NOTES FROM MCNAMARA/LEMNITZER APPEARANCES BEFORE DEFENSE SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000300240005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1962
• Content Type: NOTES

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Notes from McNamara/Lemnitzer Appearances before Defense
Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee
1 February 1962
Congressman Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (R., Michigan) was reviewing
last year's estimates and this year's estimates with General Lemnitzer
on the subject of Soviet ICBMs on launcher. He inquired as to why the
tremendous drop from last year to this year. General Lemnitzer
indicated that the low level of the Soviet ICBMs resulted chiefly from
the Soviet decision not to deploy the first generation missile but to
press for a second generation. Again Mr. Ford asked why. Lemnitzer
went off the record but it is understood that he referred to the production
plants.
Mr. Ford stated in connection with the big bomber fiasco of a
few years ago and the current ICBM fiasco, "I must admit that my
attitude toward the reliability of our intelligence is changing considerably.
Lemnitzer pointed out that this was a tough intelligence problem which
was receiving the highest priority indicating considerable research and
development and new techniques.
Mr. McNamara commented that there were really two categories
of intelligence: (1) present operational capability and (2) projections.
He pointed out that difficult as it was we were able to do considerably
better in the first category but as to the second category this inevitably
was affected by Soviet technical problems, deployment problems and
shifts of planning and, consequently, it was just not as accurate as the
first category.
Ford stated that the change of the estimate in the 12-month period
cannot help but cast doubt on the reliability of intelligence. He stated
we should go in and find out on what basis we have come up with a harder
set of figures; lacking such understanding one could conclude that the
change was made for other reasons. Mr. McNamara reiterated that
our capabilities to collect information have increased. Mr. Mahon
interjected at this point that it was to be hoped that any political
factors in connection with intelligence estimates would not be brought
into the picture and he hoped to be convinced on this matter. He then
added that what Mr. Ford was really trying to say in nice language was
whether or not the estimates could be rigged.
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Mr. Minshall indicated that he conceded that possibly some
of the new techniques were very sensitive although one could possibly
guess at them. However, he believed that some members of the
Subcommittee should be briefed on these new techniques specifically
mentioning Ford and Taber. Mahon indicated that he had been
briefed to some extent. Ford commented by stating that he was
asking his questions as if he were unaware of these matters.
Mr. Ford then questioned General Lemnitzer on the point
of whether or not if the U-2 had continued its work the estimates
would not be better. General Lemnitzer conceded that this would
help. Off the record, in response to Ford's question, Lemnitzer
stated that the U-2 was stood down on missions over Russia. Ford
added "It was a mistake to stop them. "
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