REPORT OF IAC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON EMERGENCY PLANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00014A000100110009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 3, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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IAC D-96/2
3 April 1956
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MEi)RANDUM FOR: Intelligence Advisory, Committee
SUBJECT : Report of IAC ad hoe-Working Group on Emergency
Plans
REFERENCE : IAC-D-96/1, 20 February 1956
IAC-M-232, 28 February 1956, item 6
I. Background:
1. In recognition of the probable impact?of emergency situations
on the functioning of the Intelli nce Advisory Committee (IAC.), the
Director of Central Intelligence (CI)"proposed that the TAC jointly
examine, for planning purposes, the problems associated with the
operation of the IAC in wartime or an assumed-wartime situation. The
planned would provide a preliminary testing ground
for tentative solutions for the problems identified below. The Working
Group was charged with
a. examination of the impact of mar on the functions of
the IAC, and
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.contains the following statement of assumption:
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b. identification of problems that*may arise at
and recommendation of procedures for their solution.
2. At the 251st National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 9 June
1955, the NSC3 the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General,
the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission, noted the President's statement that future tests of the
emergency relocation plan should Include 's number of NSC meetings, wl:th
a view to -assuring, that emergency relocation plans. will enable.the
Council, under wartime conditions, to meet frequently and function
effective) as the key policy advisory. body to'the President. (NSC Action
No. 1112-c) . ?
3. On 13 June 1955 the President approved the DISC Emergenpy Relo-
cation Plan as expressed in NSC 5521. Paragraph 2.a. of this document
"Under. wartime conditions, the President will'utilize the
NSC to advise hitT, on national sepurity policies. The NSC will
be convened by the President intermittently, on-such occasions,
and at such places, as he may from time to time elect."
*NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File*
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II. Assumptions
:
1. As* a result of the above two statements of emergency operation
of the NSC, the DCI has assumed that the NSC will continue to look to him for
national intelligence advice and support. He will continue to look to the IAC
as the top intelligence advisory body for national intelligence in war-
time as in peacetime.
2. The Joint responsibilities of CIA and the Department of Defense
for the wartime conduct of clandestine activities are not within the scope
of this paper.
III. Discussion:
1. The integration of political, economic, scientific, and military
intelligence in wartithe will continue to be accomplished in the form of
National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In time of war, the lain Na
effort will be concentrated-on..
a. specific requests from the NSC;
b. enengq'potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities (excluding
targetting) and intentions, all three to include scientific, tech-
nical, economic, political and certain broad military aspects;
c. evaluations of the probable courses of action of uncom-
mitted countries; _
d. evaluations of capabilities and requirements of allied.
and/or uncommitted economies;-and
? e. timely estimates of prbbgble postwar economic and polit-
ical situations in various parts of the world.
2. To accomplish these purposes the following modifications of the
present NIE mechanism activities are believed necessary:
a. There will be?a greater number of special or "crash"
estimates covering specific wartime problems rather than broad,
country estimates.
b. The speed with which NIE's are produced will have to
be stepped up, and geared to meet a large number of less com-
prehensive requirements. .
c. The production of periodic (monthly or perhaps biweekly)
global intelligence reviews may be desirable broadly to outline
the global picture and make-general short-term projections.
d. Intelligence estimates for post-hostilities planning
should be on a national intelligence level.
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3. Up to this point in the discussion, tht- Working Group has been
attempting to identify the types of action which the intelligence arm
of the USC will probably have to perform in, time of emergency. We believe
that if these concepts are sound, no policy matters with regard'to
operational concept presently exist which need to be resolved by the IAC.
After examination of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
(t1SCID) and the implementing Director of Central Intelligence'Directives
(DCID), we believe that our concepts are consistent with the policies stated
in those directives.
IV. Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. The Impact of War on the Functions?-of the IAC: Our conclusion
is that the ir:oact of war will have little if any effect on the respon-
sibilities of the.IAC, subject to further clarification of the role of
the UUSC in wartime.
Recommendation: That the IAC approve the above conclusions.
2. Assuming acceptance by the IAC of the preceding parag^aph, the
following procedural and lor'istic problems are identified and; for planning
purposes, the following remedial action is recommended.
a. Location of IAC MeetingsDurin& the Initial Phase: Since
the first phas^ of hostilities is envisioned as primarily military,
there is firm requirement for the military members of the IAC to
remain with their chiefs. As the flow of military intelligence
will represent the main source of informa on concerning. the enemy
during this primary phase, it is logical t the chiefs of the
military service intelligence agencies an the DCI will play their
most important role during this period,
Recommendation: If relocation plans must be implemented, we
believe that meetings of the IAC should be held at or near the Alternate
Joint Communications 9enter (AJCC)' during the initia],,phase of the
emergency.
b. location of IAC Meetings During Balance of Hostilities:
As new situations develop after the initial please which -require
major policy decisions by the President and for which national
intelligence support is needed, the operation of the?IAC will be
accommodated, to the requirements levied on it. By this period
of the war, we believe that the IAC principals or their designees
could meet at a convenient location'not necessarily the relo-
cation center of any one member but centrally located so that
minimum travel would be required.
Recommendation: That appropriate locations be established for
meetings of the C after the initial phase of the war. Action by
CIA, in consonance with over-all U.S. Government emergency plans,
for such eatablishment is recommended.
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C. Scheduled Production of Nation 'Intelligence Estimates:
Since the disruption o norms intelligence production activities
during the initial phases of the war must be faced, a reduced
intelligence production program stressing immediate critical areas
should be developed. There will be s critical requirement for
Special NIEs which will be supported primarily by current military
intelligence. Concurrently, there will exist a requirement for
NIEs for those nations not yet committed to hostilities. As the
decisive phase in the war is reached, NIEs should again take
precedence over special estimates to insure adequate national
planning for the economic, political and psychological problems
of the final stages of'the war as well as for the -postwar era.
Recommendation: That the production of NIEs be adjusted
during the opening phase of the war to deal, with the current
situation as first priority business; that NIEs on the uncommitted
countries be given second priority;*and toat when the decisive
phase of the war is reached, there be a reexamination of NIE
requirement with appropriate rescheduling.'
d. Inter.-AA n Partici tion .in National Inth1lirence
Production the. :aasump i.on s valid-that, the genera procedures
of ational intelligence;productior viii be only slightly changed.
for wartime operation, then the participation of representatives
of all members of:the 1A will be required.' These. personnel should
have experience in the estimative process, and they, should not be
burdened with general liaison responsibilities.
Recommendationi..'If relocation plans. must be pui into effect,
we recoomme CIA provide facilities for personnel of other
agencies while these.-personnel are working wi.t1 the Beard of
National Estimates. on the preparation of NIFs.
e. Subconinittees of the IAC: Because much of the detailed
base, upon. which s are constructed is the product of working
level liaison among the members of the IAO, we believe that most
of'the IAC subcommittees' need. to continue to function: in wartime.
Recommendation: That each stubcommitte+ of the IAC which has
a wart- ; e u iTiy be instructed to prepare a wartime plan of
operation. Any subcommittee rich feels it:does'not have a
wartime function ahquld request corroboration of Its opinion from
nection t e opera ono A he TAC during we
have identified the following problem areas and have recommended pro-
cedures for solution.
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a
Ad Hoc Working Group on Emergency Plans
a. A.decisio by the C needs to be made as to whether
during the community will
(1) play a simulated exercise,;
(2) :deal with live intelligence, or
(3) use a combination of bath with live intelligence
taking priority.
Because only a small portion of the total staff of any agency will be
relocated, the live situation can be handled both in Washington
and with the facilities ih the Relocation Cent4xa, thus providing
a check on the remote operation.
Recommendations That the intelligence 25X1 A2g
y deal only
with live inte gence during The subcommittees
should operate on the same bas a.
b. Lo istics:. Each'agency is charged with the operation and
maintenance'o its own relocation c,,pnter. Communications between
relocation centers whether electrical, courier, or transportation
is a common problem.
Recommendation: That each a no be ?ra ible for its
communica?~ ons nee s during and existing
interagency arrangements- be to fied to fit dispersal requirements.
c. Liaisons As is implied id paragraph IV 2.d above, there
are certain Saigon problems beyond the participation in national
intelligence production. We believe that,-the exchan of liaison
officers is desirable based on experience in*
Recommendation- That the exchange of liaison officers be
agreedbetween agencies.on a bilateral basis,,
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