RUSSIAN METHODS OF INTERROGATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL WORLD WAR II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 469
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions Ord File*
D 1- 8 2 3
RUSSIAN METHODS OF INTERROGATING
CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WAR II
By
KERMIT G. STEWART
Major, Infantry, United States Army
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
SECRET
 Approved 'For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
RUBSILN METHOD'.;
OF
INT RiiWC ATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL
WORLD WAR II
BY
KERMI T G.
; = 2'EWART
Major, (Inf) GSC
Yr A R N I 14 G
This docum nt contains information affectin ;
the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the Espionage Laws,
Title :L8, U. L)'. C., sections 793 and 794.
The trans~,ni. lion or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized
person is prohibited by law.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HI TGiiY
DEPid, ,TMIEivT OF THE ARMY
1951
C 1'. E T
Ir-5CIR !1.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-
ECri 11a
T
.F-Q---H E ry0iLD
r
The. Office of the Chief of Military History has undertaken
the preparation of various special studies needed in the Army School
special
System and for staff reference . Such pro j ects were initiated more
than three years ago when a canvass of general and upecial staff sec-
tions of the Army resulted in requests for studies on a wide variety
of subjects. In many cases the need for such studies was found to
be greatest in matters pertaining to foreign military methods. Thic3
study is intended to provide the Army with information on Russian
interrogation methods in a. condensed and readily usable.: form. It has
been made at the request of the Assistant Chief Of staff, G-2, GStJSA.
A considerable volume of maberiai is available for research on
uoviet method;:; of interrogation. The hussians, however, care extremely
secretive, and. there a,:e many gabs in our knowledge of their operations
and methods, particularly at the higher levels of the Soviet govern--
mental and military structure. It io felt that this study will fill
in some of the missing pieces of the Soviet puzzle. If it stimulate,,,
further investigation to gain yet more complete knowledge of Rus&iarr
methods, the continuing value of the study will be enhanced.
ORLANDO 71~ARD
vVushington, D. C. Major General, UCH.
September 1951 Chief, Aiiitary History
Approved For ReleasA2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
MISSING PAGE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE($:
/V
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved __For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
SECRET
The primary purpose of this study is to provide a reference
work on Russian methods-of interrogation for students in the Army
School System, particularly for those in the field of intelligence.
This work is also intended for use as a reference by those who
determine what instructions a United States soldier will receive
concerning his conduct in the event of capture by the armed forces
of the SovietlUhion or its satellite nations.
The scope--'of'-this study is considerably broader than indicated
by the title. The general treatment accorded prisoners of war by the
Soviets during World War II is balanced against a history of prisoner
treatment through 'the ages. Soviet attitudes regarding the rules of
land warfare surrounding prisoners are compared with the attitudes of
other peoples. A brief description of the governmental and military
structure of the Soviet Union has been presented, in order that the
student may better understand the part played by the interrogation
program in thy; over-all intelligence plan of that nation. Soviet
intelligence procedures, prisoner evacuation, prison camp conditions,
and the prisoner indoctrination- program are discussed to the extent
necessary to lead'to a ''better understanding of the interrogation
program.
In the hands of the Soviets, interrogation is not only a matins
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
v
 Approved For Release 2002/01 1 Q",: 1 18-RDP65-00
1
of gathering information but also a political weapon. The startling
confessions made in the Soviet purge trials of the lat@ 1930's or,
more recently, in the Hungarian trials of Cardinal Mindszenty and
Robert Vogler have testified to the effectiveness of communist
methods of "political" interrogation. In this study such methods
are touched upon because they were. used with a very limited number
of prisoners of war. Otherwise, the discussion has been confined to,
methods used to gain tactical and strategic information from captured
military personnel during and immediately after World War II.
Since this study is intended for use.as a reference, which means
that only isolated parts of. the work will be read by many individuals,
certain facts and ideas have been repeated from time to time in order
to permit each phase of the study to-stand alone as a self-contained
thesis.
The author has been allowed complete freedom in research and in
developing his ideas, and for this he is truly grateful. A sincere
attempt has been made to write a factual-, objective narrative, devoid
of bias. In occasional instances when only assumptions could be made
because of insufficient evidence, they have been frankly labeled as
such. The author takes full responsibility for these assumptions,
for statements of fact, and for conclusions found in the text. It
must be emphasized that the recommendations contained in the final
chapter represent the views of the author and do not necessarily
SECRET I Clunk JR, It
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/011101: E+IA-RDP65-00 1-4
reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Army.
The writer has received much help, beginning with the original
outline and continuing through the stages of researching, writing,
and editing. Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, USA-Rot., Chief, Special
Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, contributed
many valuable suggestions, smoothed the way for more complete research
than would otherwise have been possible, and offered constructive
criticism and guidance throughout the project. Lt. William Klepper, Jr.,
carefully researched the records of the German Military Documents
Section and located many documents which were of primary importance
to this study; Lt. George L. Frenkel's painstaking review of the
manuscript and his correction of many translations of German documents
have resulted in a muc'. improved, more accurate study. Lt. Col.
Robert E. Work, USAF, was most co-operative in making available Air
Force records for this project, and his constructive suggestions and
criticisms were much appreciated by the author. Mr. Israel Viic(D "Ind
his assistants have given valuable aid in securing source materials;
the Foreign Studies Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History;
the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA and GHQ, FEC;
the Departmental Records Branch, AGO; the Historical Section, EUCOM;
the Army Library; and the American Red Cross have all boon most co-
operative. It has been a pleasure to work with Miss Lucy fieidman
who has edited the final draft. of the manuscript; Mrs. Frances T. Fritz
SECttET EC
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
vii
 Approved For Release 20052/O1/10~ .lAT;RDP65-0 0 4 001-4
did the, preliminary editing of the first draft of the narrative.
Mr. Frank J. Ford is responsible for the first chart, the other six
being the work of Mr. Elliott Duna.yy. Mrs. Irene Wilhelm has been.: ;
helpful in administrative matters and has assisted with the typing;
Mrs. Laurie Herring has assiduously typed and retyped the manuscript
and out most of the stencils for this mimeographed edition of the
study.
(References in the footnotes give credit only to a few of the
many persons who have been called upon to give information. Personnel
of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA, of the:-,,
Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, and of the Office of the Chief of:
Naval Intelli ence, USN, have reviewed the manuscript; their comments
and criticisms. have been invaluable.
KErNIT G. STEWART
Washington, D. C. Major, (Inf) GSC
September 1951
S E C P. E T ~)lils 0'T
Approved For Release 2002/04il : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0J/'r0 Y GAERbP65-00756R000400030001-4
2ECRET
PART ONE
Chapter
Page
I
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY . . . . . . . . .
, 1
II
SOME ASPECTS OF-INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . .
. 9
TII
THE GROWTH OF CUSTOMS AND LAWS REGARDING PRISONERS
. 20
IV
THE GENEVA (PRISONERS OF WAR) CONVENTION OF 1929. ? .
. 42
A. Summary of Certain Protective Provisions of
the Convention. . . . .
. 42
B. Status of the Ma'or Powers in Relation to the
Geneva Convention During World War II . . . .
. 47
V
SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. .
. 55
PART TWO
VI
NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE USSR . . . . . . . .
. 69
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 69
B. Government of the USSR and the Communist Party. .
70
C. -Soviet Military and Para-Military Forces. . . . .
. 75
1. The Supreme Command . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. 75
,2. Field Organizations. of the Red Army . . . .
. 81
3. Intelligence Functions of the-General Staff
and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). 86
4. Staff Organization and the Intelligence
Sections of Red Army Field Organizations . 93
5. 'Soviet Para-Military Political, Security,
and Counterintelligence Agencies . . . 104
a. The Main Political Directorate . . . . 105
b. The History of the Soviet Secret Service. . 107
.c. The NKVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
d. Main Co rintelli ence Administration
of the Armed Forces GUKR . . . . . . . 120
D. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
S E C R E T
171 C
J11 Tlr.~,
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 200WOO / 0 R 9A-RDP65-063q $
Chapter
Page
VII SOVIET REGULATIONS REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR. . . . 136
A. General . . . . . . . . . . 13 6
B. Soviet Instructions Issued in 1940 . . . . . 138
The Importance of Taking Prisoners . . . . . . . 140
Procedure for Collecting and Evacuating Prisoners 141
Interrogation of Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . 149
C. Red Army Adherence to Instructions Con-
cerninr1 Prisoners. . . . . . . . . . . 159
D. The 1942 Soviet Field Regulation . . . . . . . 164
E. Subsequent Orders and Directives . . . . . . . . 166
F. Political Interrogation Directives . . . . . . . 170
G. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
VIII SELECTION AND TRAINING OF INTERROGATIONS AND
INTERPRETERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
A. Interrogation Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
B. Selection and Training of Intelligence Officers. 182
C. Training in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
D. Soviet Air Force Intelligence Officers . . . . . 188
E. NKVD Interrogation Personnel . . . . . . . . 189
F. Selection and Training of Interpreters . . . . . 191
G. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
IX INSTRUCTIONS FOR SOVIET CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND
TREATMENT OF REPATRIATED PRISONERS . . . . . 198
A. Indoctrination and Training. . . . . . . . . 198
B. Treatment of Repatriated Soviet Prisoners. . . . 202
C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A: Phases of Prisoner Treatment . . . . . . . . 208
B. Soviet Interrogation Methods as Applied in
the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
1. Some Aspects of Soviet Intelligence Doctrine 215
2.. Russian Characteristics Affecting
Interrogation Methods . . . . . . . . 216
3. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red
Army During the First Stake of the War. 220
4. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red
Army During the Second and Third Stages
of he. War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233
,
Approved For Release 20G /Q111(j: ;UA-RDP65&%1 6 6640 0001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
SECRET SECRET
Chapter Page
a. Military Interrogations in the Field. . . 233
b. Political Interrogations in the Field 244
c. Smersh Inter ogations in the Field .. . 248
C. Soviet Interrogation Methods Applied in
Prisoner-of-War Camps . . . . . . . . . . 257
1. General Conditions in the Camps . . . . 257
Camp Interrogation Methods . . . . 275
a." The Five Phases of the Camp Interrogation
P r o g r a m..... . . . . 275
b. Administration of the Camp Program. . 283
0. General Methods of Interrogation. . . 288
Coercive Techniques . . . . . . . 289
Indirect Techniques . . . . . 291
The Use of Informers Among Prisoners. 293
d. Specific Methods of Interrogation 295
First Phase of the War. . . . . . . . 295
Second and Subsequent Phases of the War 298
e. Interrogation Prisons . . . . . . . . 314
f. The Use of Drugs in Interrogations. . . 324
g. Interrogation of War Criminals. . . 332
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
XI SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING JAPANESE PRISONERS
OF WAR. . . . . . . . . 357
A. General Conditions in the Camps . . . . . 357
B. Camp Organization and Administration. . . . . . 360
C Camp Indoctrination Program . . ... . 362
D. Camp Interrogation Methods. . . - . . . . . 366
E. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 374
PART FOUR
XII' CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
S E C R E T 2) F CR T
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R00040 001-4
SECRET SECS
Page
Explanatory Note . . . .. . . . . . . . .
. .
.
383
Chapter I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
385
Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
388
Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
390
Chapter IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
397
Chapter V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
399
Chapter VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
401
Chapter VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
414
Chapter VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.
420
Chapter IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . .
. .
.
423
Chapter X. . . . . .
426
Chapter XI . . . .
446
Chapter XII. v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
448
GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
449
Facing Page
Figure 1, Prisoner Evacuation: Soviet Armed Forces,
World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . .
68
Figure 2, State Administrative Structure, USSR (1945) . . .
70
Figure 3, Command and Administration of the Red Army . . .
82
Figure 4, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), 1945, .
.86
Figure 5, Organization.--,l Pleen and Channels of Command,
Red Army Formation (Army Group). . . . . . . .
94
Figure 6, Organization of the Peoples' Commissariat of
Internal Affairs ? . . . . . ... . . .
112
Figure 7, Organization of the Main Directorates of
Prisoner-of-War Camps and Guard and Escort
Troops of the MVD (Postwar -- 1947). . . . . .
114
NOTE: The Appendixes (1 - 9) are contained in a separate volume.
L\IN
Approved For Release 220J,/OC1/10 cIA-RDP65- 0 96 000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1: FIFA,-R,D 6-00756R000AAg3r4 T
PART I
CHAPTER I
SCOPE AND PURPOSE
OF THIS STUDY
This is a study of Russian methods of interrogating captured
personnel during and immediately after World War II. The discussion
will be limited as nearly as possible to methods used in dealing
with prisoners of war although some of the methods have been used
more frequently with -,political and criminal offenders in the Soviet
Union and its satellite states.
The importance of prisoner interrogation has been emphasized
in Soviet military doctrine and practice. Explicit directions for
processing prisoners have been found in practically all handbooks
issued to the various arms and services of the Red Army. Soviet
training films have emphasized that the "eyes and ears" of prisoners
I
should be used as much as possible in planning attack or defense.
The capture of prisoners for purposes of interrogation has played
such a prominent part in Soviet tactics that commanders have often
specified in reconnaissance directives the sectors from which
prisoners were to be taken.
Soviet emphasis on the importance of prisoner interrogation
is not unique. Prisoners have been considered valuable sources of
3
information by belli&:.rents throughout the history of warfare, and
S E C R E T
SICK 9711 RE T
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :, A-RDP65-00756ROO0400030001=4
 r
Approved For Release A0 /6`11 0 61A-RDP65-011 "UZ0001-4
during World War II all the major. powers carried on extensive
prisoner-interrogation programs.
The tremendous number of prisoners taken during y'Jorld War II
If
sErved to increase the importance of the interrogation program.
Literally millions of Germans fell into Russian hands during the
war, the exact number being held at the time of Germany's surrender
will probably never be known. More than a million Japanese soldiers
and civilians were captured by the Red Army during its eleven-day
5
war with Japan. Russia, in turn, lost millions of troops to the
6
Germans. France, Poland, England, the United States, and other
powers engaged in the wax also experienced heavy losses of personnel
7
through capture. Additional millions of civilians suffered im-
prisonment as internees and slave laborers or as political and.
"racial" offenders in concentration camps.
With huge quantities of the raw material of intelligence
available iii the forma of prisoners, the various belligerents took
steps to insure the fullest possible exploitation of prisoner in-
formation. Field regulations and special orders issued to combat
troops specified procedures for processing and evacuating prisoners
in ways designed to insure their immediate and maximum utilization
for intelligence purposes. Large numbers of military intelligence
personnel were especially trained as interrogatoro and LS linguists.
Specialized agencies such as translator and interrogation teams were
9 HE, Ci T
Approved For Release 2002/01/1O-CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/O (1g ~C 4-9P65-00756
organized to exploit captured documents and to interrogate prisoners,
and subdivisions were created within existing intelligence services
to process prisoner information.
The emphasis on the prisoner-interrogation program quite
naturally led to the adoption of appropriate counterintelligence
measures by the various belligerents. Troops were told of their
rights as prisoners under international law, cautioned about known
tricks and strategems employed by the enemy to secure information
from prisoners, indoctrinated with principles of loyalty to be
practiced when in captivity, and warned of punishment which would
be inflicted if it were learned that an individual had deserted or
willzngly'given information to the energy.
In this study, Soviet methods of exploiting prisoners for
intelligence purposes will be described in as much detail as possible.
A brief discussion of the wartime organization of the government
of the USSR and of the Soviet Armed Forces will be followed by a
more extensive discussion of Soviet military intelligence services
and the organizational changes which took place during the war. For
most nations this would be sufficient background for an understanding
of their prisoner-interrogation programs. The Soviet Union, however,
had a highly centralized government and many intelligence organiza-
tions with over-lapping functions. The discussion, therefore, cannot
be confined to the military organization alone but must include
S E C R E T 5 M C vIET
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
~3-
 Approved For Release 20022/01/10 : CIA-RDP65' 0075GRd004d0030001-4
S E C R E T
various para-military intelligence and security organizations,
especia.ily the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD) which
was responsible for the operation of prisoner-of-war camps and for
the strategic interrogation program in those camps.
Soviet field regulations and special directives pertaining
to the handling and interrogation of prisoners, the selection and
training of intelligence personnel, counterintelligence measures,
specific methods and practices of Soviet interrogators, and other
aspects of, the prisoner-interrogation program will be given as com-
plete an, exposition as is possibly; within the limitations of research
materials presently available. The general treatment of prisoners
during evacuation and in the camps and the camp-propaganda program
will be discussed in so far as these aspects of the life of a
prisoner in Russia were related to interrogation proceaures. Since
interrogations of prisoners in the field and in the camps were con-
ducted by different agencies and for different purposes, separate
treatment will be given to these two phases of interrogation.
Separate treatment will also be given to Russian methods of in-
terrogating Japanese prisoners since this was almost entirely a
post-war development.
Excerpts from a large number of documents upon which this
study is based appear in the appendix. Many of these "ease histories"
are spectacular in nature and, if included in the text, would tend
Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756
S E C R E T
T
to focus the reader's attention on specific incidents rather than
lead to a general understanding of method. In so far as possible,
the text of this study will deal with methods of interrogation in
general terms. The documentary excerpts in the appendix will be
used to illustrate certain methods described and to support various
conclusions and evaluations appearing in the text.
In order to achieve a better understanding of Russian methods
of interrogating prisoners, the first part of this study will deal
with some broad aspects of the problems created by taking prisoners
in modern warfare. Included will be a brief discussion of inter-
national law as it pertains to prisoners of war; a short history of
the treatment accorded prisoners from ancient times to the present;
mention of the principal codes, treaties, and multipartite-conven-
tions concerning prisoners which have been framed in the past two
hundred years; and special mention of the Geneva Prisoners of War
Convention of 1929 with comments on the degree.to which the major
belligerents of World War II adhered, or failed to adhere, to that
treaty.
Germany was signatory to the Geneva Convention of 1929, but
the Soviet Union was not. Despite German offers to apply the pro-
visions of the convention to Russian priscners on a reciprocal basis,
the Russians persisted in refusing to make any commitments on the
matter. The result was a state of lawlessness between these two
Approved For Release 2002I11 &: IA-F DP65-00UL1 0001-4
 Approved For Release 20B2,0y1R :ECI1-RDP65-00Qk0iB0'i01-4
powers in so far as their prisoners were concerned. Both nations
were engaged in total war, a type of conflict which has become
almost institutional in the twentieth century. They were also
engaged in an ideological conflict, and the opposing, but equally
fanatical, ideologies of Communism and Naziism transformed a
chronic antagonism between the two peoples into a bitter hatred.
Tiie combined effect of these aggravating circumstances was a
noticeable deterioration in the field of humanitarianism and an
9
uptrend of brutalization. Some aspects of the effect of Communism
on Soviet attitudes toward that portion of international law per-
taining to prisoners of war will be given separate treatment in
this study.
Because of the place of the Soviet Union in world affairs and
the nature of the Communist dictatorship, the Russians have become
probably the most security conscious people on earth. They have
been especially secretive about their methods of handling prisoners.
As a result, there are many unfilled gaps in the information which
is currently available and upon which this study is based. Iviost
of the information has come, either directly or indirectly, from
German sources. An important direct source has been the German
Military Documents Section (GMDS), Departmental Records Branch,
Office of the Adjutant General. These files, most of which were
captured from the German Army at the close of Dorld guar II, have
SECRET )EC1IT
Approved For Release 2002/01/1P : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release.2002/01/10 : I RRDP65-00756
dad
yielded not only information on Soviet methods but a number of
Soviet documents concerning treatment of prisoners. A group of
former German staff officers working in co-operation with the
Historical Division of the United States European Command have
also made an important contribution to this study in the form of
monographs on Soviet methods of interrogating and propagandizing
10
prisoners of war. Some of these former officers who fought
against the Russians during the war were captured by the Red Army.
In. gathering material for their monographs they questioned many
former German soldiers now returned from Russian captivity.
Other information has been gleaned from these same returned
prisoners and from Soviet deserters by United States Army and Air
Force intelligence agencies in Europe and America. Soviet methods
of handling Japanese prisoners have been learned from Japanese
repatriates by United States intelligence agencies in Japan. The
text is fully footnoted as to the sources of the information, with
appropriate comments on the conjectures or conclusions which are
based on an inadequate number of case histories or upon information
of questionable reliability.
This study, comprising both a historical review and a critical
analysis of Russian methods of interrogating captured personnel, is
written with a twofold purposes (1) to point out the successful
methods that might well be adopted in future combat and at the same
S E C R E T 9 ) 1 CI I
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CI P65-007j ?P65-4
S C RT
time to v:or~d out 1'_ieff JC -Vt? Or and (2) to
provide the planners;, c;SpccJ lly thoc?e concerned with
l :.-terrogat7_Cn, C VUIl"~C;T''1.11+,i l _L :EJ:I.ce, troop-training, and t1:OO}~-
in or rt :tion T'C)g Y'ams y 1th in OrI:1'. bion on ~, hich to Ix se cou'_';tE r
1TE uii s to b,; taken ann training programs to be 111:,11 toted 'i n
t iE event C ': r with tho nc'] 11011 'ii11ose co lk~8t methods are canner
study .
rj l
S E C R E T CRE .?.
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : C1-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R00040C~0030001-4 ~ TV
E C R E T 2EC 11U F
uc.)Itiiii ASPLCTE,
OF INTEiNATIGi3,1L ?_,avc
In ancient 't1.mes captive was, in most cas kes, completely
subject to the mercy of his ilidiv.dun.l captor. The latter's Conduct
as it affected his prisoner was limitod by xo restrictions other
than those impi,sed by his personal. code of ethics or, society
do velopod, by the code of the ':oc:; al group to which he belong(-,,d.
As ci-viliza-tion progressed, however, a cons i'.i 'rab1.;) change took
place in the status of a military captive. he became a captive
of the Elation to which he had surrendered rather ..f the in,.
d.)J_viduai who mc.de the capture, ;;aect rlntions, in turn, ':t,::copt: a
vaY'Yi~ n'. degree of re ;.-?ur.,~ si.. Iiii ".e~ ?: r
ty '~or G}.tc i,~: lfw of The rights which gradually _.ccrucc' t c: prisoners Included that of
witlAic iwing certa.:_n inform :ti .ti from captors if pr isone:rr so do-
sired. Rules which most nations nave accepted in regard to their
treatment of priuonors, are among; that group of .Laws known a. the
rules, of land warfare w ich, in turn, are a Dar V of the larger body
of internatica j. maw.
A Modern nation whether en ed in G"71?" or peac 7 e r. '.
to certain
ri#.;i is alic? hr: s ertaira duties to fulfill under inter_
,vatic na 1 lam. T},-; s body of U?'t ais, u.sa guo, and rules ;?Jhicli affects
~a ~a
SEC H.ET ti~~
Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CkA-RDP65-00756R00104 0 01-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-00 1-4
SECRET n1'~ r14
and to an extent governs the relations and intercourse of states
with one another has been formulated as a result of commercial
and political transformations which took place during the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries vrlnen western civilization was undergoing
the transition from the Middle Ages to the era of modern history.
During that period the feudal system was transformed into a group
of well-defined territorial states with the goveriu.ients of the
latter assuming supreme authority within their boundaries. The
process of change, it is generally agreed, was completed by the
Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which securely established the terri-
torial state as the characteristic feature of the modern political
.system.
Under current conceptions of internabiraal law, a state (or
nation) has been defined as "the external personality or outward
agency of an independent community" which has as its attributes
"(a) pcssession of sovereign power to pledge the community in its
relations with other similarly sovereign communities, (b) independence
of all external control, and (c) dominion over a determinate terri-
2
tort'." Thus, while a state recognizes no higher lawgiving authority,
it can still pledge itself to maintain certain specified relations
with other states.
Despite the fact that the old system of feudalism had evolved
into a system of separate territorial states, these states maintained
I-CII31E "
Approved For Release 2002/01/i ctCIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 14-9
l a4
continuous relations with one another, and it was inevitable that
Approved For Release 2002/Oj/'50 C CAZRpP65-00756R
certain rules should be adopted which would assure a measure of
order and mutual understanding in these relationships. By the very
nature of the new order, it was necessary for states to agree on
common fronti " _
diplomatic and trade relations, various forms of reprisal, the
seizure of hostages, or w,tar. Within a state., public opinion can
bring about a change of policy on the part of governmental officials,
or it may bring about the fall of the government.
In time of war, one of the most effective sanctions which can
be eployed to enforce international law is the reprisal. Rules of
warfare can exist only when belligerents find it to their mutual ad-
vantage to adhere to those rules; non-adherence results in reprisals
which negate both the rules and the advantages. Laws concerning the
treatment of prisoners of war arc of a type which belligerents have
found to be mutually advantageous from a mil-.tary standpoint and are
more likely to command respect than laws limiting the use of weapons
9
or the destruction of enemy forces and resources.
An example of how reprisals can negate both rules and advantages
occurred early in World War II. During the attempted landing at
Dieppe in 1942, Canadian troops handcuffed some captured Germans on
the battlefield as a security measure. This was adjudged a technical
violation of the Geneva Convention by German military authorities
who proceeded to shackle a large number of Allied prisoners in re-
taliation, thereby setting off a "chain-reaction" of reprisals which
for a time threatened the existence of all rules of land warfare.
The resultant diplomatic de a"dlcck was broken crily by tl.o International
Red Cross Cot.aiittee vwhic;: , after much negotiation, was successful
Approved 'For Release 2002/6111 (IV:1 IA-I DP65-007
9 db1-4
69
 Approved For Release 2002/01/'01E (?JARRiPR65-00756R1T0e110T It
10
in bringing ai, end ,o the reprisals. This Committee, which
has had much practical experience in persuading nations to uphold
international law, observed in its World guar IT report: "General y
speaking, the rules of international law are implemented only on
the basis of reciprocity. Practical success depends, however, net
only on legal reciprocity; but also on one national interest balancing
with the other. Reciprocity in this sense may rest upon interest,
unlike in kind, but existing at the same moment."
.Fear of reprisals may have been the only factor which caused
Germany toward the end of lidorld War II to maintain its adherence to
the Geneva Convention in regard to Allied prisoners. Early in 1945
the Nazis, had seriously considered denouncing that Convention, but
German military leaders feared reprisals against captured German
12
personnel.
Adherence to interne tional law on the part of individual
citizens of a state is ensured to a limited degree when that state
officially ratifies a treaty or convention. The act of ratifying
a treaty carries with it the implication that the ratifying states
will require their citizens to obey the terms of that treaty. In
the United States this implication is confirmed by law. Article Six
of the Constitution of the United States provides., "This Constitution
and the laws of the, United States whi.ch shall be made in pursuance
thereof and all treaties ma ;e, or which shall be made, under the
SECRETCRdc3 I'
Approved For Release 2002/01/10.1 1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65- 66 fll
S E C R E T :-; '
,40 4+0001-4
T4
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land. . .
Upon ratification by Congress, the Geneva Convention of 1929
became law for all citizens of the United States; the armed forces
were obliged to incorporate its terms in their regulations, to
instruct all military personnel as to their rights and duties under
the Convention, and to treat prisoners who were citizens of - adhering
13
states in accordance with its provisions. Thus, international law
which has been codified in treaties has at least some of the attri-
butes of municipal law for citizens of the ratifying states. There
are other factors inherent in the concept of treaty law, however,
which tend to nullify the theory that..by codification the problem
of adherence is solved.
The sovereign authority of states which, in theory, is the
bulwark of treaty law, prcTres, in practice, to be a source of weakness.
While sovereignty may confer authority to enter into a treaty, it
also confers authority to release the state from that treaty since
1
sovereignty is incompatible with obligation. States have from time
to time renounced or violated treaties for a variety of reasons:
unfavorable treaties forced on wean or defeated nations have been
renounced when those nations recovered sufficient strength to defy
their oppressors; arrcgant or irresponsible governments of powerful
states have forced their will on others in deliberate defiance of
Approved For Release 2002M1416 IA-?DP65-007 RD Ol' DOO1-4
16-
 Approved For Release 2002/01/103 GWRDW5 00756RO
r7l
1Z
existing agreements; the realities an( dire necessities of war
have often-voided idealistic, unrealistic, er outmoded rules of
warfare ' a adopted in time of Peace or in previous wars
Within a state, the status of municipal law is determined
precisely by the courts. Herein lies the important difference
between municipal law and treaty law: save for a few international
courts which have had permissive and declaratory, rather than
arbitrary, authority, no agency for the interpretation of treaty
law exists on the international. level, and states are free to in-
terpret the terms of treaties in the light of changing national
interests, necessities, and ethics. It should also be remembered
here that the threat of punishment for transgressors has never yet
succeeded in preventing violations of municipal law.
Finally, abstract theories regarding the sanctity and force of
treaties give way to the hard fact that the terme of treaties are,
in practice, based either upon the differences in strength between
the contracting parties or upon the degree of usefulness of the
treaty to all parties. Using this criterion, treaties may be divided
into two groups: those forced on the weak by the strong and those
15
which.. are of mutual benefit to the contracting states. The rules
of warfare in general, and particularly those applying to prisoners
of war, belong to the second group.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : G i-BDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-0075~F0 (f 4
Despite numerous attempts to codify the rule;.; in treaties and
conventions, certain unwritten customs and'u.sa.ges which are well
defined and recognized by civilized nations remain in force. During
a war, these unwritten rules are of special importance. War is a
reversion to primitive methods of self-preservation which knows no
law save that of survival, and to have any rules governing the con-
duct of hostilities is something of a paradox. The weakness of
treaties and conventions, the effect of new methods and weapons, and
the other factors which,. tend to nullify the force of written rules
during hostilities serve to increase the importance of certain customs
of warfare.
!among the unwritten rules of war recognized by most civilized
nations are three it tordependent basic principles: (1) the ririe idle
of military necessity under which a belligerent is jiustifica in
applying any amount and kind of force to compel the submission of
the enemy with the least expenditure of time, life, and money; (2) the
T)rinci-ple of humanity prohibiting any violence not actually necessary
for the purpose of war; and (3) the principle of chivalry which pro--
16
hibits the resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or conduct.
The rules of warfare are particularly susceptible to rapid
change, and it is sometimes difficult to- determine whether variations
are the result of violations or due to the effect of practical deve1--
opments. Rules codified in times of peace tend to emphasize humanitarian
S) Z' C 11 E
Approved For Release 200514lhcI 8lX-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/ 08 gPRF;PFJ65-00756R00 S1
IT"
considerations to an unrealistic degree. Such rules quickly fall
by the wayside as social ethics and morality change under the realities
of war, and only necessity, humanity, and chivalry are left as guiding
principles. Even these broad, general principle,, are subject to
violation.by the more ruthless combatants.
"Total war" as practiced by belligerents between 1939 and 1945
rendered obsolete many rules of long-standing, and belligerents fell
back more and more on the unwritten rules of warfare to justify vio-
lations of the written codes. Of these rules, the maxim of necessity
was used to justify violations riore than any other as the importance
of actions banned by treaties became so great as to warrant violation.
No sanctions have as yet been devised or employed to enforce the rules
17
of warfare which can counterbalance; the force of military necessity.
The treatment of prisoners is strongly influenced by necessity
in warfare and cannot be considered apart from the current social,
economic, and military situation existing. in the nation which is
holding captives. It is only by reference to these conditions that
treatment accorded to prisoners can be explained and evaluated. 4
brief summary of practices in the past and of' modern developments
will provide a background for an evaluation of Russian practices
during World War II.
SECRET ~c~CCZ
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : EI RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 200g/T/10 RDP65-0075 -. 0 1.-4
[4 LA
TE . GROWTH OF CUSTOMS j ID LlM
RI^iGLRDIN P ISOL'IERS
Despite many periods of regression, the treatment accorded
prisoners of war, from. a humanitarian' stem.-?point, has gradually
improved through the years. This is not to say that the behavior
of captors has been consistent during any one period. The most
fierce of ancient warriors occasionally indulged generous and
merciful impulses toward their captives while certain of the
World War II belligerents visited acts of utmost savagery on their
captured foes. Duping the twentieth century several of the most
idealistic conventions regarding prisoner treatment yet written
have beep ratified by most of the nations of the world. This
humanitarian advance has been countered by the rise of certain
ideologies which have largely disregarded the acquired rights riot
only of prisoners of war but also of free citizens, and there is
evidence that humanity, in some quarters at least, is suffering a
period of regression in regard to prisoner treatment.
In ancient times there was no legal distinction between com-
batant and non-combatant. Early tribal conflicts were usually wars
of extermination. Warriors, farmers, tradesmen, women, and children
fell into the same category so far as the belligerent was corlczrned;
SECRET~~',
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
0- 1
 Approved For Release 2002/01/1OE C 1P RDR65-00756R000
no quarter was expected, asked, or given. The individual was
identified with the tribe or social group, and defeat meant loss
1
of life, liberty, and posuessions for all. Massacres of captives
were often preceded by systematic or ceremonial torture. On occasions,
captors disfigured prisoners by amputating or mutilating limbs and
facial features and then set them free in order to warn or terrorize
2
others.
A;s Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations began to flourish,
a departure from the traditional practice of slaughtering or muti-
lating captives is rioted in ancient writings; that is, the conquerors
began to make slaves of defeated peoples.- The Old Testament, for
instance, contains detailed accounts of Jewish bondage in Egypt and
Babylon. The practice of enslaving rather than killing prisoners,
though a great step forward, cannot be ascribed to the e.nierge~ice of
new humanitarian concepts and ideals, but rather an economic inter-
pre~;tation must bo given to this development. Complex, highly in-
tegrated 1,;ocietie.3 such as those which rose in Mesopotamia and E;yp't
wore made possible only by multitudes, of slaws who expanded agricul-
tural facilities, raised herds, labored in shops, rowed the boats
of commerce, built the walled cities and temples, and tended the
physical neeIs of their riasters. The killing of prisoners became
an uneconomical procedure in a society based on a slave economy.
Qme of the captives taken in, vas r? became "state owned." slaves, but
J 04CI~UET
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :-E A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 200a/(YlAa; Cl RDP65-019
the majority of them were the personal property of those who had
captured them in battle,or who purchased them from the captors.
In the Far East, barbaric methods of conducting warfare and
handling prisoners have persisted, in some instances, to the present
day. The custom of taking the heads of enemy soldiers as trophies
w Ls practiced in China and Japan until late in the nineteenth century.4
The Japanese held the opinion that a soldier who surrendered was
dishonored and deserving of death, a traditional idea which was
maintained in all strictness in Japanese military regulations pub-
5
fished as. late as January 1942. Enemies captured by the Chinese
were often induced to divulge combat information by means of bribes,
6
threats, or tortures. While a lack of respect for the lives of
prisoners has characterized the behavior of most Asiatic peoples,
.there have been notable exceptions. The Ayrans of India believed
in giving quarter to a defeated enemy who asked for mercy, and Sun Tzu,
a Chinese general of about 500 B.C., taught that prisoners should be
treated kindly. The tatter's motivations for such conduct, however,
7
were based on. practical rather than humanitarian considerations.
The early Greeks were little different from other primitive
tribes in-their treatment of prisoners, but as their civilization
progressed it became ageneral practice not to refuse quarter to
other Greeks who surrendered in battle. They also made a practice
of.ranpoming important or wealthy prisoners. As a rule, however,
S E C R E T
2 T& CITY
Approved For Release 2002/0'?6: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/'fib ~&R-RbPT65-00756
9T
these humanitarian principles applied only to those of their own
race ; even Plato considered barbarians outside the pale of civilized
9
obligations. Greek civilization at its height was based on a slave
economy, and this, as in other early civilizatioris,.served to tem-
porize the harshness which prisoners were made to suffer in the
hands of earlier Greeks.
The early Romans were as barbaric as other primitive peoples
in regard to prisoners, but as their civilization developed their
practices became less harsh on the whole than those of the Greeks.
The latter were shut. off from imperial expansion which led factions
of them to attempt assertions of supremacy frequently involving
mutual slaughter. By the time the Roman Empire had. been consolidated
under Emperor Augustus at the beginning of the Christian era, the
imperialistic policy of the Romans had resulted in a considerable
advance in the treatment of prisoners with only those who had borne
10
arms against Rome being made captives. As ar_ . ii,tperiaiistie power,
it was in Rome's interests to populate, not depopulate, her "colonies,"
and for the first time a real distinction. began to-he made between
combatants and noa-combatants. At home the enslavement of captives
took precedence over other methods of treating prisoners. Many in-
stances are reported of surrender terms which included cartel agree--
meats concerning ransom rates for various classes-of prisoners or
11
of slaves being made free men or Roman soldiers. Thus, economic
SECRET R'J ,C I MI F4: 1t
Approved For Release 2002/01/10-:7 FA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2021d1 R :.ECI --RDP65-00756
HOR0P'4
self-interest again served to improve the lot of captives. There
were riaaiy exceptions, however, to Roman temperance in the treatment
of prisoners, and no sort of barbaric cruelty was overlooked when
the Romans were bent on revenge or determined to crush resistance.
Eventually, Roman law stepped between master and slave, and
the killing of the latter without reason was forbidden. In the
latter days of the Empire, after armies began to consist of feudal
levies, there was a tendency to consider prisoners of Par as cap-
tives of the state rather than of the individuals who cadtured them.
It was lo be more than a thousand years, however, before this concept
12
was to become clearly defined and accepted.
As , Europe pa ssed through the Dark ages, there was no major
change in the attitude toward captives. Few distinctions were riade
between combatants and non-combatants; brutal treatment was the rule;
13,
and prisoners had no legal rights. The body of manners, customs.,
and rules known as Chivalry which was developed by the knights of the
Dark and Middle Ages represented a definite step forward in humani-
tarianism; certain principles of the code are still venerated,
exercising an important influence on the conduct of present day
warfare.., The European knights, however, honored this code only
among themselves, and those who participated in the Crusades against
the "infidels" of the Near East or the heretics of southern France
were notorious for the wholesale massacres and other atrocities which
SECRET ECIm
Approved For Release 200210tNfr: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 200210111O : PCI9k-kl#)di-00756R00040001 Q001 ftZT
14
they perpetrated.
The Christians of the i)ark and Middle Ages excluded infidels
and heretics from such humanitarian b3:nefits as were tendered to
fellow Christians just as the Greeks and Romans had excluded bar-
barians from treatment accorded captives of their own races.
Victorious belligerents, however, persisted in the practice of en-
slaving captives whether or not they were Christian. A canon of
the Third Lateran Council, ordered by Pope alexander III in 1179,
stated that it was unlawful to sell Christiana prisoners or keep
15
then as slaves. The institution of slavery, however, was so
firmly entrenched in the social and economic life of the times that
the admonition of.this Council had little imniediate effect, and the
enslavement of Christian captives continued into the seventeenth
century. The medieval Church was completely intolerant of heathens
and heretics, and under the Theodosian code (438 A. D,) heretics
could be fined, exiled, tortured, or killed, and slaves might be
16
beaten into the orthodox faith. The and of the Dark &ges was
characterized by the Holy Inquisition, an instituticn credited with
17
some of the most unspeakable atrocities in all history. These
exc(;ssos of religious zeal with their perversion of the true principles
of Chriwtianity had a deterring rather t Kan a stimulating effect on
the development of humanitarian concepts and, in turn, retarded
G`IC R ET
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : t A RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2o12/EQ161p ,Fl~,-RDP65-00756 1 p Q ~4
humanitarian advances in attitudes toward prisoners of war.
The Mussulrnen, for whose conversion the Clirictiuns alter-
nately prayed and fought, set an example in the treatment of
prisoners which Christians were slow to follow. its early as
805 A. D., the famous Khalif known as Haruoun al Raschid concluded
an agreement with another sovereign under which prisoners of war
18
could be exchanged or ransomed.
The period of the Renaissance and the Reformation witnessed
a great variety of practices in regard ,h prisoners of war. An:
increased use of mercenary troops resulted in a limited type of
warfare which was at times almost blcondless and in which the
taking of prisoners was only a part of what in some ways amounted
to a friendly game between gentlemen. At the other extreme there
were bloody massacres such as that which took place after the Battle
of Agincourt in 1415 and the terrible atrocities committed during
the religious wars. The last of -these, the so-called Thirty iToars r
19
War, reduced the population of some parts of Germany by half.
The enslavement of such captives as were not killed was still
general practice in England and Europe throughout the last part of
the Middle Ages. A prisoner of war was considered the absolute
property of his captor, and his lot was considerably worse than
20
that of an eighteenth century plantation slave in imerica. The
practice of ransoming prisoners came more and more into general use
Approved For Release 2002/Q1/1jQ Cil1 RDP65-007 kbil0 ~Ob~30001-4
 Approved for Release 2002/011( : UCI~-"65-00756R( 0LM
R,
as the.Middle Ages came to a close. Ransoming, in fact, became
so common that it was gradually systematized, and a scale of prices
21
for various classes of prisoners became more or less fixed by custom.
Gradually the idea that all prisoners belonged to the sovereign
replaced the old concept of individual ownership. During the
seventeenth century, captives began to be ransomed at prices fixed
by cartels at the beginning of a war or during its continuance.
The last cartel of this nature seems to have been that between
22
England and France in 1780. Exchange and parole slowly replaced
the ransoming of captives, but combinations of exchange and ransom
were practiced as late as the nineteenth century. For instance,
the United States and Tripoli concluded a treaty in 1805 in which
the two countries agreed that prisoners should not be made slaves
but exchanged rank for rank, and a monetary value for each rank was
23
established in case of a deficiency on either side.
Some attempts were made to codify the conduct of hostilities
during the late Middle Ages which presaged the later adoption of
24
elaborate codes by the military establishments of various nations.
In actual practice, very few moral or legal inhibitions restricted
belligerents in their conduct of hostilities throughout the Dark and
Middle Ages. Enslavement of prisoners, massacres, and atrocities of
all kinds were accepted as natural manifestations of war. From time
to time, however, strong-minded individuals made their appearance
SECRET t9- EC RR, 1 T
-27-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756pfl
SECRET ,Ui `O 8 L: r
who did not accept current practices as ri ht and who dared to
voice humanitarian
ideals concerning the conduct of warfare
With the bre.a.kddw&, of feudalism and the origin of nationalists,
more an(' more thinkers attempted to analyze the phonouenon of war
in the light of new relationships which were being established
between individuals, between states, and between individuals and
the state. New patterns of thought were translated into new
practices and became the beginnings of international law on the
subject of war.
By the end of the sixteenth century a considerable body of
literature had been written about the problem of regularizing war.
Writers speculated and philosophized on the objectives of war and
25
on the means which could rightfully be used to achieve such ends.
Nearly all of these writers were concerned with the plight of prisoners
of war and urged that more humanitarian methods be adopted in dealing
with teem.
One of the first systematic writers on international law v .,,as
Victoria whose works, lle hello and De Jure Soflo published in about
1550, were written in an attempt to evaluate the legality of warlike
acts. Ee observed that it was illegal to do harmful acts not necessary'
to the ' attainiqe nt of the military objectives of the war and that it
wa illegal to injure note--combatants except where there was no other
way to win.
S E C R E T 2 1711 3~ C ~:. FE .
Approved For Release 2002/01/102# IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01b1 E: CIA-l DP65-00756R0004
T
It has become customary for writers on international law
to divide historical periods by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). This
Dutch scholar is generally acclaimed as "the father of international
law," and his great work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis published in 1625,
was the first text-book to have a profound influence on the practices
of sovereigns and statesmen. Grotius was the first to appeal to the
law of nature as a moderating influence on the conduct of hostilities.
according to him, law had its sources in the nature of marl as a
27
social being. As a jurist, Grotius recognized the force of pre-
vailing practice in determining the rules of warfare, and he regarded
most of the current practices, including the enslavement of captives,
.as justified in law and ethics, provided the war was waged for a
"just" cause. Though he recognized the right of enslavement, Grotius
28
advocated exchange and ransom instead.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia (which, concluded
the Thirty Years' War in 1648), prisoners were released without
ransom at the close of the war. This action marked the end of any
extensive enslavement of captives. In the succeeding century, ex-
change and parole largely replaced ransom during the course of
hostilities, and release without ransom at the end of a war became
29
general practice. A declaration of war came to be regarded as
obligatory, military occupation was modified by restraining rules,
S E C R E T
(7L~C1[~1lea Jt
Approved For Release 2002/01/Tb~-ClA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 20g21 141q.: IfA-RDP65-007J
.qpQ 1-4
limits were placed on ravaging, the lot of non-combatants unproved,
30
and atrocities became less fre uenta
Growing concepts of humanitarianism brought about continued
improvement in condition of prisonersliip and in the treatment of
the sicl, wounded, and helpless in time of war. Beginning more or
less with the time of Grotius, it became co7non practice for nations
32
twentieth centuries.
The revival of learring, widespread literacy, and the printing
press made it possible for abstract thinkers like Grotius to have a
direct part in bringing about changes in actual practices of war
including the treatment of prisoners Masses of man read and re-
sponded favorably to humanitarian ideas which, in turn, caused them
to modify their conduct on the field of battle. While it is im-
possible t6 mak=e a precise evaluation of the part these writer-thinkers
played in ameliorating the lot of prisoners, there is no doubt that,
their role was a major one. A great many writers made contributions
to conclude bilateral treaties which, in part, stipulated the treat-
ment OAK would be accorded persons and property in time of war,
includi the disposal of ships and crows captured on the high seas.
Between 1581 and 1864. at least 291 international agreements were
concluded which Were designed to afford the maximum protection of
human life compm tible with a state of war. This trend culminated
. in, th.e great multilateral treaties of the late nineteenth and early
f 6-w
S E CR ET 1175 J. 0- 4
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7 A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/Of41-b RONDE
to the cause of humanism after Grotius, but only a very few of
the 'most influential thinkers and their ideas can be mentioned here.
Puffendorf (1632-16'97), Leibnitz (1646-1716), Bynkershoek
(1673-1743), and de Vvolff (1679-1754) made important contributions
to thought in the new field of international law. While differing
in their approach to the subject and in their emphasis on the
ethical basis of law, they all based their findings, as had Grotius,
on a study of the actual practices of men and nations from which
they attempted to generalize rnd systematize principles of inter-
33
national law.
Three writers of the eighteenth century, Charles de Montesquieu
(1689-1755), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), and Emeric de Vattel
(1714-1767),-are chiefly responsible for the modern view of the
proper treatment of prisoners. Montesquieu and Rousseau were French
political philosophers whose ideas inspired men with a new sense of
the dignity of the individual. They attempted to apply the principles
of natural law and reason in determining the rights and duties of
the individual clan in his relations with other men and with the state.
They argued ti-,at individuals engaged in a war are enemies only acci-
dentally since war is a relation between states, not between men, and
that the right to kill exists only so long as defenders are bearing
arms. According to Rousseau, when soldiers surrender, they cease
to be enemies or instruments of the enemy state and merely become
E
T
SECRET ~
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :. C1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 ,11/1,0; CI47RPP65-00756R000N0~30J- 4
Approved For Release 2002/0S
men whose life no one has any right to take since "war gives no
34
right which is not necessary to the gaining of its object." To
both thinkers enslavement was the same as taking a captive's life;
thyrefore, enslavement was unlawful. According to Montesquieu, "war
given no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing
35
any further harm, by securing their persons." Vattel, the Swiss
diplomat and jurist,.was a popular writer whose work gave currency
to enlightened theories of the time. he agreed with Rousseau that
the aims of war restricted a belligerent to actions necessary to
36
attain those aims, all else being condemned as unlawful.
In expounding these views, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Vattel
virtually completed the theoretical foundation for the modern view
on the subject of prisoners of war. Prisoners of the eighteenth
century slowly began to benefit from mutually co-operative forces
which were at work in their favor. As the ideas of hur_?anism began
humans, men and nat:icns were prepared to accept more idealistic
to exert their influence, a corresponding modification or practices
in regard to prisoners took place, and as practices became more
rules governing'the treatment of prisoners. The eighteenth century
'writings of these three writers give evidence of rules and practices
which were unheard of in the time of Grotius; the nineteenth century
became a period of steady progress. The principles of humanity as
expressed by Rousseau are by this time so firmly established that.
CIF C 17 FEE', ~.
Approved For Release 2002/01/12-CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 20021(},11I0U 1,IAFPP65-00756R1
11?
present day authorities seldom try to justify rules relating to
3.7
prisoners of war on a tneoretieal basis.
One of the first formal agreements between nations not at
war concerning the treatment of prisoners was incorporated in the
Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States anal Prussia
which was concluded in 1785 and reaffirmed in another treaty of
38
1799. The two powers agreed that, in the event of war, prisoners
would be held under healthful conditions and would be furnished
barracks and rations equivalent to those furnished the troops of
the captor power. There were a number of other enlightened pro-
visions in this treaty including a statement to the effect that
war could not annul the agreements concerning prisoners oince a
state of war was precisely that for which such agreements were
provided.
The close of the eighteenth century saw at least one other
enlightened step in favor of prisoners. In 1799 the French National
Assembly, still under the spell of idea.Ls of the Revolution, decreed
that prisoners of war were under the safeguard of the nation and the
protection of its laws. Prisoners were to be placed on the same
footing as the troops of the captor power so far as rations and
39
quarters were concerned.
The French decree and the Prussia-United States treaty were,
in many ways, ahead of their time, and general principles governing
SECRET
C
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :-d1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 20(2/161(1~-RDP65-007IQ~40l 1-4
the treatment of prisoners during
this period wore nebulously
defined and unevenly applied. Napoleon, for instance, largely
ignorel the French. decree and his general. policy wa one of
cruelty,' yet there were many cases of the hutaue treatment of
pr ..sotier s during the Napoleonic wars. In 0rrieral, however,
40
prisoners continued to benefit from slowly improving practices
during the first part of the nineteenth century. An increasing
number of European powers adopted regulations for their armies to
follow in dealing with prisoners of war.
Probably the first comprehensive codification of iriternatioiia:.
law published by a government for use by its own arsiies was the so-
called Lieber Code adopted by the Union Arrn,sr and accepted in principle
by the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Framed by Francis
Lieber (1500-1872), the famous Prussian-born i-imerican publicist,
this code wan incorporated in a War Department general order in
41
1863. The, o instructions were imitated by a number of European
powers, and the many treaties, coiiveiitions, and national regulations
relating to prisoner,: which, have been framed since 1863 have done
little more than elaborate on the, basic principles enunciated by
Lieber. This code made careful distinctions as to personnel who
were entitled to treatment as prisoners of war and, in much detail,
prescribed humane behavior on the Fart of captors'. Of special
S E C R E T 2) LE C, 11,111) F.."Ilir,
-31-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/03/'?G C lAERDP65-0075AITITIM04T
interest to thial study are the instructions (Article 80) re-
garding interrogation of prisoners:
Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from
giving to the enemy information concerning their own
army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the
use of any violence against prisoners, in order to
extort the desired information, or to punish them for
having given false information.
Following the appearance of the Lieber Code, practically all
of the major powers issued rules of war for the guilance of their
own military establishments. These have consisted of slightly
varying interpretations of existing international law and have
usually included by reference the various treaties, conventions,
42
or agreements to which each specific nation was signatory.
I11 1863, the same year the Lieber Code was adopted in America,
a committee of five citizens of Geneva gave first impulse to a
movement which culminated in the Red Cross. The first accomplishment
of the comt..ittee was the framing of a convention for the protection
of sick aiiaivounded in time of war which was agreed upon by twelve
payers at Geneva in 1864. The principle that a combatant dis-
armed by wounds or sickness is simply a human being in need of help
was thus formalized in an international convention. The next step
was to apply this principle to prisoners. The Red Cross, by its
demonstrated: impartiality, strict neutrality, and usefulness,
09 E C IR" 74 !r
Approved For Release 2002/01/107iA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 202922OC1,,/W EC1A-RDP65-0
gradually won the confidence of the various nations and by 1870
was able, unofficially, to oxtcnd aid to prisoners by opening
an information bureau on prisoners of war. In the international
conferences of 1902, 1907, and 1912, the Red Cross won victories
in securing the right to extend relief work to able-bodied
prisoners and was tacitly recognized as a quasi-official agency
to act as an intermediary in this work.
The growth of the Red Cross was merely one aspect of the
humanitarian: tendencies of the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. An increasing number of international meetings were hold
in attempts to agree on rules of land warfare. The Russian
Government called a conference in 1863 which resulted in the
Declaration of St. Petersburg. In 1874, an association in Paris
framed a code of 146 articles based largely on the Lieber Code.
The Russian Government drafted a similar code which was submitted
to the Brussels Convention later that year. Another code of the
same nature was framed by the Institute de Droit international at
Oxford in 1880. None of the latter three codes was ratified by
any power, but they had much influence upon subsequent conventions
and municipal legislation. A number of the articles from these
codes found their way eventually into the Oeileva Convention of
44
1929,
SECRET. CL Ell
Approved For Release 20027 'PI0 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/6119W: CIA-R:1P65-00756F3g1
L
M
While leaving much to be desired, the conditions under which
prisoners were taken and held continued to improve. The march of
humanism during the nineteenth century reached its climax with the
conventions concluded at the Hague in 1899. Tsar Nicholas of Russia
took the initiative in calling together delegates from twenty-five
45
powers who concluded three conventions and issued one declaration.
The third of these conventions, dealing with the laws and customs
of war on land, made specific provisions for the human; treatment
of prisoners for the first time in a multipartite treaty. These
provisions were contained in seventeen broadly conceived and
vague'_y worded articles which were based largely on the Brussels
Convention and which embraced most of the principles of the Lieber
46
Code. Interrogation of prisoners was disposed of in on, short
article: "Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare
his true name and rank,
and if he disregards this rule, he is liable
to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war
47
his class."
The inadequacy of
disputes and wars which
1906, a new "Red Cross"
the 1899 conventions became apparent in
took place at the turn of the century. In
Convention was framed and adopted by thirty-
seven nations at Geneva. This convention extended anti clarified
the 1864 Geneva Convention and was included by reference in the
48
Hague Convention No. IV a year later.
SECRET 23) `x, C
IL%
E
T
Approved For Release 2002/01/4:/CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 290@/%1/I0 qlA-RDP65-00 6f 0 1fl 0 (~Qfl1-4
IJelegates from more that forty powers met at the Hague
on June 15, 1907, and on October 18th signed thirteen separate
49
conventions, one declaration, and one final act. The -various
conventions of 3.907 improved, extended, and clarified the 1899
convention,: regarding the settlement of international disputes
and the conduct of hostilities. As for prisoners of war, the
seventeen articles of the 1899 Convention were included, unchanged,
50
in the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907.
Both the 1899 and '1907 conventions had a serious defect in
that the agreed upon rules of warfare did not apply except between
contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents engaged
51
in a war were parties to the convention. Entry of the non-
ratifying states of Montenegro and Serbia into World ~Jua,r I ren-
dered the Hague and Geneva Conventions legally inoperative among
the ratifying belligerents. Despite the legal aspect of the
situation, most of the belligerents considered the conventions
as declaratory of international law and, as such, hindirng
52
instrurients .
The large number of prisoners taken during World War I
created unforseen difficulties for all belligerents when they
attempted to abide by the vaguely worded rules of the Hague
Convention.. Violations of accepted rules occurred from time to
time, and accusations of inhumane treatiient from both sides led
SECRET rr r -
-38-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0 /10 ~T?YP65-00756R000400030001-4
to a revival of the practice of reprisals. The International
Committee of the Red Cross was able to adjust many of these
difficulties and did much to maintain respect for international
53
law in regard to prisoners. All belligerents created bureaus
of information concerning prisoners of war and, on the whole,
adhered fairly sut;sfactori1y to the provisions of the Hague
54'r
Convention No. IV.
The non-binding aspect of the :Hague Conventions, in addition
to their inac1e quC clr in pr. ov- i.ing for contingencies arising during
the war, led to a new development. treaties concerning the rules
of warfare were concluded between enemy states in time of war.
Various belligerents entered into such agreements through inter-
mediary representing powers in order to reach understandings on
55
specific points not covered by the conventions.
The inadequacies of existing codes had been amply demon-
strated during I7orld 'Jar I, and there was keen international
interest in suggestion-. concerning a new convention proposed by
the International Committee of the Red Cross at the Tenth Inter-
56
national Conference in 1921. In the same year, a new draft
convention concerning the rules of warfare was adopted by the
International Law Association in its 30th Conference at the Hague,
but the draft convention prepared by the Red Cross Committee,
which had been approved by the Eleventh Conference of that
T
SEC~Rc~ET ~'CRE
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 G1A-RDP65-007568000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2902/(M/AOI CIA-RDP65- Q 4$0 001-4
organization in 1923, was the document upon which world interest
547
centered. This text was submitted to the Swiss Government
which undertgok. ,the responsibility of ca.llin5, together an inter-
national confYrerice to consider the framing of a new convention
i egsrd in:g the treatment of prisoners of war. The resulting
treaty, the Geneva Convention of 1929, will be discussed in the
next chap-,er,
.
es itc: t1he humanistic advances which have taken place in
the past few coutu r .es, nations have conti,ued to use war as an
instrent, of international politics. The advances, however, are
witness to .tile existence and grownh of a moral conscience which
is repelled by. the. idea of unrestricted violence. In some respects,
Worl? War TI, was a period of regression so far as humanism was
concerned. It was a "total war," and distinctions between com-
batant~and non-combatants became less marked as weapons such
as the 4irplane and guided missiles made possible attacks on the
industrial centers of an ! nervy. It was an ideological war with
a tendacy on the part of certain belligerents to revert to the
old idea that members of other social groups were onts:i_de the pale
of "civilized" obl.igatio'ns. It was a war which ~saUr ra considerable
revive. of the practice of enslaving captives in both Germany and
the Soviet Union, and the latter was reluctant to release prisoners
SECRET
7 Ls E, -40-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01411: &L~-I D ?65-00756ROOO Oq,
at the close of hostilities. Wholesale violations of the
accepted codes by one or more powers, however, cannot invali-
date- completely the progress that has been made in the humanizing
of warfare.
S E C R E T
8E c1JE
Approved For Release 2002/01/l IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release.i0kO{/1b :TCIA-RDP6 i W40130001-4
CHAPTER IVV
THE GENEVk (PRISONERS OF YEAR)
CONVENTION OF 1929
A. Surimary of Certain Protective Provis ons o' the Convention
Early in 1925, Switzerland circulated a note asking whether
the various governments would be ready to take part in a conferonce
for the revision of the Geneva Convention of 1906 and whether they
would be willing in principle to join in the framing of ra, code for
1
prisoners of war. Repliers tc this note were, on the whole, favor-
able. On 1 July 1929 delegates from forty-seven nations met in
Geneva to act upon two conventions vihich had been framed by the
International Committee of the Red Cross. The convention con-
cerning treatment of prisoners of war was signed twenty-nine days
later; this code made rather than declared international law since,
unlike the Hague Convention, it was to remain effective between
ratifying states regardless of participation in a conflict by a
2
non-ratifying state. The other convention entitled The
Amelioration of the Condition of ;founded and Sick of Armies in
the Field enlarged and extended the scope of the Geneva Convention
3
of 1906.
The convention concerning prisoners of war consisted of
ninety-seven articles listed under eight titles: 1. General
S E C R E T
A =1
r
-42-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/~1/E10C: FI~-F,DP65-00756 0~04000
Provision a, II. Capture, III. Captivity, IV. Termination of
Captivity, V. Death of Prisoners of War, VI, Bureaus of Relief
and Information Concerning Prisoners of uVar, VII. Application
of the Convention to Certain Classes of Civilians, VIII. Execu-
tion of the Convention.
The provisions of the Geneva Convention applied to all persons
captured by the enomy who were mentioned in the regulations annexed
to the Hague Convention (1907) respectinC; the laws and customs of
war on land. (Title I, Articles 1-4). In these regulations, the
laws, rights, and duties of war applied not only to armies but
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following con-
ditions:
1. Commanded by. a person responsible for his subordir.nates;
2. Having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
3.
distance;
Carrying arms openly; and
Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
Inhabitants of a territory, as yet unoccupied, who spontaneously
took up arms to resist the invading troops (levy n masse) and who
had not had time to organize themselves into an "army" wero to be
regarded as belligerents coming; under the o-Lection of the con-
vention if they carried arras openly and respected the laws and
customs of war.
SECRET ' S M C R E T
Approved For Release 2002/01/10-/+k:tA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2Off2/01ic11L:' IA-RDP65-00 O6 0
*1-4
Both combatants and non-combatants constituting the armed
forces of a belligerent were, in case of capture, entitled-to
the right to be treated as prisoners of war. The convention
stipulated that its provisions would apply "to all persons be-
long.ng to the armed forces of belligerent parties captured by
the enemy in the course of military operations at see or in the
air. . . ." Certain classes of civilians were, therefore, en-
titled to treatment as prisoners of war. Those were defined in
Article 81-as "individuals who follow armed forces without directly
belonging thereto . . . provided they are in possession of a cer-
tificate from the military authorities of -;.ie armed forces which
they were accompanying. Articles 2, 3, and 4 specified that prisoners were in the
power of the government of the captor, not of the individual or.
corps who had captured them. Prisoners were to be humanely treated
and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults, and
public curiosity. They had the right to have their person and
honor respected. Women were to be treated with all regard due to
their sex. Prisoners retained their full civil status. The de-
taining power was bound to provide for the maintenance of prisoners,
and difference in treatment accorded them was lawful only when
based on.military rank, state of health, professional qual::Lfications,
or sex. Finally-- in a rule which was one of the most important.
innovations of this document -- measures of reprisal against
SECRET
IT
Approved For Release 200./,1110 :
CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/(8I/100 CI1-RDP65-00756
prisoners of war were forbidden.
The rules regarding information which a prisoner of war
was required to give his captor were clear and unequivocal..
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention is-quoted here in its entirety:
Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is
questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, or else
his regimental number.
If he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the
advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed.
No coercion may be used on prisoners to secure in-
formation relative to the condition of their army or country.
Prisoners who refuse to answer may not be threatened, in-
sulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treat-
ment of any kind whatever.
If, because of his physical or mental condition, a
prisoner is unable to identify himself, he shall be turned
over to the medical corps.
All that was attempted in Article 5 was to provide safe-
guards for the personal dignity of a prisoner in his honorable
intention to withhold information of value to the enemy. It will
be noted that the framers of the convention made no unrealistic
prohibitions regarding interrogation in that captors were left
free to ask as many questions as they wished. Captives, in turn,
were left free to answer questions if they wished, but they were
granted the right to refuse to answer all questions save those
concerning their name and rank or identifying number.
Article 6 was concerned with the disposal of a prisoner's
immediate personal possessions. Military papers, arms, and other
military equipment discovered on or with a prisoner -- articles
SECRET 5ECR T
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release O .2Im111O :CIA-RDP65- 7 '6 IF4ff 90001-4
which are often of informational value to a captor -- could be
confiscated. Gas masks, metal helmets, identification papers,
insignia of rank, decorations, objects of value, and effects
of personal use were to remain in the possession of the prisoner.
Money could be taken from a captive only by order of an officer
who was to give a receipt for the amount taken.
The scope of this study does not permit a detailed dis-
cussion of other provisions of the Geneva Convention. Generally
speaking, they consisted of rules implementing and defining the
general provisions of the second, third, and fourth articles.
Prisoners were to be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders
in force in armies of the detaining power and, as such, were
liable to disciplinary punishment for acts of insubordination
and disobedience. Safeguards were provided, however, to protect
prisoners from unjust or excessive punishments (Articles 45
through 67). As for repatriation, it was stated in Article 75
that "repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least
possible delay after the conclusion of peace."
The Soviet Union was not signatory to the Geneva Convention
and was not, therefore, legally bound to observe its provisions.
As has been noted, the force of international law is largely
derived from consent, and an overwhelming majority of world powers
assented to the Geneva Convention of 1929. Its provisions,
E E
Approved For Release 200 A1/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756 R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01/!0~t ?li-F D?65-00756R000400030001-4
SECRET
cctioequently, represent a standard of human(; conduct against
which the treatment .,;corded to prisoners of war by any nation,
including the Soviet Union, might be evaluated.
Status of the lvla*or Powers in Relation to the Geneva
Convention During World War II
Attending the diplomatic conference at Geneva in 1929
were delegates from forty-seven powers. All delegates signed
the document, but not all of the states which they represented
deposited official instruments of ratification with the Swiss
Federal Council as required by the convention. States failing
'q
to comply with this requirement cc:ul(: not be considered ao parties,
.to the agreement or bound tc obey the rules except insofar as
those rules were recognized as declaratory law. r number of state:3
having no delegates at the conference subsequently cave written
notice of their adherence to the convention, which procedure autc)_,
matically made them parties to the aagreement. The thirty-five
states which had either ratified the convention or announced, ad-
herence as of 7 December 1941 were:
Belgium
France
Poland
Brazil
Germany
Portugal
Bolivia
Groat Britain
Rumania
.Bulgaria
Greece
Spain
Canada
Hungary
Sweden
Chile
I,.idia
Switzerland
China
Italy
Thailand
Columbia
Latvia.
Turkey
Czechoslovakia
Mexico
Union of South Africa
Denmark
Netherlands
United States
Egypt
New Zealand
Yugoslavia 4
Estonia
Norway
Approved For Release 2002/O1 16 : I ADP65-0075" " N
-47-
 Approved For Release gO24911 q: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
During the war, six additional nations announced their
adherence to the conventions, Adcn, Austr?1i_a, Burma, El Salvadore,
Iraq, Lithuania. It will be noted that two of the major belli-
gerents, Japan and Russia, are missing from the list of ratifying
or adhering nations.
Japan sent delegates to Geneva in 1929 but never formally
ratified the convention. Immediately after Japan's declaration
of war against the United States and Great Britain, the Inter-
natior}al Committee of the Red Cross invited the three governments
to make use of the Central Prisoners of War Agency at Geneva and
urged them to declare themselves willing to apply de facto the
provisions of the 1929 convention despite Tapan' e status as a
5
non-ratifying state. The United States immediately sent a
f` vocable reply, but Japan hesitated for two months, meanwhile
agreeing to communicate desired information concerning prisoners
to Geneva and announcing the opening of an information office for
prisoners i.n Tokyo. Finally, early in February 1942 after repeated.
requests, the International Committee received the following state-
ment through the Japanese Legation at Berne%
Since the Japanese Government has not ratified the
Convention. relative to th he treatmgnt of prisoners of war,
signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929, it is therefore not.
bound by the said Convention. Nevertheless, in so far as
possible, it` intends to apply this Convention rluta.tis mu.tarri.is,
- 7,7P to all prisoners of war who may fell into its hands; at i.i e
same time taking into consideration the customs of each natiou
and each race in respect of feeding and clothing of pri soners .6
Approved For Release 2002/41.0 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01110 X1A-rR1;P65-007 0 1-4
the :ioto .ed that Japan had notified the
Ux*i ed States, the various states of the British Commonwealth,
and Netherlands of her intentions in regard to prisoners. As
for application of the convention to civilian internees, the
Japanese, on 14 February 1942, made a similar statement, "on
condition that the belligerent States do not subject Japanese
internee against their will to manual labor."
In its World War II Report, the Red Cross states that
negotiations with Japan "succeeded in principle, but the re"ult
a
proved unsatisfactory in practice:" The Red Cross experienced
great difficulty in securing co-operation from the Japanese
Government on matters relating to prisoners, and its repre-
sentatives were regarded with suspicion and hampered in their
9
work at every turn. Evidence introduced in the Japanese War
Crimes Trials after the war indicates that the military leaders
of Japan consciously and deliberately ignored the Geneva Convention,
particularly in regard to labor which prisoners wc;re required to
perform, though the Japanese never formally denounced the convention.
The Soviet Union was among the powers invited by the Swiss
Government to send delegates to the Diplomatic Conference at
Geneva in 1929. Despite this invitation, the Soviets slid not
send representatives to Geneva, had no part in the framing of t lt-w
document, and at no time announced adherence to the convention
Approved For Release 2002/01/10-:'1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release ?,)0~/~1I OE: qlA-RDP65-00756R0 t~'04 ?030001-4
regarding pl: isomers of war. (Both Russia and Japan had
announced adherence to the "Wounded and Sick" Convention of
1929 prior to World War II.)
When G -many and her all-'.es invaded Russia on 22 June 1941,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to its
custom, ilm. odiatoly notified all belligerents that it, placed
itself at their disposal to carry out its traditional activities
and invited them to make use of the Prisoners of War Information
Agency ',-.t Geneva. A f w- day ,3 later the commit tee, received a
telegram from Molotov, Feeopless Coxn l ssar for Fr.) reig Affairs,
indicating that the USSR would exchange information about
-12
prisoners provided that the other belligerents did the same.
Other favor able exchanges of communications gave rise : to the
hope that Russia would adopt attitude similar to that of all
other countries regarding prisoners of war.
In July 1947., the Ttalio.n Goverrunent requested, t~,hrou?fi
the Red Cross a statement from the USSR concerning the latter'.s
attitude 'toviard a 'reciprocal application of the 1929 convention.
In response the Committee received a telegram, dated 8 August 1941
and signed by Vyshinski, Assistant Peoples' Comm issar for Foreign
Affairs, stating that Russia's policy regarding the tr:atment of
prisoners' would be as follows
S E C R E T
_0-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002 OI110 RCFARDP65-0075lIF00 4008 00'01-4
The Soviet Government has already notified
the Swedish Government, representing Soviet in-
terests in Germany; that the Soviet Union considered
binding upon itself the Rules of War which are set out
.in the IVth Convention of the Hague of October 1$, 1907
concerning the laws and customs of war on land, subject
to the obligatory condition that the above rules be ob-
served during the war by Germany and her Allies. The
Soviet Government agrees to the exchange of particulars
about prisoners of war, wounded and sick, in the order
provided for under. Article 14 of the Annex to the above
Convention, and wader Article 4 of the Geneva Convention
of 1929 for the relief of grounded and sick of armies in
the field. Regarding your communication concerning the
proposal . . to apply the other articles of the Geneva
Convention of 1929, . . . the Soviet Government draws
your attention to the fact that all the main questions
of the regime of captivity are entirely covered by the
above mentioned Annex to the Hague Convention.13
On the assumption that the Soviet Government would observe
the established customs and usages, despite the vague wording
of parts of the Hague Convention, the Red Cross proceeded to set
up the administrative machinery whereby prisoner lists could be
exchanged and mail and parcels be sent to prisoners held in the
Soviet Union. On August 20th, the Germans submitted a list of
300 names of Soviet prisoners held in Germany, but the Soviets
failed to reciprocate; this first list was also to be the last.
Despite repeated promises to co-operate, the Russians never sub-
mitted prisoner lists. Neither were Soviet-held prisoners per-
mitted to exchange correspondence except in scattered instances
and then not in a manner considered by'German authorities as
14
justifying reciprocal action.
SECRET SICII~lE
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7bA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For. Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
SECRET 6C1R1. ,T
On the basis of repeated offers of co-operation from
Germany and other enemies of Russia., the International Committee
continues: its efforts to ,contact Soviet authorities. Reports
of these attempts to C.eal_ voitla the Soviets, however, alricst
always ended with anti-climactic negatives: "There was no reply,"
15
or "The Committee never received any ansi*.er."
After August 1944, the Red Cross made no further attempt
to secure Soviet co-operation. Because of Russia's attitude,
Germany refused to apply the Geneva Convention in regard to
Soviet prisoners, Consequently, all prisoners held by Russia
and all Soviet prisoners held by Germany failed to benefit from
supplies of relief goods which were made available from time to
time by other powers.Mlail was not excha.ged,, and Red Cross
representatives were not permitted to visit prisoner of war
camps in Russia or camps for Soviet prisoners in Germany.
In the first conference between President Roosevelt and
Foreign Commissar Molotov which took place at the White House
in May 1942, the President expressed a hope that arrangements
might be made to exchange lists of names of prisoners of war.
Molotov, having already stated that the Germans had been brutally
inhumane in their treatment of Soviet prisoners, "replied with
emphasis that his government was not disposed to negotiate any
arrangement. with the Germans which would give the latter the
e
SECRET;(,, ``;' }?;
_52-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/91;19 :~PI -FftDP65-00756
Im
MDT
slightest pretext for claiming that they (the'Germans) were
16
observing any rules whatever." Mr. Harry Hopkin's notes on
the same interview throw further light on difficulties experienced
when attempting to deal with the Soviets on matters relating to
prisoners:
The State Department obviously wants Russia either
to sign or adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929 rela-
tive to the care and treatment of prisoners of war. This
agreement requf..:es that the adhering countries permit a
neutral body . . to inspect the prison camps. You don't
have to know very much about Russia, or for that matter
Germany, to know there isn't a snowball's chance in hell
for either Russia or Germany to permit the International
Red"Cross really to inspect any prison camps. Molotov's
final answer to that. "Why should we give the Germans
the diplomatic advantage of pretending to adhere to in-
ternational law. . . You can't trust them." Molotov
indicated that it would be a mistake from a propaganda
point of view to give Germany the chance to say that
they were the people who upheld international law. . . .
I gather this is going to be a pretty difficult nut
to crack'for the State Department 17
The State Department never succeeded in "cracking the nut"
referred to by Hopkins. At the beginning of the war Soviet
authorities apparently had considered practicing limited ad-
herence to the general body of international law concerning
prisoners, but their subsequent policy of refusing to make any
commitments indicates that there was a quick change of policy
in this respect.
Other members of the "Big Four," the United States, Great
Britain, and China, were all ratifying states of the Geneva
S E C R E T
s "n C P, F, tal
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 .-e i-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Appr6ved''1 or Release 2002101/tOI; qApRDP65-007 F
T -4
Car_vention of 129214, in general, treated prisoners strictly
in, accordance with its provisi.ons. The convention was not ob-
se-ved
in the.curflict between China .send aprzri because of the
latter 1,s status as a Ion-ratifying state,, but after 11942 the
CI:ur gl:ing Government applied the provisions oif the convention
is dealing with German and Italian internees.. The :Lack of
contra`
lined autkiority in China, and the immense territory in-
Vo;lved prevented, an effective.application of the rules in many
irstarces.,
Germany and Italy, the zn a j or Axis, powers, in Europe, had
ratified the Geneva Convention and, in general, applied its
provisions .Nlho.i dealing with prisoners of war and internees ex
cent, of course, with the Ruojaz,, Many alleged violai,ions grew
out of Germanyrs arbitrary interpretation of rules regarding those
who were to be treated as bona fide prisoners of war (for example,
members of armed forces ofunrocognized governments such as Free
France and Poland), and the forced. labor r~erfornied in Germany by
prisoners was often in violation of orders from the German High
Command. Such rules were in many cases enforced by the military
authorities following protests by the Red Cross.
S E C R E `.C , 17 ,
,rR 7r
-54-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10`: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01 1p :CCf4- L P65-0075
SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD
OF INTERNATIONAL LAVi
E
The Constitution of the USSR opens with the declaration:
"Since the time of the formation of the Soviet Republics,, the
states of the world have been divided into two camps: the camp
1
of capitalism and the camp of socialism." It has been Soviet
Russia's policy to stand alone. Obsessed by the idea of con-
verting the world to Communism, Russia has tried since ly.lg to
maintain her position as a "third power," with isolationism an
underlying principle of her foreign policy. Even during World
War II when the Soviets were forced into an unnatural alliance
with the western democracies against the Axis, the Russians
persisted in regarding themselves as a state apart which even-
2
tually would have to fight her erstwhile allies. They made
stringent efforts to prevent their allies from learning any
more than was absolutely necessary about the Soviet Union and
its armed forces while maintaining an elaborate espionage pro-
gram in the countries of their allies. During and after the war
the Soviets conducted endless interrogations of prisoners of war
who knew anything about the western democracies in order to
collect all possible.types of information -- military, technical,
SECRET S1C,RJEP,
Approved For Release 2002/01/1055:IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2O 1/ 0 C A-RDP65-00j 0 1-4
~~, cam; ~ ~ ~
economic - - about those countries.
At the beginning of the Communist regime, the Soviets
loudly declared their denunciation of all treaties inherited
from Tsarism and the Kerensky Government. This did not prevent
them from demanding the execution of such agreements when it
3
suited their convenience. Despite their desire to remain
isolated, it was nevertheless necessary for the Soviets to enter
into treaties with other states, but in pursuing their policy of
isolationism they showed a marked preference for bi-lateral
treaties and individual agreements rather than multi-lateral
treaties. Entering into treaties and agreements with capitalis-
tic states on a large scale took place only after a fierce inner
struggle in the Communist' Party (1924-25) whici? left Stalin in
the ascendancy with his thesis of "socialism in a single country."
Formerly, the theory that a proletarian state could exist in a
capitalistic environment had been rejected by Soviet theorists
4
as "un-.Marxian and utterly utopian."
Thus rationalizing their ideological differences with the
"capitalistic" states, the Soviets became increasingly active in
the diplomatic world. The moral basis for Soviet conceptions of
international law, however, are based on the Communist's faith
in the righteousness of the class strug ie, and this faith permits
no humanitarian or chivalrous limitations. In 1921, Lenin wrote:
SECRET aCC ti
Approved For Release 200f A 710 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002101110E PI-FJe65-00756R00
T
"The object of.the party is to exploit all and any conflicting
interests among the surrounding capitalist groups-and governments
with a view to the disintegration of capitalism. 115 'Stalin echoed
Lenin's ideas in a speech three years later: "Contradiction, con-
flicts, and wars among the bourgeois states hostile to the prole-
6
tarian state are the reserves of the revolution." The indoctri-
nation program which the Soviets conducted in prisoner of war
camps during and after World War II was a part of their continuing
attempt to foment revolution in other countries and to hasten
"the disintegration of capitalism."
While Soviet diplomats concluded their pacts with various
countries, the Moscow-directed Third International pursued its
task of fostering revolution in those same countries, although
the latter was kept somewhat in check after 1928 in order to
7
permit Soviet diplomacy more flexibility in its maneuvers.
Thus, practical considerations and political necessity led the
Soviets into international agreements and alliances, but
opportunism has at all times outweighed any theories concerning
8
moral obligations to fulfill treaties. The Soviets entered into
peaceful relations with other states without relinquishing the
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that the "socialist" state,
which Communists faithfully believe will envelope the earth,
can be established ?only by force and violence, by 'war and
SECRET Y CRJE OF
Approved For Release 2002/01/10' 7CIA-RDP65-007568000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 20Q2WIIIQ :jQl/.4-RDP65-00 00 01-4
revolution, and by savage reprisals against all dissenters.
The ,drat de pure recognitions of tee Soviet Government began
9
in February 1924 with recognition by Groat Britain. As early
as April 1922, the Treaty of Rappallo had been signed with the
German Weimar Republic, a triumph for the Soviet diplomatic corps
and one which enabled them to play on the dissensions between
Germany and her former enemies throughout the. next decade. As
European. states, hesitatingly, began to acknowledge the Soviet
regime, a wide network of non-aggression, non-intervention, and
10
neutrality pacts was fabricated by the Soviets with many counties.
Throughout the 1920's and until. Hitler had destroyed the Communist
Party in Germany and secured complete contl'ol of the Third Reich
in 1934, Communist thought in Russia had slung to the hope that
Germany would be the scene of the next Communist revolution, and
it was with difficulty that Soviet leaders relinquished this
idea. After 1934, a rapid reorientation began and the new dip-
lomatic policy included pacts, particularly with France, designed
11
to protect Russia from the growing Nazi menace.
Among international agreements regarding warfare entered
into by the Soviet Union were the Covenant of the League of Nations,
the Washington treaties of 1922, the Geneva Protocol of 1928., tl:e
Locarno Treaty of 1925, .the Driand-Kellogg Pact of 19289 the Hag'ze
Conventions of 1907 on Hospital Ships and on the Rights and Duties
SECRET 3IR,C '' 7-11 ',
Approved For Release 2002/64/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/01i1"' lj-13Dp65-00756R
Aw. 1W
In-V
of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, and the Gex.eva Conventions
of 1906 and 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
12
Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field.
In the summer of 1918, very early in the Communist regime,
the Soviet Government passed a decree by which it acceded to all
international Red Cross conventions. Almost at the same time,
another decree was passed by which the government took over the
Russian Society of the Red Cross and made it an official organi-
zation. Article 1 of the latter decree reads: "The Russian
Society of the Red Cross is acting on the basis of the Geneva
13
Convention of 1864 and conventions subsequent thereto." The
Soviets professed to attach considerable importance to the work
of the Red Cross because, according to a Communist spokesman,
the most valuable human material was found not only among the
soldiers of the USSR but also among the soldiers, of the enemy.
Since the latter were mostly proletarians and, therefore,
"eventual allies of the Workers and Peasants Republic," the
preservation of their lives and health were considered 'by the
14
Soviets to be of primary importance.
Acceding to treaties of a humanitarian or social nature
and co-operating with other nations in the preservation of human
life and health has been in striking contrast to the Soviet policy
of refraining from participating in agreements bearing on social
SECRET SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/01/1.CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/1L1/10P. CIA?-RDP65-0 QA QQ3d601-4
15
problem having political significance. For Soviet Russia,
the taking of, prisoners has both economic and political iopli-
cati:Jns -- they can be used to peT:i orm 1 '.'oor and they can be
indoctrinated, and taught how to further the Communist mission
in their native countries after repatriation. The failure to
accede to the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding prisoners and
the renunciation in.practice of the Hague Convention of 1907
were perfectly consistent with Soviet foreign policy regarding
co nitlnents of a political nature.
As noted previously in this study, the Red Cross drafted
a new code for prisoners of war in 1921 which was forwarded for
_comment and criticism to all states party to the Red Gross Con-
veations. The Russian Red Gross, with official sanction, pro-
ceeded to draft a co r-ter-project which consisted, in the English
trans.ation, of less than five hundred words. This proposal. was
conservative in nature, and in no essential respect did it con--
flict with the Hague rules of 1907- or wi-: i the Geneva Convention
of 1.92>. There was, however, at least one noticeable omiss _on
in the counter-proposal. In the Hague and Geneva documents
customary distinctions between officers and enlisted men were
recognized, but the Soviets ignored such distinctions in their
15
document, the term "war prisoners" being used exclusively.
S E C R T
Approved For Release 2002/0/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/OY1q:CPtA-jR
gP65-00756 ' ~yq X0 '4
Treaties of peace with the Soviet Union concluded with
neighboring countries from 1920 to 1924 included many provisions
for the disposition of prisoners. The lack of distinction between
officers and enlisted men is a noticeable aspect of these treaties.
Wars between the infant Soviet Union and her neighbors had been
"class" as well as political conflicts, and in the treaties
numerous provisions were made for the exchange or repatriation
of civilian prisoners and hostages who had been detained for
political or ideological rather than military reasons. In only
one of the documents, the Hungarian Agreement of July 1921, were
17
distinctions made between officer and enlisted prisoners.
Prior to World War II, the only concrete indications of
the Communist attitude toward prisoners of war were contained in
the Russian Red Cross draft proposal and the few treaties dis-
cussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Upon analyzing these documents,
it would seem that the Soviets agreed with the bourgeois statesmen
on the principle that war is a relation between states and not be-
tween individuals. This concept is the foundation upon which many
of the principles concerning humane treatment of prisoners have
been founded. For Communists, however, war is always a contest
between classes, and the individuality of the person is always
merged in his class. Since officers in the armies of "capitalistic"
states are generally drawn from social classes which the Communists
r7q rig
?#,e
S E C R E T
Approved For Release. 2002/01 /1 -~elA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4
 Approved For Release 2002/0/(1OF'F CIA RDP65-0
,3'001-4
consider incorrigible ener," a,; of tl,oo pro-,eta~-ia` and since the
Russians had attemptF to ? Icre c istor!