CUBAN FIASCO BLAMED ON PLANS CHANGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170013-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170013j
Air Support Halted on `Moral' Grounds
Cuban Fiasco Blamed on Plans Change
Concern of some of President Kennedy's
closest advisers about the "immorality" of
masked aggression led to the failure of the
United States-backed invasion of Cuba last
year, says Fortune Magazine.
Charles V. Murphy, the magazine's Wash.
ington correspondent, writes the idea for the
invasion had taken root during the early sum-
mer of 1960. The Central Intelligence Agency
was given responsibility for planning it.
Then President Eisenhower personally re-
viewed the plans from time to time, Murphy
wrote, and when Jchn Kennedy was elected
to succeed him he also was briefed.
Upon taking office, President Kennedy was
given this general picture of the proposed in-
vasion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the writer
said:
With a small invasion force, success of the
operation would hinge on 1126s controlling the
air over the beachhead The planes were to
opetl?te from a staging base in Cent'ii Amer.
more than 500 miles from Cut :i, and
would have only 45 minutes for action on
target.
In contrast, Castro's air force could be over
the beachhead and the invaders' ships in a
matter of minutes and for a much longer
time. Reducing his air power thus was a neces-
sity, the Joint Chiefs felt.
? ? r
At a Cabinet meeting April 4, the CIA's
Richard M. Bissell-the man given specific re-
,sponsibility for the plan--gave a final review
of the operation, Murphy wrote.
At that time, he added, Sen. William Ful-
bright, D-Ark., chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, declared the Unit, ,d
States should not get involved at all.
Murphy said two other moon not present at
the meeting shared Fulbright's feelings: Under
Secretary of State Chester Bowles and Adlal
Stevenson, the U.S. ambassador to the United
Nations.
In deference to their feelings, Murphy wrote,
President Kennedy ruled U.E. air power would
not be on call at any time and that the B26a
flown by "our" Cubans would make only two
strikes-two days before the landing and, on
the morning of the landing.
The attack on D-Day-minus-2 was highly suc-
cessful, Murphy wrote. Half of Castro's B26s
and Sea Furies, and four of his seven or eight
T33s, were destroyed or damaged.
Then on April 17, with the invasion fleet
already en route Bissell received a call from
White House aide McGeorge Bundy, who ad-
vised him the President had ordered that there
was to be no morning strike of B26s.
? ? ?
both Bissell and CIA Deputy Director Gen.
Charles Cabell urged Rusk, advising with the
President, to reconsider but he would not,
Murphy wrote.
The writer said Cabell later asked if the
invasion force could be pulled back and if the
U.S. carrier Boxer, on station about 50 miles
from the Bay of Pigs, could be Instructed to
provide cover.
"Rusk said no ... The President was awak-
ened and he said no," Murphy continued.
Without the air cover, Murphy wrote, the
invasion force had little hope. Castro's forces
mopped up quickly, sinking two transports
and driving off two others.
President Kennedy and his strategists be-
came alarmed and at about noon on Monday
Bissell was told the B26s could attack. A small
force was dispatched but fog cut their ef-
fectiveness, the writer continued.
Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170013-2