LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080030-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 12, 2005
Sequence Number:
30
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 16, 1961
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP64B00346R000500080030-0.pdf | 181.39 KB |
Body:
DCI BRIEFING
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16 May 1961
LATIN AMERICAN REACTION TO CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS
Mid-April events in Cuba generated great interest in other Latin
American countries; preexisting attitudes of various groups somewhat
intensified, but no significant shift in opinion on Castro problem
yet discernible,
A. However, Castro's May Day speech, in which he called his regime
"socialist" viewed by many Latin Americans as open proclamation
of Cuba's membership in Bloc and ha,s led some governments more
seriously to consider counteraction.
1. Latin American press comment on police state controls and on
Communist hold on Cuba has shown marked increase and is con-
tributing to growing public awareness of threat.
B. On 24 April, Honduras became eighth Latin American government (of
a total of 19 Latin American governments) to sever relations
with Castro regime.
1. The Costa Rcangovernment appears on verge of breaking rela-
tions and is under strong domestic pressure to do so,
2. Previously, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Guatemala,
Haiti, and Dominican Republic had broken with Cuba--all but
El Salvador prior to the US break last January.
C. Of the eight that have broken relations, all but Dominican Republic
can be counted on to support strong multilateral anti-Castro action.
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S E C R E T 16 May 1961
1. In addition, Costa Rica and Panama would probably back
such action.
2. Argentine, Venezuelan, and Colombian governments--all strongly
anti-Castro--are cautiously but actively seeking an anti-Castro
formula that would have support of other key governments.
Bolivia and Uruguay would probably back such a solution.
3. The "hard core" reluctant to act against Castro consists of
key countries of Mexico, Brazil,and.+.Chile, as well as Ecuador.
4. Ecuadorean Presidellt`.'Velasco, who heads the Latin American gov-
ernment most favorably disposed to Castro, fired his pro-US
foreign minister on 10 May over the latter's anti-Castro stand
and replaced him with a man amenable to Velasco's policies.
D. Communist and other pro-Castro groups in Latin America launched
anti-US demonstrations in a number of countries immediately fol-
lowing 17 April landings.
1. But demonstrations, though in some instances violent, in no
case seriously threatened public order and were, in general,
less formidable than predicted by Castroites.
E. Cuban "good will mission" currently planning to visit key Latin
American countries presumably in attempt to block US efforts for
OAS action on Cuba.
II. While most Latin American governments now ready to consent to a meeting
of the OAS ambassadors on the Cuban problem, they are divided on what
to do at such a meeting and feel restrained from any decisive action
by four basic considerations:
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A. First, many of them fear adverse domestic reactions by leftist
and pro-Castro groups.
1. However, failure of pro-Castro demonstrations last month to
reach serious proportions may have dissipated some of this
fear.
25X1
Secondly, the principle of non-intervention in another state's
affairs arouses considerable support from Latin American govern-
ments and is regarded by many as keystone,` of inter-American
system.
1. This attitude particularly strong in Mexico where it is most
tenaciously held to when it involved US.
2. Nevertheless, sentiment is growing in such important countries
as Venezuela, Colombia, Argentina and others that principle
of non-intervention should not tie hemisphere hands in stopping
Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba.
3. Costa Rican President Echandi publicly described principle of
non-intervention as outdated and harmful.
C. Thirdly, certain Latin American leaders dislike being labelled
as outstandingly cooperative with the United States.
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S E C R E T
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SECRET 16 May 1961
2.. Chile dislikes to be in a bloc with the smaller Latin Americans,
prefers to have at least two of the three big Latin American
countries on its side.
3. Even the strongly anti-Castro Honduran ambassador stressed that
any policy on Cuba should have support of Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Mexico because such support would influence the
smaller Latin Americans.
D. Fourthly, many governments fear that public airing of differences
at an OAS meeting would gravely weaken inter-American system and do
more harm than good.
1. Even officials of those governments not completely defeatist on
issue, for instance Argentine and Uruguayan, warn that, to avoid
a fiasco any OAS meeting must be preceeded by thorough prepara-
tion so that it is directed toward a specific goal and that
there is prior agreement on major issues.
E. If given a choice, post Latin American governments would prefer to
evade all responsibility for any anti-Castro action.
25X6
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