OSI SURVEY REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00005R000100090003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 1, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
1 February 1952
OSI SURVEY REPORT
E Nd"dby tai
3
Two major problems have been raised in connection with the 03I
survey; namely-
1. The place of OSI in the intelligence community. This
problem involves a reconsideration of the mission and
functions of 0SI as set forth in CIA Regulation 70; the
mission and functions of the Scientific Intelligence
Committee (SIC) as set forth in DCI 3/3; and the
relationship of OSI to the scientific intelligence
efforts of other Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC)
Agencies.
2. The primary deficiency of our scientific intelligence
production which is basically a failure in the
collection of significant raw intelligence.
Other problems were encountered in the survey but, because of
their relative unimportance, this report will discuss them separately
after considering the two major problems.
I.
MAJOR PROBLEMS
1. The Place of OSI in the Over All Intelligence Community
The production of scientific intelligence involves
problems which are distinct from and in a sense more
difficult than the problems involved in other intelligence
production- economic, for example. This is primarily
because (a) there is a dearth of competent personnel
available for scientific intelligence (there is no
reservoir of men trained in both science and intelli-
gence) and (b) our need for scientific intelligence goes
far beyond our capacity to obtain raw intelligence sus-
ceptible of accurate evaluation. This is a complaint
which is common to the entire intelligence community
but it has special significance in relation to Scientific
Intelligence for several reasons. First, the average
collector does not have the knowledge to recognize
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scientific facts of significance to scientific intel-
ligence when he seems them. Secondly, the very rapid
development of science throughout the world in recent
years has made possible scientific warfare of such
immediate and large destructive capacity that a premium
is placed upon obtaining scientific intelligence. (A
passing thought to the possibilities of atomic warfare,
bacteriological warfare, chemical warfare, guided
missiles, and rockets is convincing without proof on
this point.) Thirdly, by virtue of the secrecy with
which applied science is generally surrounded in
industry, scientific information lends itself readily
to concealment even in a democracy and can be held
reasonably safe from penetration in a'police state.
It must also be recognized that scientific
intelligence is a relatively new concept. There is
attached, marked Tab A, a summary of background
information on the development of scientific intelli-
gence. In Tab A. reference is made to a series of
surveys of the problem before 05I was established, all
pointing up a peculiar need for a highly centralized
scientific intelligence service. Largely because of
the weight given to such independent recommendations
for centralized scientific intelligence, OSI declared
for itself in CIA Regulation 70, Tab B attached, a
statement of mission and functions which conflicts
with DCI 3/3 (see below) and organized itself to per-
form such centralized functions as indicated by the
attached organization chart, Tab C. Collection of
scientific intelligence has been assigned by NSCID 10
to State as to basic sciences and to the Armed Services
to meet requirements of the military establishment, but,
as shown below, present collection methods have to some
extent made this directive obsolete.
Conflict with Service Departments
The effort effectively to centralize scientific
and technical intelligence has conflicted with what the
Services, with considerable justification, believe to
be their exclusive prerogatives in this field. To
attain proper coordination, a Scientific Intelligence
Committee (SIC), composed of representatives of the
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Service arms, State, the Atomic Energy Commission, and CIA
was set up under NS-CID 3, pursuant to which a directive,
DCI 3/3, provided for working committees in the several.
specific substantive fields of scientific intelligence.
This program, which if it functioned as planned is
perhaps the best coordinating vehicle that can be set
up under the actual situation in the intelligence
community, is now breaking down, Although the working
committees are still functioning well in the field of
atomic energy and reasonably well in the field of
chemistry, they are not functioning at all in the field
of electronics and, at the instance of the military, the
subcommittees of SIC on electronics, guided missiles
and chemical warfare have been voted abolished, as
Defense feels these fields the exclusive competence of
Defense. Yet these fields are the very ones which
overlap strictly departmental interests. Further, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have just recently established a
Joint Chiefs Technical Intelligence Subcommittee (JTIS)
which adds another arm to the scientific intelligence
body which without clarification can only result in
further confusion. The directive of JTIS is in direct
conflict with the.SIC directive.
Two examples from recent experiences of OSI with
Service branches indicate how seriously our capacities
in scientific intelligence are affected by the conflict
which has arisen with the Service branches. The first
relates to photographs which A-2 took of what are
possibly guided missile launching ramps in Eastern Asia.
The Technical Capabilities Branch of A-2 objected to OSI
seeing the pictures; yet what may prove to be important
intelligence would have been denied to the community had
OSI not seen these photographs. Eight weeks ago, OSI
asked for the negatives so that they could blow them up
and give better study to what they interpret to be the
ramps. The negatives are still in the Far East Command.
The second example relates to an idea advanced in the
Joint Medical Intelligence Committee of SIC that by
drawing a drop of blood from a POW with each immunizing
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injection, we are able to learn what disease the
prisoner has been innoculated against or immunized
against by exposure or inheritance and from this
information to determine to what diseases such a
prisoner would be prone. With enough of such samples
obtained in Korea, for example, it would be possible
to plot a map of China indicating what areas are
immune to certain diseases and susceptible to others,
which might be intelligence of great value for bio-
logical warfare. OSl was requested to carry such a
program out. No success in initiating this program
has been obtained, partly because of the community's
attitude with respect to separating intelligence
and operations into pigeonholes, isolated from each
other.
A good case can be made that the ideal to meet
the national requirements of scientific and technical
intelligence would be a strong centralized group under
single direction, as recommended in the reports
referred to in Tab A. This is not only because of.the
dearth of adequate competent personnel and the existence
of needs beyond oux capabilities referred to above, but
also because of the risk of omission and oversight with-
out centralization; the limitations imposed by depart-
mentalization because of the exclusive interest of the
parent department in its own mission; the inseparability
of scientific disciplines and the overlapping of fields
(electronics, for examples are vital to guided missiles,
radar, communications, navigation, anti-submarine and
anti-aircraft weapons and certain fuses). Further, the
most prolific source of information on Russian scientific
development is the open literature which can best be
exploited under a single authority.
Regardless of the ideal, it seems clear that the
Services will not forego independent scientific and
technical intelligence production nor is it important
to CIA that American collection and production be on
an ideal basis so long as the job is done to the utmost
of the capabilities of the combined intelligence
community. The problem cannot be solved within CIA
alone and is considered by the undersigned important
enough to justify a reopening of the question on NSC
levels for a new determination of the respective
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responsibilities of the different agencies. Part of
the difficulties encountered with G-2 clearly spring
from its conviction that in some fields, particularly
with relation to ground weapons, CIA is transgressing
on territory of particular and exclusive interest to
the Army. Difficulty with this position, from the
surveyors' vietivpoint, is the present restricted
capacit of G-2 in the scientific field. The force
25X1 A9a under has been reduced to six men and,
sympathetic as we may be with the fundamental Army
position, we feel great hesitancy in recognizing its
validity where the competence is so restricted not by
reason of the lack of quality of the individuals on board
but by an apparent lack of appreciation of the problem
on policy making levels. Recommendations below are
made subject to this caveat and are invalid unless
their accpetance involves a basic change of policy by
the Service arms, and an open acceptance by them for
the whole community of the recommended responsibilities.
Recommendations
It is recommended that CIA Regulation 70, relating
to OSI, beyamended to clarify the responsibilities of
OSI in accordance with Tab E; and that a new NSCID be
suggested, in accordance with Tab D. assigning to the
Service arms full responsibility for the production of
technical intelligence; i.e., intelligence relating to
weapons and means of warfare which have been reduced to
known prototypes, leaving to CIA responsibility (and
power) in the technical intelligence fields only to the
extent (a) that a Service arm shall request such CIA
interest in any specific instance and (b) that one or
more of the Services will not accept complete responsi-
bility with respect to new developments to which CIA may
call attention. Exceptions (a) and (b) are essential in
order that no gaps may be permitted in our over-e11 scientific
and technical intelligence coverage. The primary respons.a_-
bility of CIA in the scientific intelligence field would
then be restricted to scientific intelligence; i. e.
intelligence with respect to research and its implications,
and to developments in the pilot plant stage before they
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are reduced to known prototypes. It is our hope that
an offer to the military along these lines will remove
many of the sources of friction which are impeding our
scientific intelligence production today and that,
whether or not the military authorities accept this
suggestion, its very presentation may evoke a more
workable climate in the scientific intelligence com-
munity.
The proposed division of responsibility would
follow the British system, as indicated in Tab A. It
should also be pointed out that this division of
responsibility would place upon the Armed Services
primary responsibility for technological surprise;
i.e., for an enemy using instruments of warfare of
which we have no prior knowledge. (We are not stressing
this point, because we believe collectors should be
warned that it is quite possible for the intelligence
community to overeiuphasize the problem of surprise.
It would be quite natural for American intelligence
officers today to be guided by a Pearl Harbor complex.
Order of Battle intelligence is relatively unimportant
in normal times and it is quite possible that our
collectors are putting too much attention today on
movements of troops and materiel to the detriment of
other more valuable information of long-term importance.)
The new Joint Technical Intelligence Subcommittee of the
JCS may be the proper body to allocate authority within
these general lines of division. It must be pointed out,
however, that in making a national estimate, we are
concerned with instrumentalities in being as well as
those in process and a free flow, without reservation
or exception, of both raw intelligence and evaluated
intelligence from the Services to CIA would be vital
despite this division of responsibility, and should
be specifically directed on both intelligence and
operational levels in the proposed new NSCID.
2. The Failure in Collection Activities
One of the basic deficiencies in our scientific
intelligence product stems from the abysmal gaps in
our knowledge of the state of research in Soviet Russia.
=sue
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This is partly because of the difficulties of pene-
tration of research activities in the police state;
is partly due to the progressive weakness in results
in scientific intelligence in proportion as the analyst
is removed from the collector; and, finally, is partly
due to our own failure to make better use of raw material
which is available to us. A summary of the sources of
value to OSI is attached as Tab F. This problem can
best be understood by relating the discussion and
recommendations to the particular sources of raw intelli-
gence which are of primary value to OSI:
a. Foreign documents.
25X1A7b
Although we have today a substantial
exploitation of foreign documents and
although the collection of such documents
should be expedited by the proposed NSCID
25X1 A7b making Ma service of common concern (as
recommended in 00 Survey Report), it is
nevertheless our opinion after surveying
OSI that a very fertile field of informa-
tion with respect to Soviet science as
disclosed in Soviet documents is today
being neglected. This is due partly to
manpower limitations but more largely to
a failure to come to grips with the problem.
The present procedure is for FDD to make
periodical abstracts which are then cir-
culated among the intelligence officers
who may call for full translations of
interesting documents. The weakness in
this procedure lies in the fact that the
abstracter is not a scientist and too
frequently fails to see the significance
of a point of scientific interest and
unintentionally disguises it in his
abstract. A better procedure would be
for = not to abstract but to list the
table of contents of foreign scientific
periodicals and confine abstracting and
translating to specific requests. An
even surer procedure would be to exploit
the foreign scientific documents entirely
outside the intelligence community. This
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25X1A5a1
25X1 A5a 1 problem is being studied by
under an OSI spons aced pro-
ject and that is the essence of his
preliminary determination. Such procedure
has one great virtue; namely, it makes the
document available to American scientists
who are just as interested in the contents
as is the intelligence community. Today
the processing of the document in the
intelligence community results inits
classification and consequent unavail-
ability to American scientists generally.
There are scientific groups aware of the
Russian language located in great enough
numbers throughout the United States at
institutions of learning, foundations, and
corporations to reduce the burden of
abstracting and translating for any one
group to workable proportions. There are
also refugee personnel, frequently with
scientific knowledge, who could be overtly
used for abstracting and translating if
documents were not classified. Therefore,
the proposed procedure would greatly speed
up the time in which the intelligence
becomes available to the producer at OSI
and would automatically bring to the aid
of the office untold analytical ability
(which is now unavailable) to appraise the
significance of such intell' ence. In
view of the fact that the studies 25X1A5a1
are not completed, no specific recommendation
is made in this report beyond the caveat
that our present procedures are ineffective
and that serious attention be given to the
problem as soon as the study is 25X1 A5a 1
completed. There will be involved the
working out of the mechanics for the deposit
and withdrawal of documents, translations,
and microfilms thereof, and mechanics for
having professional organizations make better
abstracts in fields where this is not now
done. In certain fields of scientific
interest, there are available today profes-
sional abstracts of Russian documents which
are entirely satisfactory, particularly in
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chemistry. This is done under the auspices
of the American Chemical Society. The
abstracting in physics and biology is also
reasonably good and there is an Index Medicus
which indexes documents in the field of
medicine. Some work is also being done at
UNESCO, at the Library of Congress, and at
25X1A5a1 other centers. It is hoped that the
recommendations will point the
way for the optimum use of this material.
b. The Exploitation of
0SI meets this problem b having a
25X1 DOad For RE
substantial beachhead at representing F OIAb3c
OSI's entire office. There is, however, an
25X1 A2c _ rule that - material cannot be used
F OIAb3c until it is translated and published. (The
reason for this is that all interested parties
may have the same chance at the material.)
Much time could be saved by permitting
language experts to work directly with the raw
material to take out what they need. It is a
simple matter to give such material the same
security protection which all - receives 25X1 A2cD
and an effort should be made to abolish the
F OIAb3c above rule. An "all or none" basis, such as
the_rule prescribes, has no substantive 25X1 X7
validit
25X1X7
It is also important that everyone in
OSI be cleared for- Today they cannot 25X1 A2C
be submitted for clearance until they have
first been cleared by the CIA Security Office.
It should be possible for I&S to ascertain
OCI's requirements and, so far as OSI is
concerned, develop a set of combined require-
ments before the initial security clearance.
This would save several weeks in clearing
new 0SI personnel for active duty. (There
would be some few exceptions, but these are
susceptible of administrative handling
between Ai/SI and I&S.)
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25X1A2c
Recommendation FOIAb3c
That be requested to amend its rule
in denying material to OSI until it
is translated and published; and that OCI
give I&S its requirements for clear- 25X1 A2CI
ance; and that 1&S be instructed to develop
combined requirements applicable to all
personnel to be cleared for OSI duty. ?
c. Covert Collection
The best covert collection from the OSI
25X1 A6ad F point of view has been b OSO cooperation
with where the analyst
25X1A6a has direct contact with the
manager of the field collection. A summary
of foreign collection activities is attached
as Tab G. In other areas, however, OSI
coordinates its requirements with other
agencies and offices which may be interested.
The requirement then goes to TSS at OPC which
goes back over the same ground and recoordinates.
In rephrasing the requirement, non-scientific
personnel are apt to change the significance
or the emphasis. Access of the OSI analyst
directly with the desk officer who sends the
requirement out would assure the requirement
going to the collector in a more satisfactory
form from the OSI point of view.
Recommendation
That DD/I work out with DD/P a procedure
which would permit the closest possible con-
tact (consistent with security) between the
OSI analyst and the ultimate collector in the
covert field.
d. Overt Interrogation
One of the most important sources of
scientific intelligence to date has been the
25X1X4
have particular information concerning Soviet
activities. This collection has been so
Has been done, by DD/I, since this study was made.
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25X1A6a
improved with the OSI
and with the set-up of a scientific liaison
branch at 00, that proper
exploitation of these sources depends today
almost exclusively upon the amount of effort
devoted to it. With respect to other overt
sources, principally the accumulated knowledge
of American scientists, the office has a full
and adequate program of consultants and
research projects which should not be expanded
until they can be appraised on their present
levels.
Recommendation
e. Technical Collection
The use of instruments of science to 25X1 B6a
collect scientific intelligence is particularly
fruitful in the electronics and atomic ener
fields.
25X1 B6a
25X1 B6a
25X1 B6a
Liaison for intelligence purposes between OSI
and is now satisfactory. The effectiveness
of the collection is not satisfactory. The Air
Force did not accept OSI's program (later sur-
prisingly confirmed by a top Brookhaven report)
as to the analysis to be made b A-2 of the
It is clear
from the independent, unsponsored Brookhaven
report that, had the analysis been made as
recommended, we could have learned much that
we do not know about the Soviet atomic energy
development.
Recommendation
You cannot improve this type of failure
except by the education which the failure
provides. No specific recommendation.
25X1 DOa
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(2)
A still further recommendation
depends upon the future decisions
with respect to setting up a world-
wide independent communications
system for CIA. It is understood
that such a program is now under
consideration in our Comoro Division.
If accepted, we believe it would
then be desirable for OSI to make
independent observations at such
commmmications centers as may be
established.
25X1A2g
This project gives OSI serious
concern, not primarily because of
its initial object of assisting
the Voice of America but because
the very jamming facilities which
are interfering with VOA could, in
the event of war, jam and destroy
our entire global communications
system. OSI considers it ve 25X1 DOaD
important that
25X1 DOa
25X1A2g
Recommendation
It is recommended that DD/I
undertake to break the log jam on
the and that
proceeding with this project under
whatever auspices be made a matter
of highest priority for DD/I.
OTI i. PROBLE0,
The following problems are secondary in the sense that their
solution is substantially within the capabilities of this Agency.
1. Operations Intelligence
OSI deals primarily with the intelligence groups
in the other IAC agencies. Frequently the greatest
competence is not in the intelligence officers but in
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operations officers or in the technical services. In
some branches of OSI, effective liaisons have been
established on this basis where the operations officers
have readily reciprocated for briefings and other services
rendered to them by OSI. We have found, however, that
intelligence collected within the Agency, by OSO, for
example, is frequently given to the operations division
of the Services on exclusive terms so that the Service
is not permitted to give that intelligence back to OSI.
Proper liaison. with such operations group is then impeded.
It is also sometimes true that intelligence of interest
to operational divisions comes to OSI on a "CIA Only"
basis because of its sensitive source. This results in
a holding out of information from the Services which is
undesirable and not conducive to a free two-way exchange.
Recommendation 25X1 A2C
That DD/I establish mechanics for sanitizing -
scientific intelligence which would be of interest to
operating divisions of the Services and work out with
DD/P mechanics so that scientific operating intelligence
by OSO to the Services is available to OSI.
2. Optimum Use of Consultants
We are frequently using consultants inefficiently.
The case has actually arisen of one consultant working
for three offices of CIA, such as OPC, OSI and OCO,
knowing that what he was doing for one would help the
other but reticent, for security reasons, to disclose
his mission and the knowledge derived from it on an
all-Agency basis. It -would help if mechanics were
established by which fully cleared officers of each
division could assess such a problem.
Recommendation
See 14. below.
3. Optimum Exploitation of Contacts with Other Agencies
There are ma-ay cases in which the best access to
another IAC agency with which OSI must consult is through.
a man in a CIA office other than OSI. For example, the
best and freest access to Camp Detrick, the Army's
biological research center, is available to a man in the
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TSS Division under DD/P. The needs of the Biological
Division of OSI in liaison with Camp Detrick could better
be served by this man providing the proper introduction
and taking the 0SI representative with him, than by
successive visits to Detrick from different parts of the
Agency.
Recommendation
See 4. below.
4. Intra-CIA Liaison
Generally speaking, OSI has excellent working
relations with other offices within CIA. It is clear,
however, that there is much duplication and loss of
time and, in some cases, downright confusion arising
out of the working level contacts by which these
relationships have been achieved. It is recognized
that this is not entirely a bad thing because cross-
fertilization within the intelligence community has
definite advantages. It is nevertheless thought
that some attempt better to coordinate cross-contacts
in the scientific field. should be undertaken. It is
wasteful, for example, for TSS to staff itself to
perform functions where OSI already has the competence,
and vice versa.
Recommendation
It is recommended that under the chairmanship of
the head of the Support Division of OSI, an intra-agency
liaison committee, consisting of one representative of
OPC, OSO, TSS, Communications, the communications branch
of ORR, and the scientific branch of 25X1 A8a
00, be created on a six-months' basis to explore the
possibility of greater coordination among their several
offices. This committee could work out mechanics for
making optimum use of consultants referred to in 2. above
and for exploring the most useful contacts with non-CIA
agencies (3. above).
5. Delays in Receiving Raw Material
In the course of this survey, the point was made in
several divisions and branches that what seemed like
unconscionable delays were normal in the transmission of
raw intelligence from the collector to the analyst. In
a few checked cases, it appeared that there was an averagf
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delay of from 12-15 days between the receipt of the raw
material at OCD and its delivery on the desk of the OSI
analyst and that even longer periods elapsed between the
receipt of the material in the collection office and its
delivery to OCD.
Recommendation
As it is knomu that DD/I is well aware of this
problem and working on it, it was not more thoroughly
explored and no recommendation is offered beyond that
DD/I consider, with respect to information transmitted 25X1 A6a
from
inaugurating a weekly telecon over the 25X1 A6a0
circuit.
6. Delay in Requirements Reports
It was something of a shock, after finding in the
collection offices a demand for more specific requirements,
to hear in OS1 complaints of specific re uirements which
were ignored for months, particularly in
As this situation has already been corrected at our request
so that hereafter regular reports will be made that the
information is or is not still being sought and is or is
not within the capacity of the collector, no recommendation
need be made here.
7. Medical Intelligence
Our Medical Intelligence Division, like so many other
of our producing areas, is working pretty much in a vacuum
so far as reliable raw intelligence is concerned. It is
quite possible that closer cooperation with the CIA Medical
Staff would result in raw intelligence from our medical
support units abroad.
Recommendation
That DD/I investigate the possibility suggested above
and initiate such action as he may deem desirable.
25X1A8a
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SPECIAL STRENGTHS OF CSI
There are many things to commend with respect to the organization,
personnel, and operations at OSI, and the emphasis in this survey on
problems should not cause them to be overlooked. The purpose of this
survey, however, was to be constructively helpful on problems, not to
be laudatory. Special mention should be made, nevertheless, of the
thoughtfulness and care given throughout the division to the evaluations
provided for collectors of raw material. Nothing can assist a collector
more than a careful, thoughtful and complete evaluation of his material.
The standards set for this practice in OSI are distinguished, and con-
formed to in all divisions. It should be stated that Dr. Chadwell,
25X1A9a Assistant Director, and his Deputy, are completely conversant
with their task, well aware of the deficiencies -which exist in their
division, and thoughtfully interested in improving the contributions of
their division to the intelligence community. They are staffed with
25X I A on high caliber intelligence officers in 25X1A9a
divisions in Wea ons under Physics and Electronics 25X1A9a
25X1 A9a under and Nuclear Energy under
25X1A9a 25X1A9a
A point was made in our survey of ascertaining whether OSI was
keeping fully abreast of American science and technological develoo-
ments because one guide to what an enemy may do is what we are doing.
We found that all the divisions are aware of the importance of such
activity, and most of them stated that they are giving as much tiros
as possible to checking American developments through the Research and
Development Board, consultants, operational branches of the Services,
and other valuable sources.
Before closing this report, we wish to offer two recommendations
relating to personnel:
1. To prevent important personnel from dying professionally,
it is recommended that as a policy we attempt to send our
scientists at least once annually to a professional meeti.ig
in their respective fields.
2. That the needs of the office for personnel at the levels
of chief of division, deputy chief of division, and heads
of branches be circulated periodically among our approved
consultants who may be of assistance in obtaining scienti'i-
cally competent intelligence officers.
25X1A5a1
Appr ,9x/09/07 : CIA-RDP65-00Q060r Gera 1=~`
 A
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