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Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 11, 2003
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March 14, 1960
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Approved For P4elease 200?V?W U 4AA4DP63-00313A000600050012-8 25X1 25X1 FLYING HOURS 180 306 40 144 126 765 135 900 520 80 40 660 4076 NOTE : 1. FY 1961 NUMBER SORTIES LENGTH LOURS TYPE MISSION LENGTH HOURS FY 1962 NUMBER SORTIES FLYING HOURS 20 9 Photo penetration 9 15 135 34 9 Photo tactical 9 25 225 5 8 Photo peripheral 8 5 40 16 9 Weather 9 16 144 18 7 ELINT peripheral 7 18 126 20 9 9 20 180 Photo Training B&C 191 4 85% B Config. 4 191 765 34 4 15% A-2 Config. 4 34 135 225 4 Ferry/Training B&C 4 225 900 104 5 Ferry/Training E31 5 104 520 40 2 R&D & Maint. Test B 2 45 90 20 2 MD & Maint. Test C 2 20 40 330 2 R&D & Maint. Test Edwards 2 250 500 1057 968 3800 and transition. (Used approx 75% of all flights.) 6000 ft rolls of film will be required on 70% of all Hq directed photo missions. 2. Tracker normally carried on all flights except Maintenance Test, ferry CHAL-0914 Cy of 14 l ch 160 USAF review(s) completed. TOP SECS E ?a Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Rrelease 2003/12/18:6113A000600050012-8 9? IE ENCLOSURE #14 25X1 . FLYII1 HOURS 72 45 108 84 90 680 120 760 60 120 2139 25X1 NOTE: 1. 3. FY 1961 MU1 ER SORTIES LENGTH TYPE LENGTH HOUI?S MISSION HOURS FY 1962 P BER SORTIES FLYING HOUP.9 8 9 Photo Penetration 9 6 54 5 9 Photo tactical 9 17 153 12 9 Weather 9 12 108 12 7 ELIN`?' peripheral 7 18 126 10 9 9 10 90 Photo Training B&EDW 170 4 85% B Config? 4 170 680 30 4 15% 'Wacker only 4 30 120 190 4 Ferry/Training B , W L: 190 760 30 2 R&D & Naint. Test B 2 30 60 60 2 R&D & Haint. Test EDW 2 50 100 527 533 2251 2. "Tacker nor,afy .carried on all flights except maintenance test, ferry, and transition. (Used approx 75% of all. flights). 6000 ft roofs of film XU be required on 70% of all Hq directed photo missions. C511,0914/1 CyJL_of,_ 1]. 'July 1960 RI Con f TI JJ a T Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 SITUATION EST M 'SSE PROTECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1961 and 1962 c.; -0914 A 1tibS'ch 1960 TOP -.'sr ELF T Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 TOP SE CRET I Introduction 25X1 1. Purpose 2. Background and History II Intelligence Requirements 1. Target Selection 2. Task 3. Targets 4. Corollary Tasks III Concept of operations 1. 2. 3- 4. 5- 6. 7- 8. Employment Mission and Mission Planning Utilization Primoxy Mission Capabilities Maintenance and Support Control Sortie Rate Support IV Relationship to Other Forces 1. 2. Pro Hostilities 3. Hostilities V Enclosures 1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights 2. Utilization of Bases 3, Aircraft and Equipment Assignment b. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 FrCIA.RDP563-0003113A000600050012-8 I I11TRODUCTION 1. PURPOSE a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of. project operations during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to cuuerent events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document will be utilized as a common reference and/or departure point for all concerned consistent with the above. b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the basis for justification of the budget. As such it will be reviewed and revised as necessary and no later than 1 June 1961-in order that it c~.again become the basis for budgeting and long range'planning for Fr-',:-1962 and 1963: This to include operational effectiveness; the formu- lztion of policy, tactics and techniques, and the determination of operational and R & D requirementb.. ;:.;. c) In addition, revisions via be made consistent with the latest theological advancements, the current political and economic situation, a44-new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national security, in order to provide timely and effective guidance for any follow-on program. BACKGROUM AND HISTORY ; a) At the time the Soviet Unions and its satellites denied normal access to its territory, the need for a method to collect all kinds of i . elligence became readily apparent and the requirement eras of the highest p ority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet 'Uhion indicated. the need for prompt and aggressive action in order to obtain a capability which would satisfy the intelligence requirements. b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government various studies were performed by the most capable scientific groups in the country. All of the studies validated the requirements, emphasized: the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recotmended the utilization o%' airborne platforms. e) To provide the capability for relatively safe overflights, the Lqckheed U-2 was developed, in 1955?Built into the U-2 was an altitude capability of approximately 70,000 Feet which, at that time, was considered. aThost"certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically interfere. Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could not intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they might have a limited capability of tracking the U-2 with radar. This assumption later proved to be correct except for the overly optimistic anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited Soviet to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually CHAT,-0911+ TOP SE CRET I- ~o?cfh0 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 its entire flight in denied territory was conclusively established early in the program and has continued to be the case up to the present time with one notable exception; i.e., penetrations of the USSR in the vicinity of the Soviet-Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the period July 1959 to February 1960 three such penetrations were accomplished without, to our knowledge, detection by the Soviet Air Defense system. On the basis of this experience, we can at least tentatively conclude that if penetration can be made without detection, there is an excellent chance that the entire mission can be completed without recognition by the air defense system. It is reasonable to assume that Soviet capability to in4er- cept the U-2 will increase during the period under discussion. However, it is believed that with careful flight planning and target selection, the use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum time on the ground, at pre and post-strike bases, and other tactics designed to decrease operational hazards, the U-2 will continue to possess a significant overflight utility during at least a portion of this period.* d) Diplomatic protests. which the USSR has made as a result of the AQUATONE operations in the summer of x.956 and again in early 1958 make it imperative that Project CHALICE operations be conducted in such a manner as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid- ered to have been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a flight which, although it did, not violate a third country, did fly into its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. In the period between the 1956 and 1958 protests... a total of 20 penetrations were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplomatic protest from any source. In no instance, however, was the USSR and a satellite country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances, aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. It was further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal evidence of overflight by U.S. aircraft as it had for both the 1956 and 1958 protests. It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made *A separate attachment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the U-2 on Overflights" purposely has been omitted from general distribution because of its special classification. This attachment is available in the Intelligence Section on a "need to know" basis. CHAL-0914- Cy,L of I f TOP SECRET 14ar6O Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 25X1 D 25X1 C 25X1 C25X1 C 25X1 C 25X1 C 25X1 C T C F IS E C P E T public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplo- matic measures. In both protest cases, high Uo S. political authority directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The react-ion to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout this period and will be taken into consideration for planning and when submitting proposed overflights for political approval. e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bares in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 - 5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin, termination, etc., and thereby degrade and/or weaken an official protest. This would also allow for more plausible U.S. denial. ;GENCE REQUIREMENTS 1o TARGET SELECTION Intelligence Requirements for penetration flights by Project CHALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which is composed of representatives of the Arwi, Navy, Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Require- ments encompass the fields of photographic intelligence, electronics intelligences These requirements are coordinated which has comparable representation from Consolidated target lists and established priorities reflect the composite views of all the agencies represented on both committees g as such, represent the consensus of as a whole. Targets and, priorities pe o .c are reviewed by the committees and revisions are made based, on the most current intelligence available from all sources. Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of a soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for reliable information on the present and future Soviet capabilities for such an attack. Such information is also critical to our national defense policy and planning. During the past four years CHALICE Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For,Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 T 0 P S E C R E T -4 - coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable information on which we have based our estimates of the Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack. At the present time, there is an urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas known to be, or suspected to be, associated with the three major elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability). a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding magnitude. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence Cozmmmity have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs. Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic support for fixed sites and test sites are prime search areas for this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy. anent question by recent evidence of ICBM series production. Coverage of the most suspect production facilities may help to confirm this.* b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth in the following paragraphs. (1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear powered or conventional. Our need is to determine the possible modification of existing craft, construction of new ballistic missile submarines,; and employment of both. CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering the questions. on production, characteristics, and employment of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. (2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recog- nized as a fact, although this capability is less critical to the United States than the ICBM. It constitutes an immediate and continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage offers the beat known means to answer the question of what is the deployment concept and, should assist with information on the capability of these weapons as well as their production. *The Joint Priorities Committees agreed that the most critical question was guided missiles, though, they did not seem to feel it necessary to distinguish between IRBM and ICBM. Further, they rate research and development and production as much higher than deployment at this time since evidence on these would permit a judgment of whether there was indeed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy- ment as probable in the case of the ICBM. CaAL-_ 914 Cyf of TOP SECRET l4 60 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 T 0 P S E C R E T - 5 - (3) The Soviet heavy bomber force today poses an immediate nuclear threat. Intelligence derived from sources other than CHALICE has provided a fairly accurate measurement of the magni- tude and capability of this threat. Previous CHALICE coverage has served to confirm and augment this intelligence. However, .we also have evidence that the-Soviets are developing a follow- ,on bomber aircraft which may replace the present bomber. force. In order to establish the 3tat4s and magnitude of the ,Soviet effort in the heavy bomber prograi, to clarify the inter- relationships of this and other Soviet weapons-delivery;:xsystems. and thus to gain a more accurate measurement of the overall Soviet nuclear threat, both present and future, it is also critical that we cover certa;Ln:'key Soviet bonibe? bases,,' bomber production sites, and R & D fa+eilities. (1k): In addition to knowledge of Soviet delivery system, information on the production of fissionable materials is essential to an accurate and positive measurement of the Soviet nuclear threat., Although extensive coverage of Soviet. Atomic energy installs ions. has, a-ready been ac ed through 25X2 CHALICE operations, in the Soviet 25X2 The er.and pattern of deployment of Soviet surface- to air missile sites (SA-2) is of critical concern to the Strategic Air Command. CHALICE photography has already pin- pointed approximately 50 of these sites including support facilities. Coverage of additional SAM defended areas remains a high priority requirement. CHAL-091. f j j o ' lk ch h 1960 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 20r03G/1p2/18 :SCE C RP6 T0313A000600050012-8 _6- 3. TARGETS fAilfill. the neeft outUned above are set forth in separate listings which are constantly under review and revision by the Ad Hoe Requirements Committee. 25X2 4. COROLLARY TASKS Valuable intelligence by-products also can be anticipated as a result of the coverage of the primary systems herein discussed. can be expected to yield significant details of o er o e a r tallations, transportation systems, industrial facilities, IRBM and ICBM installations, and other economic and military targets which could be of a significance only slightly less than the information we anticipate on primary objectives. One of the outstanding bonus effects that we know will be derived from fature exercise of the CHALICE capability will be an increase in our knowledge of Soviet air defense capabilities. Fairly precise data on the general deployment and characteristics of Soviet defensive electronic sites in otherwise inaccessible areas can be obtained through the capability of CHALICE equipment to detect and record electronic intelligence data. This increase in knowledge will result in a firmer base for operational plans that involve employment of our nuclear strike force. It should also be noted that exercise of the CHALICE capability over otherwise largely inaccessible areas of the USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely unknown but highly significant nature. As a specific by-product.. CHALICE photography yields terrain information from which accurate 25X1 D radar navigation and target charts, and radar prediction plates, 25X1 D can be constructed. It is also anticipated that this cHAL-091 TOP SECRET " Irl'o Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313AO00600050012-8 T O P S E C R E T -7- III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1. EMPLOYMENT a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability built into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained in the form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and above all, airborne collection equipment. In order for Project CHALICE to have maximum capability, permanent overseas bases will be maintained in Europe at Adana, Turkey, and in the Far East at Atsugi, Japan. b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary to carry on continuing research and development, and, for further perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow- on aircraft will not be available for approximately 12 to 18 months every appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capa- bility as pertains to aircraft performance. Primary mission capabilities product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the end product. In order to offset "end product" degradation due to increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained. Therefore, the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (north base) will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-2. c) The support of the facilities at will be required for the entire period. Increased activity due to the follow-on program and product improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for. d) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. () 2. MISSION AMID MISSION PLANNING a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are stated: CHAL-0914 C31L l Of r T 0 P SECRET 19 60 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313AO00600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 T O P S E C R E T -8 1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon- naissance (Photo and Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite countries in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section II "Intelligence Requirements". 2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon- naissance (Photo and Elint) on a world-wide basis in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as well as safeguard the security of the U.S. b) To fulfil the above requirements the "Operational Concept" will take cognizance of the latest political considerations and intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The concept which has evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives and prudent application of all planning factors to minimize the probability of protest. During the period we have programmed a maximum of 35 photo-overflights. (20/1961-15/1962) However, a number which will actually be accomplished will be dependent upon executive approval. c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive use of" staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period. It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking capability and in such a manner as to create !szXi.m m difficulty for positive tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort will be made to avoid the involveme:A- of third countries (specifically, Soviet Satellite Nations) either by ;Yi14rflying them on penetration or withdrawal from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all operational planning and execution, the safety of the aircraft will be of primary consideration. 3. UTILIZATION a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the results obtained will be useful in the event that the bases and/or areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future. CHAL-091+ Cy/'{ of TOP SECRET 141?sxch Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 1003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 1T 0 P S E C R E T -9- b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utilizing airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment bases. Training exercises will be accouplished on the fast move concept with mininiim U-2 ground time at any of the bases utilized. c The U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish 25X1 D The advantaged ern or r ng, economy,, 8 y or operational capability, have been demonstrated during the past years in such areas as the Middle East, Indonesia, Indo-China, and, the Baltic. It is felt that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not 'doing so. The relative value of the exercise we give the Russian radars does not outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so. The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and the quali- tative technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the above-mentioned flights - per se - would not induce greater Russian technological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt that.m mim utilization of the U-2 should be planned throughout the estimated operational life of the U-2 rather than wait for primary mission political approval that may never come. In addition, it is felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by higher level would be conducive to obtaining pol.itica'll apprcrc l . 1. PRIM..ARY MISSION CAPABILITIES a) In addition to photographic and electronic collection equip- ment which would be carried on overflight missions, it will be necessary to maintain weather observation equipment for purposes of cover; and 25X1 D during periods when ove are not in progress. list o required equipment is attached as Enclosure 3. 5. MA NANCE AND SUPPORT a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and equipment, the concept of contractor maintenance will be continued. in addition, processing of overflight photography by EK will be continued to insure maxim= intelligence exploitation. (Personnel strength will remain as stipulated in current TO's, with possibly minor adjustments.) 6. comm a) The concept of overflights (and certain other missions) being controlled by Headquatrs will be continued to insure efficient target coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy. CHAL-0914 Cy of 4 TOP SECRET ?A~60 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 25X1 D 25X1 C Approved For, Release 20'3/ 2N183 (N Fol 65=00313A000600050012-8 7. SORTIE RATE a) Estimated sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will be as indicated in Enclosure 4+. Approximately l.076 flying hours will be required to accomplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3800 flying hours to accomplish 968 sorties in FY 62. 8. SUPPORT a) Support will be required from the following echelons as indicated. This support will be in accordance with current directives and agreements. 1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, commo logis- tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison matters. AFCIG-5 will be the channel for support to all subor- dinate headquarters. 2) Theater Comznders for air base facilities, logistic support, airlift requirements and for special liaison. 3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities, personnel, logistics support and liaison matters. 4) Airways Air Coiuxications System for communications support. 5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for weather support. 6) National Security Agency for special intelligence reaction reports. 7) National Technical Processing Center for 0 readout. 8) Department of'State for negotiation for use rights to operate from certain foreign countries. I RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES CHAL?0911. CYjof 14 March l Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 TOP S E C R E T 25X1 C 2. Pre-HOSTILITIES PERIOD a) If international relationships deteriorate to a point where hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a msmum rate which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support. Although the military services have photographic and ELINT collection capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-29s of Project CHALICE are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply and with-comparative physical inummity. b) During this period it will be essential that the maximum; amount of potential enemy territory be photographed so as to provide the: 1) host probable time when an enemy attack would be launched. 2) Size of the available enemy attack force. 3) Type and extent of probable enemy attack. 4) Locations from where attacking forces and/or mislea: would be launched. 5) Overall capability of the enemy to sustain an attack:. 6) Most current target data for friendly attacking forces to use for retaliation. c) The need for current electronic intelligence will be very necessary to make available the frequencies and locations of enema' radars so that: 1) Friendly attacking forces can employ fanning techniques most effectively. CHALLO9I4+ G/of 14 Ir 60 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 2) Weak spots can be located through which attacking forces can penetrate with the least probability of interception. 3) Radar guidance of enemy interceptors and/or missiles can be interrupted. d) During the pre-hostilities period operational control will remain with Project CHALICE Headquarters. Deployment to prearranged rear bases may be necessary as dictated by the existing situation (Encl. #2). Project CHALICE resources will be utilized, on a first priority basis, to obtain reconnaissance coverage of SAC objectives as outlined in Appendix I to Annex "B" of SAC Operations Order #3.009. 3. HOSTILITIES a) When hostilities break out, Project overseas aoaets will .revert to the operational control of the Strategic Air Cond under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This transfer of control and assignment will be in accordance with the provisions of a Joint Agreement (C'HAL 0239), dated 19 July 1958, with USAF, DCS/0, concurrence date 21 Sept 1958, and in accordance with the CHALICE EWP Operational Plan, dated 20 January 1959. Upon execution of the SAC 50 series 040" SAC Operationa Order Number 1009, Appendix 2 to Annex "B" contains the necessary: instructions for utilization of CHALICE resources. b) Military personnel will be effected in accordance i-rith the arrangements contained in the Personnel Annex of the above-mentioned transfer agreement, .c) It is planned that civilian personnel will continue to function until relieved by militaiy personnel. 25X1A 25X1A APPROVED : Enclosures (4) cy1g Of 14 -ar h C AL-O9]). TOP SECR, ET Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved For, Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 V ENCLOSURES Enclosure Number 1 Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights Because of the special classification of the information contained in this report its contents are being held within Intelligence Section/DPD-DD/P and it will be distributed o:-.f "need to know" basis. CHAL-091+ lI rchE96O Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 Approved Fd.r Release 2003/12/18 : E-R F T003 3A000600050012-8 ENCLOSURE #3 AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT ASSIGNMENT FOR FR 196]. and 1962 25X1A The present distribution of aircraft, camera, electronics and other configuration types is considered adequate to satisfy current and proposed operational requirements through Fiscal 1962: A. EQUIPMENT: During staging operations it may be necessary to asai n n a tem basis, additional equipments from standby storage or divert or interchange equipments between Detachments to meet a particular staging requirement. However, the total numbers and types of configurations now available, either at the Detachments or in supply channels, should satisfy demands of current or forecast operational activity: CONFIGURATION ASSIGNMENTS 25X1 25X1 CR EQUIP WARDS Tracker A-1 A-2 B DETACHWNT B DETACHMENT C *Plus one spare 6" (HR-.730 camera per Detachment. Five manufactured - will be held at requirement exists. SPARES AT DEPOT IN Z I CHAL-0914 Cy~fj 14 ch 1960 T O P SECRFT 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8 until operational T 0 P- S E C R 1 25X1 25X1 25X1 jQ)W 3Re1e 12/18 : CIA-Rl 63-00313A000600050012-8 ELECTRONICS: B. Aircraft: 1. Distribution of U-2'e between overseas detachments and Edwards AFB has been reviewed and no change is anticipated. Assignment of Aircraft 14 March 1964 T 0 P S E C R E T Approved For Release 2003/12/18 : CIA-RDP63-00313A000600050012-8