DEAR SENATOR RUSSELL:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP64B00346R000400040030-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 19, 1962
• Content Type: LETTER

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CEINTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
19 January 1962
Honorable Richard B. Russell
Chairman, Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.
I am happy to respond at the Armed Services Committee's
request to the statement Senator Eugene J. McCarthy made on
18 January 1962 at the opening of the Committee's hearings on my
nomination to the position of Director of Central Intelligence. I
shall respond directly to the specific questions posed by Senator
McCarthy at the end of his statement, but as other portions of the
statement were considered during the hearings I shall also set
forth my position in regard to them.
The first question asked if the Central Intelligence Agency
is to be reorganized and if so in what respects. I have been and
I am studying the organization of the Agency very intently. The
present pattern of organization of the Agency is the result of years
of study by competent people, both within the Government and out-
side consultants, and in my opinion it is not a bad pattern of
organization. However, I believe that in all departments of the
Government there is an evolution in management procedures and
opportunity for improvement so I think that some changes will be
indicated in the Agency organization. I would propose to discuss
any important changes with our congressional Subcommittees.
During the hearings before your Committee I read into the
record a letter from the President concerning the scope of the
responsibilities he has asked me to assume, and the President
stated therein that he would expect me to delegate to a principal
deputy as I may deem necessary so much of the direction of the
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detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit
me to carry out the primary task of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence. This, of course, I intend to do and while I will have
over-all responsibility for the Agency, I am studying what delega-
tions of authority should be made to the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence.
Senator McCarthy's second question asked what bearing
such changes would have upon the duties of the head of the Central
Intelligence Agency and upon the operation of the Agency. Any
changes made in Agency organization will have no bearing on the
duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, the scope of whose
responsibilities is set forth in the Presidential letter mentioned
above. The authority of the Director has been neither enhanced
nor diluted, and I believe the purpose of the President's directive
is to make clear that the Director of Central Intelligence is his
principal intelligence officer to exercise the dual role set forth
in the law, to be responsible for the direction of the Central
Intelligence Agency itself, and to assure the coordination of the
intelligence community as a whole. The one change that has been
made is in connection with the coordination function. The Director
of Central intelligence is Chairman of the United States Intelligence
Board, which is composed of the heads of all the intelligence
components of the Government, and I have placed the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence on that Board to represent the
views of the Central Intelligence Agency in connection with any
matters considered by the Board. It appeared to me that if I
served as Chairman and as suca as the President's representative
and the Deputy as the Agency's representative was the advocate
of the Agency's viewpoints I would be in a position to take a more
objective point of view. This new arrangement was approved by
the President in the letter referred to above.
Senator McCarthy's third question asks for my views as to
the authority for some of the actions attributed to the Central
Intelligence Agency in the field of foreign affairs within recent
years. Many events have been attributed to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency over the years, and it would be impossible for
me to have the facts on these matters, but I certainly do not
accept that becausrs they are attributed to the Central Intelligence
Agency the Agency is responsible for them. The Senator's
question appears to go to the basic juridical or constitutional
authorities of the Executive Branch, and this involves profound
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legal questions which, since I am not a lawyer, I do not feel
competent to debate. It is my understanding, however, that the
President has wide powers in the field of foreign relations and
within the framework of the constitution is empowered to do what
he deems to be necessary to protect and promote the national
interest. At the present time, in my opinion, the national
interest is best served by taking steps to deter the encroachment
of communism. As provided by law the Central Intelligence
Agency operates under the direction of the National Security
Council which is advisory to the President and of which he is
Chairman and, therefore, it is but one of the arms in the
complex of establishments which are involved in the President's
conduct of foreign policy. I intend to carry out to the best of my
ability all duties assigned, and I must assume that no such assign-
ment would cause me to violate my oath of office to support and
defend the constitution.
Senator McCarthy's fourth question concerns my judgment
as to methods which can be justifiably used by the Central Intelligence
Agency. The very nature of the question is such that I believe I
cannot respond to it, particularly in the light of the responsibility
imposed upon me by law to ass-,ire the protection of intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Senator McCarthy's fifth question was to the extent of my
involvement, if any, in what had been described or reported as
"leaks" from the Atomic Energy Commission with reference to
the moratorium on nuclear testing. I know of no instance where
I personally or any of the Commissioners were charged by anyone
with leaking anything either on this subject or any other subject
of a classified nature. There were leaks in this area, but there
were none that were attributed to the Atomic Energy Commission.
Senator McCarthy's sixth question inquired as to the facts
with regard to the charge that I attempted to have scientists fired
at the California Institute of Technology. Ten scientists at Cal
Tech signed a statement concerning suspension of nuclear testing.
I differed strongly with their position and felt that the manner in
which the statement came out tended to imply that it was an official
Cal Tech position. I wrote my letter stating my strong disagree-
ment to one of the ten scientists directly, Dr. Thomas Lauritsen.
To the best of my recollection I did not send copies of this letter
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to the university or officials thereof, and the file carbon which
I retained does not indicate any distribution. I would be less than
candid if I did not say that my views concerning this matter were
known to many people. However, I did not officially or unofficially
request the dismissal of any or all of the scientists by the Institute,
and none were dismissed as a result of any action by me.
The general thrust of Senator McCarthy's statement was
the need for greater congressional supervision of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and early in his statement he said there is
no regular or normal procedure in existence or in use today by
which committees of the Congress are consulted or informed of
the Central Intelligence Agency's activities. There are, of
course, Subcommittees of the Armed Services Committees of
both the Senate and the House, constituted as CIA Subcommittees,
and there are Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees
of both the Senate and the House, constituted to consider the
Central Intelligence Agency's appropriations matters. The
Central Intelligence Agency has been at all times responsive
to the calls of these Subcommittees and in addition has brought
to their attention matters the Agency felt should properly be
considered by them. I will continue this policy and this relation-
ship with these Subcommittees.
Senator McCarthy's statement quoted a comment by
Hanson Baldwin that intelligence is too important to be left to
the unsupervised? In addition to the relationship with the Sub-
committees of the Congress set forth above, the Agency reports
to the National Security Council and is subject to direction by the
National Security Council. There: are precise interdepartmental
arrangements for consideration of certain of the Agency's activities
so that the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense can
apply policy guidance and be adequately informed.
Senator McCarthy also sets forth a quotation from Walter
Lippmann stating that the Central Intelligence Agency has been
much too often an original source of American foreign policy.
I do not consider that the Director of Central Intelligence is a
policy-making position. The chief function of the Agency is to
obtain all possible facts from all sources and after proper evalua-
tion disseminate them to the President and other appropriate
policymakers. I might be asked my personal views, and if so
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I would feel free to give them but do not conceive that it is proper
for the Director of Central Intelligence to volunteer in regard to
questions concerning the national policy. Within the intelligence
structure there are, of course, from time to time policy questions
concerning organization or methods, but these are not related and,
therefore, must be clearly differentiated from matters of national
policy and are settled internally through the mechanism of the
United States Intelligence Board.
I trust the foregoing will serve the needs of the Committee.
Yours very truly,
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
20 - Senate Armed Services Committee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1- ER
30 additional to Senate Armed Services
1/ 22/ 62
1 - IG 1 - McCarthy file
3 - Col. Grogan
1- OGC
4 - Leg. Counsel - Russell file
Committee file
Confirmation Hearings File
Chrono.
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