EVALUATION OF JOINT ARMY-NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00658A000100090008-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 18, 1946
• Content Type: REPORT

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ENCLOSURE "B"
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER
APO 500
CE 319.1 (18 Apr 46) I 18 April 1946
SUBJECT: Evaluation of Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies
TO: Chief of Engineers, War Department, Washington 25, D.C.
ATTENTION: Chief Military Intelligence Division.
1. Reference is made to your letter, above subject, dated 26
February 1946. The attached review of Joint Army-Navy Intelli-
gence Studies (JANIS), by Colonel H. G. Schenck, represents the
view of the agency charged with the preparation of engineer in-
telligence reports in connection with the New Guinea and Philip-
pines o-!)orations and the anticipated operations against the
mainland of Japan. This review leads to the conclusion that
JANIS was timely and valuable; and offers the following recom-
mendations for improvement:
a. "limi.nation of conflicting and contradictory features.
1]xpansio.n of Chapter I to a fully integrated overall
summary of the remainder of the study.
c. Inclusion of references and estimates of reliability.
d. Utilization of specialists only in the preparation of
all elements of the studies.
2. The following comments represent the views of the under-
signed, derived from experience, both in the preparation of
certain chapters of JANIS, the actual use of these studies and
other intelligence reports in the planning of engineer opera-
tions in the fjeld, and in the extension of these studies by
theater resources. In this connection it would appear pertinent
to submit a general appraisal of terrain intelligence as required
for military operations.
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3. Theoretically, at least, intelligence data should be
available to the planning agencies concerned with military
operations, in the following order:
a. Broad studies at National Defense level to serve as
basis for overall strategy.
b. Technical and terrain studies at National Defense level
relating to the features affecting operations in the given
area,
c. Theater level studies of a general nature based on a
above, expanded and modified by theater experience and infor-
mation to serve as,a guide in the application of resources.
d. Detailed feature analyses at theater level in extension
of b above, based upon the latest information available,
e. Further extensions of c and d by the tactical commands
charged with the actual conduct of operations.
4. As far as is known to the undersigned, no broad studies
of the character indicated in paragraph 3a above were prepared
for use of the major strategic staffs during the course of the
war. No doubt individual studies of this character were prepared,
however, by the Joint Intelligence and Joint Logistic Committees
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It may be argued that such broad
intelligence studies upon which the major strategic conceptions
are based in part, cannot be prepared with assurance without the
benefit of detailed research, the result of which would appear
eventually in comprehensive reports such as JANIS-. Major strat-
egy, however, is seldom governed by local conditions. For
example, had the Joint Chiefs of Staff been aware of, or con-
cerned with, climatological conditions and construction and
transportation difficulties involved in the Leyte Operation, the
.operation. m _ght not have been authorized. It may be assumed
that the elements of broad strategy will continue to be governed
by generalized. appraisals which may be made without intensive
research.
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5. The exact place of JANIS in the scheme of intelligence
studies as"difficult to establish. While I do not have a copy of!.'
the JANIS charter, it is my assumption from the nature of the
contents, that the following represent its objectives:
a. To inform the strategic planners as to physical and
economic features of a given area in sufficient detail to
permit a fair appraisal of the military task involved in as
the task is affected by these features.
b. To provide supply and technical services sufficient
data by which major decisions as to technique, transporta-
tion, construction and allied matters may be' made.
c. To provide to the major tactical command concerned,
back round data as far as available at National Defense level,
as a springboard from which it may take off in pursuit of
greater detail.
6. As actually prepared, JANIS appears to have attempted to
take a middle ground between the broad general study required by
the strategic planner and the detailed feature analysis required
by the technical services and the tactical commands. The fea-
tures having a Pronounced effect upon supply, equipment, train-
ing and techniques must be analysed in maximum detail, and at
an approi:riate time, by experts thoroughly familiar with their
subject and with the requirements of their prospective customers.
Most of the information required is strictly factual and must be
so reported. The accuracy of the work depends upon the- quality
of the source material available to the, analyst and his capacity
to select, appraise and reconcile inconsistent and contradictory
data. JANIS was an attempt to present these data in consolidated
and sometimes abbreviated form. That attempt resulted from the
inescapable conclusion that independent studies by various Army
and Navy :intelligence agencies were introducing many duplica-
tions, r :valries in the acquisition of source materials and
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inconsistent conclusions. Further, such independent studies
prepared without overall guidance not only made it impossible
to assemble a complete picture at any one time,.but also re-
quired all using agencies to assemble and consult a tremendous
mass of references. JANIS was late entering the intelligence
field, its direction by the Joint Intelligence Committee of J.C.S.
'was inadequate and its formation was makeshift arrangement to
coordinate independent agencies already well organized and em-
barked on....ndependent programs. The staff assembled for JANIS
was not competent to appraise the contributions of the agencies
to which wore assigned various elements of the studies, nor to
reconci.'Ic; inconsistencies in reports; hence it became primarily
an editing and publishing agency. The excellent format of the
publicat:Lons gave them an air of competence and stability,
inspir:j_.ng a confidence not always justified.
7. In order that the objectives of JANIS as set forth above
may be attaa_,ned, it is necessary first, that the staff respon-
sible for their preparation receive positive direction by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or comparable authority at National De-
fense level as to areas to be covered, priorities and time
schedules. The actual collection, analysis and publication for
such studies may proceed by either of two methods:
a. Through the operation of similar intelligence agency
at Nate[.o:o.nal Defense level made up of experts of all essential
categories. Such an organization has strength in mass produc-
tion, in the elimination of competition for source material
and in the elimination of duplication and inconsistencies.
It has disadvantage in its inability to meet rapid changes
in plans or to provide spot information of vital interest to
one or a few planning agencies. Further, the selection of
personnel for such a dominant intelligence agency will be
greatly hampered by the reluctance of interested agencies to
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release competent experts. The centralization of detailed
i.ntolligo.nce studies, runs the further risk of misdirection
into selected channels based on the backgrounds and pre-
dominant interests of the key personnel.
b. A supervisory and coordinating staff at National De-
fense level with individual elements of the studies.assigned
to the agencies of primary interest. This procedure was
adopted by JANIS, If properly organized and furnished ado-
quate direction and support, such an organization has the
advantage of insuring intelligence experts and of permitting
greater flexibility in their employment. The disadvantage.
of du---'1:_cation and contradiction are apparent but can be
lar;oly eliminated by close supervision and cooperation.
The major danger in such an organization is diversion of
effort at the changing whims of the individual research
agencies, i.e. concentration on immediate problems to the
negglect of long range objectives.
8.-Of the two methods indicated, I would choose the latter,
i.e., research and preparation by the agencies of primary inter-
est; direction, supervision, publication and distribution by a
centralized agency at National. Defense level. For such an
organization to be effective, there must be:
a. i'ositive.direction.
b. Rigid assignment of subjects and enforcement of
directives.
c. Firm time schedules for original preparation and
revision.
d. Consistent and competent supervision from the National
Defense level,
Such an organization must be equipped with a full time staff.
9. Summary, These remarks are not extended to include in-
tellige.nce studies at theater and lower levels, a subject which
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is closely related to studies such as JANIS. The major factor
in the concentration and conservation of effort on essentials of
intelligence is the element of time. Theoretically a planning
directivo passed from higher to lower levels should be ac-
companied by a summary of intelligence data plus references to
completed studies. In general, this procedure did not prove
practicable during the war, since as a rule; planning directives
were issued while the pertinent intelligence data, was still in
course of -,.)reparation, This leads to the conclusion that in-
telligence data necessary to support a planning directive cannot
be prepared from scratch during the course of military opera-
tions.
10. Conclusions.
The preparation of joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studios
on the order of JANIS should be a normal peace time function
at the National Defense level.
b:. Contents of such studies should accord in general with
JANIS with the exceptions that:
(1) All subjects should be treated as exhaustively as
the character and availability of source materials will
Permit.
(2) Strictly military features (strength, compositions,
oqui-.,Pment, tactics and technique) of foreign military
forces are not proper elements of this type of study,
(3) Sources of information should be fully documented
and appraised.
(/I) A brief or summary (Chapter'I) treating on subjects
of the study with equal emphasis should be prepared for the
use of strategic planners at the National Defense level.
c. The organization charged with the preparation of such
studies should, be under the direct supervision of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and should operate on a' loo% basis.
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d. The various features should be assigned to those ele-
ments of the National Defense organization having primary
interest, under strict directives as to priorities, time
schedules, scope, coordination and revision.
e. Manuscripts should be maintained in loose leaf form
ready for assembling and publication at any time.
For the Chief Engineer:
/s/
HERBERT B. LOPER
Brigadier General, CE
Chief Engr. Intel. Div.
1 Inca:
I.ncl 1. - Review of JANIS by
Col. H. G. Schenck
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