PUBLICATIONS SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00046R000200130003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 25, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Publications Survey
024602
UL 1957
1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI
approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 4.
2. The staff of the Inspector General has completed a preliminary
survey of Agency publications. Information developed to date indicates
that:
a. In December 1951, you assigned responsibility for the
coordination of all intelligence publications to the Assistant
Director/Intelligence Coordination (see Tab A attached). Uhder
this assignment of responsibility the present categories and format
of DEVI intelligence publications were established. However, with
the abolition of the Office of Intelligence Coordination in 1953
centralized Agency responsibility for the coordination of intel-
ligence publications apparently ceased to exist. Only in the DD/I
has an effort at centralized review been continued.
b. Past studies on the publications problem have been limited
essentially to finished intelligence and have failed to consider
many other important publications?especially in the DD/P area. If
real progress is to be made in systematizing Agency publications,
then all serial documents which circulate beyond the confines of any
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one Deputy area must be included in the definition of publications.
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c. Under the foregoing definition of publications the magnitude
of the Agency's effort is staggering. The DD/I alone lists approxi-
mately 100 serial publications ranging from documents produced on a
daily basis to those produced irregularly. The listing includes
many information reports and factual compilations but does not in-
clude a number of Top Secret and code word publications. A sampling
consisting of one issue of each of the DD/I publications (listed in
Tab B) nearly fills two drawers in a standard four-drawer safe.
d. Although no official records of serial publications in the
DD/P and DD/S exist, experience in IG surveys indicates a similar
heavy volume of publications.\
/ The DD/S publications include General Counsel
Opinions, Training Bulletins and Catalogues, Support Bulletins, and
Communications Instructions to mention but a few.
e. There seems little doubt that the number of current publi-
cations could be significantly reduced by mergers and consolidations
or through outright cancellations. Improvements in existing format
and content likewise appear necessary and desirable in many instances;
25X1 for example,
have been
produced are circulated in a variety of forms both within and without
- 2 -
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the Agency. Some of these studies make no reference to CTA and
contain no statement of source or other information on the nature
and origin of the document (see Tab C attached). Without some
centralized review and control, such variations in the pattern of
Agency publications appear inescapable.
f. Recommendations for changes in existing publications can
only be made after the most thorough evaluation, not only of the
publications themselves but also of the objectives, purposes and
consumer requirements for the information contained in these publi-
cations. Publications frequently represent the basic justification
for the existence of producing units, and.recommendations directed at
such publications must be carefully reasoned if they are to produce
concrete results rather than bitter objections. In short, publications
are not separate entities in themselves but rather reflect the basic
substantive operations and efforts of the various components of the
Agency.
3. The information reflected in the foregoing paragraph indicates that
a one-time survey of Agency publications will not in itself correct the
present deficiencies on a long-term basis. Definitive improvements will
only be obtained through a centralized effort established on a permanent
basis. The primarily substantive nature of publications indicates that
the Deputies should participate actively in any review of the present
situation and in the establishment of any central coordinating mechanism.
The DD/I as the Deputy responsible for the production of finished intel-
ligence appears most logically qualified to lead such a centralized Agency
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ILLEGIB
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publications review and control effort. Such a centralized mechanism
would also materially strengthen the Agency's hand in efforts to
coordinate the multitude of intelligence publications emanating from
other IAC agencies.
4. It is recommended that you direct the establishment of an Agency
Publications Board to be chaired by the DD/I with senior representation
from each of the other Deputy areas and authorized to review, coordinate,
control, improve and systematize all Agency publications as defined in
Paragraph 2.b. above.
25X1
APPROVED:
Acting Inspector General
Director of Central Intelligence (Date)
Attachments:
Tab A - Attached to all copies.
Tab B and C - Attached to Orig only.
de: DDCI
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18 December 1951
MINORANDUM FOR: Each Assistant Director
SUBJECT : Examination of Intelligence Publications
1. In order to provide more systematic handling of the initiation
of new intelligence publications in the Agency, the Assistant Director
for Intelligence Coordination has been assigned the responsibility for
insuring that:
a. The publication of information contained in the issuance
is within the functional cognizance of CIA and the originating
Office.
b. The publication is properly coordinated and integrated
with other intelligence publications issued by both CIA and other
Intelligence agencies.
C. The requirements of intelligence consumers are most
efficiently and economically satisfied.
2: In discharging this responsibility the AD/IC will consult with
both producers of the publication and end-users on the substantive aspects
of the publication in question and with the Advisor for Management on
functional and other administrative aspects. He will also insure that the
interests of this Agency and other agencies are reconciled.
3. In the event of disagreement the AD/IC will refer the problem,
fully documented, to the DDCI for decision.
4. ADAC will be responsible for conducting periodic review of
existing intelligence publications with the parties concerned and report
semi-annuAlly to the DCI on the status of the Agency's intelligence pub-
lications.
/s/ Allen W. Dunes
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
er.CR.FT
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Approve
03-2
AT
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. Cruscott
cr tions qurvev
tit some p.oirt, n the future n comi unity wide
8urvey of intell nce pliFlicntions -would be
-00d Lnij 2nd mi* t TeP d to overall
svinpe in CO st, improvement Quality And a
bringinutogethor of the corraunity- at one more
point.
25X1
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FYI: Distribution on this includes a copy for
each of the DD's.
FORM NO
10 I REPLACES FORM 10. 101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
1471
Re suspense on Publications Survey, General Cabell
has approved draft regulation ich is now being readied
for final form. Will send the f-tached to file.
ekt 4 Nov
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CLL? I NTEFr
-E-T
SERIA:!, PUBLICATIONS
of the
Number 3
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)
(Preliminary)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CENTRAL REFERENCE
CIA LII3RARY
Aula 195?
. L,';'3E ONLY
r Release' I) I
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Next 36 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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THE POPULAR FRONT IN FRANCE
Septembei. 1956
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THE POPULAR FRONT IN FRANCE
CONTENTS
A. The Birth of the Popular Front
B. The Life of the Popular Front
C. The Death of the Popular Front
D. The Trade Union Merger
Appendix A: Suggested Bibliography
Appendix B: Notes
Appendix C: Principal Sources
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THE POPULAR FRONT IN FRANCE
A. The Birth of the Popular Front
The Popular Front concept, as an official policy of the
Communist International (Comintern), was laid down by Georgi
Dimitrov at the COmintern's VII Congress, which was held in
MpseOw in July-August 1935. As Dimitrov explained it, Com-
munists, in order to resist the threat of Fascism at home and
abroad, and especially the threat of Fascist Gevmany to the
Soviet Union, Vere to combine not only with the masses but
also with the Social Democrats as well as any non-Socialist
or even right-wing groups opposed to Fascism. This was a Ma-
jor reversal of policy, for the Communists had until that
moment looked upon Socialists as their principal enemies and
had never ceased to revile them as traitors to the interests
of the working classes.
It is generally stated that the Popular Front which there-
after came into being in France and took over the government
in June 1936 was the result of the new Dimitrov line. While
the Blum government undoubtedly expressed the objective of
this policy, it was the result of purely French 'political
developments which had begun at least a year and a half before
Dimitrov made his speech. At the Comintern Congress the agree-
ment already reached in France by the Communists and Socialists
was held up as a model to the other Communist parties.
In France relations between the Communists and Socialists
had been extremely bitter since the VI (1928) Comintern Con-
gress_ The French Socialists were supported by the bulk of
the French workers, while the Communists were a small implac-
able faction. By 1934, however, they had come to share two
things: a desire to extend their influence among labor, and
dislike--even a fear,--of the rightist governments then
dOminating France and of the rising French Fascist groups.
- The economic depression, which came somewhat later to
France than to the rest of Europe, resulted in especially
severe economic hardships for the French workers, who were
less protected by social legislation than the workers of
most European states, and created a more bitter feeling than
perhaps had ever been known in, France. The opportunity was
not ignored by the Communists, who-eagerly fanned this feel-
ing in an effort to regain prestige they had lost in preced-
ing years and even to displace the Socialists as the principal
champion and acknowledged leader of the French worker.
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At the same time, exploiting the discontent existing among
all groups of the population but especially among the lower
middle class, and pointing to the examples of Germany and
Italy, Fascist organizations made their appearance in France
and won considerable support. The growth and activity during
1934 of such groups as the royalist Camelots du Roi, Action
Francaise, Coty's Solidarite Francaise, Taittinger's Jeunesse
Patriotes, and Count de la Rocque's Croix de Feu made many
leftists apprehensive of the poSsibilities of a Fascist coup.
The Fascists were helped by the:Stavisky scandal with its
lurid revelations of corruption in high places and the impli-
cation of influential politicians, including some from the
Radical Party of the then Premier, Camille Chautemps.
The scandal, followed by the death of Stavisky at Chamonix
near the Swiss border--called suicide by the police but be-
lieved by many to have been murder to prevent the implication
of additional government personages--forced Chautemps to re-
sign. Another Radical, Daladier, was then called upon to
form a new government. On 6 February 1934, when he was
scheduled to present his program to the Chamber of Deputies,
the Fascists decided to act. Mobs of rightists stormed the
Palais de Bourbon 2.1 in an effort to overthrow the government.
The attempt was a vain one, but it served to show the
leftists how real the Fascist danger was. The first move in
the series that eventually led to the formation of the Popular
Front occurred two days later when a joint Socialist-Communist-
Radical Socialist demonstration was staged in Paris. At this
point the desire for unity was still felt only superficially.
When the rightist Doumergue was called upon to form a govern-
ment immediately following the 6 February riots, the Socialist-
led Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT - General Confedera-
tion of Labor) ordered a nation-wide general strike for
12 February. The Communists, not willing to remain aloof
from this demonstration of popular will but equally unwilling
to permit the Socialists to provide the leadership, decided
that their Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire (CGTU -
General Confederation of United Labor), while not techni-
cally joining the CGT appeal, should launch a parallel appeal,
thereby making it possible for the Communists to claim a
share in the success of the strike
The initiative for unity of Action between the Socialists
and Communists came from the latter. On 31 May 1934, the
Communist organ L'Humanite published an open letter to "So-
cialist workers and branches" and to the "Permanent Adminis-
trative Committee of the Socialist Party," calling for joint
anti-Fascist action and demonstrations, especially as re-
gards efforts to secure the release of Ernst Thaelmann, a
condemned German Communist. .A similar letter was addressed
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to the Socialists by the French Communist Party (FCP) on
5 June. Then on 23 June, the FOP Congress, meeting at Ivry,
addressed an official offer to the permanent national board
of the Socialist Party to conclude a pact against the Fascist
menace.
The offer placed the Socialists in a dilemma. They dis-
liked and distrusted the Communists, and strongly resented
the virulent abuse of Socialists which still filled the pages
of the Communist press. Nevertheless, they were keenly aware
of the danger posed by French FasciSm and could not ignore
the potential strength which united action vould lend. The
proposal for joint action on behalf of Thaelmann was parti-
cularly hard to refuse, however suspicious they might be of
the Communists, for Thaelmann was then a symbol of Fascist
persecution. The party was also under strong pressure to ac-
cept from its Paris section, which was controlled by the ex-
treme left wing of the party.
On 5 June, the Socialist Executive, with only three votes
in opposition, decided to accept the Communist invitation,
but it demanded as a condition that the Communist attacks on
Socialist leaders cease as long as cooperation continued.
This assurance was given in a letter dated 2 July, whereupon
the Socialist Executive on 15 July agreed to conclude a United
Action Pact. Delegates of the two parties met on 27 July
and agreed on the terms of the pact.which they then signed.
The pact provided that the two parties would jointly
strive to (1) mobilize the population against the Fascist
groups, and disarm them; (2) defend demOcratic liberti6s,
secure proportional representation, and a dissolution of the
Chamber; (3) combat preparations for war; (4) combat decree
laws; and (5) combat Fascist terror in Germany and Austria,
and secure the release of Thaelmann, Karl Seitz, and of all
imprisoned anti-Fascists. To achieve these aims, each party
agreed to organize jointly meetings and demonstrations, utiliz-
ing party Organizations, press, members, and elected repre-
sentatives. Each pledged to refrain from insults and attacks
on the other, although each party.' could denounce those who
violated the agreement. It was specifically provided that
controversies over tactics and doctrines mould be permissible.
Outwardly the terms of the pact were a victory for the
Socialist point of view. The Communists, however, were ?not
concerned with the formal aims of the new United Front (which
to them was only a tactical maneuver) but in the achievement
of united action and the creation of a joint unity committee
to enable them to reach the Socialists and unorganized ele-
ments on more favorable ground. They were confident that
the advantage they held because of their tight discipline,
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as compared to the weak organization of the Socialists, would
inevitably result in gains for themselves.
In the meantime, France continued under a rightist govern-
merit. Doumergue, having attempted to assume powers which
would have placed him beyond the control of Parliament and
prepared the way for a Fascist revolution, was driven. from
Office. He was succeeded by Flandin, a Centrist, and then
by the reactionary, though!more circumspect, Laval. Under
these men the Fascist leagues continued unchecked, while the
economic situation worsened because the n200 Familiesn and the
big financiers refused to let the government take the neces-
sary measures, insisting instead on monetary deflation and
wage cuts.
The Communists had achieved a measure of success in per-
suading the Socialists to form a United Front, but this was
not enough. Together the two parties still could not hope to
dominate the political scene. The Communists turned their
attention to the problem of bringing in more rightist groups,
especially the Radicals (or Radical Socialists). The Radi-
cals, representing chiefly peasant proprietors, small traders
and manufacturers, and other elements of the middle class,
disliked both the Communists and the Socialists as well as
the Fascists. The Socialists were afraid to compromise their
socialism by any cooperation with the Radicals. Yet, unless
labor could cooperate with the Radicals, rightist elements
would remain in power and Fascism would continue to grow.
Unless brought into cooperation with moreleftist parties,
the Radicals had no alternative except to support rightist
elements. The existence of the United Front made cooperation
with the Radicals more palatable to the Socialists, since
if they were to undertake such cooperation without the Com-
munists, many of the more leftist Socialists might well go
over to the Communists.
The first Communist move to bring in the Radicals came
during the cantonal elections of August 1934, when the Com-
munista announced that they would vote for Radicals on the
second ballot where warranted, On 9 October, Thorez, the
FCP leader, changed the name of the movement from the United
Front to the Popular Front to attract the Radicals. The
Radicals as well as the Socialists were reluctant to engage
in joint political action with the Communists, but increas-
ing support for such a policy among the rank and file members
of the two parties caused the leaders to consider such a
course when they realized -that such a trend could not be
denied.
A further common meeting ground was created by the
signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact in May 1935. The Radicals
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had favored rearmament while both the Socialists and Commu-
nists Opposed it. During Laval's visit to Moscow to sign
the pact, Stalin and Laval issued, on 15 May 1935) a -joint
statement to the effect that Stalin approved French measures
of'defense. The FCP then dropped its opposition to rearma-
ment as did the Socialists, although the latter still in-
cluded an important pacifibt bloc:. The split in the Socialist
Party and in the CGT over: this issue weakened them and there-
by made cooperation more imperative than ever.
The municipal elections of May-June 1935 assured the Com-
munists of final success in their efforts to establish a
Popular Front, There was close cooperation between the So-
cialists and Communists and, in many places, between these
two and the Radicals and other leftist groups. ?The elections
were a Success for the leftists, but within the bloc the Com-
munists gained at the expense of the Radicals and Socialists.
Thereafter it was clear to the latter two groups that they
would have to support a Popular Front or risk defeat in the
coming national elections. Especially significant was the
election result in the 5th Arrondisement of Paris, a moderate
quarter, where a Professor Rivet, an anti-Fascist candidate,
won over Lebecq, a Nationalist candidate and the hero of the
6 February incident.
On 30 May, while the elections were still in progress)
the Communists forced the issue by securing acceptance of
their demand for the creation of a tripartite representation
of left wing parties in the Chamber of Deputies, and the new
Joint Parliamentary Committee Met for the first time that
day. The new alliance of Radicals, Socialists and Communists
was next formally asserted on 14 July 1935, when the tradi-
tional Bastille Day celebration was conducted jointly.
Between 300,000 and 400,000 people marched from the Place de
la Bastille to the Place de la Republique, singing the
Marseillaise and the Internationale, carrying the Tricolor'
and the Red Flag, led by Daladier, Biumiand Thorez-. Two
weeks later, the election victory was celebrated at a meeting
where Paris witnessed the unusual sight of the three men
speaking from the same platform.
The political situation resulting from the May-June
elections and the renewed activity of the Fascist groups,
especially the Croix de Feu, following Laval's assumption
of the premiership, eliminated the last Socialist resistance
The Socialist Party convention, meeting in Mulhouse in the
fall of 1935, approved political cooperation with the Radicals and the Communists and the establishment of a Popular
Front.
The Radical Party convention ended in the same result
though only after considerable disagreement and controversy
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between those urging a union with leftist forces and the
more reactionary bloc which desired continued support of
the Laval government. To the former--the group led by
Daladier and the anti-Fascists--it was clear that without
unity the new Chamber would be like the old, and that whether
Laval remained or was replaced by some other Centrist, the
result would be a weak rightist government under which Fascism
could continue to grow. The convention agreed, however, that
Radical ministers should remain in the cabinet, provided
Laval took action against the Fascist leagues. With respect
to the Popular Front, the convention resolution did not men-
tion it by name, but authority to Join it was clearly given
in a statement to the effect that "it ffile partg welcomes
with joy the powerful rally throughout the country determined
to block the road to the enemies of the Republic--a rally
which conStitues a wholesome and legitimate defensive front
with which the Radical Party has loyally cooperated since
July 14, 1935." E./
On 18 January 1936, because of Laval's failure to deal
effectively with the Fascist leagues, the Radical Executive
Committee ordered its members to withdraw from and to oppose
the Laval tovernment. With the resignation of the Radical
ministers on 22 January, the government fell. Albert Sarraut,
a Senator, formed a new cabinet. The Popular Front group
immediately began to prepare for the coming national elections,
which they had every hope of winning, for they had the bulk
of the French people behind them, while their opponents
were an incoherent group of people with little or nothing to
unite them except their opposition to the Popular Front.
The Popular Front program on which the election campaign
was waged had been published on 11 January by what was known
as the Comite Nationale de Rassemblement Popular (National
CoMmittee of Popular Rally), which comprised ten organiza-
tions: League of the Rights of Man, the Vigilance Committee
of Anti-Fascist Intellectuals, 1/ World Committee Against
Fascism and War, 4/ Movement for Militant Action, the Radical
Socialist Party, he Socialist Party, the FCP, the Socialist-
Republican Union, the CGT, and the CGTU.
The program was divided into three sections. Under the
title "Defense of Freedom," it called for a general amnesty;
disarmament and dissolution of the Fascist leagues; measures
for the purification of public life; measures to liberalize
and control the press through publication of financial
resources, repression of libel, and abolition of advertising
monopoly; trade union liberties; measures to improve educa-
tion; and the improvement of the economic, political and
moral status of the colonies. With respect to "Defense of
Peace," it called for international cooperation through the
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League of Nations, support for collective security and auto-
Matic sanctions against aggressors, nationalization of 'war
industries and prohibition of the arms trade, and repudia-
tion of secret diplomacy. Economic aims were defined as
restoration of purchasing power by such measures as estab-
lishment of a national unemployment fund, reduction of the
work week without reducing the weekly wage, and institution
of a public works program; elimination of the agricultural
and commercial crisis by establishing a Cereals Board., re-
valuing agricultural prices, and strengthening agricultural
cooperatives; reorganization of the credit structure through
regulation of banking and reorganization of the Bank of
France; and a financial purification program, to include such
things as an investigation of war profits, establishment of
a War Pensions Fund, tax reforms through the establishment
of a progressive income tax and measures against tax? evasion,
and control of'capital exports.
This program satisfied none of the participating parties
completely, but it was one that all could support. The
Communists frankly admitted that they agreed to it only be-
cause, for the moment, they could do no better. Speaking to
the PCP VII Congress at Villeurbanne at the end of January
1936, Thorez stated:
The government of the People's Front Will be a govern-
ment which will stop the Fascist menace by disarming
and effectively dissolving the armed bands; a govern-
ment which will make the rich pay; a government which
will rely on support in this twofold task on the extra-
parliamentary activity of the masses and on the QOM-
mittee of the People's Front; ... it will be a govern-
ment of the action of the working class and of its
party, the Communist Party, a government which will
allow for the preparation of the final capture of power
by the working class.
As long as conditions do not allow us to set up a
People's Front Government as we interpret the term, we
have decided to support a government of the Left in
carrying out a program in the interests, and according
to the will, of the people of France; but we are no
party of the bourgeoise which has given any undertaking
to join a bourgeois government.,/
In
In the domestic field, the FOP emphasized a program that
had sufficient validity to receive the backing of Socialists
and Radicals, stressing especially the phrase "200 Families,"
which had ftrst been used by Daladier. Thus the FOP "ap-
peared for the first time not as a party of agitators under
foreign direction but as a French party, participating An
7
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the national defense and sharing the heritage of patriotism
and of French revolution, as a party in the parliamentary
sense and almost as a government party." ?I
The electionV was an overwhelming victory fOr the
Popular Front, which won 368 of the 618 seats in the Chamber
of Deputies, as against 232 for the various groups or the
right. Of the three major Popular Front parties, the
Socialists had 149 seats, the Radicals 109, and the Commu-
nists 72. ,W While the Socialists emerged as the strongest
single party, electing roughly 50 more deputies than in the
previous national election, the Communists could consider
the reaults a personal victory. For while the number of
votes for the Socialists was almost exactly the same as in
1932, the Communists almOst doubled their poll from 794,000
to 1,503,000. As for the Radicals, they not only polled
approximately 400,000 votes less but lost roughly 50 seats.
The Communist delegation, it may be noted, increased from
10 to 72
B. The Life of the Popular Front
The immediate problem was to form a government, a task
which fell without argument to Leon Blum, who, as the Socialist
Leader, headed the largest parliamentary group of deputies.
It had been assumed that the Communists would participate in
the government, especially in view of statements made by
Thorez and other Communist leaders during the formation period
of the Popular Front and during the election campaign, but
this proved to be a mistaken assumption. The FOP decided
that its leaders should not accept cabinet posts, though it
pledged the government its support provided the Popular Front
program was carried out. This equivocal and distrustful atti-
tude of the Communists weakened the Blum ministry from its
first day.
In a statement to the press on 6 May, Thorez and Duclos
explained the decision by saying that "the presence of Com-
munists in the government might be exploited by the enemies
of the people and used as a pretext for scare campaigns,
which could mean a weakening of the Popular Front." _91 Actu-
ally, it was a clever political strategem designed to assure
the Communists maximum political influence and opportunity
to exploit the new situation to further extend the influence
of the FOP over the French masses. By remaining out of
the government, the Communists could exert a parliamentary
veto over it, taking credit for all of its succeasea without
being responsible for any possible failures. It also re-
mained free to extend its contacts with labor, which, by a
wave of major Strikes, indicated that it expected changes
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which the government was incapable of effecting. By lending
support to the demands for such changes the PCP curried the
favor of the masses away from their Socialist and Radical
partners, who had to shoulder the blame for failing to insti-
tute them.
Blum was not unaware of the real reason why the Commu-
nists refused to serve in his cabinet and, in a speech on
30 May, before he was installed as premier, he declared:
I am being spoken of as a Kerensky who is preparing
the way for a Lenin. I can assure you that this is
not going to be a Kereneky government; and it is
equally certain that if we fail we shall not be suc-
ceeded by a Lenin. 22/
It was a clear warning to the Communists that failure to sup-
port him would play into the hands of the Fascists. It
failed to change the FCP policy, however, for the Communists
knew that they could always cease their sabotaging tactics
if they brought the government too close to the brink of
disaster.
The cabinet was further weakened by the refusal of the
influential Radical leader Edouard Herriot to serve. His
great prestige would have strengthened the cabinet, but he
perferred.to serve as President of the Chamber. Blum also
tried to persuade Leon Jouhaux, secretary general of the
CGT, officially to participate in the government, but
this the latter refused .to do, reasserting the traTitional
CGT
policy of avoiding direct political activity. The final
composition of the cabinet included, besides Blum, 17. Social-
ists, including the Ministers of Interior, Colonies, Finance,
National Economy, Pensions, Public Works, Mines. and Electri-
city, Agriculture, Postal Services, and Labor and Public
Health. Chautemps, a Radical, waa Minister without Portfolio,
and there were 12 other Radicals in the government, including
the Ministers of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Air,
Justice, Education, and Commerce. The Communists, though not
represented directly, had a direct channel into the cabinet
in the person of Pierre Cot, a fellow traveling. Radical, who
was Air Minister.
The Blum ministry, upon taking office, was immediately
faced with a major crisis, which the lame-duck Sarraut govern-
ment had ignored during its last month of existence. This
was the problem of the "it-in " strikes which had started in
May when 80 workers had occupied the Usines aircraft plant
at Issy-les-Muulineaux. The movement spread in the provinces
and? at the end of the month, to the Paris region, affecting
metallurgical and engineering plants especially, and then
back to the provinces again at the beginning of June.
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The strikes were a new phenomenon in France. Similar
strikes had occurred in Italy in 1920, but they,were far
from offering an exact parallel. The Italian strikes had
been ordered by the trade: unions, whereas those in France
were the reault of a spontaneous movement among the. workers and
the trade unions' main concern was to get them under control.
The strikes had a real basis in the inadequate wages and
working conditions of French workers generally, and, while
the Communists aided and abetted the strikers--Communist
deputies made speeches in occupied factories and Communist
spokesmen curried the strikers' favor by declaring on all
possible ?cessions that the correct way to solve the crisis
was to grant all of the worker& demands?it seems clear
that the strikes were not of Communist origin.
To some extent the Communists were actually embarrassed
by the strikes. For while they did not hesitate to ex-
?
ploit them for their own ends, the Communists realized that
they weakened the prestige of the new Popular Front regime
with which the Communists were pledged to minimize class
hatred and to maintain French national unity against Nazi
Germany. When the strikes continued to threaten the stability
of the Blum cabinet, Thorez declared on 10 June, after the
Matignon agreement had been reached, that it is important
to know when to stop a strike, for otherwise you are playing
into the hands of the reactionaries." .12/ When the strikes
did let up shortly thereafter, the Communists were thus able
to take credit, which they did not merit.
The strike wave was solved when the government imposed
arbitration on employers and workers by the Matignon agree-
ments, signed on 7 June at Hotel Matignon in Paris by
jonhaux for the COT and Duchemin, president of the Confedera-
tion Generale de Production Francaise (CGPF - General Con-
federation of French Producers), the largest employer group
in the Paris region. The agreements were a victory for the
workers, providing for such gains as a 40-hour week, paid
holidays, and recognition of collective bargaining. All
these points were then embodied in a series of bills which
were submitted to and immediately passed by the Assembly.
The strikes and their termination had both favorable
and unfavorable results for the Popular Front. The left was
stimulated by the new victory, while the trade unions, a
major element in the Front, acquired millions of new members
in the months that followed. The government's support of
the workers did not alienate the bulk of the Front's non-
Socialist supporters, who realized that the concessions
were justified and saw in the strengthened trade union move-
ment a new bulwark against Fascism. Nevertheless, a section
of the Radical Party, headed by Caillaux, objected to the
government's surrender to the workers even while realizing
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that it could do nothing about it. The employers realized
the necessity of giving way, at least momentarily, because
the Popular Front was strong; but many of them resented having
to consent to arrangements worked out only by the CGPF, which
represented only a small segment of French employers.
The real winner was the FCP, which emerged as the spokes-
man for the French labor movement, with vastly increased
prestige and influence. The FCP Immediately used its new
position to hasten the Communist take-over of the newly uni-
fied CGT (infra). The Communists openly demonstrated their
power. in September 1936, when they arranged a new wave of
strikes partly to maintain and extend their mass influence
but mainly to make their weight felt and to embarrass their
partners. The strikes in this period all had four things
in common: (1) they were started under Communist leadership
or at least prompting; (2) they were neither large nor long-
lasting, but created a never-ending feeling of uneasiness;
(3) wherever possible they were "sit-in" strikes to inject a
sense of revolutionary disorder; and (4) when the desired
political effect had been achieved, they were abruptly broken
off. The strikes left no doubt that the Popular Front had
, permitted the Communists to achieve in a few months undis-
puted control of the French labor movement.
The Matignon agreements and the subsequent labor legisla-
tion were only a beginning to a solution of France's labor
problems, because social reforms, once enacted, are not
treated in France as definitive even by the defeated party.
The employers pursued a ruthless policy of counter-attack
and delay, which was bound to succeed since real wages were
dependent upon the general economic situation. The fact that
the Front had no real coherent economic policy hampered, from
the beginning, all of its efforts. Since strict controls
and basic reforms were blocked by the joint opposition of
Radicals and Communists and a rise in productivity was blocked
by the flight of capital and the 40-hour week, the wage in-
creases won by workers at Matignon could have only an infla-
tionary effect. Consequently, the franc had to be devalued
twice. It was good propaganda for the Communists to protest
against these devaluations which their own attitude had
helped to bring about.
As a result of the decline of the general economic situa-
tion and a rise in the cost of living, real wages, by the
middle of 1938, were down to the level preceding Matignon,
while production had declined by 25 per cent as compared
with 1930. Earned wages and salaries, which were 87.4 bil-
lion francs in 1935, had risen to 133 billion by 1938, a
rise of 52 per cent. But between November 1935 and November
1938, the cost of living had risen by 55 per cent. The rise
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in the cost of living and the fall in real wages Was the in-
evitable result of two devaluations in a single year which
had reduced the value of the franc by 50 per cent. Moreover.,
the wage increase obtained under the Matignon agreements was
more apparent than real. The agreements called for a 35 per
cent increase, but because of the shorter workweek, the actual
gain was about 12 per cent.
The disastrous effects of inflation and decreased produc-
tion were aggravated by the fact that France at this point
was hit by the end of the depression which had largely by-
passed her at the beginning of the decade. The situation was
due in large part to Communist tactics. Knowing that without
controls, which they consistently opposed, it was mere pre-
tense to talk of making the rich pay and, at the same time,
doing their best to launch ever new wage demands, the Commu-
nists deliberately sought inflation, decline of real wages,
and a consequent intensification of the class struggle. In
short, they really did not want the Popular Front government
to succeed. They could take credit with the workers for support-
ing new wage demands, while blaming their Socialist and Radical
partners for the deterioration of the economic situation which
resulted. The prestige of the Communists was further enhanced
and that of their partners lowered when the government, obliged
to enforce the laws of France, had workers ejected from a num-
ber of occupied plants in October 19360 during a new wave of
Communist inspired strikes. The Communists, of course, violently
protested this 'betrayal" of the Fronts programs.
In September 1936, the major Communist action was a 2k
hour protest against non-intervention in Spain (infra), which
proved tantamount to a general strike of the Paris armaments
industry, and thus INISS a warning to the government that the
Communists could make France helpless against an enemy. At
the same time, strikes were organized in the northern textile
mills, with occupation of plants. The plants were cleared,
but when the workers returned the government could not act,
for the Communists threatened to withdraw their support and
this would have caused the Pall of the government. A solution
to the impasse in the form of a six per cent wage increase
only kindled unrest and a new wave of wage demands all over
France while, at the same time, it produced a new flight of
capital and a further drop in the franc abroad.
The consequences were immediately apparent. On 24
September the Bank of France raised its discount rate from
three to five per cent, and on the following day the franc
was devalued. The latter step had been long overdue. The
Communists protested violently, but they also objected to
the introduction of'controls. The situation provided the
clearest possible picture of Communist duplicity. While
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Now- Irser
they incited the workers, they also supported the financiers.
The Communists had made the safeguarding of the franc one of
the specific promises in return for which they gave support
to the Blum ministry in the Chamber on 5 June. On 25 Septem-
ber, the very day that the franc was devalued, L'HUmanite, in
di0OusOing the question of devaluation, wrote that?l'It goes
without saying that our CamMuniat Party remains and always
Will remain firmly opposed to any operation of this kind?-and
will demand the severest.Meaaurea against the instigators of
such an Offense. Yet the Communists joined in the ChaMber
vote approving devaluation.
The Blum Government did its best to'carry out the other
economic points of the Front program, The Bank of France was
reorganized and reformed. Its Council of Regents, previously
-elected by the 200 largest stockholders, was brought under
governmental control. Nationalization of the arms industry
was begun by Pierre Cot, Air Minister, who nationalized the
military aircraft industry,. forcing Daladier, War Minister,
to follow suit With munitions factories. New regulations were
eStablished to control prices, especially those of necessities,
while an effort also was made to set a minimum level for whole-
sale agricultural prices. A series of tax reforms was
instituted.
Blum also 'carried out the Front pledge to dissolve the
Fascist leagues) but the effectiveness of this Step was more
apparent than real. De la Rocque, for example, simply re-
grouped his followers of the dissolved Croix de Feu into A
new party called the French Social Party (Parti Social Fran-
eaise). In addition, a new extreme nationalist group, the
Cagoulards, made its appearance. The rightist and Fascist
press continUed in existence and waged a campaign against
leftist leaders so vitriolic and slanderous that one of Blum s
Colleagues?Roger Salengro, Minister of the Interior--was
driven to suicide.
On 16 March 1937, the French Social Party staged a rally
in a mOvie theater in the Paris suburb of Clichy. Although
it was. a quiet affair for which proper police authorization
had been obtained, the Communists attempted to disrupt it,
conSidering it an open provocation since Slichy was a known
leftist quarter in which de is Rocque had few if any supporters.
A clash between Communitt led crowds.and-police resulted in
Six persons killed and several hundreds injured. The leftists,
especially the Communists, were enraged that the police, under
a Socialist government, would fire on the populace to pro-
tect Fascist activity. Thorez violently denounced "govern-
ments of the Left, which pursue a policy of the right." .12/
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The first open break between Blum and the Communists,
however, came over the issue of intervention in Spain. The
French government Was bound by treaty to supply war goods
to the Spanish government. The British government, however,
exerted pressure on Paris not to sell munitions to Spain but
instead enter a non-intervention agreement, fearing that
otherwise the Fascist powers would intervene directly. Suc-
cumbing to this pressure and realizing that above all else
the French people were afraid of war, the Blum cabinet imposed
an embargo on arms shipmente to gpain. This move, though
taken reluctantly by the Socialists, was warmly supported by
the Radieals.
The Communists, bitterly opposed to the embargo demanded
that the policy be reversed on threat of withdrawal from the
Popular Front. These threats were countered by Blum's threat
to resign if they did. Since the Blum government was, in
Communist eyes, still better than any possible alternative,
they did not dare carry out the threatened secession. But on
5 December 1936, in a vote of confidence on the Spanish issue,
the Communist deputies abstained, the first such action since
the Front had taken office. The Communists announced that
although they disagreed with the government's Spanish policy,
they would support it loyally in all other matters. The inci-
dent nonetheless showed how shaky the Front coalition really
was.
In January 1937, the Blum goVernment.found itself con-
fronted with a major economic epistle. The draft budget pre-
sented to parliament on 2 January totalled 73 billion francs,
of which only 43 billion were covered. Production was fall-
ing, especially coal production as a result of Communist
maneuvers in the northern industrial regions. As a measure
to save the government and prevent a further deterioration
of the country's economic position, Blum announced a "pause"?
a temporary freezing of further expenditures and further re-
forms. In the next two months the "pause" was implemented
by the abolition of restrictions on the gold trade, the can-
celling of six billion francs of expenditures on public works,
a rise in railway tariffs, and the entrusting of currency
policy to Pour non-party experts as a move to restore confi-
dence in the franc-.
The Communists reacted violently, bitterly accusing Blum
of betraying the Front program. Even before the Implementa-
tion measures had been taken, they launched a new strike
wave involving workers all over France, which only served
further to aggravate the economIc situation. In March, the
Communists found a new means of harassing the government.
,Being in unchallengeable control of the building workers,
the Communists were able to sabotage preparations for the
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Paris exhibition, on which the national and international
prestige of the government depended. At the construction
site, the Communists started a series of strikes following
one upon another, so that when one was Bettled the next mould
start. The exhibition was finally opened but only atter a
three-week delay and with most of the buildings still incom-
plete.
During this period, the Communists did not confine their
harassment tactics to the labor scene. One writer has
described the period as follows:
The communists were constantly requesting the holding
of joint sOcialist-communist demonstrations. There
would be lengthy negotiations. A joint program would
be worked out, speakers appointed, slogans fixed, and
pledges taken by both sides not to raise certain contro-
venial issues. Then, almost invariably, these pledges
were broken. The communist speakers', against their
given wordl'would raise the issue of Spain, or the issue
of the Front francaise, or sOme economic issue like 'let
the rich pay.' There would be recriminations, concilia-
tions, breaks, and then the game would begin all anew....
The socialists, on their side, became more acrimonious in
their press, thus provoking bitter communist complaints....
In April 1537, when the Blum government was tangibly at
the end of its tether, the communists started to bOycott
the socialist-communist committee of cooperation; not
that it Would have made much differenCe.
C. The Death of the IVular Front
All these developments served constantly to weaken the
position of the Blum government. The downfall of the Blum
Ministry Came in June 1937 as a result of economic problems.
On the 15th Blum asked the Assembly to grant him emergency
powers "for the recovery of public finance, as well as for
the protection of savings, money, and the public credit."
The Communists, though disliking the idea, were still unwill-
ing to see the government fall, BO they gave the proposals
a last-minute endorsement. A group of Radical deputies, how-
ever, voted against Blum in the Chamber. In the Senate, al-
ways mere conservative than the Chamber, a group of 80 Radi-
cals led by Caillaux, who had been antagonistic ever since
the Matignon agreements, refused to grant Blum the requested
powers. As a result, Blum and his cabinet resigned on 21 June,
after nearly 13 months in office.
The Communists had undermined and the Radicals had over-
th own the government. To conCeal-their own responsibility
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in the affair and also to give their Socialist enemies no
respite, the Communists now began to denounce Blum's resig-
nation as cowardice. On the 24th, Thorez, in addressing a
Communist demonstration, attacked Blum for having given up
at a time when the Communists had declared their willingness
to enter the government.
The Communists had offered to join a government, prefer-
-ably one including elements further to the right so as to
form a Front Francaise or to fOrb., a government themselves.
The first idea was anathema to the Socialists-, while the second
was impractical. The Radicals were by now no less disillusioned
with their Communist allies than were the Socialists, and the
proposal of Communist participation in the government was
flatly rejected by the Radials.
The Communists had gotten rid of Blum but had failed to
secure a better position for themselves. They might noW have
voted against their "allies," might thus disrupt the Front
completely and compel the fomation of a government further to
the right. But this would not have paid, for such a govern-
ment would certainly not have been more friendly to them than
the Blum government had been. There was no alternative, there-
fore, but to maintain their former position of supporting a
Popular Front government while remaining outside the cabinet.
For all practical purposes, the tall of the Blum cabinet
marked the end of the Popular Front, although succeeding govern-
ments under Radicals. Chautemps and Daladier and, briefly, under
Blum again were technically Popular Front cabinets. The
Chautemps cabinet was essentially the old Blum cabinet with
Chautemps and Blum merely having exchanged places, but the atti-
tude of the Communists" was somewhat friendlier since Chautemps,
unlike Blum, had not taken part in the denunciation of the
events which had been taking place in the USSR.
But Communist support was still in words only. Speaking
on 24 June, Thorez said that the Chautemps government "can
rest assured, like its predecessor, of the loyal support of
the Communists to the extent it assures the defense of the
social conquests of our people, the enactment of the still out-
standing points of the Popular Front program, and a financial
recovery at the expense of the rich." 1.?./ To make the point
clear, the Communists, although France was on the brink of
financial disaster, requested the immediate enactment of an
old-age insurance scheme and a sliding wage scale, which could
only have produced a runaway inflation. To facilitate the
latter result, the Communists, in September, a few days after
the price of wheat had been raised to 180 francs per quintal
with their consent, requested a new raise in the wheat price
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coupled with a forcible reduction of food prices, but at the
same time apposing controls.
For the next few months the Communists kept relatively
quiet. The results of the cantonal elections in October, which
revealed a stagnation of Communist influence compared with 1936,
had a sobering effect. But in December Communist inspired
strikes again gripped all of France. Faced with the strike
wave and the continuing currency crisis, Chautemps requested
energetic measures of economy. On 13 January he spoke of
"mysterious efforts of some obscure force" and threatened that
"if some do not listen to my appeals, the force of law will
strike them." On the 14th, Ramette, a Communist spokesman in
the Chamber, counter-attacked, accusing Chautemps of abandoning
the Popular Front program. In place of the premier's program
Of industrial peace and financial economies, he suggested a
costly program Of social reforms, inclUding a sliding wage
aeale. Chautemps responded by declaring that "he returned to
the Communists their liberty of dee-A.81_0n." After that,
there remained little practical importance to the Popular Front
Complete rupture of the Front at this point was prevented
by Blum who refused to continue in the government without Com-
munist support. Chautemps resigned but when attempts to form a
broader based cabinet proved unsuccessful; he reappeared on
18 January with a completely- Radical cabinet, for which both
the Communists and Socialists voted in the absence of any alter-
native.
The next crisis came quickly. When Chautemps asked for
Additional emergency powers to deal with the economic., financial
and currency Crises, the Socialists refused and the eabinet
reeigned. He was replaced by a Socialist-Radical government
under Blum on 10 March.
The Communists treated Blum this time with undisguised
hostility, for they regarded Socialists in general and Blum in
particular as their worst enemies. They greeted the new gove/1-
ment with a declaration that this was not the solution desired
by the country, which could only be interpreted as an Open
challenge. To emphasize the point, the party launched the
biggest of all its strike Waves. By 7 April, Blum, opposed by
both Radicals and Communists, resigned, technically as the
result of Senate refusal to Approve a tax an capital.
If the Popular Front had not ended with the Ramette-Chautemps
exchange of January, the fall of the second Blum cabinet can
-certainly be said to mark its demise. The new government headed
by Daladier, a Radical, was no longer dependent on Socialist
and communist votes. Although the Communists at first seemed
to approve of Daladier--they brought the strikes to an end--
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they soon embarked upon their old tactics. But the govern-
ment, now firmly in the hands of conservatives, was no
longer in a mood to tolerate Communist maneuvers. A dockers'
strike in Marseille, called by the Communists, was broken by
the use of Senegalese troops. In August Daladier publicly
attacked the 40-hour week. Thus the Popular Front receded
into the pages of history.
In considering the failure of the Front, three principal
Causes can be discerned First, there are the Front's failures
as regards foreign policy, especially in respect to Spain-. The
failure Of the leftist government in France to resist the
rise of Fascism in Spain alienated many of its own supporters
while giving encouragement to the French Fascist movement.
Sympathy for the rival forces in Spain further widened the
breach between the French left and right, lending to French
internal politics "a quality of ideological fanaticism such as
had not been seen in France fOr a long time. It helped under-
mine the democratic foundations of the French government and
morally to disarm France in the face of Fascist aggression."
A second cause was the internal policy of the Soviet Union.
The vast 1937-1938 purges of the party administration and armed
forces bewildered potential Soviet friends among the masses,
while they made military leaders doubt the value of the USSR
as an ally, which, in turn, strengthened the arguments of the
appeasers. Moreover, the purges served to strengthen the mount-
ing anti-Communist sentiment among the Radicals, who formed
an integral and necessary part of the Poputar Front.
Most important, however, was the mutUal suspicion and lack
of good faith existing between the Communnts and their part-
ners- The Communists, from the beginning, continued their
demagogic agitation against the Socialists and other political
groupings. They never stopped trying to win the Socialist and
democratic masses away from their leaders. Their maneuvers
to take all the credit for the Front's successes but none of
the blame for its failures served to increase the mutual dis-
like and distrust.
The Popular Front never functioned efficiently or as orig-
inally envisaged. The Committee of Coordination, set up in
July 1934 to carry out the terms of the United Action Pact,
never became operative. The Committee of Cooperation, formed
after the Blum government took over in June 1936, did not
meet until 8 December of that year and thereafter held only
a few meetings. According, to one French political writer-,
it was the constant Socialist policy to state "we Shall not
continue to discuss thingswith you ffommunist.g unless you
previously return to the status quo, unless you first disavow
this insult or that injury; the Communists, on their side,
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tried to wriggle out of the situation by delaying a decision
... and then to start the whole game over again." IV
The failure of the Front to solve adequately the press-
ing economic and financial problems was due in large part to
the sabotaging activities of the Communists. The constant
strikes arranged by the Communists, their refusal to agree
either to devaluation or to. controls, and their sponsorship
of constant demands for wage increases, in addition to all the
other Communist measures and maneuvers referred to above made
it impossible for the government really to come to grips with
the problem and to take the drastic measures which alone
would have been effective.
Throughout the first Blum Cabinet, the Communists consist-
ently acted in ways designed to Undermine the position Of
the Socialist leader.. The denunciation by Blum of the purges
in the Soviet Union especially incurred the wrath of the Cbm-
munists, who retaliated by accusing him constantly of betraying
the objectives of the Front? More personal attacks also were
not neglected. For example, on 26 August 1936, the Communist
press attacked_ MAlm for special honors allegedly conferred on
Hjalmar Schacht, the German financial dictator, on the occasion
of his visit to Paris. Actually Schacht had been ignored to
the extreme limit compatible with diplomatic decorum, but this
fact did not deter the Communists.
On 29 November, in a speech at St. Etienne, Thorez de-
clared that "the fate of the Popular Front is not tied to the
existence of one specific cabinet." 22/ This was an open stab
in the back of BiUm. The Wave of strikes in January 1937 in
connection with Blum's call for a "pause" was a more open at-
tempt to get rid of him. Yet at the same time a Communist
writer declared without apparent embarrassment that
It seems appropriate to us to renew our declaration of
unflinching loyalty to the Popular Front at this moment
when certain of our companions of our struggle still
reproach us for our refusal to take our share in the
cabinet. This, as these comrades well know, is not a
question of principle but simply of opportunity. 2).1
Another example of Communist duplicity is their attitude
towards the Front Francaise ideas. While still proclaiming
loyalty to the Pdpular Front, Thorez, as early as 6 August
1936, called for a shift from a Popular Front to a Front
Frantaise, which implied a repudiation of the limitations
of -Che Popular Front and a rejection of the struggle of a
militant left against the right. The Socialists recoiled
from the idea because they had joined the Front on the assump-
tion that it would strengthen republican militancy, not.
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dissolve it into an amorphous national union with indeter-
minate goals. To smooth ruffled Socialist feelings, the Com-
munists agreed to refrain from using the slogan. A letter
written by the FCP in September contained the sentence:
Intent as always upon avoiding anything which, by word
dr action, might Impair the fraternal ties between
-communist and socialist workers, and so as to avoid
mutual polemics which could only serve the enemies of
the working-plass, we are prepared to abstain from using
the term Front francaiSe. 22
Nevertheless, the Communists unconcernedly continued to make
propaganda fOr and to use the term Front Francaise.
While the reasons for the Fronts failure are thus fairly
clear, the results of the experiment are less easy to evaluate.
One immediate effect was to arrest the growth of the Fascist
groups, although the danger posed by them Was greatly exagger-
ated at the time. Moreover, the econOmic chaos resulting from
Popular Front vaCillation and from the inflation-wage increase
cycle fostered by the Communists did more to weaken France
and prepare her for future collapse than the Fascists could
ever have hoped to do.
The most far-reaching result, which remains even to the
present day, was the extension of Communist influence. When
the Popular Front movement began, the Communists, though their
influenbe was not to be slighted, were not a formidable factor
in'French political life. But the opportunities afforded
them during the Front era permitted them to reach unprecedented
heights. Much of this pOsition was lost with the signing of
the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the outbreak of war, but the founda-
tion remained which, coupled with the prestige gained by their
wartime underground role, permitted a rebuilding of the Com-
muniSt position after the liberation.
? The labor movement was virtually taken over in its entirety.
French labor had traditionally avoided active participation
in political affairs, and had conducted its strikes solely for
economic reasons, The Communists changed that. As their in-
fluence in the CGT grew, they manipulated the unions as they
pleased, launching strike waves solely to bring pressure on
the government or to help bring about the economic chaos and
collapse they desired. To be sure, most strikes had an
alleged economic motive, but the real political reasons were
always discernible. By August 1938, during the strikes called
in protest against the Daladier government, the Communists,
in contrast to their previous tonduct, no longer attempted to
conceal their objectives and frankly declared that "our party
approves unreservedly the action of the workers in their common
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"we Nar?'
struggle for their rights and fdr a return to the 27Opular
FronL/ program. " .21/
The FCP also was able to extend its influence among the
peasantry. During the Front period,. the Communists bombarded
the government with bills to aid the peasantry. They preached
peasant Unity and sought to merge their Confederationof Toil-
ing Peasants with the Socialists' National Peasant Confedera-
tion, and organized demonstrations like the National Peasants'
Day. Communists living in villages were urged to join that
village organization which contained a majority of local peasants,
whether reactionary Or progressive in leadership, and whether
Called a cooperative union Or a hunting and fishing club. The
infiltration tactics employed during this period mayexplain,
at least in part, the Sizeable support which the FCP today re-
Ceives in rural areas.
D. The Trade Union Merger
The growth of Communist influence during the Popular Front
period was nowhere more extensive than in the French trade union
movenient. When the events which led eventually to the Popular
Front first began in 1934, the Communists had but small influ-
ence in the labor movement, which they exercised through the
relatively unimportant COTU. At the end of the period, they
dominated the labor movement, having gained control of the new
COT which resulted from a merger of the CGTU and the Socialist'
led COT. Although briefly interrupted by the events of the
war, this influence essentially persisted so that in the post-
war period, non-Communist trade unionists found it necessary
once again to split the French labor movement in order to gain
freedom of action and to escape Communist manipulation for
political purposes.
The merger of the COT and CGTU paralleled the developments
that led to the agreement among the Communists, Socialiffts, and
Radicals to establish the Popular Front, and the two trends
exerted a mutual influence. The progress towards the creation
of 0 political alliance facilitated the labor merger, while
the latter further encouraged the political agreement.
As with the political side of the question, the initiative
for labor unity came from the Communists, who felt, correctly,
that unity would permit them to extend their influence among
the workers. The idea was not a new one. Negotiations to
that end had occurred before but had always failed when the
Socialists and CommUnista were unable to agree on a basis for
unity. DUring the period involved here, success was possible
because the Communists decided to sacrifice technical and
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ideological demands for the sake of achieving the desired
end. In fact, when unification was finally on the verge of
realization, the major opposition appeared within the FCP it-
self from vested interests in its trade union section, i.e.,
from Communist trade union-party officials who objected to the
terms under which the merger was to occur since they meant,
for them, loss of personal stature and power.
From early 1933, Communist policy had been to encourage
the creation of autonomous unions outside both the CGT and
CGTU. The Communists now changed their policy to one of advo-
cating the merger of similar groups of the CGT and CGTU, unit
by unit, from the smallest local unit upward. This was a
shrewd tactical move, for the workers themselves, unconcerned
by the problems and value of ideology, saw no reason why a
unified movement should not be formed. As in the case of the
political agreement, support for unification was stronger among
the rank and file than among the leaders,
The Communists wanted the governing boards of the new
groups formed by the merger of CGT and CGTU units to have equal
representation from both group. This was quite unacceptable
to Jouhaux and his CGT colleagues, for the CGT groups were,
in almost all cases, larger than their CGTU counterparts. At
a meeting on 5 October 1934, called to consider the proposed
unification, the CGT National Board supported Jouhaux on this
point, and also insisted on continued CGT membership in the
Amsterdam Internationa1--2Wanathema to the Communists--as well
as on a pledge by the Communists to stop their infiltration
tactics.
Although reluctant to accept the CGT terms, the Communists
were so desirous of securing acceptance of the principle of
unification that they agreed td the CGT demands. On 9 October,
therefore, the CGTUagreed to abandon its demands for equal
representation, and suggested the creation of a joint commission
to negotiate the details of unification,
By 18 March 1935, most of the problems had been solved,
largely by concessions on the part of the Communists, The lat-
ter, for example, agreed to abandon the practice of "fractions"
within unions and to forbid union leaders to hold party posi-
tions at the same time. When the Communist trade union leaders
resigned their party offices in June 1935, CGT leaders declared
that the road to unification was now open. The CGT convention
in September 1935 approved the terms of unity, and the actual
merger was effected at a joint convention held at Toulouse
in February 1936. The new organization retained the name CGT.
Formally, it was a complete victory for the Socialists;
fractions were forbidden; affiliation with the IFTU was continued;
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the loose, decentralized structure of CGT was. to 'remain un-
changed; and unification was to proceed from the bottom up.
JouhaUx remained as secretary general. Of the eight secretaries
of the new COT, six were Jouhaux men as against two Communists----
Fachon and Racamond. The only major concession made by the
Socialists to the Communists was the adherence of the COT to
the Popular Front, a reversal of the long COT practice of avoid,.
ing direct political activity.
It was, however, a hollow victory for Jouhaux. The Commu-
nists had achieved their principal objective, unification, and
in the months that followed they succeeded, either by clever
maneuvering or by outright violation of the merger terms, to
render meaningless the concessions they had made. The immediate
response to the unification and to the benefits won for Labor
by the CGT under the Matignon agreements was a phenomenal growth
in union membership as thousands upon thousands of workers
joined the COT. E...V The old leadership was unequal to the prob-
lems raised by this influx. Jouhaux and his associates had
relied on personal influence rather than on good administration
and organization to control the workers. But their personal
standing held no meaning for the masses of new membere. When
the old system failed, there was nothing to keep the rank and
file in line.
It was not accidental that the COT remained inactive dur-
ing the wave of "sit-in" strikes with which Blum was forced
to. deal. Although the settlement of Matignon was negotiated
by the COT on behalf of the strikers, the strikes themselves
were in no way under its control. In an attempt to reassert
his position as the principal spokesman for French labor,
jouhaUx formulated a program of social reforms for submission
to the Chamber of Deputies, but even this modest program was
trimmed as a result of pressure by his new Communist allies?
who were Chiefly interested at that point in extending their
political influence to the right.
When the Matignon agreements left the workers still dis-
satisfied, it was Thorez who advocated that they return to
WOrk.. The fact that the strikes ended almost immediately
thereafter served to emphasize the new power of the Communists
in the labor movement. During the Popular Front period, it
was they who 'could launch and stop strikes at will and they
were not at all hesitant about using this power.
The Communists fulfilled their prOmise to deactiVate
fractions within trade unions, but they achieved the same
and even greater 'effect by other methods. They proceeded to
organize factory nuclei, which were active daily in factory
life, because fractions operated only in union.meetinge
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Thus the Communists were able to maintain constant close con-
tact with the workers rather than only periodically.
The rule that union officials could not also hold party
offices was soon ignored. During the Popular Front era, Com-
munist deputies Croizat, Midol, Brout, Demusais, and Parsal
held CGT positions, as did Semard and Paul Marcel, members of
the Conseil General of the Department of the Seine. Communist
deputy Coste was also president of the metal workers' union in
the Paris region, with more than 200,000 members. Nedelec,
secretary of the CGT federation of Bouches-du-Rhone, was also
a member Of the FCP's Central Committee. In contrast, the
only violation of the rule by a Socialist was the case of
Choussy, a deputy who was also second secretary of the federa-
tion of agricultural workers.
Although the Communists had abandoned their demand for
equal representation, the concession proved not to be an impor-
tant one. Once the merger had occurred, the individual
industrial unions and departmental federations were free to
determine their own rules and organization. In most cases,
ex-CGTU men were given some representation on governing boards
and paid staffs. However, the unions reelected their bureaus
annually, and there was nothing to prevent the Communists
from acquiring a majority of union offices as their influence
grew, which in fact happened. Once the Communists had gained
a foothold within a union, they could count on their tight dis-
cipline and singleness of purpose gradually to secure for them
a commanding position, Wherever the Communists initially were
in a minority, as was generally the case outside of Paris,
they insisted that votes on issues not be counted but unanimity
achieved for every decision, thus giving them an absolute veto
power. Once in control, however, they discarded this principle
and prevented, by strong-arm methods if necessary, the non-
Communist members from raising their voices.
The case of Bouches-du-Rhone (Marseille) affords an excel-
lent example of how the Communists took advantage of every
opportunity to seize control of a union from their less shrewd
Socialist partners. At the time of the merger, the CGTU was
completely without influence in the Marseille region. Never-
theless, as a gesture of good will, the CGT appointed one
Communist as a secretary of the departmental federation and
another as editor of the departmental CGT periodical. When
an election of new officers was held six months later, the
treasurer and several other CGT men were replaced by Communists.
Thereupon the deparLmental secretary general resigned in pro-
test, to be replaced by a Communist. Thus, in less than a
year, the Communists advanced from a position of relative unim-
portance to one of complete control.
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Nor
The same process was repeated elsewhere many times. On
the national level, the Communists first gained control of
two of the most important unions?engineers and building
trades--and also increased their influence among railway
workers. Before the Popular Front era came to its final de-
mise, they controlled 12 of 30 national unions, including
chemical, textile, electrical, leather, and agricultural
workers. They controlled the regional unions of the Seine
Faris), the Lower Seine (Le Havre and Rouen), the Somme
Amiens), the Lower Rhine (Strasburg), and dominated the en-
tire Mediterranean coast and the Alpine region north to
Grenoble.
As the Communists gained control of the labor movement,
they called strikes at will and for political purposes, the
effects of which were to a large extent responsible for the
Inability of the Front governments to solve the economic and
financial problems facing the country. Never before or since
had French labor counted for so'much in French politics. At
the same time, it must be recognized that this influen0e was
due less to any inherent strength of labor than to the weak
forbearance of the Popular Front governments.
The decline began in April 1938 when Daladier assumed
the premiership. The great strike then in progress in the
aircraft industry ended in a few days. The employers, accept-
ing the suggestion of a government they regarded as their
own, granted a further rise in wages while the unions conceded
the introduction of a 45-hour week in the industry, a tremen-
dous concession, since once' thiS first breach was made in the
40-hour week, it could not last much longer as a national
institution.
On 21 August Daladier publicly attacked the 40-hour week
as a hindrance to serious rearmament which the international
situation showed to be necessary. On 21 October he published
a series of emergency regulations which practically abolished
the 40-hour week. The Communists attempted strong counter-
moves. On 17 November, Communist led workers occupied the
Renault works, but the days of unpunished law-breaking were
over and that same night the gardes mobiles stormed the
Renault plant with the help of tear gas. On 22 November, the
Communists, showing their hand in a field hitherto closed to
them, carried a considerable section of the miners of the
north with them into an occupation of the mines. Military
forces were immediately employed to clear the mines.
The 21 October decrees also were the start of Communist
agitation for a general strike. The move gained momentum
with the factory occupations and with the use of armed
forces against workers. The Socialist faction within the
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COT opposed the idea. However, when the Communists threatened
to withhold from the COT the financial contributions of all
Communist controlled unions, Jouhaux and his followers gave
in even though they knew the futility of the move, could fore-
see the probable disastrouSconsequences to the CGT, and real-
ized that it was in the nature of an act of revolutionary
insurgency against their country at a moment of great danger.
The strike failed, for it had been grossly mismanaged.
Having been announced five days in advance, it found the govern-
ment fully prepared. The workers, too, had time to think. Al-
though the strike was allegedly in defense of the 40-hour week,
everyone believed that it actually was directed against Munich
and that it was a strike for war. But not all the workers were
for war, nor were all of them even in favor of a 40-hour week.
Since their real wages had declined with inflation and unemploy-
ment was growing, many workers, particularly those in the arma-
ment industry, welcomed the rearmament drive and the extra
earnings provided by longer hours. Moreover, on the eve Of the
strike, the government requisitioned railways, public utilities,
and the more important mines, sc that the CGT secretly advised
workers to appear at the plants on the day of the strike but
to refuse to work. This plan was foiled by the presence of
police at the plants. As the result of these factors, the
strike was a complete failure.
The effects on the COT were catastrophic. Membership had
slowly been declining since 1937, but now, at one stroke, mil-
lions tore up their membership cards. Although the CGT never
revealed officially the extent of its losses, membership
reportedly fell in a few weeks from 5,300,000 to 2,000,000.
The organization also lost its privileged position within the
state. Jouhaux was dismissed from the board of directors of
the Bank of France, and the two union representatives from the
board of the National Railways. In protest, the COT withdrew
its representatives from all governmental and joint employer
and union boards, thus saving their opponents the trouble of
expelling them. Thousands of active unionists were dismissed
from their jobs. The Communists had thus been hoisted on
their own petard, for the labor movement was no longer an
instrument of power.
The united labor movement, now gravely weakened, came to
an end in 1939 with the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact,
which disgusted French workers as it did other segments of
the French people. As soon as war broke out, the regional
union of the north, the miners' federation, and the unions of
postal employers, telephone and telegraph workers, and seamen
began to exclude prominent Communist members. At the CGT's
National Council meeting in September, Communists were ex-
pelled from both the leadership and ranks of the COT, while
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Communist locals and unions at every level were expelled from
Organizations affiliated with the.,CGT.- The criterion applied
was whether or not the person or organization condemned the
German-Soviet Pact.
At the end of September the government legally dissolved
the FOP and its affiliated organizations. With respect to
the labor movement, the CGT found it necessary in many cases
to dissolve existing unions and to create new ones, while in
other instances the government itself- dissolved unions by decree.
The Communists had now been stripped of their influence
over French labor, while the Socialists regained their preemin-
ent position. But this situation lasted only four years. In
1943, as a result of their efforts within the resistance Move-
ment, the CGT readmitted the Communists who then rapidly
re-
gained their former position, partly because of their discipline
and abundant supply of trained labor leaders, and partly because
Socialist prestige had been weakened when CGT leader Rene
Belin became Minister of Labor in. the Vichy government,
Until March 1945, the anti-Communists had a five to three
majority on. the top CGT committee, but Communist control of
the major industrial unions-miners, railway, metal, chemical,
textile, food trades, agriculture, building trades-as well
as of the big regional unions, fOrced-a grant of parity on
the Comite Confederal National and the creation of the post of
co-secretary general, which was given to Communist Benoit
Faahon. At the 1946 convention, the first since l938?- 75 per
cent of the delegates were controlled by the Communists, who
permitted the non-Communist bloc to keep parity on the Comite
Confederal but took 20 of the 35 seats on the Administrative
Committee. But even the Comite Confederal parity was more ap-
parent than real, for of the six, seats allotted to the Jouhaux
faction, two were held by fellowtravelers, thus assuring the
Communists of undoubted control.
With the mounting tensions of the cold war, the Communists,
as they had done during the Popular Front era, began to use
the CGT as a political instrument, calling strikes to under-
mine the government and to oppose policies which the FCP con-
sidered hostile to its Soviet masters. The blatant use of
the unions in late 1947 to attempt to force France to reject
Marshall Plan aid disgusted many French workers to the extent
that they preferred to split the labor movement than remain
Soviet puppets. As a result, a large segment led by Jouhaux
seceded to form the Confederation Generale du Travail-Force
Ouvriere (CGT-P0- General Confederation of Labor-Workers'
Force), while an even larger group, estimated as high as two
million, left the CGT but did not join either the CFT-FO or
any other group.
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It seems clear that although the FCP lost its control of
Trench labor at the outbreak of war in September 1939, it
was the position gained during the Popular Front era which
enabled it so easily to again capture the CGT after being re,-
admitted during the war. It is, therefore, in this field
where the real significance is to be found--and the real
tragedy--of the French experiment with the Popular Front.
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'YEW
APPENDIX A
SUGGESTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
Although much has been written on the Popular Front con-
cerning its mechanics and accomplishments, there is almost
a complete absence of studies specifically oriented to show
the dangers and disadvantages of the Socialist and Radical
attempt to work with the Communists within the framework of
the Front. The only pertinent writing along this line are
chapters V and VII of Franz Borkenau's,European Communism
(New York, 1953), which have been extensively used in the
preparation of this paper. A former member of the German
Communist Party, Borkenau was, from 1921 to 1929, employed in
the Comintern's Western European Branch. Since that time,
although no longer a Communist, he has continued to follow
Communist activities in Europe. Since his entire book is
designed as an expose of Communist machinations and dangers,
his chapters on the French Popular Front are revealing as to
Communist duplicity.
There are several books which examine the Popular Front
critically, assigning blame to all parties rather than to
the Communists alone. Gaetan Bernoville's La Farce de la
Main Tendue (Paris, 1937) and Paul Lombard's Quatorzj?tErs
de Demence: l'Experience Leon Blum (Paris, 1937) can profit-
ably be read in this connection. The most bitter attack is
perhaps Reginald Dingle's Ruesia's Work in France (London,
1938), which is designed primarily as a T6fense of the French
Fascistic groups such as the Croix de Feu, etc. The author's
political views can perhaps best be judged from the fact that
he vigorously defends the courage and honesty of the scandal-
mongering Gringoire whose vicious attacks drove Interior
Minister Roger Salengro to suicide.
Alexander Werth, a British journalist who was in France
during the Popular Front era, has written the following ac-
counts of the Popular Front: Which Way France? (New York,
1937); The Twilight of France; 193'3-1940 (New York, 1942);
"The FiEFf Populaire in Difficulties," Foreign Affairs XV
(July, 1937), pp. 608-618; and "After t e Popular Front,"
Foreign Affairs XVII (October, 1938), pp. 13-26. Three other
use ul articles are: "Le Front Populaire," Fortune XV (June,
1937), pp. 82-91; Walter Sharp's "The Popular Front in
France," American Political Science Review XXX (October,
1936), pp. 857-883; and France Under the Popular Front,"
Round Table XXVIII (December, 1937), pp. 44-61. A French
-C-FM.Flic view of the Popular Front is given in Yves Simon's
The Road to Vichy, 1918-1938 (New York, 1942); while Jacques
A-1
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Bardoux, a senator from Puy-de-Dome, sees the Front as a
Marxist, as distinct from Communist, experiment in his book
L'Ordre Nouveau (Paris, 1939).
In view of the close relationship between the Popular
Front and trade unionism, most of the above-cited works touch
at least to some extent on the CGT-CGTI, merger and other as-
pects of the CGT' s role in the Popular Front. For more de-
tailed information on the trench labor movement, the following
works. Can be consulted: Henry Ehrmann, French Labor from
Popular Front to Liberation (New York, 1947)1 Michel Collinet,
uvr er Francais.: Esprit du Syndicalisme (Paris, 1951);
737617- Goetz-Girey, LA Pensee Francaise (Paris,
1948); Andre Delmas,-7 7i= -a la Barricade. ChroniqUe
S ndicale de l'Avanterre TParis, 1950); and Georges Le-franc,
istoire dU-Mouvement Syndical Francais (Paris, 1937). A
Short l'ut informative article is Robert Dell's "Trade Union
Experiments in France,". Review CLII (October,
1937), pp. 431-437.
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APPENDIX
NOTES
1. The building in which the Chamber of Deputies meets.
2. Alexander Werth, Which Way France? (New York, 1937).
3. An organization formed in late 1935 by the physicist
Langevin, the anthropologist Rivet, and the philosopher
Alain, which soon included a galaxy of leading intellect-
uals such as Gide, Picasso, Joliot-Curie, Julien Brenda
and others. The original sponsors favored the Socialist
Party but later shifted to the Popular Front. Many mem-
bers later switched to the FCP.
k. A pacifist, Communist-front organization also known as
the Amsterdam-Pleyel Committee.
Paul Lombard, uatorze Mois de Demence: l'Experience
Leon Blum (Pari 1937).
Mario Einaudi et al., Communism in Western Europe (Ithaca,
1951), p. 71.
The first balloting was held on 26 April, the second or
run-off voting on 3 May.
8. Figures taken from Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to
Malenkov (New York, 1953), p. 181. No two writers seem
to give exactly the same figures. For example, Werth,
. cit., says the Socialists won 149 seats, the Radicals
flTd the Communists 72. Martin Ebon, in World Commu-
nism Today (New York, 1948), states that the Popular
Front won 375 seats of which 73 were held by the Communists.
D. N. Pritt in The Fall of the French Republic (London,
1941), pp. 80-81, gi-767*--EFe election results as follows:
Deputies Elected Votes Received
Parties
Rightist Groups
Center Groups
Leftist Groups:
Radicals
Small Left Groups
Socialists
Communists
Others
1936 1932 1936 1932
122 105 2,254,000 2,262,000
116 164 1,938,000 2,225,000
116 158 1 461,000 1,805 000
X
101
66 518,000 511,000
1,922,000 1,931,000
72 10 1,503,000 794,000
10 11 95,000 85,000
'En3 615
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An analysis of the returns by regions and by departments
is given in J. W. Pickersgill, "The Front Populaire and
the French Elections of 1936," Political Science Quarterly
LIV (March, 1939), pp. 69-83.
9. See Ebon, ma. cit., p. 180.
10. Werth, Ea. cit., p. 274.
11. French cabinet ministers were normally drawn from the Chamber
and the Senate, but this was not a constitutional requirement.
12. Ebon, 2E. cit., p. 180.
13. Ibid., p. 181.
14. Franz Borkenau, European Communism (New York, 1953), p. 208.
15. Ebon, 2E. cit., p. 182.
16. Cited in Borkenau, 2E. cit. p. 210.
17. See Ibid., p. 211.
18. Seton-Watson, Ea. cit., p. 182.
19. Maurice Paz, "Echec de 1936," Le Nef (June-July 1950), cited
in Borkenau, 2E. cit., p. 192.
20, See Borkenau, op. cit., p. 205.
21. Ibid., p. 207.
22. Ibid.
23. Cited in Ibid., p. 215.
24. That is, the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU),
the international Socialist trade union organization.
25. Georges Lefranc in Histoire du Mouvement Syndical Francais
(Paris, 1937), p. 471, says that the CGT grew from
1,024,000 on 1 March 1936 to 4,738,600 on 1 March 1937.
The International Labour Review (August, 1937), p. 162,
gives the figures of 1,167777 -in April 1936 as compared
to 4,314,740 in December 1936.
26. Data on the general strike based largely on Borkenau, op.
cit., pp. 218-219. ,
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APPENDIX C
PRINCIPAL SOURCES
Bernoville, Gaetan. La Farce de la Main Tendue. Paris, 1937.
Borkenau, Franz. European Communism. New York, 1953.
Cole, G. D. H. The Peoples Front. London, 1937.
Cot, Pierre. "The Popular Front. Dawn of a New Era," Free
World III (January, 1944), pp. 67-70.
Dingle, Reginald. Russia's Work in France. London, 1938.
Ebon, Martin, World Communism Today. New York, 1948.
Einaudi, Mario, Domenach, Jean-Marie, and Garosci, Aldo.
Communism in Western Europe. Ithaca, 1951.
Fraser, Geoffrey, and Natanson, Thadee. Leon Blum. Man and
Statesman. New York, 1938.
Lombard, Paul. uatorze Mois de Demenoe: l'ExPerience Leon
Blum. Paris, 1937.
Seton-Watson, Hugh. From Lenin to Malenkov. New York, 1953.
Werth, Alexander. Which Way France? New York, 1937.
C-1
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