RED SUB PERIL HELD RISING AT FAST PACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000100170069-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: February 4, 1962
• Content Type: NSPR

146 AS NG' 41 PQ~i11
d. fw170069-2
~e c ising
At Fast Pace
?Idmil al s, Spec cb
Urging Sys if t
Action Censored
By John G. Norris
$tAff b. ePor:er
In its Bearings to date. the
Stennis Committee has efiec-
tively brought out the pros
and cons of "muzzling" mili-
tary officers on foreign pol-
icy, but another Pentagon cen-
sorship, issue has been left
unt ou chest.
Not long ago a ranking Navy !
admiral submitted for De
fense Department clearance a
.speech in wh ich he, planned to
give warning of a danger
which causes him great con-,
cern.
It stressed the prime hn-
portance of launching a ma-
jor program imediately to
counter the rapidly mounting'
Soviet m i s s i l e submarine
threat. A stepup in effort now
(could check the threat, he
said, while delay may produce
real trouble.
i On objection of the Defenses
Department Comptroller's DC-
flee, he was told to tone down
the speech. His views were
I said to conflict with official
policy and the budget.
The facts indicate that there
is nmcli cause for the act-
~miral's concert, although the:
issue is broader than this.
The Defense Department
I will .not release such figures
but it can be stated authorita-
Itively that U. S. intelligence
estimates that the Soviet
Union now has about 30
sile submarines, about 10 of
them nuclear powered.
Not in Polaris Class
None are comparable with
the six U. S. Polaris subs
now in commission, which;.
carry 16 1200-mile-range mis-1
siles that can be fired from
below the sea. The Russian
silg sub Beet inciudes both j
Ib~ t~s~~fia~ `c~air - a?r~rea=
Red Sub Peril Held
Rising at Rapid Rate
ing missiles like the 500-mile
American Regulis subs.
They carry a maximum of
three missiles each which
have a maximum range of 350
miles, and must surface to
fire. It is doubtful that they
can match the Polaris' relia-
bility and "invisibility" rec-
ord to date.
The Polaris craft have had
all 16 of their missiles ready
to fire on 15 minutes notice
95 per cent of the time on
station, and 15 out 16 mis-
siles ready 99.9 per cent of
the time. As yet no Polaris
has been detected, as far as
the Navy can tell.
But the total U.S.S.R. mis-
sile sub fleet now is conceded
to be bigger than was con-
sidered likely only a short
time ago, and there is little
doubt that the Red Navy is
expending great effort to
match the Polaris and further
expand its undersea missile
fleet.
!How big an antisubmarine
effort the United States should
mount to meet this threat is
a matter of dispute both with-
in the Navy and thee Defense
Department.
Great strides have been
made in submarine defense
in recent years as a result
of a gradually increased level
of effort. The present ASW
forces are equipped to make
a good showing against the
Ru sian forces today, al-
though Navy chiefs cannot
guarantee that' the Unite.
States would, not suffer seri-
ous casualties if the 30 Soviet
missiles should launch an at-
tack.
Some of the present short-
comings of ; the Russian subs
are not as important as may
seem. Their missiles do not
need long range to blast
American coastal cities, and
while surface firing increases
their chance of detection, the
craft should. be able to get
their shots off first.
On the other hand, geogra-
phy and America's world-wide
allies present Russia with a
more difficult submarine at-
tack problem than that faced
by -U. S. Polaris craft. Over-
seas air bases and surveil-
' ance.nets provide the means
of detecting Red subs as they
emerge from the straits and
narrow waters limiting Rus-
sian egress to the open sea.
Another aspect of the prob-
lem 'Involves attacks on U. ,S. '
warships and supply vessels
in limited war. During the
Korean War, Red China had
no submarines. Today, the
Chinese Communist Navy has
25 to 30 Soviet-type subs. Mos-
cow also alas furnished sub-
marines to Indonesia, Egypt
and some to European satel-
lites.
In case of another Korea, i
Soviet submarines could cov-
ertly attack U. S. ships with
little fear of discovery.
No Soviet subs have been
given. to Cuba, although re=
centiy . Soviet merchantmen
have been towing patrol craft
and subchasers to Cuba for
delivery to Castro's navy.
The real threat of Com-
munist submarine power, how-
ever, lies ahead, when Russia
gets many nuclear-powered
missile and torpedo attack
subs. Much of the present
American ASW defense, which
can cope with conventional
submarines, may then become
obsolete.
ASW chiefs would like to see
a greater development effort
on nuclear-powered surface
ships and planes, with the
unlimited endurance to match
the A-propelled subs. They
.also talk of the need of main-
taining a permanent antisub-
marine barrier force as well
as a host of other costly
development programs.
The decision as to how
much money should be de-
voted to meeting the subma-
rine threat is a complicated
problem. Some Pentagon of-
ficials argue with much
plausibility that only the
Chief of Naval Operations or
Secretary of Defense can
properly conclude how much
should be allocated for va-
rious Navy and. overall de-
fense needs so as to maintain
balance armed forces.
But, in the past, Congress
and the people have insisted
on settling vital arms ques-
tions that are disputed by the
experts. Past Defense
chiefs have tried, without suc-
cess, to "muzzle" the advo-
cates of bigger bomber forces,
greater air defense and larger
armies. .
Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000100170069-2