(Sanitized) ALERT PROCEDURES AND 'TAKE' ANALYSIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: May 29, 1959
• Content Type: MFR

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This doenmert cortai;.s infermatien
referring to Prej ,At U~ UCE
SITUATION ESTIMATE
for
PROJECT CHALICE
FISCAL YEARS 1960 and 1961
USAF review(s) completed.
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I Introduction
1. Purpose
2. Background and History
II Intelligence Requirements
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Target Selection
Task
Targets
Relationship of Targets to Forces
Corollary Tasks
III Concept of Operations
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Employment
Mission and Mission Planning
Utilization
Primary Mission Capabilities
Maintenance and Support
Control
Sortie Rate
Support
IV Relationship to Other Forces
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2. Pro Hostilities
3. Hostilities
Enclosures
1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 or Overflights
2. Utilization of Bases
3. Aircraft and Equipment Assignment
4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours
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BEET
I INTRODUCTION
a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of
project operations during the FY 19606-61 time period. Due to current
events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document
will be utilized as a conmon reference and/or,departure point for all
concerned consistent with the aboves
b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the
basis for justification of the budget. As such it will be reviewed and
revised as necessary and no later than 1 September 1959 in order that it
can again become the basis for budgeting and long range planning for
FY 1960 and 1961: This to include operational effectiveness, the formu-
lation of policy, tactics and techniques and the determination of
operational and R & D requirements.
c) In addition, revisions will be made consistent with the latest
technological advancements, the current political and economic situation,
and new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national
security, in order to provide timely and effective guidance for any
follow-on program.
c) To provide the capability for relatively safe overflights, the
Lockheed U-2 was developed in 1955. Built into the UU2 was an altitude
capability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered
almost certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically
interfere. Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could
not intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they
might have a limited capability of tracking the U?2 with radar. This
assumption later proved to be correct except for the overly optimistic
anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited." It is
reasonable to assume that the Soviet capability to intercept will increase
.of airborne platforms.
the country. All of the studies validated the requirements, emphas d
the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recommended the uti' ation
various studies were performed by the most capable scientific group
2. BACK AND HISTORY
a) At the time the Soviet Union and its satellites denied normal
access to its territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of
intelligence became readily apparent and the requirement was of the highest
priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated
the need for prompt and aggressive action in order to obtain a capability
which would satisfy the' intelligence requirements.
b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government
P REGRET
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during the period under discussion. However, as can be seen by reference
to Enclosure 1, there is still significant overflight utility remaining
in the existing U-2 capability throughout this period. As further pointed
out in Enclosure 1, the probability of loss is considered slight9 especial-
ly if certain selected target areas, which are suspected to have more
advanced defensive equipment, are avoided. The use of dispersal and
deployment bases for deception with minim an ground time as pertains to
the U-2, would greatly impede any efforts of the Soviets to employ special
techniques and equipments against the U-2. By critical selectivity of
target areas and flight plan routes, the U-2 will be able to continue to
operate throughout this period with virtual physical immunity at the
beginning, to operations on a calculated risk basis at the end of the
period.
d) Diplomatic protests which the USSR'has made as a result of the
AQUATONE operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make it
imperative that Project CHALICE operations be conducted in such a manner.
as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest of 1956,
the violation of the air space over third countries was considered to have
been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This view continues
valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a flight which,
although it did not violate a third country, did fly into its radar screen
with the resultant possibility that the third country had knowledge that a
penetration of the USSR had been made. During the interim, a total of 20
penetrations were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplo-
matic protest from any source. Recorded reaction to these flights indicates
that the violated countries were, in most instances, aware at the very
least that a prohibitive flight was being made. It was further assumed
that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal evidence of overflight
by U. S. aircraft as it had in the cases of both the 1956 and 1.958 protests.
It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made public. The
resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the physical capability
to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplomatic measures. In both
protest cases, high U. S. political authority directed that the overflights
be stopped immediately. The reaction to the Soviet diplomatic action will
probably continue throughout this period and will be taken into consider-
ation for planning and when submitting proposed overflights for political
approval.
e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases in
combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 - 5 hours)
will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin, termination,
etc., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official protest .This would
also allow for more plausible U. S. denial.
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II INTELLIGENCE REQUIR7'1ENTS
1. TARGET SELECTION
Intelligence requirements for penetration flights by Project CHALICE
have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which is com-
posed of representatives of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Central Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency. Requirements encompass the
fields of photographic intelligence, electronics intelligence, and communi-
ations en e e recuirements are coordinated with
r Conso
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lidate ge s s
established priorities reflect the composite views of all the agencies
represented on both committees and, as such, represent the consensus of
the Community as a whole. Targets and priorities
per c are reviewed by the committees and revisions are made based
on the most current intelligence available from all sources.
2, TASK
Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of a Soviet
nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for reliable inform
matl:on on the present and future Soviet capabilities for such an, attack.
Such information is also critical to our national defense policy and plan-
ning; During the past three years limited CHALICE coverage has been by far
the most lucrative source of reliable information on which we have based
our estimates of the Soviet capabilities foxes unclear attack. At the
present time, there is an urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain
objectives and areas known to be, or suspected to be, associated with the
three major elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability
of the nuclear threat).
a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the status
of the Soviet ICE4 program, an inherent threat of overriding magnitude,
Studies over the past two years by the U. S. Intelligence Community have
concluded that CHALICE provides the only available means offering reasonable
assurance of obtaining on an immediate basis the required intelligence on
the deployment of Soviet IC4s. Certain rail lines which lend themselves
to rail launch or logistic support for fixed sites and test sites are
prime search areas for this information. Increased urgency has been lent
to the deployment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production.
Coverage of the most suspect production facilities may help to confirm this.*
I lagreed that the most critical question was guided
missiless, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to distinguish
between IRR and ICS4. Further, they rate research and development and
production as much higher than deployment at this time since evidence on Q
these would permit a judgment of whether there was indeed a threat in d
existence; their thinking does not put deployment as at all probable nooy~
in the case of the ICBM and not "most critical" to look for in the case`"'
of the IRBNI.
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b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE
coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth
in the following paragraphs.
. (1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic
missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear
powered or conventional aircraft. Our need is to determine the
possible modification of existing craft, construction of new
ballistic missile submarines, and employment of both. CHALICE
coverage offers the best available means of answering the ques-
tions on production, characteristics, and employment of submar-
ines capable of launching ballistic missiles.
(2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recognized
as a fact, although this capability is less critical to the
United States than the ICEM. It constitutes an immediate and,
continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage offers the best
known means to answer the question of what is the deployment
concept and should assist with information on the capability of
these weapons, as well as their production.
(3) The Soviet heavy bomber force today possesses an immediate
nuclear threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than
CHALICE has provided a fairly accurate measurement of the magnitude
and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage has
served to confirm and augment this intelligence. However, we! also
have evidence that the Soviets are developing a follow-on bomber
aircraft which may replace the present bomber force. In order to
establish the status and magnitude of the Soviet effort in the
heavy bomber program, to,clarify the interrelationships of this
and other Soviet weapons delivery system, and thus to gain a more
accurate measurement of the overall Soviet nuclear threat, both.
present and future, it is also critical that we cover certain key
Soviet bomber bases, bomber production sites, and R & D facilities.
(4) In addition to knowledge of Soviet delivery systems, infor-
mation on the production of fissionable materials is essential to
an accurate and positive measurement of the Soviet nuclear threat.
Khruschev's recent statement to the effect that the USSR has, or
will shortly have, enough'nuclear weapons stockpiled to permit
them to stop producing fissionable material for "military purposes"
is basically at variance with our estimates, although we concede
an immediate Soviet capability to launch a devastating nuclear
at`t'ack against the United States. However, we do not have suffi-
cient information to gauge whether the Soviets have, or are
producing sufficient fissionable material in order:
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(a) To provide the required nuclear warheads for air
defense;
(b) To mount a sustained attacks
(c) To arm all or a great portion of their tactical
weapons with nuclear warheads.
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CHALICE coverage of one production area has enabled us to make a reason-
ably accurate estimate of the plutonium and U-235 production from this,
location. Coverage of the remaining key production sites can supply us
with information for an estimate of the production of fissionable material
at this time and can also permit a projection of production for three or
more years. Such information has never been obtained through other
collection methods and, in addition to its critical urgency for estimates
of immediate Soviet capability, indications of a program out of all pro-
portion to our estimate of Soviet needs would be a most significant
indication of possible Soviet intentions and of inestimable use for
political maneuvering, as well as military planning.
3. TARGErS
Photographic objectives (targets) to fulfill the needs outlined
above are as follows:
4. RELATIONSHIP OF TARGETS TO FORCES
Four of the 30 highest priority targets set forth above are located
in the 1'ar.East, 12 lie-in Central Russia
the remaining 14-'tnrkets lie in Western USSR and would be accessible from
either Adana Germany. All targets could be
obtained with a minimum of 14 penetration missions, assuming favorable
weather and successful equipment operation.
5. COROLLARY TASKS
Valuable intelligence by-products also can be anticipated as a result
of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed. Route photograph
can be expected to yield significant details of other Soviet air installa-
tions, transportation systems, industrial facilities, IHBM and ICBM.
Deleted because of the high classification it would impose on thevera7l
document. This would restrict its use and defeat the purpose for which it
was intended. The target list can be obtained from Project Intelligence as
Enclosure No. 5.
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installations, and other economic and military targets'which could be
of a significance only slightly less than the information we anticipate
on primary objectives. One of the outstanding bonus effects that we
know will be derived from future exercise of the CHALICE capability will
be an increase in our knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities.
Fairly precise data on the general deployment and characteristics of
Soviet defensive electronic sites in otherwise inaccessible areas can
be obtained through the capability of CHALICE equipment to detect and
record electronic intelligence data. This increase in knowledge will
result in a firmer base for operational plans that involve employment
of our nuclear strike force, It should also be noted that exercise of
the CHALICE capability over otherwise largely inaccessible areas of
the USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely
unknown but highly significant nature. As a specific by-product,
CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which accurate radar
navigation and target charts, and radar prediction plates can be cony,
structed. It is also anticipated that this photography will permit
resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is so essential to
the successful destruction of enemy targets by guided missiles.
III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
1. EMPLOYMENT
a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built into
the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained in the
,form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and above all,
airborne collection equipment. In order for Project CHALICE to have
maximum capability,. permanent overseas bases will be maintained in Europe
at Adana, Turkey, and in the'Far East at Atsugi, Japan.
b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary to
carry on continuing research and'development, and, for further perfection
of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow-on aircraft
will not be available for approximately 18-24 months every appropriate
action will be taken to product-improve the existing capability as per-
tains to aircraft performance. As pertains to primary mission capabilities,
product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight
reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the end
products, In order to offset "end product" degradation due to increased
performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing and/or
develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that the end
products will be equal to or better than those now obtained. Therefore,
the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (North Base) will be
maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-20
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c) The facilities will be maintained throughout
this period for testing or and other special equipments designed
and/or developed for CHALICE, GUSTO and other unknown but sensitive
projects that require special and/or expedited handling. The lack of
other facilities and/or high costs of providing new facilities have
resulted in the assignment of such projects to this facility.
d) Due to insufficient information concerning the vehicle, the
exact specifications for a new base to support the follow-on vehicle
are .;not known. It is felt that funds will be required in the second
;half of the Fiscal Year for construction and/or improvement of runways,
hangars, shop facilities, office buildings and living accommaodations,
in:order to support the GUSTO project..
ii : The support of the facilities at will be required
'ror-.the entire period. Increased activity due to the follow-on program,
product improvement of CHALICE, and the special projects mentioned in
para,c above will have to be provided for.
f) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging
and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (licl #2)
g) As a means of more efficient support for ferrying or brief
staging operations, a proposal to install a mobile maintenance capability
in a C-130 has been developed by Detachment B. Feasibility has :reduced
to a considerable degree support requirements formerly levied on staging
bases. This system of mobile maintenance has been sufficiently exercised
to permit an accurate appraisal: of its effects on our current concept of
staging operations.
h) (1) As of 26 May 1959,`program approval has been granted for
the modification and installation'of the J-75 engine in four (4)
U-2 aircraft. Preliminary flight teats of the clean airplane give
a first apps tion to the expected altitude increase over an
aircraft equipped with the J-57. This approximation and extrapola-
tion of prior slipper tank configuration data is as follows:
Initial Midpoint Terminal
It is expected that a slight range degradation will be experienced.
W/O slipper tanks
With slipper tanks
(compared to clean J-57 aircraft)
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(2) It is believed that a minim= of six aircraft should be
modified to the J-75 configuration for the following reasons:
(a) Provide for deployment of two operational aircraft
to Atsugi.
(b) Provide for deployment of two operational aircraft
to Adana.
(c) Provide two aircraft at Edwards AFB. One to be held
in operational ready status for overseas deployment; the other
to be used as a test bed for further flight tests.
(3) The assignment of two J-75 equipped aircraft to the over-
seas locations will provide following benefits:
(a) Adequate in place operational capability to perform
overflight missions employing fast stage concept of operation.
. (b) Provide sufficient aircraft to maintain pilot profi-
ciency.
(c) Establish adequate logistic requirements and stock
levels to maintain mission capability within the respective
theatres of operation.
(4) The two aircraft at Edwards AFB will provide an operational
spare that could quickly be ferried to either theatre of operation.
The sixth aircraft would be used for continued research and develop-
ment.
(5) In the event only four aircraft are modified it is recom-
mended that they be deployed in following manner:
'(a) Two aircraft to Adana.
(b) One aircraft to Atsugi.
(c) One aircraft to Edwards AFB. (This aircraft to be
used for continued research and development.)
2. MISSION AND MISSION PLANNING
a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the 's
National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are~Pt,ated:
1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial reconnaissance
of the USSR and the USSR satellite countries in order to obtain adequate
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and timely intelligence consistent with the provisions men-
tioned in Section Il: "Intelligence Requirements,"
2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial reconnaissance
on a world-wide basis in order to obtain adequate and timely
intelligence which will uphold and advance the national policies
and interests of the U. S,, as well as safeguard the internal
security of the U, S.
b) All of the foregoing has dictated a substantial change from
the Project's initial philosophy of operations which envisioned an
intensive program of overflights (as many as 30 sorties per month by
each of the three detachments) over a limited period of time. The
concept which has evolved from experience during the past three years
and which will be followed during the period will, feature careful
selection of highest priority objectives and prudent application of all
measures to minimize the probability of a protest.,
c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases
are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory,
allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these
bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, more
extensive use of staging bases will be required in the future. In
addition, it can be assumed that these bases are possibly under visual
surveillance. All of which points out the need for greater deception
and mobility during this period. It is planned that future Project
CHALICE missions will be directed against areas in which the Soviets
have the least radar tracking capability and in such a manner as to
create maximum difficulty for positive tracking, Selection of such areas
will be consistent with highest priority target coverage requirements.
In addition, every effort will be made to avoid the involvement of third
countries (specifically, Soviet satellite nations) either by overflying
them on penetration or withdrawal from the USSR, or by permitting them
to become knowledgeable, through their radar defenses, that such a
penetration is being made. In all, operational planning and executiom,
the safety.of the aircraft will be of primary consideration.
3. UTILIZATION
a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the
results obtained will be useful in the event that, the bases and/oar areas.,
flown over are denied to the U. S, in the future
b) Training will include the exercise of mobility
plans utiLiz:ing
airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment basees.Q~
Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with
minimum U-2 ground time at any of the bases util.ized..
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c) The U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish
peripheral electronic and photographic reconnaissance. The advantages
in terms of; training, economy, availability of a timely operational
capability, have been demonstrated during the past fiscal year in such
areas as the Middle East, Indonesia, Indo-China and the Baltic,, It is
felt that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not doing so.
The relative value of the exercise we give the Russian Radars does not
outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so.
The Russian radar operators are known to ba proficient and the qualita-
tive technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the
above-mentioned flights-per se-would not induce greater Russian tech-
nological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt that
maximum utilization of the U-2 should be planned throughout the estimated
operational life of the U=2 rather than wait for primary mission political
approval that may never came. In addition, it is felt that knowledge of
continued and current successful operations by higher level would be
conducive to obtaining political approval.
4. PRIMARY MISSION CAPABILITIES
a) In addition to photographic and electronic collection equipment
which would be carried on overflight missions, it will be necessary to
maintain weather observation e
progress. list of required equipment is attached
as Enclosure 3.
5. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT
a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and
equipment, the colieeut of contractor maintenance win be continued.
In addition,.procesaing of overflight photography by EK will be continued
to insure maximum intelligence exploitation. (Personnel strength will
remain as stipulated in current T04s, with possibly one or two minor
adjustments.)
6. comm
a) The concept of overflights (and certain other missions) being
controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target
coverage and compatibilit
f
y o
operations with national policy.
7. SORTIE RATE
a) Estimated sortie rate and flyin
hour b t
s
g
y 3 of mission wi
be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately
be required in FY 60 and 2818 flyinghotin Fl* 61.f hours will
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8. SUPPORT
a) Support will be required from the following echelons as indi-
cated* This support will be in accordance with current directives and
agreements. %
1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, common logis-
tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison
matters. AFCIG-5 will be the channel for support to all subord-
inate headquarters.
2) Theater Commanders for air base facilities, logistic
support, airlift requirements and for special liaison.
3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities,
personnel, logistics support and liaison natters.
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support.
Corm unications System for comrmynications
5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for weather support,
6) National Security Agency for special Intelligence
reaction reports.
7) National Technical Processing Center for ELINT readout.
S) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to
operate from certain foreign countries.
IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES
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2. PRE-HOSTILITIES PERIOD
a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where
hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct
penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a maximum
rate which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support.
Although the military services have photographic and ELINT collection
capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE
are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply and
with comparative physical inununity.
b) During this period it will be essential that the maximum
amount of potential enemy territory be photographed so as to provide the:
1) Most probable time when an enemy attack would be launched.
2) Size of the available enemy attack force.
3) Type and extent of probable enengy attack.
4) Locations from where attacking forces and/or missiles
would be launched.
5) Overall capability of the enenV to sustain an attack.
6) Most current target data for friendly attacking forces
to use for retaliation.
c) The need for current electronic intelligence will be very
necessary to make available the frequencies and locations of enemy radars
so that:
1) Friendly attacking forces can employ jamming techniques
most effectively.
2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking forces
can penetrate with the least probability of interception.
3) Radar guidance of enemy interceptors and/or missiles can
be interrupted.
d) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will
remain with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deployment to prearranged
rear bases may be necessary as dictated by the existing situation,
(Encl, #2), Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first c>
priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives
as outlined in Appendix 1 to Annex "B" of SAC Operations Order #1039.
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3. HOSTILITIES
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a) When hostilities break out, Project overseas assets will
revert to the operational control of the Strategic Air Command under
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assignment
will be in accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement
(CHAL 0239), dated 19 July 19589 with USAF, DCS/O, concurrence date
24 Sept. 1958, and in accordance with the CHALICE W Operational
Plan, dated 20 January 1959. Upon execution of the SAC 50 seriss EWO,
SAC Operations Order Number 1009, Appendix 2 to Annex "Ban contains
the necessary instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources,,
b) Militate personnel will be affected in accordance with the
arrangements contained in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned
transfer agreement,
.It is planned. that civilian personnel will continue to
function until relieved by military personnel,
Colonel,
APPROV_?ED:
BURKE
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P
Enclosures (4)
Dist.:
Cy 1 - DD/P Cy 15
Cy 2 A/C/DPD-DD/P Cy 16
Cy 3 - Admin/DPD-DD/P Cy 17
Cy 4 - Cover/DPD-DD/P Cr 18
USAF
Chief, Operations Branch
DPD-DD/P
Cy 6 - Mat/DPD-DD/P/P Cy 19 - S C Hqs
Cy 7 - R&D/DPD,DD/P
Cy 8 - Cant /DPD-DD
Cy 91- Fin DPD-DD/
Cy 10- CC/0ps/DPD-DD/P
Cy 11- Commno/DPD-DD/P
Cy 12 -AFCI0- 5
Cy 13- Ops/DPD.DD/P
Cy 14- Intel/riPD-DD/P
CHAL..0676
Cy--k-of -a
1 June 1959
25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 Approved or Release 2003112/18 : CIA-RDP63-00~13A000600030040-9
TOP SECRET
V ENCLOSURES
Enclosure Number 1
Life Expectancy of the U-2 on Overflights
25X1
1. This analysis of the U-2 vulnerability was prepared by
Project Intelligence utilizing as a s utations from O6SI? 25X1
Air Defense Co
nfe a and a comprehensive
special study The source also includes reactions
from previous ftyinni-I
ns and special zoom climb and Al radar intercept
attempts performed in December at Eglin AFB, Florida.
2. It is believed that, with the exception of small sectors
of the Soviet Territory involving shallow penetrations, the U2. will
be detected, tracked, identified as to type and mission, and the
reaction, in all cases, will be to the maximum extent possible to
destroy the aircraft. The reaction will be restricted to air-to-air
intercept attempts with the exception of Moscow and possibly
Leningrad, Baku, and Vladimirovka areas where surface-to-air missiles
may be utilized.
3. The probability of successful air-to-air intercept for the
next 3 to 6 months is small. With the possible exception of a mid-air
collision, the defensive aircraft require an air-to-air missile to
complete the intercept. No element of the Community can furnish valid
information of the operational deployment of air-to-air missiles.
4. Because of the possibility of the introduction of a fighter
with performance that allows co-altitude intercept and/or the appear-
ance of operational air-to-air missiles, life expectancy of the U-2
must be expressed in terms of months, and all available-sources of
intelligence information must be continually reviewed for indicators.
Concurrently, Operations and R&D projects must be pursued to counter
probable threats'to the U-2 so that its life expectancy may be extended.
These include:
a. Engine development to provide increased altitude capability;
b. Spectral analysis to determine the beat color that would
deny visual acquisition of the U-2;
25X1
TOP SECRET
CHALr-0676
CX-Lofj1
1 June 1959
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 Approved Fo'r Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00ii 3A000600030040-9
TOP SECRET
5. U-2 vulnerability should receive formal re-evaluation within
the next three to six months. If, at this time, it appears that
additional controlled intercept attempts are required to more accurately
determine vulnerability, the tests should receive highest priorit;yo
C'HAL-0676
Cy_ofJ2
1 June 1959
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 25X1A
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 Approved for Rele~[se 2003/12/18 :CIA-RDP63-00313A00~1600030040-9
t TOP SECRET
ENCLOSURE #3
AIRCRAFT AND EQU
FOR Ft ? 60 and t 6l
The present distribution of aircraft, camera, electronics and
other configuration types is considered adequate to satisfy current
and proposed operational requirements through Fiscal 1961:
A. ant: During staging operations it may be necessary
to assign, on a tempor basis, additional equipments from standby
storage r- I or divert or interchange equipments between
Detachments to most a particular staging requirement. However, the
total numbers and types of configurations now available, either at
the Detachments or in supply channels, should satisfy demands of
current or forecast operational activity:
Configuration Assjg,ments
CAMERA EQUIPig3JT:
Detachment B Detachment C
Spares at Depot
in ZI
Tracker
6
5
0
A-Z
1*
1*
2
A-2
3
3
1
B
2
2
2
C
Dropped from the project due to R & D difficulties.,
* Plus one spare 6" (HR 730) camera per detachmento
CCKFIGURATION
Five manufactured ?- will be held at
the detachments.,
until needed at
CHAL.0676
CY of_ Lg
I iTune 1959
TOP SEOET
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 ApprovedFor ReI ase 2003/1
W 3-00313A00 600030040-9
Be Aircraft:
1e Distribution of U 24s between overseas detachments and
Edwards AFB has been reviewed and no change is anticipated
Assiment of Aircraft
U-2 ___ Other
Base B 5* 2 2 0 0
Base C 3 0 2 1 1 (L-20)
-Headquarters
CHA 0676
Cy Lof
1. June 19 9
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9
 rif-
Approved"ror Release 2003/12i!
-0.0 13A000600030040-9
ENCLOSURE #4
ESTIMATED U-2 FLYING HOURS
FY 160
FY 9 61
FLY
HOURS
Nit SORTIES/LENGTH HRS TYPE MISSION LENGTH (HRS/NBR SORTIES
FLY HRS
135
15
Photo penetrate
tion
9
15
135
450
50
Photo tactical.
9
50
450
40
5
Photo peripheral
8
5
40
1000
Ferry/training
1000
153
17
ELINT peripheral
17
153
25X1 D
360
60
Weather
60
360
200 .
100
R & D, Maintenance 2
Test for `Data MC
200
25X1 25X1 D
R & D, Maintenance
Test; training for
TOP SECRET
'ZI Base
was within ].0O hours of actual fly time accomplished.
FY` 58 Estimate of total flying time
CR L-067
Cy_,(aofl,,
]. June 1959
Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600030040-9