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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 24, 2000
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Publication Date: 
September 29, 1955
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PDF icon CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2.pdf175.23 KB
Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2 September 29, 1955 DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT ON SENIOR ECONOMIC OFFICERS CONFERENCE (W. S. Delany) At the Faris Conference o f_ eni r Economic Officers in Euro_pej East-West trade h ,one hpur on the agenda, Wednesda, 21 September. I presented the attached,,pap er, followed by NTalstrom's presentation, attached' Mr. Waugh, in the chair, asked for comment or any statement the country representations present desired to make on Walstrom's appraisal of national attitudes as reflected in COCOM. There were no comments. Brown U.K.) questioned the cost ratio staff paper (SS-1) as relates to the strategic evaluation of items. I invited his attention to the fact that F the concept was based on the effect of the over-all economy of the Bloc and on his further questioning, I stated I did not acre t the cost ratio concept as-an added criterion because in my opinion it smoke of econo is warfare, and was not nee of able. Regarding the bilaterals with the U.K., which took lace in London on riri~rr.nrwiri September 26, Moline, Barnett and myself met with Wheeler and Gresswell of Defense and Edden of the Foreign Office. The discussion opened by my stating that we would appreciate the present thinking of the U.K. representatives towards trade controls, especially China. Wheeler began his presentation by stating that U.K. present thank r1g_was towards a COCOM list of items ,pointed towards security requirements of the West in a global war with nuclear weapons. When questioned if limited wars with conventional weapons need not be equally considered, U.K. voiced the opinion that the bloc was practically self-sufficient in that respect. U.K. stated they were working State Dept. eclassification & release instructions on file Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2 SECRET in Defense towards the formulation of such a list, and anticipated readiness in about one month. U.K. gave no indication of list control - except to say they would attempt item justification. Re arding the timing of the forthcoming CG -- U.K. agreed to a meeting not earlier than first week in December or at least ten days after the end of the Foreign Ministers Meeting, whichever was later. Re and ng China controls -Barnett -presented the U.S.point of view on the necessity for holding to the present level. (Notes attached were prepared by Mr. ?falstrom immediately following meeting.) Mr. Barnett emphasized the U.S. responsibility in the China area and the necessity for the retention of a unified effort in the support of that position and stated that the U.S. at this time had no room for manuevering on China controls and that the possi- bility of flexibility is related to a change in circumstances which might result if a firm line could be held during the Geneva talks between the U.S. and Chinese Ambassadors. U.K. had previous to this indicated little interest in the CHINCOM list. They, however, did appear to react to the U.S. presentation and expressed an appreciation of the U.S. position. The Foreign Office representative stated that they did not agree with the U.S. position of force or threat towards China as a means of winning any change in Chinese attitude. Nevertheless, they supported the U.S. position in the U.N. this year on the recognition issue. They were not clear as to what this might mean for their attitude towards the U.S. position as relates to trade controls. U.K. expressed the desire to come to a single list of controls contending that China and USSR are one group and should have the same treatment on trade. SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2 Ir- SECRET They did not agree that there could be a differential as relates to the potential of each in limited wars with conventional weapons. It was evident to me that. as a result. of the meetl On_. 'ar? ss and t _bilatera is s, that unless there 4 a change in atta,tu e as_relates # ~ o , h n t r o l s on,. tie _ part off' gt,,,PCs., we will be unable to oall~_ the tenton of the~resentlevel of controls to China and find it ' difficult to get an a reemeqtfor any differential betweenCOCOM and CHIN-CON controls. __________ -:- - So far as the COCOM controls themselves., I would evaluate the U.K. intent to be the proposal of a common list applicable to the Bloc as a whole., and controlling only such items as would contribute to the Bloc's ability to wage a global war with nuclear weapons. Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP64-00014A000100260011-2