HOW THE CUBAN INVASION FAILED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200170017-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 7, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

A7040
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attack of the ships and then of the troops
on the beach. Rusk was not impressed. The
ships, he suggested, could unload and retire
to the open sea before daylight; as for the
troops ashore being unduly inconvenienced
by Castro's air, it had been his experience
as a colonel in the Burma theater that air
attack could be more of a nuisance than a
danger. One fact he made absolutely clear:
military considerations had overruled the po-
litical when the D-minus-two strike had been
laid on; now political considerations were
taking over.
Past midnight Bissell and Cabell restudied
the battle plan while signals of consterna-
tion welled up from their men far to the
south. At 4 o'clock, less than an hour be-
fore first light on the Cuban shore, Cabell
went back to Rusk with another proposal.
It was manifestly impossible for the Cuban
brigade's small force of B-26's (only 16 were
operational) to provide effective air cover
for the ships from their distant base. Cabell
now asked whether, if the ships were to pull
back to international water, the U.S.S. Boxer,
a carrier on station about 50 miles from the
Bay of Pigs, could be instructed to provide
cover. Rusk said no. The President was
awakened. Cabell registered his concern.
The answer still was no.
Castro's air force could be over the beach-
head and the invaders' ships in a matter of
minutes. Hence the absolute necessity of
knocking out Castro's air power, or at least
reducing it to impotence, by the time the
ground battle was joined.
This, in general terms, was the plan the
Chiefs reviewed for Kennedy. They judged
the tactical elements sound, and indeed they
accorded the operation a high probability of
success. But some of Kennedy's closest ad-
visers were assailed by sinking second
thoughts. What bothered them was the im-
morality of masked aggression. They re-
coiled from having the U.S. employ subter-
fuge in striking down even as dangerous an
adversary as Castro, and they were unani-
mously opposed to having the United States
do the job in the open.
THE CHANGES
The immorality of the intervention
found its most eloquent voice before the
President during a meeting in the State De-
partment on April 4, only 13 days before
the date set for the invasion. The occasion
was Bissell's final review of the operation,
and practically everybody connected with
high strategy was on hand-Secretary of
State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara,
Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Joint Chiefs
of Staff Chairman Lemnitzer, CIA Chief Allen
Dulles, as well as McGeorge Bundy, Paul
Nitze, then Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann and
three Kennedy specialists in Latin American
matters-Adolf Berle, Arthur M. Schles-
inger, Jr., and Richard Goodwin. There
was also one outsider, Senator WILLIAM
FULBRIGHT, chairman of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, whose support
Kennedy wanted. After Bissell had com-
pleted his briefing and Dulles had summed
up risks and prospects, FULBRIGHT denounced
the proposition out of hand: it was the
wrong thing for the United States to get
involved in.
Rusk said he was for it, in answer to the
President's direct question, but as would
presently be manifest, he privately had no
heart for it. Two other men among the
'President's senior foreign policy advisers, not
present at the meeting, shared FULBRIGHT's
feelings: Under Secretary of State Chester
Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. In deference
to these views, Kennedy made two separate
rulings which were to contribute to the fatal
dismemberment of the whole plan. First,
U.S. airpower would not be on call at any
time. Second, the B-26's flown by our Cu-
bans could be used in only two strikes be-
fore the invasion-first on D minus 2 days
and again on the morning of the landing.
Dawn of April 15, by the timetable, the B-
26's, having flown undetected through the
night from their Central American staging
base, appeared over Cuba and bombed the
three fields on which Castro's ready air was
deployed. The attack, was, on the whole,
highly successful. Half of Castro's B-26's
and Sea Furies and four of his T-33 jets
were blown up or damaged.
REQUEST FOR "BOXER"
Sunday evening, only some 8 hours
after Kennedy had given the final go-ahead,
the expedition in the first dark was creep-
ing toward the Cuban shore. In Bissell's
office, there was a call on the White House
line. It was Bundy, being even crisper than
usual: The B-26's were to stand down, there
was to be no air strike in the morning, this
was a Presidential order. Rusk was now act-
ing for the President in the situation. Bis-
sell was stunned. He and CIA Deputy Direc-
tor General Charles Cabell, an experienced
airman, went together to the State Depart-
ment to urge Rusk to reconsider. Cabell was
greatly worried about the vulnerability to air
THE FND
The invasion force hid little chance. They
were without the ranging firepower which
the B--26's with their bombs and machine
guns had been expected to apply against Cas-
tro's tanks and artillery. Castro's forces
came up fast. He still had four jets left,
and they were armed with powerful rockets.
He used them well. Before the morning was
done he had sunk two transports and driven
off two others.
Now Kennedy and his strategists became
alarmed. About noon on Monday, Bissell
was told that the B-26's could attack Cas-
tro's airfields at will. But the orders came
too late. Most of the pilots had been in the
air for upward of 1.8 hours in an unavailing
effort to keep Castro's planes off the troops
and the remaining ship. That night a small
force was scratched together. It was over
Cuba at dawn, only to find the fields hidden
by low, impenetrable fog.
Tuesday was the turning point. The men
ashore had fought bravely and gained their
planned objectives. They had even seized
and bulldozed the airfield. But they were
desperately short of ammunition and food,
and under the pressure of Castro's superior
firepower and number they were being
forced back across the beach. There re-
mained one last chance to make the thing
go. Boxer was still on station. The release
of a few of its jets simply for air cover should
see two landing crafts with ammunition and
rations safely to the shore.
At a White House meeting that night, Bis-
sell made it plain that unless U.S. air power
was brought forward, the men on the beach
were doomed. He asked that Boxer's planes
be brought into the battle. Rusk still would
not have this. Several others were also op-
posed, including the President's personal
staffers. Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh
Burke vouched for the worth of Bissell's
proposition. The outcome of the meeting
was a singular compromise. Jets from Boxer
would provide cover next morning for exactly
1 hour, long enough for the ships to run
Into the shore and start unloading and for
the remaining B--26's to get in a hard blow.
Next morning, through an incredible mis-
chance, the B--26's were over Cuba half an
hour ahead of schedule. Boxer's jets were
still on the flight deck. But Castro's jets
were ready. Two of the B-26's were shot
down; others were hit and forced to abort.
That was the melancholy end.
The House Vote on the Conference Com-
mittee Report Containing the So-Ca]led
Hanford Compromise Is Scheduled for
Wednesday, September 13, 1961'
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES E. VAN ZANDT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, September 7, 1961
Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Speaker, I
wish to call attention to the House
schedule for next week, which includes
consideration of the conference commit-
tee report on the Atomic Energy Com-
r ission authorization bill. It is impor-
tant that every Member of the House
who voted to instruct conferees to delete
the Hanford electric power provision
from that bill, and all other Members
in sympathy with this position, be pres-
ent when this legislation comes to the
floor.
I am certain that some of my col-
leagues are discouraged at the long delay
incident to the handling of this legisla-
tion. The growing resentment at the
way in which it has been batted about
is quite understandable.
After having deleted the Hanford
powerplant provision from the Joint
Committee bill, the House found it nec-
essary to take the unusual step of in-
structing its delegates following the Sen-
ate's reinsertion of the provision. If
you will recall, the motion to instruct
conferees to delete the project carried
by 235 to 164, a majority which one
might assume would be adequate to no-
tify our friends in the Senate that we
are unqualifiedly opposed to the project.
If proponents of this measure are of
the opinion that Hanford will become
more palatable as this session nears to a
close, it is my opinion that they are in for
a big surprise. There is not going to be
any flexibility on a matter of such im-
portance to the national welfare.
Actually, by dragging out final action,
proponents may very well be building up
greater opposition to their project.
While the bill is collied across the
Capitol, tension mounts in Berlin. Any-
one who might have had a tendency to be
apathetic about the international crisis
heretofore is now getting his daily jolts
from newspaper headlines. As the grav-
ity of the situation comes into focus, ap-
peals for junk projects that would de-
prive the defense structure of necessary
funds have far less chance of reaching
sympathetic ears. The Hanford gen-
erating station has no place in the de-
fense program. There is absolutely no
room for it in the national budget.
Just to keep the record straight, I want
to notify my colleagues that, while this
legislative breakdown has been persist-
ing, the case against the Hanford power-
plant has been building up among those
who suffer most from it. I refer to rep-
resentatives of the coal industry and
residents of mining communities as well
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CONCTRESSIC) AL
America today. It is drama that began
nearly 400 years ago on this hallowed ground
when intrepid souls set out from the mother
country, England, in their tiny vessels, to
found the dynamic civilization in freedom,
which we now enjoy but, perhaps do not
always appreciate.
This week marks the end of the 1961
season for the presentation of "The Lost
Colony" pageant performed by its able and
dedicated cast of actors, musicians, dancers,
and choristers.
I must open my remarks with special rec-
ognition of the genius of Paul Green who
felt the deeper meaning of the American
dream-the American goal-by creating this
tremendous outdoor symphony on this site
some 25 years ago. Each year there has been
some change-for he has sought to perfect
this phase of his presentation of the mean-
ing of the American heritage.
America's greatness has grown from its
variety, and Paul Green has extended his
vast talents to other historical phases of our
national growth with such successes as
"The Common Glory," now in its 15th sea-
son at Williamsburg, Va.; "Faith of Our
Fathers," in the National Capital; "Wilder-
ness Road," at Berea, Ky.; "The Founders,"
at Jamestown Island, Va.; and "The Con-
federacy," at Virginia Beach, Va.
In the light of all that, my friends, you
must know that this is a night to remember,
to feel deeply, and to cherish.
When I was asked not so long ago if I, as
Congressman from this First District of
North Carolina, would participate briefly in
this seasonal closing of our State's historic
drama, the news in Washington, D.C., was
exceedingly grim. The world seemed beset
by cold fire-interspersed here and there
with brutal bursts of passion that did not-
do not-make sense in a civilized world.
The intervening weeks do not look any bet-
ter.
Korea, though some 10 years behind, has
left scars which may still pain many who
are here tonight. The Suez crisis of 1955
and 1956 made a deep impact on the nations
of the world as the Aeab States went through
pangs of extreme nationalism and flirtations
with the untiring Communist powers, China
and India reached serious crises over bound-
ary matters. A President of the United
States was advised not to visit one country
because of the possibility of disorders which
might threaten his safety. And later, he
and the United tates were outrageously af-
fronted by the Premier of the Soviet Union
at a meeting in Paris of top officials of the
great world powers-the United States, So-
viet Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
Republic of France.
Today, we have one crisis on top of an-
other. The West Germany/West Berlin situa-
tion is boiling and dangerous in light of the
extreme measures which have been taken
to seal off the unhappy East Germans from
access to the West. The problems of the
French in Algeria and between the French
and the Tunisians, gravely, though indi-
rectly, affect these shores. The turn of our
near and formerly friendly neighbor, Cuba,
to communism and Soviet domination is
frightening. Recent developments in Brazil
are mystifying. Africa is in a tremendous
ferment. And who knows what has really
happened in Laos and Vietnam?
These things are of great concern to us in
Washington, D.C., at the seat of our Govern-
ment.
I know they are to all of you.
National divisions, realinements, and in-
consistencies seem to plague the world. We
have a North Korea and a South Korea; we
have a North and a South Vietnam, there is
an East and West Germany-complicated by
the city or cities of East and West Berlin
located 110 miles within the World War II
boundary of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. In the Union of South Africa we see
the concept of apartheid, or White suprem-
acy, carried to greater extremes than it has
ever been in this country. In other parts of
Africa the concept of black supremacy seems
to be on the rise.
These are the things of today and of re-
cent years. But let's go back to the times
portrayed by Paul Green's pageant, the time
when the English-speaking peoples asserted
themselves on this continent.
Things were no different then than they
are today. Not really.
History books have to cover time by re-
cording the main events. They cannot give
us the infinite details which we learn from
our daily newspapers, radios, and television.
But those books do tell us that power
struggles in Europe were then, as now, shak-
ing the structure of the entire civilized world
at the time our brave Roanoke Island colo-
nists came to these shores.
We know that Spain had been in control
of the seas for a hundred years or more.
That the Portuguese were competitors. We
know that the English were, through their
ruling classes, in violent diplomatic and re-
ligious conflict with the rest of Europe. We
know that the Dutch were straining to com-
pete in the colonization of the unsettled
areas of the world.
In the official souvenir program for to-
night's entertainment-the one that costs
50 cents per copy-there appears a chronol-
ogy of Pre-Colonial America, it tells about
Columbus in 1492. It shows that England
wasn't going to wait very long, and John
Cabot discovered North America for Eng-
land in 1497. It shows that an Italian ex-
plored the present North Carolina coast for
France in 1524. And it shows the vigorous
efforts of the English under the direction of
Sir Walter Raleigh to establish a colony in
the New World, at Roanoke Island-where we
now stand.
The Colony was lost. Its fate is intriguing,
and historians have been interested for more
than 370 years in finding the answer to the
disappearance of the sturdy, well-balanced
and well-provisioned group of colonists.
They brought families and produced English
children. They had brought Christianity.
They had established law and order in the
wilderness. They had taken the first steps
to move the Western World into the modern
era.
In this great drama-Paul Green suggests
an answer to the fate of the first brave
groups to begin the history that becomes the
cornerstone to English, then Anglo-Ameri-
can and then American heritage. His story
of the lost colony is self-sufficient.
But I want to say in conclusion that as
we look backward we must look forward.
"The past is prologue."
There was a cold war then-between Eng-
land and Spain. There was no declared war-
but the Spanish Armada sailed against Eng-
land-and was defeated. From that date
English seapower was supreme all over the
world-upholding the freedom of the seas
for all nations who would use them for
peaceful purposes. From those perilous
times to the present perilous times man's
indomitable spirit has pushed the frontiers
of civilization and knowledge incredibly far.
Think of this analogy and feel a surge of
hope for the future that lies ahead. Our
faith in God and country may be summed
up in the final beautiful lines of this great
pageant:
"Let the wilderness drive us forth as wan-
derers across the earth, scatter our broken
bones upon these sands * * * it shall not
kill the purpose that brought us here. * * *
The dream still lives. It lives * * * and shall
not die."
A7039
EXTENSION OFREMARKS
OF
HON. CHARLES E. GOODELL
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, September 7, 1961
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, under
the leave to extend my remarks in the
RECORD, I include the follow ng article
which appeared in the September 1, 1961,
issue of Time magazine:
HOW THE CUBAN INVASION FAILED
Last April's U.S.-backed invasion of Cuba's
Bay of Pigs will be long remembered and
angrily debated. In the September issue of
Fortune, the magazine's Washington Cor-
respondent Charles J. V. Murphy tells in
behind-the-scenes detail the incredible story
of how that invasion failed. Excerpts:
The idea for the invasion had taken root
during the early summer of 1960. By then,
thousands of defectors from Castro's Cuba
were in the United States. Many of them
were soldiers. The job of organizing and
training them was given to the Central In-
telligence Agency. It became the specific
responsibility of one of the CIA's top dep-
uties, Richard M. Bissell, a former economist
who is also a highly practical executive.
During the summer and fall of 1960, Presi-
dent Eisenhower from time to time per-
sonally reviewed the scheme. In late
November, the last time it came up for his
comprehensive review, an_ operational plan
had not yet crystallized. It was taken for
granted that a landing in force could not
possibly be brought off unless the expedi-
tion was shepherded to the beach by the
U.S. Navy (either openly or in disguise) and
covered by airpower in whatever amount
might be necessary. Eisenhower, the com-
mander of Normandy, understood this well
enough.
After his election, Kennedy had been
briefed fairly frequently on the Cuban situa-
tion. He discussed Cuba at length in both
his preinaugural talks with Eisenhower. On
taking office, Kennedy decided that he had
to have from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a
technical opinion of the feasibility of the
project.
HOW IT WAS PLANNED
The plan still assumed that U.S. military
help would be on call during the landing.
Castro's air force consisted of not quite
two-score planes-a dozen or so obsolete
B-26's, plus about the same number of
obsolete British Sea Furies. But in addi-
tion, there were seven or eight T-33 jet train-
ers, the remnants of an earlier U.S. transac-
tion with the Batista government, so the
force was not the pushover it appeared at
first glance. Armed with rockets, these jets
would be more than a match in a battle for
the exiles' B-26's.
It stood to reason that, considering how
small the landing party was, the success
of the operation would hinge on the B-26's
controlling the air over the beachhead.
And the margins that the planners accepted
were narrow to begin with. The B-26's
were to operate from a staging base in a
Central American country more than 500
miles from Cuba. The round trip would
take better than 6 hours, and that would
leave the planes with fuel for only 45 min-
utes of action over Cuba. In contrast,
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