APPENDIX 'B'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00658A000100140014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Releded 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP64-0065bb00100140014-8
CONFIDENTIAL
APPENDIX "B"
DISCUSSION
1. The function of monitoring press and propaganda broad-
casts of foreign powers is an overt means of obtaining intelli-
gence information of use to the intelligence agencies of State,
War and Navy Departments.
STATSPEC
2. This function was originally undertaken by M under the
FCC early in l941 as a result of recommendations made by
the Defence communications Board.
STATSPEC
3. The was organized functionally into: an office of
the Director which gave general supervision to the service;
a Monitoring DiviS rj-p onsible for preparing the monitoring
schedule for all stations and of providing excerpts from
programs monitored nearWashington; a Publications Division
responsible for preparing and issuing reports on incoming
broadcasts for rapid distribution to government agencies re-
questing them and for maintaining a central background file;
an Administrative Services Division responsible for mimeograph-
ing, collating, and distributing the processed reports; and a
field organization responsible for operating field stations
located at strategic points for interception of foreign broad-
STAT PECK monitored in the Washington area. In addition, the
E Appendix "B"
Approved For Release 2000/09/11 CIA-RDP64-00658A000100140014-8
 Approved For Releas2000/09/11: CIA-RDP64-006580100140014-8
CONFIDENTIAL
4. The War Department was informed S-i.-fA e6er 1945 that the
FCC was in process of liquidating the M The War Department
thereupon expanded its monitoring program to meet the need
arising from this liquidation. The War Department. employed
STATSPEC
former -personnel, effectivtT3AOTr pffber 1945, and has
since acquired by transfer all 0 facilities, including
those held by lease or contract. The War Department arranged
for the renegotiation of outstanding leases and contracts.
5. The function of monitoring foreign press and propaganda
broadcasts should be continued since it is of value to the
intelligence agencies of the State, War, Nava., and other
government departments. Based upon a survey, the Department
of State appears to have the greatest use for the product of
such monitoring. The necessary budget arrangements to main-
tain this function should be made for the F.scal Year 1947.
The War Department is the only agency now prepared to under-
take this budget problem and it has included the necessary funds
in its budget requirements.
c . It appears that tT'SP'E organization carrying on the
former functions of the M under War Department direction
should be liquidated for the following reasons:
a. Its reports a.rf circulated too generally to organiza-
tions and individuals, including for,-,:L,,-;n agencies. In
order that proper intelligence direction may be given to
its activities, its product should be restricted to
authorized intelligence agencies of the Federal government.
b. The personnel of the organization have not betn
screened for security. Adequate screening is essential,
since disclosure; of th:e direction giv e?:i to the activities
of the organization would be detrimental to this Nation's
inter: ests and security.
Approved For Release 2000/09111': CIA-RDP64-00658 14 t 14-8
 Approved For Releasb4000/09/11: CIA-RDP64-00658i 0100140014-8
CONFIDENTIAL
7. The present organization should be supplanted by a new
organization capable of performing the monitoring function
required by authorized intelligence agencies of the Federal
government.
8. Central direction of the monitoring effort should be
given in order to insure that the specific needs of all proper
recipients are considered. This direction can be given by
the Director of Central Intelligence, advised by a committee
including a coordinator from the Central Intelligence Group
and members from A-2, G-2, State, and ONI.
9. Under such central- direction, any of the three departments
concerned could operate the monitoring, editing and distributing
of the press and propaganda broadcasts of foreign powers.
a. Howe.ve.r, certain preliminary steps would be required
before State or Navy could undertake the operation, in--
cluding:
(1) Provision for the necessary administration and
supply;
(2) Transfer of the budget from War Department to
the department which would take over the operation;
(3) Arrangements for the necessary communication
facilities between. the field and Washington;
(4) Screening of personnel for security purpose,
including- any members of the present organizati-on Who
may b (:e re-employed in the now organization.
b. Continued operat :ion by the War Department would
require only screening of the personnel,
10. Operation by the Central Intelligence Group (as distin-
guished from central direction of effort) would require that
the same steps outlined under 9 a, above, be taken, with
particular emphasis on arrangements for administration and
supply.
Approved For Release 2000/09/11 CIA-RDP64-00658A00010014001.4-8
- 8 - Appendix tB"
 Approved For Releasb4000/09/11: CIA-RDP64-00658AQ00100140014-8
CONFIDENTIAL
11. Paragraph 3 c, of the Presi_d~ent's letter of January 22
roquiroos the Director of Central Intelligence to perform,
for the benefit of intelligence agencies of the State,. v7ar
and Navy Departments, "such services of common concern as
the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more
offLciently, accomplished centrally." It appears clear that
direction of monitoring effort for the benefit of these in-
telligence agencies can be accomplished more efficiently
centrally. However, with regard to efficiency of actual
operation, little evidence; can be found to justify a con-
clusion that operation by the Central Intelligence Group would
be more efficient than operation by one of the departments.
In any event, the evidence is not strong enough to justify
the establishment of the required overhead facilities Ln the
Central Intelligence Group, duplicating those alr_ady existing
in other a;oncies. The following comments on relative efficiency
also apply:
a. Lack of organic communication facilities militates
against efficient and econorriical operation by the -State:
Department.
b. Lack of direct staff control of monitoring facilities
ONl militates against efficient op:.rat on. by th. Navy
Department.
c Lack of organic communication facilities and
established overhead facilities militates against efficient
and economical operation by the Central intelligenc Group.
Moreover, it appears that the C . I . G. is, not leg~-,lly
authorized -to assume the contractual obligations involved
d. Con.sid,rLng that the War Department has none of the
lacks specified in a to c. above, it is believed that opera-
tion of the function by the War Department would he some-
what mor efficient and economical than by any other
Approved For Release 2000/09/11 :-CIA-RDP64-00658AQQg1,qQJ004-8