withdrawal from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all, operational planning and executiom, the safety.of the aircraft will be of primary consideration. 3. UTILIZATION a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the results obtained will be useful in the event that, the bases and/oar areas., flown over are denied to the U. S, in the future b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utiLiz:ing airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment basees.Q~ Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with minimum U-2 ground time at any of the bases util.ized.. CHAL-4676 Cy of I June 195'9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CLf D A000600030040-9 c) The U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish peripheral electronic and photographic reconnaissance. The advantages in terms of; training, economy, availability of a timely operational capability, have been demonstrated during the past fiscal year in such areas as the Middle East, Indonesia, Indo-China and the Baltic,, It is felt that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not doing so. The relative value of the exercise we give the Russian Radars does not outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so. The Russian radar operators are known to ba proficient and the qualita- tive technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the above-mentioned flights-per se-would not induce greater Russian tech- nological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt that maximum utilization of the U-2 should be planned throughout the estimated operational life of the U=2 rather than wait for primary mission political approval that may never came. In addition, it is felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by higher level would be conducive to obtaining political approval. 4. PRIMARY MISSION CAPABILITIES a) In addition to photographic and electronic collection equipment which would be carried on overflight missions, it will be necessary to maintain weather observation e progress. list of required equipment is attached as Enclosure 3. 5. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and equipment, the colieeut of contractor maintenance win be continued. In addition,.procesaing of overflight photography by EK will be continued to insure maximum intelligence exploitation. (Personnel strength will remain as stipulated in current T04s, with possibly one or two minor adjustments.) 6. comm a) The concept of overflights (and certain other missions) being controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target coverage and compatibilit f y o operations with national policy. 7. SORTIE RATE a) Estimated sortie rate and flyin hour b t s g y 3 of mission wi be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately be required in FY 60 and 2818 flyinghotin Fl* 61.f hours will TOP E cCRET C FiAI,0676 Cy~i_of 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18f A-80313A00060030040-9 8. SUPPORT a) Support will be required from the following echelons as indi- cated* This support will be in accordance with current directives and agreements. % 1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, common logis- tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison matters. AFCIG-5 will be the channel for support to all subord- inate headquarters. 2) Theater Commanders for air base facilities, logistic support, airlift requirements and for special liaison. 3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities, personnel, logistics support and liaison natters. 25X1 4) support. Corm unications System for comrmynications 5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for weather support, 6) National Security Agency for special Intelligence reaction reports. 7) National Technical Processing Center for ELINT readout. S) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to operate from certain foreign countries. IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES 25X1 V CHAT,-0676 Cyr oi~a 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/1810 2. PRE-HOSTILITIES PERIOD a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a maximum rate which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support. Although the military services have photographic and ELINT collection capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply and with comparative physical inununity. b) During this period it will be essential that the maximum amount of potential enemy territory be photographed so as to provide the: 1) Most probable time when an enemy attack would be launched. 2) Size of the available enemy attack force. 3) Type and extent of probable enengy attack. 4) Locations from where attacking forces and/or missiles would be launched. 5) Overall capability of the enenV to sustain an attack. 6) Most current target data for friendly attacking forces to use for retaliation. c) The need for current electronic intelligence will be very necessary to make available the frequencies and locations of enemy radars so that: 1) Friendly attacking forces can employ jamming techniques most effectively. 2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking forces can penetrate with the least probability of interception. 3) Radar guidance of enemy interceptors and/or missiles can be interrupted. d) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will remain with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deployment to prearranged rear bases may be necessary as dictated by the existing situation, (Encl, #2), Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first c> priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives as outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex "B" of SAC Operations Order #1039. CHAL-0676 -.kor..L7 1 June :1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 I up-MM - 13 - 3. HOSTILITIES 313A000600030040-9 a) When hostilities break out, Project overseas assets will revert to the operational control of the Strategic Air Command under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assignment will be in accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement (CHAL 0239), dated 19 July 19589 with USAF, DCS/O, concurrence date 24 Sept. 1958, and in accordance with the CHALICE W Operational Plan, dated 20 January 1959. Upon execution of the SAC 50 seriss EWO, SAC Operations Order Number 1009, Appendix 2 to Annex "Ban contains the necessary instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources,, b) Militate personnel will be affected in accordance with the arrangements contained in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned transfer agreement, .It is planned. that civilian personnel will continue to function until relieved by military personnel, Colonel, APPROV_?ED: BURKE Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P Enclosures (4) Dist.: Cy 1 - DD/P Cy 15 Cy 2 A/C/DPD-DD/P Cy 16 Cy 3 - Admin/DPD-DD/P Cy 17 Cy 4 - Cover/DPD-DD/P Cr 18 USAF Chief, Operations Branch DPD-DD/P Cy 6 - Mat/DPD-DD/P/P Cy 19 - S C Hqs Cy 7 - R&D/DPD,DD/P Cy 8 - Cant /DPD-DD Cy 91- Fin DPD-DD/ Cy 10- CC/0ps/DPD-DD/P Cy 11- Commno/DPD-DD/P Cy 12 -AFCI0- 5 Cy 13- Ops/DPD.DD/P Cy 14- Intel/riPD-DD/P CHAL..0676 Cy--k-of -a 1 June 1959 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved or Release 2003112/18 : CIA-RDP63-00~13A000600030040-9 TOP SECRET V ENCLOSURES Enclosure Number 1 Life Expectancy of the U-2 on Overflights 25X1 1. This analysis of the U-2 vulnerability was prepared by Project Intelligence utilizing as a s utations from O6SI? 25X1 Air Defense Co nfe a and a comprehensive special study The source also includes reactions from previous ftyinni-I ns and special zoom climb and Al radar intercept attempts performed in December at Eglin AFB, Florida. 2. It is believed that, with the exception of small sectors of the Soviet Territory involving shallow penetrations, the U2. will be detected, tracked, identified as to type and mission, and the reaction, in all cases, will be to the maximum extent possible to destroy the aircraft. The reaction will be restricted to air-to-air intercept attempts with the exception of Moscow and possibly Leningrad, Baku, and Vladimirovka areas where surface-to-air missiles may be utilized. 3. The probability of successful air-to-air intercept for the next 3 to 6 months is small. With the possible exception of a mid-air collision, the defensive aircraft require an air-to-air missile to complete the intercept. No element of the Community can furnish valid information of the operational deployment of air-to-air missiles. 4. Because of the possibility of the introduction of a fighter with performance that allows co-altitude intercept and/or the appear- ance of operational air-to-air missiles, life expectancy of the U-2 must be expressed in terms of months, and all available-sources of intelligence information must be continually reviewed for indicators. Concurrently, Operations and R&D projects must be pursued to counter probable threats'to the U-2 so that its life expectancy may be extended. These include: a. Engine development to provide increased altitude capability; b. Spectral analysis to determine the beat color that would deny visual acquisition of the U-2; 25X1 TOP SECRET CHALr-0676 CX-Lofj1 1 June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved Fo'r Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00ii 3A000600030040-9 TOP SECRET 5. U-2 vulnerability should receive formal re-evaluation within the next three to six months. If, at this time, it appears that additional controlled intercept attempts are required to more accurately determine vulnerability, the tests should receive highest priorit;yo C'HAL-0676 Cy_ofJ2 1 June 1959 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 Approved for Rele~[se 2003/12/18 :CIA-RDP63-00313A00~1600030040-9 t TOP SECRET ENCLOSURE #3 AIRCRAFT AND EQU FOR Ft ? 60 and t 6l The present distribution of aircraft, camera, electronics and other configuration types is considered adequate to satisfy current and proposed operational requirements through Fiscal 1961: A. ant: During staging operations it may be necessary to assign, on a tempor basis, additional equipments from standby storage r- I or divert or interchange equipments between Detachments to most a particular staging requirement. However, the total numbers and types of configurations now available, either at the Detachments or in supply channels, should satisfy demands of current or forecast operational activity: Configuration Assjg,ments CAMERA EQUIPig3JT: Detachment B Detachment C Spares at Depot in ZI Tracker 6 5 0 A-Z 1* 1* 2 A-2 3 3 1 B 2 2 2 C Dropped from the project due to R & D difficulties., * Plus one spare 6" (HR 730) camera per detachmento CCKFIGURATION Five manufactured ?- will be held at the detachments., until needed at CHAL.0676 CY of_ Lg I iTune 1959 TOP SEOET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 ApprovedFor ReI ase 2003/1 W 3-00313A00 600030040-9 Be Aircraft: 1e Distribution of U 24s between overseas detachments and Edwards AFB has been reviewed and no change is anticipated Assiment of Aircraft U-2 ___ Other Base B 5* 2 2 0 0 Base C 3 0 2 1 1 (L-20) -Headquarters CHA 0676 Cy Lof 1. June 19 9 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9 rif- Approved"ror Release 2003/12i! -0.0 13A000600030040-9 ENCLOSURE #4 ESTIMATED U-2 FLYING HOURS FY 160 FY 9 61 FLY HOURS Nit SORTIES/LENGTH HRS TYPE MISSION LENGTH (HRS/NBR SORTIES FLY HRS 135 15 Photo penetrate tion 9 15 135 450 50 Photo tactical. 9 50 450 40 5 Photo peripheral 8 5 40 1000 Ferry/training 1000 153 17 ELINT peripheral 17 153 25X1 D 360 60 Weather 60 360 200 . 100 R & D, Maintenance 2 Test for `Data MC 200 25X1 25X1 D R & D, Maintenance Test; training for TOP SECRET 'ZI Base was within ].0O hours of actual fly time accomplished. FY` 58 Estimate of total flying time CR L-067 Cy_,(aofl,, ]. June 1959 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9