AN APPRAISAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000300220005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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1. Foreign Policy. Nothing in the XXII Congress at
Moscow last October, or in Soviet behavior since, suggests
any change in the broad lines of the USSR's foreign policy.
Khrushchev has reaffirmed, and is vigorously pursuing, the
strategy of "peaceful coexistence" aimed at defeating the
West without war. As part and parcel of this policy, he
is continuing to build Soviet military strength in order
to increase the USSR's political weight in the world and
to prosecute general war as effectively as possible should
deterence fail.
II. Domestic Affairs. The Congress revealed, however,
that domestic Soviet politics is a lively and contentious
business. Khrushchev does not, we believe, have to fear
for his position. But he does have to maneuver among col-
leagues who are less than equal to him but more than the
terrorized lackeys who surrounded Stalin. These colleagues
share Khrushchev's general outlook, but they may have suc-
ceeded in limiting the revisions which he wished to make in
economic priorities (greater benefits for the consumer) and
military policy (downgrading of conventional forces and
traditional doctrine).
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III. In attacking Stalin, Khrushchev was seeking to
discredit all views other than his own, not only among
his colleagues, but also in the party apparatus at large.
The hierarchy of professional party workers is of a con-
servative cast and tends to be suspicious of Khrushchev's
innovations. The anti-Stalin campaign was meant to break
their emotional attachment to their old mentor, while the
concurrent attack on the anti-party group was intended to
warn them of the penalties of failing to adjust to the
Khrushchev era. The Soviet leaders still appear to be
undecided, however, how best to explain the excesses of
Stalinism and at the same time defend their party system.
IV. The question of the return of Molotov to Vienna
also clouds the picture. But Pravda's recent attack a-
gainst Molotov's "dogmatic obstinacy" in opposing Khrush-
chev's peaceful coexistence policy would seem to invalidate
speculation that Molotov's return to Vienna would indicate
rehabilitation and a political defeat for Khrushchev.
V. Bloc Relations. Of much more immediate interest
and import is the renewed Soviet attack, primarily via
Albania, on Chinese pretensions to international leadership.
Peiping has once again rejected the demand that it acknowl-
edge Soviet authority; it continues to uphold Albania and
is countering Soviet sanction: by providing Tirana with
economic aid. It also continues to lobby openly against
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Soviet positions in international front gatherings, and
to maneuver for support among other parties. Neither
side evinces a willingness to compromise, and each ap-
pears prepared to contemplate an open split.
VI. In following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet
relations, we have generally felt it unlikely that matters
would proceed to the point of a public disavowal of the
myth of unity. Such a break would almost inevitably be
followed by open recriminations, dual claims to the
possession of doctrinal truth, and calls for the over-
throw of the competing leadership. Communists everywhere
would be pressed to declare themselves; purges and splits
would probably occur in many parties; some, especially
those in Asia, might eventually align themselves with the
Chinese. The Sino-Soviet military alliance would become
inoperative. This kind of break would have a profound
effect upon Soviet views of the world and their prospects
in it. Conceivably it might lead, in the long run, to
more normal relations with the West.
VII. Nevertheless, our present reading of the evidence
persuades us that the chances of such an open break during
the next year or so have increased very substantially--per-
haps the odds are now about even. Even if a break is a-
voided, we believe that it will remain in the foreground
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as a continuing possibility, and that Sino-Soviet relations
will be an uneasy and distrustful truce, marked by co-
operation at various times and places and by competition
at others.
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