IT'S TIME FOR A CHANGE --BEFORE IT'S TOO LATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000200200005-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 8, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN

A6154
and the sentiments of Congress, the problem
deserves our earnest study at this time.
I hope that these comments will clarify
the position of the Department in these
matters.
Sincerely yours,
DEAN RVSK.
Some Depressed Areas Created by
Washington Deskmen
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. BRUCE ALGER
OF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 7, i96i
Mr. ALGER. Mr. Speaker, a number
of people living in what they believed
to be prosperous and happy communi-
ties, have recently been told by Wash-
ington bureaucrats that actually they
are in depressed areas. This is the ridic-
ulous extremes to which paternal gov-
ernment and uncontrolled bureaucracy
DP 000200200005-7 August 8
Nebraska public officials and businessmen
were equally bewildered by this surge of
solicitude from Washington. The chief of
the State division of resources said that all
he had learned on a trip to Washington to
be briefed on the workings of the depressed
area law was that counties fn every State
would be found eligible.
So this program looks a good deal like a
device to spread around political favor in
the hope of expressions of gratitude at the
polls, and Che end is pursued even if the
Democrats are obliged to discover depression
where it doesn't exist.
~._" --..___.w ..
It's Time for aChange-Before it's Too
Late
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, August 8, 1961
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I com-
mend to the attention of our colleagues
the following special report of the Na-
munity is a going concern, nanaung do tion on the Central Intelligence Agency.
the satisfaction of its own citizens, the This report, by Fred J. Cook, is dated
problems which come up from day to June 24, 1961.
day> it has to be a depressed area if Mr. Cook took his information from
some bureaucrat in Washington decides published sources and I do not care to
it should be. Once the decision is made comment on the validity of all of his
we appropriate more money to force aid conclusions; but only say that it is time
upon people who do not want it. For for achange-and we had better hurry,
my part I will trust the people to decide before it is too late.
upon the economic condition of the The report follows:
areas in which they live. You may be TaE CIA. .
interested in the facts concerning some
of the communities .designated as de-
pressed by the Washington deskmen,
as outlined in the following editorial
from the Chicago Daily Tribune:
THOSE DEPRESSED AREAS
Senator JOHN TOWER of Texas announced
indignantly the other day that the Kennedy
administration, in its quest to find places
where it could spend almost $400 million ex-
tracted from Congress for aid to areas of
chronic economic depression, had designated
47 east Texas counties as depressed. It did so,
he said, without their knowledge and with-
out consulting business leaders.
Senator TOWER said that 6 weeks before
Smith County was labeled a depressed area,
two large industrial corporations had an-
nounced that they were about to construct
plants there. He said that in a single week
residents of the city of Tyler, in that county,
had taken out permits to build $374,000 worth
of houses, which would hardly suggest de-
pression.
Similar complaints were heard from Ne-
braska, where 12 central Nebraskan counties
were named as depressed areas by the De-
partment of Commerce. They thus become
eligible for redevelopment funds out of the
administration's kitty.
One of these, Dawson County, is one of
the most prosperous agricultural counties
in the Nation, according to Representative
MARTIN of Nebraska. The Census Bureau
reported last year that agricultural produc-
tion in the county amounted to more than
$60 million. At Cozad, a town of 3,000 in
Dawson County, the Monroe Auto Equip-
ment Co., of Michigan, recently completed a
new ~41/a million plant offering jobs to 260
persons. It encountered difllcultyYn obtain-
ing this many workers because of full em-
ployment in south central Nebraska.
articles for the Nation-"The FBI," "The
Shame of New York," and "Gambling, Inc.;'
have won him important journalism prizes
for the last 3 years. In giving him the as-
signment, we told Mr. Cook to stick to the
public record; we did not want him to at-
tempt to seek out undisclosed -facts or to
probe into possibly sensitive areas. His as-
signment was simply to summarize existing
published material which, long since avail-
able to potential enemies, was still not read-
ily available to the American public. Mr.
Cook has followed our instructions. There
is not a fact hereafter set forth which has
not already been published. Yet, put to-
gether, these facts add up to a story that
proved new to us, as we are certain it will
prove new to the reader. And Enough of the
known facts are presented to warrant an in-
formed judgment about the agency. For
what Mr. Cook proves is what Sir Compton
Mackenzie demonstrated for Nation readers
in another connection (see "The Spy Circus:
Parasites With Cloaks and Daggers," Dec.
5, 1959)' namely, that intelligence of the
cloak-and-dagger variety is a two-edged
sword, and that the sharper edge is some-
times held toward the throat of the wielder.
And another lesson that Mr. Cook drives
home is this: clearly the CIA must be di-
vested of its action of operational functions
and restricted to the sole function of gather-
ing information for other agencies operating
under customary constitutional safeguards.)
PART I. SECRET HAND OF THE CIA
Shortly before B p.m. on December 5, 1957,
a faceless man dropped a letter into a mail
pox in New York City's Grand Central Sta-
tion area. It was to the editor of the Nation.
The opening sentence read: "As an American
intelligence officer, i feel duty bound to state
my apprehensions as to the future of my
country." What was the basis of these ap-
prehensions? The threat of rampant world
communism? The menace of Soviet weap-
onry? The dangers of internal subversion?
No. The writer, whose letter bore in almost
every line intrinsic evidence of minute and.
intimate knowledge, was concerned about
(EDI'TOR'S NOTE:-"The only time the peo- .just one crucial aspect of the times-the
pie pay attention to us," Allen Dulles once mortal damage America was inflicting upon
said of the CIA, "is when we fall flat on our itself. This was a damage, he sound, that
face"-or words to that effect. But as Mr. resulted directly from the careers and the
Dulles would be the first to concede, the power and the misconceptions of two men:
reason for the default lies not with the peo- the late John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of
pie, but with the CIA itself. The disastrous State, and his younger brother, Allen Welsh
gay of Pigs episode is not the only fiasco Dulles, then as now head of the vitally im-
that can be laid at the door of the lavishly portant Central Intelligence Agency, the of-
financed CIA. But in this latest Rasco more ficial eyes and ears of American foreign
of the facts came to light than in similar policy, the medium that gathers and sifts
earlier episodes. Now, therefore, seemed an and judges information-and so conditions
excellent time, while the facts of the Cuban the minds and predetermines the decisions
fiasco are fresh in mind, to take a look at of American policy makers on the highest
an agency which is of vital concern to na- levels.
tional security and the well-being of the Now, 4 years later, in the wake of the
people, but abouC which the people know less Cuban disaster--and other less publicized
than about any major agency of Government. but ..equally significant disasters-the words
What interested us, as editors, were not the of the intelligence agent who unburdened
immediate causes of the particular fiasco; himself in that letter read like the most in-
we do not propose to join the feverish post- fallible of prophecies. America was being
mortem search for scapegoats. Our concern pushed along the road to foreign policy dis-
was with the basic question: How did this asters, he wrote, by the closed minds of the
extraordinary agency come into being? What Dulles brothers-by their refusal to face facts
is known about its record? How does it as facts and their insistence redetermined
fit into the Alerican constitutional scheme facts into the framework of p
of things? On the face of it, an inquiry into policy.
an agency dedicated, as is the CIA, to secrecy This is the way the intelligence officer
in its plaauring, its operations, its personnel, phrased it:
and its budget, presents a difficult journal- "The following circumstances are cause for
istic undertaking. But a considerable deep concern:
amount of material has been published about "i. U.S. foreign policy is not formulated
the agency and its operations, some of it on the basis of an objective analysis of facts,
clearly inspired by the CIA with the ap- particularly those made available by intelli-
proval of its.Director. True, most of the ma- gence service, but is being determined by
terial is scattered and disparate, consisting of John Foster Dulles' personal rash concep-
small items which, taken alone, have little tions.
meaning. But when put together by aIi " 2. The fact that Allen Dunes is in charge
astute craftsman, they form a significant of collection and evaluation of all informa-
pattern. The easiest part of our job was to tion makes it possible for the Secretary of
find the craftsman. Fred J. Cook's special State to distort the information received as
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- APPENDIX A6153
come, particularly when German reparations should pay compensation for the property of program should not be shifted to the loan
come to ar3 end in 1963. those who do not return. Conceivably, Is- category under the new Aid for International
It is possible that Israel might have bal- reel may be expected to repatriate some ref- Development program. Israel has an annual
anted her economy by this time if she had ugees to reunite families. But I do not see growth rate of 8 percent, a per capita income
been permitted to live normally. But Israel how anyone could expect Israel to repatriate of something more than $1,000 per annum,
is a besieged state. She is surrounded by hos- any substantial number in advance of a and an ability to administer a technical as-
tile countries, some of whom-the United peace settlement. The United Nations reso- sistance program oP its own for the benefit-
Arab Republic and Iraq-have been receiving lution of 1948, which is always cited in this of a number of other countries. These
weapons from the Soviet Union and some of connection, clearly intended that repatria- favorable and welcome developments, juxta-
whom-Jordan and Saudi Arabia-have been tion should come in the context oP peace ne- posed with the foreign aid criteria now be-
receiving military aid from the United States. gotiatiens. And as long as Arab leaders re- fore the Congress, support the view that
I have never been able to understand why fuse to negotiate with Israel, and persist in while assistance to Israel should continue at
our Government did not grant military aid the threat of war, it is most unlikely that present levels it may readily be on the basis
to Israel-especially since we have not hest- Israel would open its doors to potential of loans and surplus commodities rather
toted to provide military assistance to coun- enemies. than grants. What recise
tries which have been at war with her. Any Father Vincent Kearney, associate editor of be undertaken, and what agent es should exa
other country menaced by Soviet weapons America, national Catholic weekly, wrote in tend the assistance, are matters still to be
has been granted our military aid, without that publication an April 9, 1960: finally determined. I should like to assure
question and without delay; And many of "Nor is it reasonable to expect Israel to you, however, that this administration has
these countries have not shared Israel's ded- commit national suicide by opening her bor- no intention of reducing the volume.
ication to Yreedom and her commitment to ders to a million potential enemies--the dis- To turn to the question oP the UNRWA
coni;ribute to the defense of the free world. placed Palestine. refugees. Israel still pro- appropriation, i am most grateful for your
As a consequence of our attitude, lacking tests it is ready to negotiate a settlement. expression of support in the difRcult ques-
military air and denied membership in any We cannot know what Israel will propose, tion of how to diminish the substantial eco-
eollective security system, Israel has been unless the opportunity is given it to meet nomic burden on this Government and at
compelled to buy weapons from European Arab leaders face to face."
countries and to divert a large part of her the same time meet adequately the human-
resources to defense. On top oP this, Israel's Under these circumstances, 2 find it hard itarian problem of the Arab refugees. Re-
economy has been further burdened because to credit newspaper reports that the admin- ports that the administration is pressing
of the Arab bogcott and blockade which has istration intends to press Israel to take i;he Israel to repatriate Arab refugees because of
continued largely because it has not been initiative by offering to repatriate all who pressure from the Appropriations Committee
effectively challenged by Western overn- want to return. If these reports are accurate, 'or that we expect Israel to receive Arabs in
ments and the United Nations. g then it seems to me that we are raising false a manner or in numbers to threaten her
I am aware that our grants and loans have hopes in the minds of the Arab refugees. security are without foundation. The De-
decisively helped Israel to surmount these The published texts of the President's mes- partment is not unmindful of congressional
economic obstaples and to overcome the sage to the Arab leaders speak of "repatria- concern with appropriations made annually
handicaps she has suffered because of her tion or compensation," but do not men- without visible evidence oP progress towards
heavy defense requirements. But now that tion the ward resettlement, so far as Z can an eventual solution of the problem. How-
grant aid to Israel is coming to an end, I discover. It is wrong to foster the illusion ever, I would agree with you that more
am most concerned about the administra- in the minds of the Arab refugees that we important is moving towards a satisfactory
tion's future plane. I would .like to in uire really believe that the primary and initial resolution of the Arab-Israel problem.
whether the administration intends to allow burden rests on Israel and that we are in- The amount that we are seeking for sup-
Israel to bortrow adequate funds in the form different to her security and survival. We port of UNRWA in fiscal year 1962 is, as you
oP development loans under the new ro- should be clear on this issue and leave no remark, not a heavy price to pay for stability
gram. It seems to me that the ver least doubt in the minds of the Arabs that we in the Near East area. However, last year,
y advocate resettlement as the logical solu- the committee of the conference on the
we can do is to maintain our loans and sur- tion.
plus food shipments to Israel at a high level, authorization bill, in its report, specifically
so that she may continue to cope with the Let me emphasize that members of the stated that the United States should suc-
problems that confrgnt a country which lives -House Appropriations Committee would like cessively reduce its contributions to UNRWA.
in a state of intolerable siege. I feel certain to see this problem solved as quickly as pos- The funds appropriated for UNRWA at that
that many Members of the House. share my sible. But it is precisely because we do want time were less than what we had considered
views in this regard. to see this issue solved, equitably and swift- to be necessary. Even now, UNRWA is faced
It Ss a source of great disappointment that ly' that it is wrong to encourage the Arabs with a shortfall in its basic relief budget.
the Arab refugee problem remains unsolved to believe that we intend to force Israel Although our request for funds for UNRWA
and that we must continue to appropriate to repatriate them. If we persist in this in fiscal year 1962 is slightly above last year's
funds annually for the UNRWA without line, the Arabs will never be willing to ar.- appropriation for this purpose, the incre-
any visible or tangible progress toward a cept any resettlement. This would prove a went being specifically earmarked for the
solution. disservice to the best interests of the refugees expanded UNRWA vocational training pro-
But I would like to make it clear, Mr. themselves and would make ft necessary for gram, we quite frankly have had to bear in
Secretary, that, however much we may re- us to continue the UNRWA appropriations mind the fact that if inadequate funds are
Bret this expenditure, this is one item in the indefinitely-a burden we have no right i;o appropriated UNRWA will be unable to per-
foreign old appropriations which will con- impose on our taxpayers without the prom- form its responsibilities and as a result the
tinue to have my augport and I think the ise of progress. refu ee
With kindest regards, I am, g problem will be cast adrift. We are
support of Congress as a whole. It is a Sincerely, by no means wedded to the indefinite con-
necessary and humanitarian measure. And tinuation of UNRWA, but believe, for the
it is not a heavy price to pay for stability. JoHrr J. ROONEY, time being at least, continued support of the
'T'his does not mean to say we are satis- The following is Secretary Rusk's re- agency offers the most efficient and eco-
fled to let conditions remain as they are, ply: nomical means of keeping the highly volatile
Obviously we are not. All of us would like refugee problem from erupting to the detri-
tosee some constructive action. I would like THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
to put my views on record because, judging DEAR MR. RO NEY?nThankuly 21, 1961. ment of political stability in the Near East
you Por the area.
from reports in the press, Z am afraid that thoughtful comments, conveyed in your let- With respect to a possible solution of the
the administration may be moving in the ter of July 14, concerning our aid programs Arab refugee problem, the United States
wrong direction. in the Middle East. I appreciate very much continues to support some reasonable imple-
It has been reported that the adminis- having your views which in most respects mentation of paragraph 11 of the United
tration is pressing Israel to repatriate Arab parallel our own. Nations resolution 194 (III) which provides
refugees because oP pressure from the Com- As you know the ultimate terms of Por- g ptfon oP re striation as
inittee on Appropriations. The Arab reso for the refu ees the o p
has said that the administration is ro P eign assistance legislation for fiscal year 1962 law-abiding citizens oP Israel or oP compen-
p posing or the character of assistance to any specifi.~ sation for those who do not wish to return.
that Israel take back as many as 250,000, country are not possible oP definition at this Any repatriation would, in our view, have to
I am mystified by these reports because I time. As far as aid to Israel is concerned, be so implemented as to take fully into
do net believe that Members oP Congress we share your view that there should be no account Israel's legitimate security and eco-
would hold up this appropriation in order radical modification or reduction in pro- nomic requirements. Contrary to press re-
to stampede the administration into under- grams previously carried out in that country. Ports, the administration has made no sug-
taking an initiative. that could prove to be Such consideration as has been required has gestion either to Israel or to the Arab states
both Impractical and unjust. centered on how the. Israel program can of any specific number of refugees who
Most people who have given thought to properly be fitted in to the general foreign should be repatriated. Nor does the De-
the problem are agreed that the large ma- ai$ framework which we are proposing. At; partment have a specific plan in mind, but
settled n tArabACOUntries ee0i course,beIsrael thepsmallLl rant aid om uestfon is whether believes that, consistent with the U.N. Gen-
. g ponent in the Israel eral Assembly resolutions mentioned above
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_e sees fit. Facts thus presented disorientate
sot only the President and Congress but.
_lso the people of the United States.
" 3. As a consequence, our foreign policy
s not based on the real interests of the
Jnited States. It has suffered one defeat
-fter another and may eventually draw us
nto a nuclear war."
Though John Foster Dulles since has died,
.lien Welsh Dulles still rules the CIA, and
he Cuban debacle that his agency sponsored,
-Tanned, and directed has provided graphic
.roof that he still retains his ability to "dis-
rientate not only the President and Con-
ress but also the people of the United
-totes."
Cuba: The lost lesson
No issue of our times lies closer to the core
f the decision of war or peace on which the
erg survival of mankind depends. For from
ur proper understanding of the facts, our
ecognition or denial of complicated and even
t times transparent truths, must derive the
~rmulation of our policies and the most
steful of our- decisions. Cuba is only the
-lost recent and most striking example.
4hen the CIA spurred on the abortive
tivasion under the roseate delusion that
=ubans were chaffing to revolt against the
granny of Fidel Castro, the United States
-thieved only the disgrace and opprobrium
~ a British-style Suez on an even more Futile
male. Not only did the invasion fail igno-
ziniously, but the attempt helped, if any-
hing, to solidify the iron rule of Castro. It
nabled him to pose as the hero of his people,
uccessfully repelling a "foreign" invasion.
t touched off a ripple of reaction through-
~at Latin America where people, while they
zay not want a dictator like Castro, want no
tore the gratuitous meddling in their in-
~rnal affairs by the American giant to the
-0rth. It takes no seer to perceive that all
he evil frusta of the Cubari blunder have
of yet been reaped.
Shockingly, in this context come indica-
_ons that the U.S. Government, instead of
-arning a most salutary lesson from the
ixban fiasco, has determined. to turn its
ack even more resolutely upon facts and
=uth. In the last week of April, after offi-
lals on every level should have had time tp
3gest the moral of Cuba, some 400 newspa-
-er editors and columnists were called to
Jashington for a background briefing on
reign policy by the State Department. As
rimes Higgins, of the Gazette and Daily
York, Pa.), later wrote, "There developed
t this conference a very evident tendency
u the part of the Government to blame the
e'ess, at least part of the press, for spoiling
axe plans of the Central Intelligence Agency."
'he Government theory plainly was, not that
~fe whole conception was faulty, but
not too much had been printed about
ze gathering of Cuban invasion forces-
nd that this had alerted Castro and
wined an otherwise promising endeavor.
1fe head-on collison of this comforting the-
ry with the most elemental facts about
aodern Cuba was ignored with great de-
~rmination-with such great determina-
on, indeed, that President Kennedy, in a
Beech to a convention of American news-
aper editors, suggested that the editors,
More they printed a story, ask themselves
-ot only "Is it news?" but "Is it in the in-
=rest of national security?" Such a cen-
~rship, even if only voluntary, would in-
~itably result in increasing the blackout of
aformation from which the American peo-
le have suffered since the end of World
Tar II. As James Higgins wrote, "The truth
F the story * * * was not to be considered
n important measure of its rights to see
tint. * * * I got the impression in Wash-
~gton of a governmental closed mind.
This is a liability that could be fatal to
_1 mankind in a world. teetering on the
age of thermonuclear disaster. What
America so obviously needs is not fewer
facts' but more, not deceptive images that
fit our prejudices and preconceptions, but
truth-however unpalatable. What Amer-
ica needs is the unvarnished truth about
Chiang Kai-shek, about Quemoy and Matsu,
about Laos, about Latin America-and es-
pecially about Cuba, the island (as the
President so often has reminded us) that 1s
just 90 miles from our shores, the island
about which our secret and public misin-
formation has been demonstrated to be quite
literally colossal.
2'he Agency nobody knows
In this all-pervasive atmosphere of the
shut mind and the distorted fact, Cexitral
Intelligence is the key, the vital Agency.
Yet it is the one Agency of Government
about which the American people are per-
mitted to know almost nothing, the one
Agency over which their own elected repre-
? sentatives are permitted to have v#rtually no
control. CIA is the only Agency whose
budget is never discussed, whose Director can
sign a voucher for any amount without
checkup or explanation. Haw many persons
does it employ, how many agents does it
have? Even Congressmen do not know pre-
cisely. Its Washington headquarters staff
alone is estimated to consist of more than
10,000 employees; in total, it is believed to
have more persons on its payroll than the
State Department. How much money does
it have at its disposal? Again, even most of
the Congressmen who vote the funds do not
know precisely. CIA itself says this figure
is very tightly held and is known to not more
than flue or six Members in each House.
CIA allotments are hidden in the budgetary
requests of various Government depart-
ments; estimates vary from a low of 18500
million annually to the &1 billion mentioned
by the conservative New York Times. A
billion dollars a year concentrated in the
hands of one man about whose activities the
American people are permitted to know vir-
tually nothing-and about whose activities
it appears to be suggested they should know
even less----represents the kind of power that,
in essence, can well determine the Nation's
course and remove from its people the power
of decision.
Two-Treaded monster
This danger that CIA may not just inform,
but also determine policy, has been en-
hanced from the agency's inception by an
authorized split personality. From the start,
CIA has been atwo-headed monster. It is
not just a cloak-and-dagger agency entrusted
with the important task of gathering in-
formation concerning our potential enemies
throughout the world; it also has the au-
thority to act on its own information,
carrying out in deeds the policies its Intel=
ligence discoveries help to form. Though
its overt acts are supposed to be under the
direction of the National Security Council,
-the risk inherent in such a dual respon-
sibility is obvious. With an end in view,
can intelligence be impartial?
The hazards implicit in such a vast, con-
centrated, double-motive agency were not
unforeseen. Harry Howe Ransom, of Har-
vard, in his "Central Intelligence and Na-
tional Security," describes the reaction of
Adm. Ernest J. King 1n March 1945, when
the Secretary of the Navy sought his views
on the formation of the proposed centralized
intelligence agency. "King replied," Ransom
writes, "that while such an arrangement was
perhaps logical, it had inherent dangers.
He feared that a centralized intelligence
agency might acquire power beyond any-
thing intended, and questioned whether such
an agency might not threaten our form of
government: '
BritLsh intelligence, for centuries con-
sidered one pf the world's most expert, ha8
lgng held, that the wedding of action t0 ilL-
telligence is a fatal flaw in CIA. So have
others. In 1948, Prof. Sherman Kent, of
Yale, himself an intelligence gfficer in
World War II, wrote a treatise on the pur-
poses and the dangers of intelligence opera-
tions in a book called "Strategic Intelligence
for American World Policy." At the time
CIA had just been formed and its perform-
ance lay entirely in the future, but Professor
Kent struck out vigorously at what he called
"the disadvantage of getting intelligence too
close to policy:' He added:
"This does not necessarily mean officially
accepted high U.S. policy, but something
far less exalted. What I am talking of is
often expressed by the words "slant," "line,"
"position," and "view." Almost any man
or group of men confronted with the duty
of getting something planned or getting
something done will sooner or later hit upon
what they consider a single moat desirable
course of action. Usually it is sooner; some-
times, under duress, it is a snap judgment off
the top of the head.
"I cannot escape the belief that under
the circumstances outlined, intelligence will
find itself right in the middle of policy, and
that upon occasions it will be the unabashed
apologist for a given policy rather than its
impartial and objective analyst."
It takes no particular insight to find the
seeds of the Cuban fantasy in that percep-
tive paragraph.
In the aftermath of so monumental a
blunder as Cuba, however, it seems pertinent
to inquire: Just what is the record of CIA2
Are its successes overbalanced by its tail-
ures7 And does it, in its dual role of secret
agent and activist operative, not merely in-
form our foreign policy but, to a large meas-
ure at least, determine it?
Let it be said at once that there can be
no exact scoreboard chalking up the runs,
hits and errors of CIA. Allen Dulles himself
has commented that the only time his
agency- makes the headlines is when it
falls fiat on its face in public. Its suc-
cesses, he intimates, cannot be publicized
for the obvious reason that to do so might
give away some of the secrets of his far-
flung intelligence network. This is true, but
only partially so. For CIA, while it refrains
from public announcements, does not dis-
dain the discreet and controlled leak. And
some of these Teske have found their way
into such prominence as Saturdaq Evening
Post exclusives.
Whe~?e the CIA succeeds
Despite the secrecy of CL4, therefore, there
is on the public record, in the 14 years since
its creation in 1947, a partial and, indeed,
highly significant record of its deeds. And
by this record it is possible to judge it. Let's
look first at some of the achievements.
In 195b, a CIA comxxfunications expert,
studying a detailed map of Berlin, discovered
that at one point the main Russian tele-
phone lines ran only 300 yards from a radar
station in the American sector. The CIA
dug an underground tunnel, tapped the
cables and, for months, before the Russians
got wise, monitored every telephonic whisper
in the Soviet East Sector.
In 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev delivered
his famous secret speech denouncing the
crimes of Josef Stalin before the 20th Com-
munist Party Congress, a CIA agent man-
aged to get the text and smuggle it out to
the Western world. Washington was able to
reveal the explosive contents before the So-
viets themselves had edited the speech for
public consumption. The blow was probably
one of the strongest ever struck at Commu-
nist ideology. Communist parties in the
United States and other Western countries,
long taught by Communist propaganda to
regard Stalin with reverence, felt that the
bedrock of belief had been cut out from
under them.
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 Av156 ~ ~ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -.APPENDIX August 8
The U-2 spy plane operation, a risky pro-
c~dure that backfired disastrously in the end,
was for years one of the world's most suc-
cessful feats in espionage. From 15 miles
tzp, this plane took pictures of such in-
cradible clarity and detail- that it was pos-
sible to distinguish between a cyclist and a
pedestrian; its radio receivers, which moni-
tored all wavelengths, recorded literally
millions of words. A single flight across
Russia often furnished enough assorted in-
foz?mation to keep several thousand CIA em-
ployees working for weeks, and the flights
lasted for 4 years before, at the beginning
of May 1960, on the very eve of the sched-
uled summit conference in Paris, pilot
Francis Powers took off on the mission on
which he was shot down. The bad judgment
implicit in ordering the flight at such a deli-
cate time, the ridiculous CIA cover story
that Powers was gathering weather data,. the
solemn promulgation of this fairytale and
the swift subsequent exposure of the United
States before the world as an arrant lfar-
all of this wrecked the summit, forced the
United States to abandon the U-2 aerial
espionage program, and inflicted enormous
worldwide damage on American prestige.
Whether, in the ideological war for men's
minds, the ultimate tarnishing of the Ameri-
can image outweighs the positive details
garnered by the U-2's in 4 years of success-
ful espionage remains a forever unresolved
point of debate. For one thing, the ideologi-
cal war goes on, neither finally won nor ir-
retrievably lost; for another, no one except
on the very highest and most closely guarded
levels of Government can possibly know just
how vitally important were the details the
U-2 gathered.
Though the U-2 program became, in its
catastrophic finale, a fulcrum of policy, the
significant pattern that emerges from the
Berlin wiretapping, the smuggling of the
Khrushchev speech, the years-long earlier
successes of U-2, seems fairly obvious. All
dealt with intelligence-and intelligence
only. The intent was to gather the kind of
broad and detailed information on which an
intelligent foreign policy may be based.
These activities did not in themselves con-
stitute active meddling in, or formation of,
policy. Unfortunately, not all CIA activities
call into this legitimate intelligence role;
time and again, CIA has meddled actively
in the internal affairs of foreign govern-
ments. And it is in this field that some of its
most vaunted successes raise grave questions
about the drift and intent of our foreign
policy.
Where it fails
Here are some of the high spots of CIA in
Suternational intrigue:
In 1953, with Allen Dulles himself playing
a leading role, CIA sparked a coup that
ousted Mohammed Mossadegh as Premier of
Iran. Mossadegh, a wealthy landowner, rose
to political power by capitalizing on popu-
lar hatred of the British Anglo-Iranian 011
Co., which dominated the economy of the
nation, exporting Iran's greatest national
resource by payment to the national treas-
ury of what Mossadegh considered a mere
pittance. Mossadegh set out to nationalize
the oil industry in Iran's interest, allied him-
self with pro-Communist forces in Teheran,
and virtually usurped the power of Shah
Mohammed Reza PahlevY. When he did, a
successful CIA plot bounced Mossadegh out
of office so fast he hardly knew what had hit
him;. the Shah was restored to power; and a
four-nation consortium, in partnership with
the Iranian Government, was given control
over the country's liquid gold. CIA showed
a tendency, if not to brag, at least to chuckle
1n public about this wily and triumphant
coup; but the aftermath has furnished no
cause for unalloyed rejoicing. The United
States poured millions of dollars into Iran
to shore up the government of the anti-
Communist Shah. A congressional coznmit-
tee found in 1957 that, in 5 years, Iran had
received a gtzarter of a billion dollars in
American aid. Yet the Iranian people them-
selves had not profited. So marry American
dollars had stuck to the fingers of corrupt
officials that Iran was running up constant
deficits, though the congressional commit-
tee found that it should have been fully
capable, with its oil revenues, of financing
its own national development. Despite the
hundreds of millions of dollars in American
aid, Iran remained- so primitive that, in some
isolated towns, in this 20th century, residents
had yet to see their first wheeled vehicle; a
whole family might live for a year on the
produce of a single walnut tree; and small
children labored all day at the looms of rug
factories for 20 cents or less. Small wonder,
as Time reported in 1900, that Mossadegh "is
still widely revered"; small wonder either
that a new Premier, appointed. by the Shah
in early May 1961, after a riotous outbreak
in Teheran, was described by the Associated
Press as the Shah's "last hope of .averting
bankruptcy and possible revolution."
In 1954, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman wou an
election in Guatemala and achieved supreme
power. This democratic verdict by the
Guatemalan electorate was not pleasing to
the United States. American officials de-
scribed the Arbenz regime as communistic.
'this has been disputed, but there is no ques-
tion that Arbenz was sufficiently leftist in
orientation to threaten the huge land hold-
ings of Guatemala's wealthy classes and the
imperial interests of United Fruit and other
large American corporations. Amsrican dis-
enchantment with Arbenz needed only a
spark to be exploded into action, and the
spark was supplied by Allen Dulles and CIA.
Secret agents abroad spotted a Palish
freighter being loaded with Czech arms and
ammunition; CIA operatives around the
world traced the peregrinaT.lons of the
freighter as, after several mysterious changes
of destination, she finally came to port and
began unloading the munitions destined for
Arbenz. Then CIA, with the approval of the
National Security Council, struck. Two
Globemasters, loaded with arms and am-
munition, were flown to Honduras and Nica-
ragua. There the weapons were placed in
the hands of followers of an exiled Guate-
malan Army officer, Col, Carlos Castillo
Armas. He invaded Guatemala, and the
Arbenz regime collapsed like a pack of cards.
It is perhaps significant that the Guate-
malan blueprint was practically identical
with the one CIA followed this April in the
attempt to overthrow Castro. Only Castro
was no Arbenz. In any evert, Guatemala,
like Iran, remains one of the CIA's most pub-
licly acknowledged coups; and, like Iran, the
sequel raises disturbing doubts about
precisely what was gained. l~or the prom-
ises of the CIA-backed Castillo forces to in-
stitute social and democratic reforms have
not yet materialized. Half of the arable land
in the nation of 4 million persons still re-
mains in the hands of 1,100 families. The
economy of the country is dominated by
three large American corporations, topped by
United Fruit. Workers in the vineyards of
United Fruit staged a strike in 1955 trying
to get their wages of ffi1.80 a d:zy raised to ffi3.
They lost. And Guatemala is still a dis-
tressed country-so deeply distressed that
the Kennedy administration feels it must
have several more bushels of American aid.
In 1954 and again in 1958, the United
States almost went to war with Communist
China over the rocky islets of Quemoy and
Matsu, squatting less than 3 miles off the
Chinese coast. When Red Chinese artillery
barrages blanketed the islands, heavily
overpopulated with Chiang Kai-shek troops,
American public opinion was conditioned to
reset angrily to these aggressive actions.
What hardly any Americans realized at the
time was that the Red Chinese had been
subjected to considerable provocation. A21en
Dulles' CIA. had established, on Formosa,
an outfit known as Western Enterprises,
Inc. This was nothing more than a blind
for CIA; and, as Stewart Alsop later wrote
in the Saturday Evening Post, CIA agents,
operating from this cover, masterminded
commando-type guerrilla raids on the
mainland * * * in battalion strength. The
title to Alsop?s article told all: "The Story
Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to
War.,,
In 1960 and again in 1961, the landlocked
Indochina principality of Laos threatened
the peace of the world in a tug-of-war be-
tween East and .West. Again the American
public was confronted with glaring headlines
picturing the nzenace of an on-sweeping
world communism; it was given, at the out-
set at alzy rate-and first impressions in in-
terztational sensations are almost always the
ones that count--practically no understand-
ing of underlying issues. Yet a congres-
sional committee in June 1959, had filed a
scathing report on one of the most disgrace-
ful of American foreign aid operaitions. The
committee found that, in 7 years, we had
poured more than $300 million into Laos.
This indiscriminate aid had caused runaway
inflation and wrecked the economy of the
country. At our Snsistence, a 25,000-man
army that the Lao didn't want or need-
and one that wouldn't fight-had been
foisted on the Lao people. In a eom-
pletely batched-tzp program, American resi?
dent geniuses spent some $1.6 million tc
bixzld a highway, built no highway, and
wound up giving all southeast Asia a vivid
demonstration of the most unlovely aspect:
of the American system of bribery, graft, and
corruption. As if this wasn't bad enough
little Laos fairly crawled with CIA agents
These gentry, in late 1960, in another of them
famous coups, overthrew the neutralist gov?
ernment of Prince Souvanna Phouma anc
installed a militarist regime headed by Gen
Phouma Nosavan. The Phouma army clique
had just one qualification to recommend it
but it was a qualification dear to the hear:
of CIA: it was militantly anti-Communist
Unfortunately, this attitude did not recom
mend the new regime as heartily to thi
Lao people as it did to the CIA; Genera
Phouma had almost no popular support, anc
when the Communist Pathet Lao force;
began to gobble up vast chunks of the na
tfon, there was hardly any resistance. Th.
result was inevitable. The United States wa
placed in the humiliating position of prac
tically begging to get the very type of neu
tralist government its CIA had conspired t~
overthrow. A greater loss of face in face
conscious Asia c?quid hardly be imagined.
Revolutions for hire?
These are just a few of the best-docu
mented examples of CIA's meddling in the
internal affairs of other nations. There ar
others. There is the case of Burma, oa
whom CIA foisted unwanted thousands n
Chiang Kai-shek's so-called freedom fight
ers-warriors who found it much pleasance
to take over practically an entire Burmes
province and grow opium than to fight th
Red Chinese. There was this spring's Alger
fan Arrny revolt against Gen. Charle
de Gaulle, an event in which an accusin
French press contends the CIA played a~
encouraging hand. CIA categorically denie
it, but French officialdom, suspicious as
result of previous CL9 meddling in Frenc;
nuclear-arms program legislation, has re
frained from giving the American agency
full coat of whitewash.
Such activities obviously range far beyon
the bounds of legitimate intelligence Bath
ering. No one will argue today, in the ten
sions of a cold war that at almost an
moment might turn hot, against the nee
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 1961
Appr~~.~~rER~?e~NALORECORD CI APPENDIX 3468000200200005- A
615
for an expert intelligence-gathering agency.
But does it follow that we need and must
have an agency geared to the overthrow of
governments in any and all sections of the
world? Have we, who pose (most oP us sin-
cerely) as a truly democratic people, the
right to send our secret agents to determine
for the people of Iran or Guatemala or Laos
what government shall rule them? We
have never proclaimed this right; our pub-
lic officials doubtless would express pious
abhorrence at the thought. But, in the
light of past events, we can hardly be sur-
prised if, to the world at large, CIA actions
speak louder than official protestations.
Nor can we escape the odium of regimes
with which the CIA has saddled us. It fol-
lows as inevitably as day the night that, if
CIA conspires to overthrow a foreign govern-
ment on the blind theory that in the war
against communism anything goes, the
American people as a whole are burdened
with responsibility for the regime that CIA
has helped to install. And the record of
such regimes In many remote corners of the
world is decidedly not pretty. In the Light
of the past, it should be obvious that tkxe
future is not to be won by propping up
puppets with sticky fingers.
On this whole issue, perhaps the most
perceptive piece of writing was produced in
the aftermath of Cuba by Walter Lippmann
in a column entitled "To Ourselves Be True."
Lippmann, fresh from recent interviews with
Khrushchev, wrote:
"We have .been forced to ask ourselves
recently how a free and open society can
compete with a totalitarian state. This is
a crucial question. Can our Western society
survive and flourish if 1t remains true to its
own faith and principles? Or must it
abandon them in order to fight fire with
fire?" Lippmann's answer to this last ques-
tion was a ringing, "No." The Cuban ad-
venture had failed, he wrote, because for
us it was, completely out of character-as
out of character as for a cow to try to fly
or a fish to walk. The United States, of
course, must employ secret agents for its
own information. "But the United States
cannot successfully conduct large secret con-
spiracies," he wrote. "The American con-
science is a reality. It will make hesitant
and ineffectual, even if it does not prevent,
an un-American policy * ? ~ It follows-that
in the great struggle with communism, we
must find our strength by developing and
applying our own principles, not in aban-
doning them."
Probing more deeply, Lippmann analyzed
Khrushchev's philosophy and explained the
Soviet leader's absolute belief in the ultimate
triumph of communism. The Soviet Premier,
he had found, is sincerely convinced that
capitalism is rigid, static; that. it cannot
change, it cannot meet the needs of the
people, the needs of the future. Only com-
munism can, and communism will succeed
capitalism as .capitalism supplanted feudal-
ism. This, with Khrushchev, is "absolute
dogma." Having explained this, Lippmann
then wrote:
"I venture to argue from this analysis that
the reason we are on the defensive in so many
places is that for some 10 years we have been
doing exactly what Mr. K. expects ua to
do. We have used money and arms in a
long, losing attempt to stabilize native gov-
ernments which, in the name of anticom-
munism, are opposed to all important social
change. This has been exactly what Mr. K.'s
dogma calls for-that communism should be
the only alternative to the status quo with
its immemorial poverty and privilege."
We cannot compete with communism,
Lippmann argued, if we continue to place
"the weak countries in a dilemma where
they must stand still with us and our client
rulers, or start moving with communism."
We must offer them "a third option, which
is economic development and social imprave-
7
ment without the totalitarian discipline of allies, he along with other members of the
communism." American delegation skipped across the
Obviously, the philosophy of Walter Lipp- border to Berne in Switzerland. It was lxere
mann is several eons removed from that of that Dulles got his first taste of the secret,
the CIA man, whose record shows he has just high-level intrigue that so often determines
one gage of merit-the rigid rightwing in- the fate of empires and of peoples. As he
flexibility of the anticommunistic puppet later told a visitor; "That's when I learned
regimes that CIA has installed and supported. what a valuable place Switzerland was for
The record suggests that in the CIA lexicon information-and when I became interested
there is no room for social and economic in intelligence work."
reforxns; sxxch phrases imply a possibly Dulles' interest doubtless was stimulated
leftish tendency, and God forbid that we by the heady role he played in the very kind
should ever back such. Let'A give 'em, in- of top-drawex, behind-the-scenes maneuver-
stead, a military dicisatorship. This CIA ing that was to mark the pattern of his later
philosophy-in-action is the very antithesis life. By the beginning of 1918, the creaky
of the American spirit Walter Lippmann was Austro-Hungarian Empire, exhausted by war,
writing about, and to understand how we could perceive plainly before it the hideous
came to be encumbered with it, one must specter of imxninent collapse. Naturally, its
understand the career and ties and outlook Emperor Charles, with a ruler's primal in-
of one man---Allen Welsh Dulles. stinct for self-preservation, wanted to salvage
PART TI. ALLF,N DIILLES: DEGTNNTNGS as much from the ruins as was possible. His
When Allen Dulles was 8 years old, he negotiator in this laudable endeavor was his
wrote a 31-page essay on the Boer War, an former tutor, Dr. Heinrich Lammasch. Lam-
event that was then disturbing the ? con- masch had met the tall and charming Allen
science of the world. The last sentence read: Dulles in Vienna; he was perfectly aware
"I hope the Boers win this war because the that the young man was the nephew of the
Boers are in the right and the british in American Secretary of State; and so, with
that small "b" Sn "British," Dulles explained
that he wrote it that way deliberately be-
cause he didn't like the British at tkxe time
and hoped that small "b" would show just
what he thought of them.
Now, 60 years later, Allen Dulles is very
much the man foreshadowed by the boy
author. The interest in foreign affairs that
led him to write a small book on the Boer
War at the age of 8 (it was actually pub-
lished by a doting grandfather) has re-
mained with him throughout his life.. Some
would say, too, that he retained the strong
prejudices, or the stout convictions (depend-
ing- on how you look at ft), that led him at
the age of 8 to refuse to dignify the British
with a capital letter.
The future master of the CIA was steeped
in the aura of international affairs from
earliest childhood. He was born on April
7, 1893, in Watertown, N.X., where his father,
Allen Macy Dulles, was a Presbyterian min-
ister. His mother, the former Edith Foster,
was the daughter of f>eD. John Watson Fos-
ter, who Sn 1892 had become Secretary of
State in the Republican administration of
Benjamin Harrison. Years later his mother's
brother-in-law, Robert Lansing, was to serve
as Secretary of State in the administration
of Woodrow Wilson.
These family ties were to be influential
both in the career of Allen Dulles and in
that of his brother, John Foster, 5 years his
senior. Allen graduated from Princeton
with Phi Beta Kappa honors in 1914 and
promptly went off to teach English for a
year in a missionary school at Allahabad,
India. Returning to Princeton, he got his
master of arts degree, then followed in the
footsteps of his older brother by joining the
diplomatic service ruled by his uncle, Secre-
tary of State Robert Lansing. On May 16,
1910, when he was 23, he went off to Vienna
as an undersecretary in the American Em-
bassy. Though- the young man himself
could have had no inkling at the time, this
was where it was all to begin; here were to
be woven the first permanent strands into
the career of the future boss oP CIA.
Beginnings in Vienna
Vienna was then the capital of the Austro-
Hungarian empire, the partxxer of Kaiser
Wilhelm's Germany in the bloody warfare
of World War I. America herself was about
to become involved in this most tragic oY
wars, from which the world has yet to sal-
vage aformula for peace. In the striped-
trouser set and the top-level society of
Vienna, young Dulles, the nephew of the
American Secretary of State, quicklp made
his mark; and, when America joined the
possible levels, he approached Dulles and
through him made arrangements for the sal-
- vage talks the Austrians so much desired.
The secret discussions which Allen Dulles
thus played a key role in arranging began on
January 31, 1918, in a villa in Grummlingen,
near Berne, belonging to a director of
Krupp's. Prof. George D. Herron, who often
carried out secret assignments for President
Wilson, headed the American delegation,
Professor Lammasch and industrialist Julius
Meinl led the opposing bargain hunters.
The Austrians were ready to promise almost
anything in the hope of preserving the Haps-
burg monarchy, and the Americans, evidently
blind to the already tarnished luster of the
throne, deluded themselves into the belief
that they were really being offered aprize-
that the Austrian Emperor might be propped
up as "a useful force."
Finding these nice Americans so receptive,
Lammasch was effusive in his promises.
Austria-HUngaxy would be positively de-
1lghted to follow the American lead in every-
thing, especially . iP (does this sound fa-
miliar?) the generous Americans would ex-
tend financial aid and help to build F a
bridge of gold betweexi Vienna and Wash-
ington. Dulles' immediate superior, Hugh
Wilson, was intrigued by the prospect, and
all of the American delegation seems to have
been quite enthusiastic. The British, in-
formed of the proposal, were far more skepti-
cal and warned against trusting too much in
the performance of the Hapsburgs. Events
proved the British so right. The Austrian
monarchy collapsed, Charles abdicated, and
the net result was a fiasco. Yet Time in
1959 could write of this period that Allen
Dulles, in the Switzerland of 1918, "hatched
the first of the grandiose plots which were to
become his tradema.rk."
Introduction to Germany
After Berne came the great peace confer-
ence at Versailles. Secretary of State Lans-
ing, second only to Wilson among the Ameri-
can negotiators, saw to it that his two r_eph-
ews had reserved seats at the great event.
John Foster was given the task of studying
such financial problems as reparations and
war debts; Allen had an even more fasci-
nating job as assistant head of the Depart-
ment of Current Political and Economic Cor-
respondence, a key organization that han-
dled and channeled all communications to
the American delegation. Allen Dulles' im-
mediate bass was Ellis Dressel, a leading
American expert on German affairs and a
man who was convinced that the new So-
viet Union represented a world menace, one
that could be dealt with effectively (shades
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A6158 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX ~'
of 1945) only through a partnership be- later, was to growl at diplomatic myopia never will be revealed, but the effects became
tween America and a revived Germany. and the braid-ors-cutaway tradition:' obvious. In 1930, Colombia got a new Pres-
This was not the prevailing view is that Such, on Dunn's testimony at least-and ident: Dr. Enrique Olaya Herrera, a former
simpler world of 1918 1n which hatred of he soon took the first opportunity to get Colombian Ambassador to the United States
militaristic Germany was the dominating out of Naval Intelligence because he couldn't snd a well-known friend of Wall Street
factor. It is significant mainly because, for stand working with Dulles-was the well- bankers. Soon after his election, he visited
its day, it was an extreme view and because coddled young man who, after 2 years in New York and was promised amillion-dollar
Allen Dulles was quite close to Dressel and the Balkans, was called back to Washing- loan, provided the Barco Concession was hon-
shared many of his beliefs. In December ton to head the State Department's Divi- ored. It was.
1918, and .again in early 1919, Allen accom- sion of Near Eastern Affairs. This adventure in the international di-
panied his superior on trips to Germany dur- The Near East, then as now, was a sensi- plomacy of o1I, revealing in its way, was
1ng which they conferred with high German tive area, and for much the same reason-oil. actually little more than a minor vignette in
industrialists. The bent of Dulles' own British interests had had a hanxmerlock on the ascending careers of Allen Dulles and his
thinking at the time is indicated in a mem- the rich preserves of the entire Mediter- older brother, John Foster. The interests
orandum that he wrote on December 30, 1918, ranean basin and had tried to freeze out and outlook aP the two were intertwined al-
entitled: "Lithuania and Poland, the last American rivals; but now such companies as most inseparably. They were partners in the
barrier between Germany and the Bolshe- Gulf and Standard 011 were no longer to be firm of Sullivan and Cromwell; they repre-
viks:' It evidently was based largely on in- denied. The years during which Dulles sented the same clients and the same Snter-
farmatlon gathered Prom Polish and Lith- headed the key Near Eastern Division were, ests; their two careers moved together in
uanian refugees, and it described the Bolshe- as It so happened, the very years during measured cadence, almost like the steps of
vik menace in the strongest terms. Dulles which the Rockefeller interests in Standard trained dancers. Most important among
even advocated support of Polish-Lithuanian Oil negotiated a toehold in the Iraq Petro- their varied interests, and claiming a major
intervention in Russia, writing:. "The Allies leum Co., and the very years in which the share of their attention, were some of Ger-
should not be deter"red from a military expe- Mellons of Guif were laying the groundwork many's greatest international cartels.
dition because of their fear that it would for valuable concessions in the Bahrein Is- Three of their clients represented the very
require hundreds of thousands of men." lands. Both of these developments became top drawer oP German industry. These were
Peace concluded, Dressel was sent to Ber- public and official in 1927, the year after the Vereinigte Stahlwerke (The Thyssen and
firs as American charga d'affaires in Germany, Dulles lest the State Department to join the Flick trust), IG Farbenindustrie (the great
and Dulles went with him. Here he was N His decision was imotivat d rprimar ly eby tern. lcThe legal wi s tof the D lies b others
thrown into contact with a stream of Ger-
man politicians, industrialists, and Army financial considerations. The. highest sal- aided all three.
officers, many of whom were concerned about ary he had made with State was some $8,000 At the onset of World War-II, the German
the new Communist menace and talked a year, and he was a married man, with a masters of American Bosch Corp. began to
about the possibility of raising a European growing family. Sullivan and Cromwell (in fear for the safety of their holdings, and an
army-spearheaded by German generals, oP which older brother John Foster was already elaborate corporate coverup was arranged.
course-to fight the radical Bolsheviks. a partner) belonged to the legal elite of The Wallenberg brothers, Swedish bankers,
Nothing came of these plans, and Dulles soon Wall Street-one of those law firms that have agreed to take over American Bosch (with
is~as transferred to Constantinople. made themselves the virtual brains of big the promise to return it after the war, of
In later years, the stereotyped portrait of business, supplying indispensable advice on course), but good American front names
Allen Dulles given the American people by almost every financial, industrial, and tom- were needed to provide camouflage. Hence
virtually all of the large media of informs- mercial deal. It advised both the Rocke- it developed that in August 1941, just a few
tion pictures a master spy, a supersleuth, fellers and the Morgans; it fairly reeked of months before Pearl Harbor, John Foster
who confounded his rivals in international the kind of money that solves all a young Dulles became the sole voting trustee of the
intrigue Prom his earliest days. The image, married man's most acute financial problems. majority shares. In 1942, the U.S. Govern-
contrasted with the reality ai what came out In this plush atmosphere, Allen Dulles ment seized the shares, contending Dulles'
of Dulles' first "grandiose plot" at Berne, quickly made himself at home.- He had trusteeship was meerly a device to cloak
seems considerably overblown, but it suffers _ hardly fitted himself into his law chair, enemy interests.
even greater damage when one studies the indeed, before he became involved Sn the Business before polities?
acid pen portrait of Dulles in action in the kind of backstage masterminding that has Equally Close and equally significant was
Balkans left by a veteran American intelli- come to -seem almost second .nature to him the role that Allen Dulles played in the great
Bence officer of the period. ever since. Schroeder international banking house. The
Dabbling in oil The nation in question was the South parent firm was German and was headed by
American state of Colombia. By treaty, Co- Baron Kurt von Schroeder. A genuine scar-
The disenchanted agent was Robert Dunn, lombia had awarded the Morgan and Mellon
a veteran and hard-bitten American news- faced Prussian, the Baron played a key role
interests the extremely rich Barco Conces- in the accession to power of Adolf Hitler.
paperman who had received his initial train- sion, so-called, in Notre de Santander Prov- It was in his villa at Cologne on January 7,
ing in skepticism at the hands of Lincoln Snce. But in 1926, just as Allen Dulles was
Steffens. Dunn later spent nearly 20 years uittin the State Department, Dr. Miguel 1933, that Hitler and von Papers met and
in Naval Intelligence. He was a lieutenant Abadia Mendez was elected President of Co- worked out their deal for the Nazi seizure
in Turkey in those first years of the 1920's lombia. He quickly proved to be a disturb- of power. In subsequent years, von
when Allen Dulles appeared upon the scene. in element in the placid world of American Schroeder remained close to the Nazi hier-
Years later, in his book "World Alive," pub- g archy. He was made SS Gruppenfuehrer
oil interests. He threatened to repudiate the (the equivalent of general), and he was
lashed by Crown in 1956, he wrote as follows: Barco Concession; he aroused great popular
"And now Mr. Secretary of State Colby's support; and worried American oil barons chairman of the secret "F'renden-Kreis S,"
young men were arriving in the flesh to decided they would have to act. They turned which collected funds from Ruhr magnates
whistle at the nymphs on our office ceiling. naturally to their legal brains. One such to finance Heinrich Himmler. Outside Ger_
Among the cooky-pushers strange to a naval brain was. Francis B. Loomis, a former State many, the , Schroeder financial empire
staff came one bettle-browed Boston Brah- Department official; another, Allen W. Dulles. stretched long and powerful tentacles. In
min, rich as a dog's insides with copper pressure was immediately applied on Abadia- England, it had J. H. Schroeder Ltd.; in the
stock. Mendez, but he, stubborn man, wouldn't United States, the Schroeder Trust Co. and
"One Allen Dulles, freckled, with tooth- yield. In August 1928, he accused the Ameri- the J. Henry Schroeder Corp. Allen Dulles
brush mustache, was a serious grad of the sat on the boards of directors of both.
can companies of refusing to pay Colombia Almost any lawyer would contend, of
Princeton Golf Club, fresh from Versailles 'what they owed it for the years 1923-26 and
and drawing the fatal boundaries oP Czecho- reaffirmed his intention of revoking the Bar- course, that there is nothing wrong with
slovakfa." co Concession. This led a secretary in the selling his talents where the money is and
Dunn continues by recounting how a American Embassy Sn Bogota to write Wash- that he has a perfect right to represent any
London Times reporter happened to find in ington that he was convinced "the President client, no matter what his pedigree. The
a secondhand bookstall an ancient volume wfll not withdraw his annulment of the Dulles brothers, however, did not just hap-
irom which anti-Semitic propagandists ob- a.greement until he is forced to do so under Pen to represent an isolated German client
viously had filched the ideas for the "Pro- the pressure of a hard and Past demand." or two; they represented the elite of German
tocols of the Elders of Zion:' Neither the industry, firms closely tied to the Nazi ma-
Times reporter nor Dunn was very much Colombia the gein chinery, over a long period of time, on the
excited by the discovery because, as Dunn Farce was applied. The State Department closest terms and even in directoral capaci-
wrote, the protocols had been well exposed sent a sharp note to Bogota. Colombia tours- ties. Granted the complete propriety of the
by internal evidence as forgeries and hardly trred by threatening to natipnalize all her oil representation, it would be naive in the ex?
anyone took them seriously any more. fields. The United States served Colombia treme to believe that such multiple, close
"But now [Dunn addedj, while Stamboul 'with a formal ultimatum. The Meilons associations do not away political ~udgmeuts
boiled sedition against the entente and threatened an economic boycott. Angry anti- In the long-forgotten records of the times
Kemal chetties threatened siege, Dulles American demonstrators paraded in .the there are indeed some indications that thi:
"decoded to 'Secstate' academic analyses of streets of Bogota.. waa so. In Aprll, 1940, for example, Dr
that stale forgery. No wonder Roosevelt, The full details of their labors probably Gerhart A. Westrich, one of Ciermany'F
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A6159
leading lawyers, a man who had handled ,But equally there is no record, public or so he listened to Schellenberg. ScheIlen-
some European affairs for Sullivan and Crom- private, that he didn't. All one can say is berg argued that the war was lost unless a
well, came to America by way of Siberia, that, throughout their careers, the two "political solution" could be arranged. Only
ostensibly as Hitler's special emissary to brothers displayed a marked community of Himmler, he contended, could achieve this.
consult with American. businessmen. He political views. Only Himmler could intrigue to spread dis-
established residence on a swank New York Then came Pearl Harbor. sension among the Allies, to split them apart,
suburban estate and before long he was When it did, a whole new career opened to achieve the needed separate settlement
consulting, not just with American oil and up for Allen Dulles. During his service in with the West. Himmler hesitated, caution
industrial tycoons, but with a strange assort- the State Department years before, he had warring with ambition. The argument be-
ment of factory workers and mechanics. The become friendly with an Assistant Attorney tween him and Schellenberg lasted until 3:30
New York Herald Tribune exposed this sus- General named William J. (Wilfl Bill) Don- a.m., but Himmler finally agreed to try Schel-
picious activity and charged that Westrich ovan. When Pearl Harbor plunged us into lenberg's idea.
had made misrepresentations' in applying World War II, Donovan was picked to head The prize at stake was enormous. If he
for a driver's license. John Foster Dulles America's first auperspy outfit, the Otfice of succeeded, Himmler could make himself
immediately came to the Nazi agent's de- Strategic Services. He promptly contacted master of all Germany. The ruthless SS
fense. I don't believe he has done anything Allen Dulles and urged him to go to his, old chief was well aware, as William. L, Shirer
wrong," John Foster said. "I knew him in familiar stamping grounds in Berne, Switzer- makes clear in "The Rise and Fall of the
the old days and I had a high regard for land. There Allen was to set up a Euro- Third Reich," that military cliques were
his integrity." American agents began an peon espionage headquarters. The reason plotting the assassination of Hitler. On oc-
investigation, however, and in 2 weeks Donovan picked him for the task was that casion Himmler made a great pretense of
Dr. Westrich was on his way to Japan, he wanted a man who had high contacts in- activity and sent some of the more obvious
The Westrich affair, inconclusive in itself, side Nazi Germany. On this score, Allen bunglers before execution squads, but it
assumes greater significance when one con- Dulles certainly qualified. seems certain he could have protected the
eiders the ?Anglo-American Fellowship and pART nr, nvr,r,ES AND Txu ss Fuehrer much more efficiently than he did.
the America First Committee. It seems certain also that he gave the plot-
In Britain, the London branch of the The officially favored version of Allen Dul- flog generals loose rein, anticipating the
Schroeder banking firm financed the Fellow- les' exploits in Switzerland in World War II situation that would develop if and when
ship and concentrated on selling the Munich goes like this: He was the very last American they succeeded in blowin u his revered
brand of appeasement to the British people. to slip legally across the French border in leader.' Himmler, with his Iron grip on the
The Fellowship sought as members proms- November 1942, as German troops came pour- machinery of the secret police, felt fully
nent names in the Conservative Party, big 1ng into Vichy France in swift reaction to competent to deal with the generals? he
businessmen, bankers. These eminents were the Allied invasion of North Africa. His as- seared no other rival in the Nazi Party; and
given the VIP treatment on conducted tours signment in Switzerland was to find out who if, in foreign affairs, he could achieve Schel-
of Germany; they were entertained by Hitler re imeem3nd mwhether oppe sed to the Hitler lenberg's "political solution," he could per-
and Goering, and von Ribbentrop exercised g y were working petuate the Nazi system with himself in
all the wiles of propaganda to sell them on actively to overthrow it. In true master-spy Hitler's shoes.
the virtues of the Nazi system. There was tradition, he put out his feelers and soon tha Meet "Mr. Bull"
no secret about this activity, no doubt about fish were swirnzning into his net; soon secret
its aims and purposes. And so it is intrigu- anti-Nazis were coming tp him to funnel him Such appears to be the compelling reasons
ing to find prominently listed as members of vital information and to give him the that led Himmler and Schellenberg to send
the Fellowship not just the banking house most intimate details about the plot to do two SS agents to seek out Allen Dulles in
of J. H. Schroeder Ltd. itself, but the in- away with Hitler. Berne. The SS agents were a Dr. Schude-
dividual names of H, W. B. Schroeder and Some of this happened, but it isn't all that kopf and Prince Maximillian Egon Hohenlohe.
Si. F. and F. C. Tiarka (see Tory M. P, by happened. To understand the significance The Nazi version of these negotiations was
Simon Hoxey, published in England by Vic- of developments in Berne, one needs to re- contained in three documents written at the
for Goliancz). F. C. Tiarks actually served call the background of the times. In Janu- time, labeled "top secret," and preserved in
on the Fellowship's council, or governing ary 1943, just as Allen Dulles' intelligence- the files of Schellenberg's dreaded Depart-
-body, and H. W. B. Schroeder and the two gathering operation began to get going in ment VI of the SS Reich Security Office. Bob
~larkses oat with Allen Dulles on the board full swing, Churchill and Roosevelt were Edwards, a member of the British Parlia-
of the J, Henry Schroeder Banking Corp. meeting in Casablanca for the first of those ment, cites these documents and quotes them
On this side of the Atlantic, the incorpora- summit conferences that were to determine fully in a pamphlet written this year, "A
rtion papers for the America First Commit- the conduct of the flgh.ting and; more impor- Study of a Master Spy (Allen Dulles)." In
-tee, devoted to persuading Americans to font, the conditions for ending it. It was studying his account, upon which the fol-
lieep out of World War II, were drawn up in at Casablanca that the two great Allied lead- lowing section is based, St must be borne in
John Foster Dulles' law office. Records of ers proclaimed the doctrine of "uncondi_ mind that the documents represent an enemy
America First subsequently showed that tional surrender" and vowed to "spare no version of the "talks and must, therefore, be
John Foster, the more famous of the two effort to bring Germany to her knees." read with caution; nor should it be forgotten
brothers during most of their lifetimes, Their proclamation came at a time when that in the shadow world of the secret
supported America First financially. In a witch's brew was already boiling inside agency, duplicity is a common coin and truth
February 1941 his wife contributed $250, and Germany. German militry strategy long most difficult to determine.
_n May 1941 another ls200. On November 5, had been predicated on avoiding a war on Edwards, who fought with Loyalist forces
4941, just 1 month before Pearl Harbor, two fronts. This had been a cardinal grin- in Spain-during the civil war in the 1930x,
=lmerica First records listed a-$500 contribu- ciple of Hitler himself until the seemingly has been general secretary of the Chemical
pion from "John Foster Dulles." Dulles endless succession of easy victories un- Workers Union since 1947. He is a former
zimself, when questioned about these ties, balanced his judgment anal" propelled him member of the Liverpool City Council, and
protested: "No one who knows me and what into war with the Soviet Union. The limit- has served in Parliament, elected with Labour
.have done and stood for consistently over less void of Russia quickly began to engulf and Cooperative backing, since 1955. He at-
37 years of active life could reasonably think the Nazi war machine, and then, on top of tracted considerable attention when he be-
:hat Icould be an isolationist or 'America the Eastern struggle, had come the Japanese gan protesting in the House of Commons
~irster' in deed or spirit:' stroke at Pearl Harbor, a blow that had sur- about the activities of the Krupps and Bil-
Yet the deed and the spirit seemed to be prised Hitler almost as much as it had the boo and the danger of permitting the Ger-
anplicit in a series of public speeches that American fleet. This development had mans to establish bases in Spain. As a
john Foster Dulles made in the months be- thrown the tremendous power and resources result, "from absolutely reliable sources in
-ore Pearl Harbor. On at least three Deco- of America into the scales against the Axis Bonn," he says, he received a number of
ions, he ridiculed the notion that America Powers, and soon both German. generals and documents, including the three dealing with
aced any danger from the Axia Powers, the more astute leaders of the SS saw that Dulles and the SS.
Wiese, he said, were simply "dynamic peo- ultimate defeat was inevitable unless some The first of these documents is a brief
ales" seeking their rightful place in the sun. compromise political settlement cou]d be covering letter, of which only one copy was
n a speech before the Economic Club of Forked out with the Allies. A number of made. It is dated April 30, 1943, and is from
TeW York in March 1939, he said: top-level conferences were .devoted to this SS-Hauptsturmiuehrer Ahrens to Depart-
"There is no reason to believe that an problem, botp in the camp of the military ment VI, dealing with: "Dulles, Roosevelt's
otalitarian states, separately or collectively and the cam of the SS. special representative in Switzerland." The
could attempt to attack the United States In one of these secret conclaves in August second is a record of conversations between
?r could do it successfully. Certainly it is 1942, SS-Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellen- Dulles, referred to throughout the report as
cell within our means to make ourselves berg, one of Heinrich Himmler's g rightest "Mr. Bull," and Prince Hohenlohe, spoiled
mmune in this respect. Only hysteria en- proteges and one of the most don Brous of "Herr Pauls: ' The conversations took lace
pertains the idea that German Ital or Nazi secret agents, proposed a bold solution in Switzerland in mid-February 1943.
- y' y to his boss. Himmler, the master of the "Immediately on arrival," according to the
span contemplates war upon us." secret police for whom Kurt von Schroeder memorandum on the Dulles-Hohenlohe
There is no public record that Allen had. raised funds in the Ruhr, was a eau- talks, "Herr Pauls" .received a call from a
tulles shared either his brother's sanguine toous man where his own neck was involved; "Mr. Roberts," a Dulles aid and confidant.
world outlook or interest in America First. but he was extremely ambitious, too--and Roberts was anxious to arrange an immedi-
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 A6160 Approved For Relea~~~O~Q.~/~~~(~g~C~l~--~~~034~~$~g~0005-7
ate meeting with his chief, Allen Dulles.
Hohenlohe stalled until he could check up
on Dulles. From Spanish diplomats, from
the Swiss and from representatives of some
of the Nazi satellite states in the Balkans,
Hohenlohe learned that Dulles operated on
the very highest level, apparently with a
direct pipeline into the White House, by-
passing the State Department. This con-
vinced the SS agent that he should, by all
means, see "Mr. Bull."
He was greeted, he reported, by "a tall,
powerfully built, sporting type of about 45,
with a healthy appearance, good teeth, and
a lively, unaffected and gracious manner.
Assuredly a man of civic courage." The
conversation was cordial. Hohenlohe and
Dulles quickly established that they had
met before, in 1916 in Vienna and in the
1920's in New York. With these prelimi-
naries out of the way the SS report of the
talk between "Herr Pauls" and "Mr. Bull"
continues:
"Mr. Bull said * * * he was fed up with
listening ail the time to outdated politicians,
Bmigr~s and prejudiced Jews: In his view,
a peace had to be made in Europe in the
preservation of which all concerned would
have a real interest. There must not again
be a division into victor and vanquished,
that is, contented and discontented; never
again must nations like Germany be driven
by want and injustice to desperate experi-
ments and heroism. The German state must
continue to exist as a factor of order and
progress; there could be no question of its
partition or the separation of Austria. At
the same time, however, the might of Prussia
in the German state should be reduced to
reasonable proportions, and the individual
regions (Gau) should be given greater inde-
penden,ce and a uniform measure of influ-
ence within the framework of Greater
Germany. To the Czech question, Mr. Bull
seemed to attach little importance; at the
same time he felt it necessary to support a
Cordon sanitaire against bolshevism and
pan-Slaviem through the eastward enlarge-
ment of Poland and the preservation of
Rumania and a strong Hungary: '
German hegemony
If this view seems hardly in ,accord with
the publicly avowed Roosevelt-Churchill
program of unconditional surrender and
bringing Germany to her knees, the rest of
the Dulles philosophy, according to this SS
report, seems to agree even less with the
ideals for which thousands of allied soldiers
were at that moment dying. Herr Pauls
reported that Mr. Bull seemed quite to rec-
ognize Germany's claim to industrial leader-
ship in Europe. Of Russia he spoke with
scant sympathy. * * * Herr Pauls had the
feeling that the Americans, including in this
Case Mr. Bull, would not hear of bolshevism
or pan-Slavism in central Europe, and, un-
like. the British, on no account wished to
see the Russians at the DarYtenelles or in
the oil areas of Rumania or Asia Minor. In-
deed, as Herr Pauls noted later, Mr. Bull
made no great secret, though he did not
speak in detail, about Anglo-American an-
tagonisms.
The conversation now took an abrupt turn.
Herr :Paula made what he described as a
very sharp thrust on the Jewish question
and said he sometimes actually felt the
Americans were only going on with the war
so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and
send them back again.. To this Mr. Bull re-
plied that in America things had not quite
got to that point yet. and that it was in
general a question whether the Jews wanted
to go back. Herr Pauls got the impression
that America intended rather to send off the
Jews to Africa.
Discussing the reorganization of postwar
Europe, "Mr. Bull" appeared to reject British
ideas "in toto." Hohenlohe reported:
"He agreed more or less to a Europe or-
ganized politically and industrially on the
basis of large territories, and considered that
a Federal- Greater Germany (similar to the
United States), with an associated Danube
Confederation, would be the best guarantee
of order and progress in central and east-
ern Europe. He dcea not reject national so-
cialism in its basic Ideas and deeds so much
as the "inwardly unbalanced, inferfority-
complex-ridden Prussian militarism:'
"Then Mr. Bull turned to the subject of
national socialism and the person of Adolf
Hitler and declared that with all respect to
the historical importance of Adolf Hitler
and his work it was hardly conceivable that
the Angle-Saxons' workedup public opin-
ion could accept Hitler as unchallenged
master of Greater Germany. People had no
confidence in the durability and depend-
ability of agreements with him. And re-
establishment of mutual confidence was the
most essential thing after the war. Never-
theless, Herr Paula did not get the impres-
sion that it was to be viewed as a dogma
of American prejudice."
The conversation continued with Hohen-
lohe trying to get some inkling of allied
military intentions and with Dulles fending
off his queries. The American agent did
deliver, however, a pointed warning. He cited
America's "expanding production of aircraft,
which will systematically be brought into
action against the Axis powers." Then:
"Mr. Bull is in close touch with the Vati-
can. He himself called Herr Pauls' attention
to the importance of this connection, for the
American Catholics also have a decisive word
to say, and before the conversation ended he
again repeated how greatly Germany's posi-
tion in America would be strengthened if
German bishops were to plead Germany's
cause here. Even the Jews' hatred could
not outweigh that. It had to be remem-
bered, after all, that it had been .the Ameri-
can Catholics who had forced the Jewish-
American papers to atop their baiting of
Franco Spain."
The third top-secret Nazi document deals
with another talk between "Mr. Roberts,"
Dulles' righthand man, and another SS
agent, identified only as "Bauer." This took
place in Geneva on Sunday, March 21, 1943.
It was a long, rambling, inconclusive rehash
of the war and its issues, but certain strong
strands emerge in the SS report. "Sauer"
quoted Roberts as saying "he [Roberts] did
not like the Jews and it was distasteful to
think that they were now able to adorn their
six-pointed star with an additional tvreath
of martyrdom." The coolness toward the
British, the pro-German warmth was there,
"Bauer" quoted Roberts:
"America had no intention of going to
war every 20 years and was now aiming at
a prolonged settlement, in the planning ai
which she wished to take a decisive part and
did not wish to leave that again to Britain,
bearing in mind the bitter experience of the
past. It would be nothing else but regretta-
ble if Germany excluded herself from this
settlement, for that country deserved every
kind of admiration and meant a great deal
more to him than any other countries."
How much trutlx?
The impact of these reports, read 18 -years
later, can only be described as shocking.
The picture that emerges is of a Dulles per-
fectly willing to throw the Austrians and the
Czechs (whom the Allies then were publicly
pledged to free) to the wolves; a Dulles who
"does not reject national socialism in its
basic ideas and deeds," despite the smoking
furnaces oI the Nazi charnel houses; a Dulles
who, blaming all on Prussian militarism,
was looking forward to seeing a strong and
resurgent Germany dominating all of cen-
tral Europe; a Dulles who was concerned
primarily (as the Dulles oP 1918 had been)
August "b'
with using Germany and Poland as buffers
against Russia in the east; a Dulles who was
concerned, as one would expect the Dulles of
the 1920's to be, with keeping Russia out of
the oil-rich Near East; a Dulles who seemed
still to regard the British with a small "b; '
who looked with equanimity (as the Dulles
who had represented some of the mightiest
German corporations might be expected to
do) upon German industrial leadership of
Europe-a Dulles who, paid "respect to the
historical importance of Adolph Hitler and
his work," who thought Hitler would have to
go, but who did not make this seem like "a
dogma of American prejudice."
One finds oneself asking the shocked gttes-
tion: Was this the real Allen Dulles?
It is not easy to decide. Always, in any-
thing that touches upon the double-dealing
shadow world of the secret agent, one must
have more than normal reservations. This
picture of Dulles la the picture that emerges
from SS reports, but perhaps SS agents, like
a lot of other secret agents, might have been
tempted to tell headquarters what they knew
headquarters wanted to hear. Even if the
SS reports were completely accurate, there is
tto guarantee that Dulles actually believed
all -that the reports attributed .to him. He
was trying to pick the minds of his SS callers,
as they were trying to pick his, and in the
brain-picking duel, any agent might be likely
to cloak, to a degree at least, his real beliefs
and intentions and to pretend to what he
did not really feel. Was this what Dulles
was doing? Was he being extremely cordial
and agreeable to Hohenlohe merely in the
hope of luring information out of him? Or
were at least some of those sentiments he
expressed really his own?
Whatever the truth, there is no imputation
in these documents that Allen Dulles was
anything but a patriot seeking to further
what he conceived to be the best interests
of his country. Not his motivbs, but his
judgments, are called into question as one
,peruses these SS records.
In any case, the SS portrait must be as-
sessed against some checkpoints-Dulles'
own known background and certain future
developments, all of which seem to fall into
a pattern. Dulles certainly played the
master's role in cloak-and-dagger activities
in Europe. He remained the boss of the
Berne nerve center of intelligence through-
out the war, and he came out of the conflict
with an overpowering reputation as Amer-
ica's master spy. Under the circumstances,
it is carious to find that the pattern of
German rapprochement described in Hohen-
lohe's report was repeated again and again
in other secret dealings by American agents.
For a soft peace
One of these negotiations .took place in
October 1943, when Dr. Felix Kersten, a Fin-
nish masseur who had won the confidence
of Himmler himself, went to Sweden to con-
fer with an unnamed American agent. They
discussed the danger from the east and a
compromise peace. Tentatively, they agreed
on the restoration of Germany's 1914 bound-
aries (this would have included France's
Alsace-Lorraine), the ending of the Hitler
dictatorship, reduction of the German
Army, control over German industry, a.nd
an American pledge to forget about an en-
larged Poland. Still later, in the spring of
1944, another American feeler was put out
by a secret agent in Yugoslavia, again for
negotiations that would involve .the possi-
bility of uniting the western allies with
Germany for the struggle against bolshevism.
These repeated overtures would make it
seem as if someone somewhere had some
pretty determined ideas about a soft Ger-
man peace and the building up of a strong
postwar Germany to combat the Soviet men-
ace. Ail of this occurred at a time when
Russia ostensibly was our ally and was
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.CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX A6161
.cked in the fiercest of death grapples with
-ermany. If the Russians, who had their
~vn spy system, were aware of these secret
=achinations-as they may well have been,
~r, according to the Germans, Hungarian
dents had broken the code Dulles was
sing-the seemingly unreasonable Russian
istrust oP America would begin to seem
-ss unreasonable. Such are the penalties
an intelligence operation that runs coun-
=r to the official policy of the nation employ-
^g it.
Whether Dulles himself had any respongi-
_lity for the persistent pro-German feelers
not established, but there is one further
rong indication of his attitude toward
?ermany in one of his best-publicized ex-
_oits. Not long after his arrival in Berne,
= received a call from an emissary con-
~cted with the military side oP the cross-
~,tch of plots involving the destruction of
Stier. His caller was Hans Bernd Gisevius,
erman vice consul in Zurich and a,member
the Abwehr, the secret intelligence.
3sevius was a huge, 6-foot-4 German who
~d been connected with anti-Hitler plots
_ 1938 and 1939, before. the outbreak of
ae war. He had close connections with
.me of Germany's top military leaders, who
~d long been convinced that Hitler would
give to be removed Prom the scene. From
idles, Gisevius and his fellow .plotters
anted just one assurance-that, if they
lied Hitler, Washington would support
^em in setting up a new and presumably
~ti-Nazi Government.
The German conspirators did not just ask
s Washington's backing; they held out
threat. If the Western democracies re-
=sed to grant Germany a decent peace,
=ey warned, they would be compelled to
^rn to Soviet Russia for support. This,
would seem, was hardly the tone of men
spired by great ideals. As Shirer percep-
vely remarks: "One marvels at these Ger-
an resistance leaders who were so insistent
a getting a favorable peace settlement from
_e West and so hesitant in getting rid of
flier until they got it. One would have
_ought that if they considered nazism to
- such a monstrous evil "' ? ^ they would
ave concentrated on trying to overthrow it
gardless of how the West might treat their
-w regime." No such reflection appears
have occurred to Dulles. He was inclined
accept the demands of the plotters and
-ged Washington to back the bargain, to
-omise favorable terms of peace. In this
e failed. Roosevelt insisted on "uncondi-
~nal surrender: '
In the light of what we now know, the
sdom of the deal proposed by Dulles sp-
ars to be highly dubious. One thing is
rtain: Himmler knew oP the plots against
tier and deliberately lest enough of the
matters free to score the near miss of the
Ji4 bomb explosion in Hitler's East Prussian
-adquarters. Himmler certainly had every
-tention of dominating the Germany that
Auld have survived the loss of the Fuehrer,
_d there can be little doubt that, if he had
-en successful, the Nazi system would have
.en perpetuated. This, at least, the doc-
_ne of "unconditional surrender" avoided.
~e complete crushing of Germany, the free-
of the wraiths in its concentration
mps-total victory and its revelations-
~de any apologia for nazism impossible.
Suc~i an outcome could hardly have been
hieved by the Allen Dulles who peeps out
us from the pages of SS reports or by the
len Dulles who was ready, by his Own ad-
_ssion, to deal with the military plotters.
PART IV. DULLES, PEACE, AND THE CIA
.Allen Dulles came back from Berne with
ch a reputation as a clock-and-dagger
e,stermind that his exploits are still spoken
with awe. He was decorated with the
~xerican Medal of Merit, a Presidential Ci-
~ion, the Medal of Freedom, Belgium's
Leopold Cross, and France's Legion of Honor.
These medals represented several triumphs
in espionage.
The greatest feats stemmed from Dulles'
contact with an employee in the German
Foreign Office who has been identified only
as "George Wood." A secret anti-Nazi,
"Wood" risked death many times to make
contact with Dulles in Berne. At each meet-
ing, he delivered to the American agent
copies of ultra-secret German. documents.
The impressive total of 2,600 documents re-
portedly was funneled into Dulles' hands by
"Wood." Some 'are said to have been of
such importance that they vitally affected
the course of the war.
According to the Dulles legend, docu-
ments supplied by Wood gave the first clue
to German experiments with the V-1 and
V-2 rockets at the Peenemunde testing base
on the Baltic. Dulles' information, it is as-
serted, warned the Allies in time, enabled
them to raid Peenemunde with their heavy
bombers, and set the rocket program back
an all-Important 6 months.
There is no doubt that the raid on Peene-
munde did just this, but there is consider-
able doubt whether Dulles can claim sole
credit for it. Winston Churchill, in his
history of World War II, writes that German
experiments with rockets at Peenemunde
were known even before the war and that
as early as the autumn of 1939 "references to
long-range weapons of various kinds began
to appear in our intelligence reports." Ed-
wards, the British Member of Parliament,
writes categorically:
"Finally, it is a well-known fact that it
was not Mr. Dulles who distingxxished him-
self by discovering the V-rockets, but un-
assuming Miss Constance Babbington Smith,
the British expert on aerial reconnaissance
photography, who on June 23, 1943, identi-
fied the launching ramps on an aerial photo-
graph of Peenemunde. The British Secret
Service had known about plans for building
them ever since 1939."
Fewer questions have been rafsad about
some of Dulles' other exploits. One of these
dealt with a mysterious Nazi spy by the
name of "Cicero." Edwards insists that the
full story of "Cicero" has not yet been told,
but the accepted version goes like this:
From some of the documents given him by
Wood, Dulles learned that the British Am-
bassador in Turkey, Slr Hughe Knatchbull-
Hugessen, had a valet who was actually a
Nazi spy and who used the rode name of
"Cicero." The tip about "Cicero" came to
Dulles just in time to alter the route of an
American convoy and save it from a planned
U-boat attack.
Even more important than saving a convoy
was the final achievement credited to Dul-
les-the surrender of the German Army 1n
Italy in 1945. Ilixlles arranged this through
his contacts in the SS. specifically through
negotiations with SS-Obergruppenfuehrer
Karl Wolff. As a result, the German sur-
render in Italy came earlier than otherwise
might have been the case, and presumably
the lives of thousands of Allied soldiers were
saved.
The Dulles ambivalence
With war's end., Duties returned for a time
to his law desk at Sullivan and Cromwell,
but with his glamorous (and glamorized)
World War II masterminding behind him, it
was hardly to be expected that world events
would leave him long alone. Both he and
his older brother, John Foster, now began
to emerge on the national scene in new and
ever more powerful roles. The buildup for
both was, and was to remain, tremendous.
The Nation's largest news media agreed with
virtually a single voice that John Foster
Dulles was the infallible wise man of foreign
policy; his ties to top-level German industry
under the Nazis, his links to America First,
his speeches proclaiming we had nothing to
fear from the Axis, were all forgotten. Only
some maverick columnists like Drew Pearson,
I. F. Stone, Dr. Frank Kingdon, and Harold
L. Ickes remembered the past. And who were
they to outshout New York's Gov. Thomas
E. Dewey, who discovered and proclaimed
(years before Eisenhower) that John Foster
Dulles was "the greatest statesman in the
world" and "the only man in the world whom
the Russians fear"?
Then-and stnee
Under the cover of such authoritative proc-
lamations of highly disputable fact, the
American public as a whole completely forgot
that the Dulles brothers had been the high
legal priests and the helpful manipulators
of some of the. greatest German trusts; and
little significance seems to have been at-
tached to the curious coincidence that, in
the immediate postwar era, they became the
spokesmen for a compassionate German pol-
icy. With the adaptability of lawyers and
politicians, they seemed at times to ride both
sides of the issue, but in the final analysis
their weight appears to have been thrown on
the pro-German side.
Typical of this ambivalence was the per-
formance of Allen Dulles in the days right
after the guns were silenced. In an article
he wrote in Collier's in May 1946, he based
his lead paragraph on the events of 157 B.C.,
comparing Berlin with Carthage. "Berlin
remains a monument to Prussian and Nazi
philosophy," he wrote. He suggested it
might be a gpod idea to leave in the heart
of Berlin a completely devastated area as a
perpetual reminder of what the Nazis and
Prussian militarism had wrought. "The
central area, for example, a half mile radius
around Hitler's Chancellory," he explained,
"might be set aside as a perpetual memorial
to the Nazis and to Prussia." Berlin should
no longer be the capital of Germany; it
should- be regelated to an inconsequential
role as a mere railroad and commercial cen-
ter because "Berlin has lost its birth-
right. ? " ? It has lost it because for gen-
erations this city has housed the chief dis-
turbers of world peace. Hence, as the capi-
tal of Germany, Berlin `delenda ets.' "
Yet, in less than 2 years' time, Allen Dulles
appeared to be worrying less about the
horrors of Nazl and >?russian militarism and
more about the virtues of a strong Germany.
When congressional committees began de-
bating the European recovery program,
former President Herbert Hoover, John
Foster Dulles, and Allen Dulles were among
the leaders in the drive to rebuild German
industry-with which the Dulleses, at least,
had had the strongest kind of personal and
financial ties. Describing this effort, Helen
Fuller wrote 1n "The New Republic" in Feb-
ruary 1948:
"For months, the Herter committee on
European aid has been passing for ahigh-
minded, bipartisan group of good Samari-
tans. Actually, the Herter bill that is being
urged as a substitute for ERP was mainly a
Hoover product. Chairman Christian A.
Herter (Republican, of Massachusetts), a
Hoover protege, allowed .Allen Dulles, inter-
national banker and friend of Hoover, to do
the drafting, called in other likeminded
Wall Streeters to help:'
The authpr went bn to describe the "snail's
pace" dismantling of German industry
abroad, the concentrated "strong Germany"
propaganda drive in the United States. She
quoted John Foster Dulles' testimony, which
seemingly straddled both sides of the issue.
John Foster favored reparations and control;
but he insisted it wouldn't be economical
to duplicate Germany's steel industry in
France, and all Western European countries
would be positively "delighted to see Ger-
many restored and smoke pouring out of the
factories of the Ruhr as rapidly as possible."
Acidly, Helen Fuller wrote: "The Inter-Allied
Reparations Agency could show Dulles fat
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A6162 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX
offtciai records to the contrary. France, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, and many others
want German equipment with which to re-
build their own devastated economies."
This is the background from which the
"strong Germany" policy of today was to
emerge. Whether the Germans of today are
a completely different race from the Germans
of the past who brought two of history's
most horrible wars upon the world, whether
the "strong Germany" policy represents the
acme of wisdom of a disastrous gamble in
power politics-these are questions that only
the future can decide. What is important
here is to understand some of the pressures
producing the policy. When one examines
these, one finds the Dulleses advocating a
public policy that coincided neatly with the
-.{lictates of what had been their longtime
private interests. The Allen Dulles of 1918,
of 1942-4b, of 1947-48, seems the same man,
with the same strong alliances to top-level
Germans regardless of their ideology; and
it is this strong pull of private ties that
becomes so disturbing when one tries to
analyze the public performance of the man
who was soon to become head of CIA.
Birth of the CIA
The Agency itself was essentially the cre-
ation of President Harry S. Truman, and it
resulted almost inevitably from the painful
lessons of World War II. Pearl Harbor had
had a permanent and understandable effect
upon the thinking of American leaders. In
the post mortems conducted Into that dis-
aster, it had become apparent that ample
information was available in Washington to
have alerted Army and Navy commanders
at the Pearl Harbor base of their danger;
but no effective use had been made of the
available intelligence, largely because there
was no single agency entrusted with the
accurate and speedy interpretation of such
detail. The emergencies of war led to the
hasty creation of OSS, but OSS was ob-
viously astopgap measure, not a final solu-
tion.
On October 1, 1945, immediately after the
cessation of hostilities, Truman abolished
OSS. The President apparently had a per-
sonal distaste for the nasty business of spy-
ing, and he was, in addition, under bureau-
- erotic pressures from all sides to decapitate
OSS. The President apparently had aper-
intelligence services wanted no such power-
ful competitor; the FBI under J. Edgar
Hoover long had felt it should be the sole
gatherer and dispenser of vital information,
both at home and abroad; and the Depart-
ment of State and the Bureau of the Budget
both had the knives out far C'SS. With the
dissolution of the agency, however, a chaotic
situation quickly arose. Intelligence reports
from all the competing intelligence-gath-
erers flowed In bewildering profusion across
the President's desk. Frequently, no two
agencies agreed on anything; frequently,
their analyses and predictions flatly contra-
dicted one another. The result was that the
President was almost as badly off from this
plethora of advice as he would have been if
he had had no advice at all, and he was left
largely to follow his_ own hunches.
This obviously was no wap to chart strat-
egy among the perilous reefs of the cold war,
and various solutions were proposed. Dono-
van, as early as 1944, had suggested to Roose-
velt the creation of a Central Intelligence
Agency so powerful it would dominate the
entire field. Opposition to such a mono-
lithic structure was led,by the Navy, which
took the position that each of the serv-
ices, with its own special requirements and
ends !n view, needed !ts own agents. Ad-
miral King, in addition, foresaw in a power-
ful Central Intelligence a possible threat
to democracy, and in Congress there were
very real sears lest, in our hunt for intel-
l+gence, we create a potential gestapo.
Giant step forward
The result was a compromtse. Truman, by
Executive order on January 22, 1948, set up
the Central Intelligence Group, the forerun-
ner of the present CIA. This was to be, as
Ransom explains in his authoritative book,
primarily "a holding compaxly coordinating
the work of existing departments." It func-
boned under an executive council, the Na-
tional Intelligence Authority, composed of
the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and
the President's personal representative.
Under this setup, the practice began which
continues today of having Central Intelli-
gence provide for the President's personal eye
a daily, exclusive and unified digest and
summary of all important international in-
telligence. Truman, understandably, felt
that a great step forward had been taken.
"Here, at last," he writes in his memoirs, "a
coordinated method had been worked out,
and a practical way had been found for keep-
ing the President informed as to what was
known and what was going on."
The Central Intelligence Group, however,
was only a temporary expedient, as OSS had
been before it; and Congress, in ordering the
semi-unification of the defense establish-
ment in 1947, abolished CIG a,nd created the
present Central Intelligence Agency, func-
tioning under a National Security Council,
comparable to the former National Intelli-
gence Agency. Before final action was taken,
the advice of Allen Dulles was sought. This
he gave in a significant memorandum dated
April 23, 1947.
Dulles made six principal reeommenda-
tiona: CIA, he thought, should have abso-
lute control over its own personnel; tts chief
should not have men foisted upon him for
political or other reasons, but should have
lull say in picking his own assistants. The
agency should have its own budget, and the
right to supplement this by' drawing funds
from the Departments of State and De-
fense. CIA should have "exclusive juris-
diction to carry out secret intelligence opera-
tions." It should have "access to all Intelli-
gence information relating to foreign coun-
tries." It should be the "recognized agency
for dealing with the central intelligence
agencies of other countries." And, finally,
it should have "its operations and personnel
protected by `official secrets' legislation which
would provide adequate penalties for breach
of security."
Prixieiple of separation
In his comments on the proposed agency,
Dulles made several important observations.
CIA, he felt, should be predominantly civil-
ian rather than military in its high com-
mand, and if a military man was appointed
to head it, he should become a civilian while
he held the office. -Its administration, he
felt strongly; must have long-term continu-
ity and professional status: its Director
should be assured of long tenure, like Hoover
in the FBI, "to build up public confidence,
and esprit de corps in his organization, and
a high prestige:' He opposed the creation
of an agency that would become "merely a
coordinating agency for the military intel-
ligence services" and warned that this "is
not enough" Most significantly, in view
of the future course of events, he recognized
the dangers inherent in wedding information
to policy.
"The State Department * * ?," he wrote,
"will collect and process its own information
as a basis Yor the day-to-day conduct of its
work. The armed services intelligence agen-
cies will do likewise. But for the proper
judging of the situation in any foreign coun-
try it is important that the information
should be processed by an agency whose duty
it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions
from those facts, without having either the
facts or the conclusions warped by the in-
evitable and even proper prejudices of ,the
August
men whose duty it is to determine policy ax
who, having once determined policy, are t
likely to be blind to any facts which mfg;
tend to prove the policy to be faulty. T7
Central Intelligence Agency should ha
nothing to do with' policy. It should try
get at the hard facts on which others mu
determine policy."
The case could not be put better. Wi
this strong, explicit statement, virtual
every expert on the subject has always bey
in complete agreement. But, unfortunate:
this wasn't the way CIA was to be set u
and this wasn't the way that increasing:
under Allen Dulles himself in later years,
was to run.
Rumors that this cardinal principle
intelligence-the separation of informati~
from the roles of policy and action-might
flouted by the new spy outfit were curre
even as it was being created. In the hee
ings on the National Security Act of I9~
Congressman Fred Busbey sounded
anxious note. "I wonder," he asked, "if the
is any foundation for the rumors that ha
come to me to the effect that through t]
Central Intelligence Agency, they are co
templating operational activities?"
The question wasn't answered at the tin
but the act in its final form left the do
open and "they" walked through. The #
curity Act charged CIA with five specs
functions: to advise the National Securi
Council on intelligence matters related
national security; to make recommendatfo
to the council for coordination of intelliger
activities of departments and agencies
the Government; to correlate and evalus
intelligence and provide for its appraprit
dissemination within the Government;
perform for the benefit of existing Sntel
genes agencies such additional services
the NSC might determine could be mx
efficiently handled centrally; and final
most important, "to perform other fixnctic
and duties" relating to national secur
intelligence as the NSC might direct. It
this "other functions and duties" clause tl'
gave CIA broad powers to enter, not just t
field of intelligence, but the field of ova
activities.
The prioteiple violated
The concentration of power in the har
of the Agency, implicit in its organizati~
was increased tremendously' by revisions
the CIA statute made in 1949. Three ma
changes placed almost dictatorial powers
the hands of its Director. He was gh
the right to hire and fire without regard
Civil Service or other restraints. CIA
exempted from the provisions of any la
that might require publication or disclose
of the "organization, functions, names,
ficial titles, salaries or numbers of person.
employed" (even the Bureau of the Bud
was directed specifically to make no repc
to Congress on any of these matters; fn ot]
words, CIA became a completely clo;
book). At the same time, its Director
given full authority to spend any amount
his personal voucher, without accounts
"This," as Ransom comments, "is truly
extraordinary power for the head of
executive agency with thousands of e
ployees and annual expenditures in the ht
dreds of millions of dollars."
To counterbalance these sweeping pow
there were few restraints. Congress, e
dently with that haunting Gestapo spec
in mind, did specify that CIA should h
no arrest or subpena powers within
United States. The FBI's files, while
barred to it, were not exactly opened eitl
for, while other agencies were required
report their intelligence findings to CIA,
FBI was not. The CIA may obtain wh
.ever specific information the FBI has ii
requests it 1n writing, but this is quit
different affair from being kept informe6
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X961 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX A6~63
a matter of routine oP what the FBI knows. danger. If U.N. forces pressed on into North mouth, Allen Dulles looks more like a kindly,
Finally, a supposed safeguard was set up Korea, would the Chinese Communists, with tweedy, college processor than a mastermind
around those all-important "other functions their hordes of manpower, enter-the war? of secret intelligence, and he and his wife
and duties" the CIA was empowered to per- Gen. Douglas MacArthur was confident form one- of Washington's most popular
farm. These were to bfl embarked upon that they would not. All of our intelligence party-going couples. They-frequently, how-
only at the direction of the National Secu- forces agreed in essence on this forecast. In ever, do little more than put in an appear-
rity Council, presided over by the President this, as in the recent Cuba invasion, our ante and- leave early. But even these fleet-
himself, But, as Ransom points out, the vision appears to have been blinded by our ing visits cause some eyebrow raising, for
principal intelligence adviser of the NSC is desires, and the intelligence for which we most comparable commanders of secret
the Director of CIA. The Director. is "a con- pay literally billions of dollars was abysmally agents, less gregarious than Dulles, shun
stant participant in NSC deliberations," and wrong, while the .advice of independent bb- the cocktail circuit with its 'guilt-in tempta-
this, to Ransom, seems "to suggest that the servers, whose minds were not chained by Lions to wag the tongue. This is a risk that
scope of CIA operations is to a large extent the demands of policy, was plainly right. Dulles assumes with apparent joyousness,
self-determined. * * * Certainly Congress In the Korean war, as in the case of Cuba, and this much must be said for him: he has
has no voice as to how al~d where CIA is there were many clear and explicit warnings never yet been accused of dropping the
to function, other than prohibiting it to en- that a blind intelligence refused to heed. wrong word into the wrong ear.
gage in domestic security activities;" One of these was delivered by Supreme As far as personality goes, then (and, as
This is the powerful and secretive setup- Court Justice William O. Douglas. An astute everyone knows, it goes far), Allen Dulles
doubly powerful and insidious in,its influ- world traveler, Justice Douglas had been has been and still is a popular man in Wash-
ence because it is so secretive, so free of any roaming through southeast Aaia during the ington. At 68, he is still amazingly active.
effective checkrein-that .Congress created late summer of 1950. His pulse takings con- He plays a good game of doubles in tennis,
to protect us against the possibility of an vinced him that, if our troops crossed the still shoots golf at around 90 when he has a
atomic Pearl Harbor. How has it functioned? 38th parallel, the Communist Chinese would chance to play. Friends describe him as a
In the beginning, as waa perhaps inevitable enter the war on a massive scale. He per- man ai "enormous patience," and to inter-
with anew agency, its performance could sonally warned President Truman of this. viewers-he presents the candid and attrac-
be described only as decidedly spotty. Rear A similar warning was sounded in Wash- tive face of a man who modestly deprecates
Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was the first ington by the Indian representatives to the his own cloak-and-dagger roles. "I've never
ni