ESTABLISHMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION, SPECIAL STAFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64-00658A000100370009-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 22, 1946
• Content Type: MEMO

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
':ID 912 22 May 1946
s..EO ` DiJL Fu;-t `" E C '.I 'F O. STAFF:
hi RiZT: establishment of Psychological Warfare Division,
.- gecial Staff
1. PS cnolo 'ical warfare problems of interest to the War Depart-
meat have been the re?:.onsibility of the Propaganda Branch, G-2, WDGS,
r ct-i_n.. under the direct control of he A. C. of S., G02, in acccl?c7..n.ce
t:itn instructions of the Dei'ut - Chief of Staff. (Tab A) Under the
provisions of JCS 224 Series, the Chief, Propaganda Branch also scts
t`'' Ar .= Faber of toe Joint Chiefs of Staff Liaison with the Over-
Leas Planning Board, Office of InternatioaL-J Information and Cultural
of fairs, , Decnhtment, of State. The Prof psnoa Branch also provide; . or
!.AF interest in psy cholo i ce l warfare in accordance vd th the decision
of tie D. C. of abolishing the AAF Psvcholo ;ic: l P r zr re Service
r(' tx ans Perrin, _ its rprs.onnel to the Propaganda Branch. (Tab B)
Z Prior to the establishment of the Pro_pa.,anda Branch, psycholo-
ical war are problems were the resmnsibility of the followi.r. r staff
';r. enci_es:
. orld bar I - P sycnolo-ic Subsection, K.I. 2, Militar.11
Ia hell i_ence Division
109-1941 - tone
i941 - Soecia.l Studies Groin) - OASe and A.C. OF S., C-h
1942 - 'ycholor cal Warfare Branch, MIS
1943 - O PD Policy Section, Strateny and Policy Group
A brief su.mmaro of Vier Department nartici oation it nsvcholoti c- i _ra.rfsre
i attached as Tab C.
3. Nlt ou--h oro :a_ganda leaflets were employed by the Continental
Forces in action against British troops at toe Battle of Bunker dill
in 1775, and, in more modern tiles, en exten >ive prod r a&a effort
wan c,eveiouea in Vdorld bar I, yet no firm doctrine or determination of
,e ',.roper- role of paya.olo-ical warfare in t:"'_c .ili..t .r'r establishment
had been develop: ed by the har Department at toe outbreak of World her II.
is a result, civilian ca-,encies were to a large extent relied ur,en to
_;1an, develop and execute psychological wax f a.; e missions for the ; rm o
forces. Under Executive Order 9312, the Office of War Information was
Lc 3i Ted responsibility for plannin :, develo ment and execution of all
Approved For Release 2001/08/27: CIA-RDP64-00658A000100370009-9
 Approved For Rele"se 2001/08/27: CIA-RDP64-00658A006i80370009-9
t es of the ecera l ro>rr m of r',0io, press, publications, and reln_ted
foreign pr01..?agaros activities i VOlviri t:?e cisse::in.ctior"= of information
erce t in LF,.t n America, which was as i -,ned to the Office of Coord ,
inH.tor
of Inter-pmerican Affairs. ProLratrris of foreign prot)a.gzuaua in tre
theee.ters of or)era.tions were subject to the approval cf tre joint Chiefs
of ;ta.f, r, while those harts executed, in theaters of military oaerations
.we -?e subject to the control.. of the theater cor.m,1-rider.
4. As a result, osycnological warfare operations in the vnz'ious
trneaters were to a large extent concerned with the integration and
utilization of civi1innns who had been hastily trained, and selected for
this work by the O'ie`I.
In the absence of ~ r Deoa.r ,men.t doctrine or
Oolicy, various arran_ -ements end agreements were made by the the,-"ter
coy m nders concerning the decree of such utilization, In some
the-7--tern, notably SVv'ni, very little use was wade of O'hiI civilians in
tie 7 Wield, while in ot, ,er areas, t),~-rticu ar1y those unaer S Air' control,
extensive use was iticr.t .e in all operations, both strategic and tac ,ical.
5. By military order of -6aoses durin rtir e
i ci olo ic~l warfare is an operational finction involvin_ not only
i
rr litany intelligrence, but s trr.te ~:ic cdevelopments, -olitic A. forces,,
ictoi?ic and ethnic bac grounds of people, and diplomacy on t ,,e ?li. hest
level. however, the diverse arid technical character- of its operations
_r _r rest:onsibilities does not .aperar to be logical res onsibiliti. of
Lhe Operations Division.
11. In t.e event of a future emergency, while overall . oliti ca.l
nc ~.r,avchologic