ANATOMY OF A FAILURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200200001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2003/10/10: CIA-RDP,64, ' II' X0'1-1
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 By TAD SZULC
The author was for five years South American correspondent of the New
York Times. He has recently been transferred to the Washington bu-
reau, where he is diplomatic correspondent for Latin-American affairs.
HE tragedy of the Bay of Pigs-the weird and dramatic 72 hours
last April when a miniature army of Cuban rebels senselessly
hurled itself against dictator Fidel Castro's heavily armed fortress
-deserves a unique place in the annals of military and intelligence
disasters.
World War II proved that even the most carefully planned and
executed landing operation may end in shocking failure. But the anti-
Castro invasion was doomed from the beginning by misleading intel-
ligence reports, faulty planning, disregard for the political realities and
astonishing ignorance of subversion procedures. Disobedience of
orders-including one from President John E Kennedy-and outright
deceit added to the confusion and insured defeat.
The CIA field agents who planned the invasion kept their su-
periors in the dark about many aspects of their handiwork. The in-
credible mismanagement of these agents during the months of lever-
ish preparations for the landing in Cuba has never before been corn-
pletely revealed.
The basic error was made early. The Central Intelligence Agency
estimated that an attack by 1,300 men would cause the instant col-
lapse of a Communist police state defended by 300,000 troops. On
the strength of this estimate, the U. S. gave full approval to the opera-
tion. Yet. while approving this foolhardy plan, the CIA allowed the
destruction of a promising guerrilla movement inside Cuba wlriclr
might have succeeded in overthrowing Castro.
As preparations for the invasion began, at least 100 Castro spies
circulated freely in the build-up area in Florida. Their photographs
were on file in the Dade County Sheriff's office, but. no elfort was
made by Federal authorities to remove them from the scene, or to con-
ceal the movements of the anti-Castro fighters from these informers.
While the Castro spies operated freely, two Federal agencies
detained groups of anti-Castro revolutionaries. The Federal Cornmu-
nications Commission impounded a rebel boat which broadcast anti-
Castro propaganda, and requested the indictment of the boat's opera-
tors forbroadcasting without a license. And a boat carrying explosives
for the Cuban underground was captured off Tallahassee by a Fish and
Wildlife Service patrol boat.
Perhaps this failure to inform other Federal agencies of U. S. aid
to the anti-Castro Cubans was motivated by security. If so, this was
one of the few instances of security during the months of preparation.
Many Cuban waiters in Miami could give the names of the CIA agents
in charge of the operation, and the Cuban rebel chiefs blandly advised
newsmen to "clear it with the CIA" when they sought permission to
accompany the troops.
In short, the Cuban invasion of April 17 never had a serious
chance of success. It should not have happened. Experienced Cuban
leaders had predicted a fiasco weeks before the attack was launched.
But this march toward catastrophe won the specific military endorse-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the approval of most top White
House and State Department political experts. On the basis of such
recommendations, President Kennedy gave the orders for the doomed
invasion to proceed.
Yet there is massive evidence indicating that neither the President
nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff-nor possibly even CIA Director Allen W.
Dulles-was fully aware at any time of the details of the plans being
carried out by their subordinates in Florida, Louisiana, Central Amer-
ica and the Caribbean. These details made the difference between
possible success and certain disaster.
TILE L1IISTAKES THAT BROUGHT DEFEAT
If the President had known the full and appalling truth in time, it
now seems likely that he would have corrected some of the glaring
errors-or perhaps countermanded the offensive. What were some of
these major misjudgments?
Acting on its assumption that Cubans would rise against Castro
as soon as the invasion began, the CIA decided to commit virtually the
entire striking force in one place.
Worse yet, influenced by political considerations, the CIA elim-
inated the anti-Castro organizations inside Cuba from the operational
picture. This destroyed the very machinery that might have brought
about Castro's downfall.
At the same time, the CIA ignored President Kennedy's direc-
tives excluding Batistianos-followers of Dictator Fulgencio Batista,
who was overthrown by Castro in 1959-from the "Liberation Army."
As a result, after the failure of the invasion, Castro was able to present
to his television audiences more than 100 captured members of the
rebel force who were known Batista followers. The group included
several former police agents with criminal records-men hated by
most Cubans, pro-Castro or anti-Castro.
The tangled story of the invasion that failed began late in May,
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 1960, when anti-Castro forces in Cuba and in Florida set up the first
centralized rebel organization-the Revolutionary Democratic Front.
The Movement of Revolutionary Recovery (MR1{ i, which had
been formed earlier by a group of onetime supporters of Castro, in-
cluded some of his best military officers. They hoped to "salvage" the
social and political revolution and to save it from the inroads of dic-
tatorship and communism.
The MRR fighters excluded Batistianos, who had previously or-
ganized several anti-Castro factions in Miami. The most notorious of
these was the private army of ex-Sen. Rolando Masferrer, who had
made himself infamous during the Castro revolution by carrying out
a brutal campaign of repression in Oriente province.
The MRR later joined with traditional Cuban political leaders in
launching the Revolutionary Democratic Front. One member of the
Front was Lt. Manuel Artime Buesa, 28, a former official in an Agrar-
ian Reform Zone in Oriente under Castro. He was destined to be the
man around whom much of the rebel tragedy revolved.
The Front was pledged to the goals of democratic social revolu-
tion, but it was, on the whole, a rather conservative group. Its political
appeal inside revolution-conscious Cuba was severely limited. Never-
theless, it was the best Cuban group that could be found. and so by the
middle of July, 1960, the Eisenhower Administration decided that. it
should serve as the nucleus of the "Liberation Army."
The Front purchased or leased several isolated farms In Florida
to use as training grounds for volunteers. Certain American and
Cuban corporations with interests in Cuba contributed much of the
money needed for these preparations.
Most of the rebels were taught parade-ground drill and the use of
M-l rifles, while Castro was giving his militia tough mountain train-
ing and receiving the first shipments of heavy Soviet arms.
Soon after Guatemala's President Miguel Y(Iigoras Fuentes
broke relations with the Castro regime. the U. S. Government worked
out a secret agreement with him. authorizing establishment of bigger
training camps on Guatemalan soil. Richard M. Bissell, a deputy of
Dulles, took command of the increasingly elah)orate operation at CIA
headrluarters in Washington. His chief field representative was Frank
Bender, who had acquired guerrilla experience with the French under-
ground during \'Vorld War II.
Within 60 days after the U. S. took charge, Lieutenant Artirne
emerged as the favorite of the CIA planners. lie had no military
experience of any consequence, but his youth, his oratorical gifts and
his political views-an odd blend of revolutionary slogans and basic
conservatism-appealed to Bissell and Bender.
The initial plan worked out by the CIA and Artime bore no
resemblance to the final operation. It called for creation of 30 guer-
rilla-and-sabotage groups inside Cuba, under orders to go into action
at the moment rebel sea and air landings were made_.Assaults by these
units in 30 pre-selected areas were counted on to throw Cuba into
such chaos and confusion that Castro would be unable to deploy his
well-armed forces adequately to head off the invasion.
Already available in the Escambray Mountains of Cuba was an
ill-awned but effective band of 200 or 300 anti-Castro fighters. These
men-who might have been enlisted in the planned guerrilla-and-
sabotage operation-had defied Castro for months. Castro had finally
dislodged all the peasants in the area to prevent them from helping
the guerrillas with food and weapons, and had set up roadblocks to
halt the movement of supplies and volunteers to the hills.
POLITICS DESTROYS THE CUBAN UNDERGROUND
here was a ready-to-fight anti-Castro force inside Cuba. All it
nccded from the CIA was food and weapons. But adequate aid never
came. Why?
Survivors of this group who escaped to Florida said political
considerations cost them CIA help. The Escambray commanders were
reluctant to swear unquestioning allegiance to the Revolutionary
Democratic Front. Therefore, they were seen as unwelcome rivals of
the Miami group and left to fend for themselves until too late. Supplies
were finally parachuted to them between December, 1960, and March,
1901, but by then the perimeter held by the underfed, inadequately
tinned guerrillas had shrunk perceptibly. The parachuted supplies
fell into the hands of Castro's militiamen, and the Fscambray opera-
tion was doomed.
Even with the loss of the Escambray Mountain fighters, other
effective underground groups were growing increasingly active in
Cuba. The principal clandestine organization-People's Revolution-
ary Movement-led by ex-Castro Minister of Public Works Manuel
Bay, was attracting many prominent people.
Although the CIA knew of the Escambray Mountain guerrillas
and the Cuban underground, it abandoned the initial plan to make
use of these groups. The reasoning behind this change of plans is one
of the fundamental mysteries of the whole Cuban undertaking. Two
explanations have been given: political divisions in the anti-Castro
forces, and the blind overconfidence of the CIA in the alternate
single-landing plan which led to disaster.
While the neglected groups inside Cuba suffered from lack of
supplies and direction, a deep division became apparent in the forces
conlinued
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200200001-1
Castro agents in Miami were able to
observe exactly what was happening
being trained by the CIA. Artime, the leader favored by the CIA,
edged closer and closer to right-wing groups. There were even reports
that he had become involved with Batistianos-the worst crime in the
Cuban revolutionary demonology. The CIA did not withdraw support
from Artime, however, and those who criticized the young leader-
who now called himself Captain-soon found themselves squeezed out.
As the struggle for control continued, Manuel Ray came from
Cuba, demanding recognition and support for his Cuban under-
ground. Ray arrived in the U. S. with a clear political program calling
for continuation of the social revolution in Cuba, but under demo-
cratic leadership. A smear campaign was unleashed in Florida to
present him as a "dangerous leftist" and the proponent of "Fidelismo
without Fidel." Right-wing Cuban politicians and businessmen. who
were worried about their confiscated property, passed along the word
about "this dangerous man Ray." The CIA field agents went along
with the anti-Ray spokesmen. Ray found that his underground fight-
ers would not share in the financial aid given to other anti-Castro
groups, nor receive the weapons and explosives they needed.
Ray explained over and over that his group favored a demo-
cratic, anti-Communist Cuba. but that it was unrealistic to expect
that the clock could be turned back on some of Castro's social reforms.
The nation could not regress to the social and economic status of the
Batista days, he argued. Even when he and his companions cited pro-
nouncements of the United States Government expressing sympathy
for the pure goals of the Cuban social revolution, the response was
shrugged shoulders.
Thus long before plans were ready to oust Premier Castro, a
battle for the political future of Cuba was already raging in Miami
hotel bars and rooms. The debate also divided men in the faraway
training camps of the "Liberation Army." Because the CIA had power
to offer or refuse aid to one or the other faction, the agency found it-
self in the position of a political arbiter.
It chose to back the right-wing groups.
This choice-which could influence the long-range foreign policy
of the United States toward Cuba-was made without consulting the
President or the State Department. With the decision to limit support
to right-wing Cubans, the CIA assured the defeat of the planned anti-
Castro invasion.
In Guatemala, the official policy of excluding Batistianos was
never put into effect. Artime gave the San Roman brothers, former
Batista officers, high commands. Other Batistianos were streaming
into the camps. Now the CIA took the position that the Batistianos
were experienced military men and proven anti-Communists and
therefore should not be barred from the "Liberation Army."
About 200 of the anti-Castro troops in Guatemala rebelled against
this reversal and were imprisoned by the right-wing command. Most
of them were subsequently released and returned to Miami, but the
CIA kept 17 of them under heavy guard on an isolated island in Gua-
temala until after the invasion.
Manuel Ray demanded that the Batistianos be weeded out of the
anti-Castro army. He also asked for the full support of the Cuban
underground. A representative of the Revolutionary Democratic Front
signed a secret pact accepting Ray's conditions, and on March 20, the
CIA-trained troops and the Cuban underground seemed ready to work
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 Approved Fof Release 2003
together. Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, a candidate acceptable to both Ray
and the Front, was named chairman of a joint Cuban Revolutionary
Council, which promptly issued a general mobilization order. But
under the surface appearance of order, confusion still prevailed.
In Miami, a team of top guerrilla leaders sat playing cards, work-
ing cross-word puzzles and wondering why they had not been enlisted
in the impending attack. All were former captains in Castro's forces,
and several had gone through the U. S. Army's Jungle Warfare School
in Panama. Their request for boats and weapons to use in a landing in
their native Oriente province had brought them such inadequate
equipment that they had abandoned the projected mission as suicidal.
('l'he radio they were offered did not work, and a 50-caliber machine
gun issued to them did not fit its mount. The food supplies were to-
tally inadequate. "Was somebody trying to send us to our death?" one
of them asked incredulously.) Ignored by the CIA, they kept on
playing cards.
In the last week of March, it was an open secret in Miami that
the invasion was approaching and that somebody had decided on a
one thrust, do-or-die attack, despite the alarmed warnings of experts
that the single landing would invite carnage and court disaster.
Recruits were assembled every evening at the general staff build-
ing in Coral Gables, issued khaki uniforms and driven to the deac-
tivated Marine Corps air base at nearby Opa-locka. From there they
were flown to Guatemala in unmarked U. S. Air Force transports.
Families and friends gathered to bid them farewell and press
into their hands paper bags with sandwiches and cold chicken. There
was feverish activity at the Front's headquarters on Biscayne Boule-
vard. Doctors and nurses were leaving for the field hospitals. The whole
movement could not have been more obvious to the Castro agents if
the rebel volunteers had marched down Flagler Street with drums and
fifes, and signs proclaiming, "Guatemala, Here We Come."
In these final days of preparation, President Kennedy ordered
the Immigration and Naturalization Service to arrest ex-Senator Mas-
ferrer. (After the invasion failed, Masferrer was released on bail pend-
ing a hearing.) CIA Director Dulles assured inquirers that all Hatis-
tianos had been weeded out. Unknown to him, such Batista officers as
the San Roman brothers were then reconfirmed in their commands.
Ten days before the invasion, Captain Artime was given the top
command by the CIA., which failed to consult Manuel Ray on this
vital decision. This violated the secret agreement, and Ray considered
quitting the Revolutionary Council. But then, in the interest of unity,
continued
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 Approved For Release 2003/10/10 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000200200001-1
The underground "co-ordinator" heard of the invasion from the author
lie told his followers to go to the Guatemala training camps.
His men, however, got only as far as a farm near the Bauer Drive
on the outskirts of Miami. About 120 of them were placed under
guard there by Front and CIA agents, along with a contingent of ofli-
cers who had escaped from a Cuban prison in December. Inexplicably,
they were prevented from going to Guatemala.
At this very late stage, Ray was still confident that the under-
ground would be called upon to play a major role in the forthcoming
attack, though he had not been told when the invasion would occur.
Oddly enough, the Ray underground began receiving explosives
and weapons from the CIA in the last few weeks before the invasion.
Consequently, it launched a major sabotage campaign designed to
soften up the defenses of the Castro regime before the big assault.They
set on fire the big Hershey sugar mill and burned the huge El Encanto
department store in Havana and a wholesale house. in Santiago.
The underground's plans-which. unbelievably, were not co-
ordinated with the invasion plans-called for a concentrated sabotage
campaign in the second week of April, with Havana power plants,
major highways and railroads as the main targets.
The "National Co-ordinator" of the underground was smuggled
out of Cuba and taken to New York for sessions with the Revolutionary
Council. He was supplied with two tons of powerful C-4 plastic explo-
sives and ordered back to Cuba. But neither he nor any other leader
of the underground was told that the date for the invasion had already
been set and that the invasion armada was being assembled in Puerto
Cabezas in Nicaragua.
CISTRO'S "DESTROYED" AIR FORCE STRIKES
The U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the idea of carrying
out the landings on the swampy coast of Cicnaga de Zapata, in the
elongated Bay of Pigs. But not a bridge was blown up nor a railroad
line destroyed to prevent Castro from bringing forces swiftly to this
invasion point. The CIA, with supreme confidence in its plan, and
determined to keep out political groups it did not favor, had neglected
to inform the Cuban underground of the date or place of the landing.
The underground "co-ordinator" was fast asleep in a modest
Miami home when the news of the invasion came at dawn of April 17.
I l l s voice broke when he asked me on the telephone at 5 a.m., "Do you
really mean that an invasion has started without us?" It had indeed.
Since midnight, rebel soldiers in leopard-spot camouflage uniforms
had been pouring ashore from five Liberty ships, chartered by dummy
operators for the CIA and the Revolutionary Council.
At daybreak, C-54 and C-46 transport planes, flying from Guate-
mala and Nicaragua, began dropping paratroopers over the Ray of
Pigs swamp. Eight or nine rebel B-26 bombers and obsolete P-51
fighters flew cover over the beachhead.
By midmorning, however, it became horribly clear how badly
the invasion planners had miscalculated the entire project. The tiny
Castro air force-which was supposed to have been destroyed on the
ground two days earlier by Guatemala-based B-26's painted with
Cuban insignia, or to have defected at the news of the invasion-
quickly gained control of the air. That was the beginning of the end
of the beachhead.
What the rebels had momentarily gained by the element of sur-
prise was promptly lost by their inability to follow up their initial
success. Before noon of April 17, the Castro aircraft had sunk the
Liberty ship carrying all the communications equipment, the entire
Fifth Battalion of the invasion force and stores of weapons. (These
extra weapons had been brought for the guerrillas that the CIA
expected to materialize in these remote marshes. )
In the first hours of combat, a rebel column had thrust almost
30 miles inland along a narrow road leading from the swamp toward
the heartland of Cuba. But a battalion of Castro's well-trained militia
from Cienfuegos was able to halt the surprised rebels long enough for
heavy reinforcements to swing into battle.
These reinforcements, including Soviet-made tanks and heavy
guns carried on flatbed trucks, were able to reach the beachhead area
swiftly, using highways that might have been cut by the underground.
Lacking any advance information, the underground lighters did noth-
ing. The equally bewildered civilian population was mystified. And
so, it seems, were the invasion troops themselves.
Testimony by many of the prisoners indicated that the invaders
fully expected sea-and-air support by United States forces. The orig-
inal plan seemingly called for participation in the invasion by IT. S.
aircraft and Navy ships, but two weeks before the attack, President
Kennedy resolved to let the Cubans go it alone. Cuban rebel soldiers
were not told of the change in strategy, except for Kennedy's state-
ment in a news conference several days before the attack that no
American would become involved in the anti-Castro enterprise. (The
five-ship armada, however. was escorted by two U. S. destroyers as
far as Grand Cayman Island. ) This was the final ingredient in the
inevitable defeat.
Even in the closing moments of this drama, the fantastic con-
fusion that characterized the rebel undertaking from the moment of
its inception was still apparent. Aboard a ship off the coast of Cuba. a
rebel captain commanding a guerrilla force that was to land in his
native Oriente province unbelievingly read sealed orders instructing
him to land in a province he hardly knew. He sailed away.
In a house near Miami. guarded by armed CIA agents, a virtually
captive Cuban Revolutionary Council listened incredulously to radio
newscasts narrating the tale of the disaster. An elderly man wept
while staring at the duffel bag containing the field uniform he hope(] to
wear as he stepped ashore in Cuba to proclaim a rebel government.
In Caribbean waters all around Cuba, passing ships and yachts
picked up exhausted and half-dead rebel infiltrators who had boarded
small craft in Florida for commando landings to help a revolution that
never had a chance.
In 72 hours, it was all over.
"It says 298. Subtracting inc makes it 257."
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