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January 1, 1951
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SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 *ARMY Declass/Release Instructions Ord File* D 1- 8 2 3 RUSSIAN METHODS OF INTERROGATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL WORLD WAR II By KERMIT G. STEWART Major, Infantry, United States Army OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 SECRET Approved 'For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 RUBSILN METHOD'.; OF INT RiiWC ATING CAPTURED PERSONNEL WORLD WAR II BY KERMI T G. ; = 2'EWART Major, (Inf) GSC Yr A R N I 14 G This docum nt contains information affectin ; the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title :L8, U. L)'. C., sections 793 and 794. The trans~,ni. lion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HI TGiiY DEPid, ,TMIEivT OF THE ARMY 1951 C 1'. E T Ir-5CIR !1. Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA- ECri 11a T .F-Q---H E ry0iLD r The. Office of the Chief of Military History has undertaken the preparation of various special studies needed in the Army School special System and for staff reference . Such pro j ects were initiated more than three years ago when a canvass of general and upecial staff sec- tions of the Army resulted in requests for studies on a wide variety of subjects. In many cases the need for such studies was found to be greatest in matters pertaining to foreign military methods. Thic3 study is intended to provide the Army with information on Russian interrogation methods in a. condensed and readily usable.: form. It has been made at the request of the Assistant Chief Of staff, G-2, GStJSA. A considerable volume of maberiai is available for research on uoviet method;:; of interrogation. The hussians, however, care extremely secretive, and. there a,:e many gabs in our knowledge of their operations and methods, particularly at the higher levels of the Soviet govern-- mental and military structure. It io felt that this study will fill in some of the missing pieces of the Soviet puzzle. If it stimulate,,, further investigation to gain yet more complete knowledge of Rus&iarr methods, the continuing value of the study will be enhanced. ORLANDO 71~ARD vVushington, D. C. Major General, UCH. September 1951 Chief, Aiiitary History Approved For ReleasA2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 MISSING PAGE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MISSING PAGE($: /V Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved __For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 SECRET The primary purpose of this study is to provide a reference work on Russian methods-of interrogation for students in the Army School System, particularly for those in the field of intelligence. This work is also intended for use as a reference by those who determine what instructions a United States soldier will receive concerning his conduct in the event of capture by the armed forces of the SovietlUhion or its satellite nations. The scope--'of'-this study is considerably broader than indicated by the title. The general treatment accorded prisoners of war by the Soviets during World War II is balanced against a history of prisoner treatment through 'the ages. Soviet attitudes regarding the rules of land warfare surrounding prisoners are compared with the attitudes of other peoples. A brief description of the governmental and military structure of the Soviet Union has been presented, in order that the student may better understand the part played by the interrogation program in thy; over-all intelligence plan of that nation. Soviet intelligence procedures, prisoner evacuation, prison camp conditions, and the prisoner indoctrination- program are discussed to the extent necessary to lead'to a ''better understanding of the interrogation program. In the hands of the Soviets, interrogation is not only a matins Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 v Approved For Release 2002/01 1 Q",: 1 18-RDP65-00 1 of gathering information but also a political weapon. The startling confessions made in the Soviet purge trials of the lat@ 1930's or, more recently, in the Hungarian trials of Cardinal Mindszenty and Robert Vogler have testified to the effectiveness of communist methods of "political" interrogation. In this study such methods are touched upon because they were. used with a very limited number of prisoners of war. Otherwise, the discussion has been confined to, methods used to gain tactical and strategic information from captured military personnel during and immediately after World War II. Since this study is intended for a reference, which means that only isolated parts of. the work will be read by many individuals, certain facts and ideas have been repeated from time to time in order to permit each phase of the study to-stand alone as a self-contained thesis. The author has been allowed complete freedom in research and in developing his ideas, and for this he is truly grateful. A sincere attempt has been made to write a factual-, objective narrative, devoid of bias. In occasional instances when only assumptions could be made because of insufficient evidence, they have been frankly labeled as such. The author takes full responsibility for these assumptions, for statements of fact, and for conclusions found in the text. It must be emphasized that the recommendations contained in the final chapter represent the views of the author and do not necessarily SECRET I Clunk JR, It Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/011101: E+IA-RDP65-00 1-4 reflect the views or policies of the Department of the Army. The writer has received much help, beginning with the original outline and continuing through the stages of researching, writing, and editing. Brig. Gen. P. M. Robinett, USA-Rot., Chief, Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, contributed many valuable suggestions, smoothed the way for more complete research than would otherwise have been possible, and offered constructive criticism and guidance throughout the project. Lt. William Klepper, Jr., carefully researched the records of the German Military Documents Section and located many documents which were of primary importance to this study; Lt. George L. Frenkel's painstaking review of the manuscript and his correction of many translations of German documents have resulted in a muc'. improved, more accurate study. Lt. Col. Robert E. Work, USAF, was most co-operative in making available Air Force records for this project, and his constructive suggestions and criticisms were much appreciated by the author. Mr. Israel Viic(D "Ind his assistants have given valuable aid in securing source materials; the Foreign Studies Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History; the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA and GHQ, FEC; the Departmental Records Branch, AGO; the Historical Section, EUCOM; the Army Library; and the American Red Cross have all boon most co- operative. It has been a pleasure to work with Miss Lucy fieidman who has edited the final draft. of the manuscript; Mrs. Frances T. Fritz SECttET EC Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 vii Approved For Release 20052/O1/10~ .lAT;RDP65-0 0 4 001-4 did the, preliminary editing of the first draft of the narrative. Mr. Frank J. Ford is responsible for the first chart, the other six being the work of Mr. Elliott Duna.yy. Mrs. Irene Wilhelm has been.: ; helpful in administrative matters and has assisted with the typing; Mrs. Laurie Herring has assiduously typed and retyped the manuscript and out most of the stencils for this mimeographed edition of the study. (References in the footnotes give credit only to a few of the many persons who have been called upon to give information. Personnel of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GSUSA, of the:-,, Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, and of the Office of the Chief of: Naval Intelli ence, USN, have reviewed the manuscript; their comments and criticisms. have been invaluable. KErNIT G. STEWART Washington, D. C. Major, (Inf) GSC September 1951 S E C P. E T ~)lils 0'T Approved For Release 2002/04il : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0J/'r0 Y GAERbP65-00756R000400030001-4 2ECRET PART ONE Chapter Page I SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY . . . . . . . . . , 1 II SOME ASPECTS OF-INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . . . . . . 9 TII THE GROWTH OF CUSTOMS AND LAWS REGARDING PRISONERS . 20 IV THE GENEVA (PRISONERS OF WAR) CONVENTION OF 1929. ? . . 42 A. Summary of Certain Protective Provisions of the Convention. . . . . . 42 B. Status of the Ma'or Powers in Relation to the Geneva Convention During World War II . . . . . 47 V SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. . . 55 PART TWO VI NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM OF THE USSR . . . . . . . . . 69 A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 B. Government of the USSR and the Communist Party. . 70 C. -Soviet Military and Para-Military Forces. . . . . . 75 1. The Supreme Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 ,2. Field Organizations. of the Red Army . . . . . 81 3. Intelligence Functions of the-General Staff and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). 86 4. Staff Organization and the Intelligence Sections of Red Army Field Organizations . 93 5. 'Soviet Para-Military Political, Security, and Counterintelligence Agencies . . . 104 a. The Main Political Directorate . . . . 105 b. The History of the Soviet Secret Service. . 107 .c. The NKVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 d. Main Co rintelli ence Administration of the Armed Forces GUKR . . . . . . . 120 D. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 S E C R E T 171 C J11 Tlr.~, Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 200WOO / 0 R 9A-RDP65-063q $ Chapter Page VII SOVIET REGULATIONS REGARDING PRISONERS OF WAR. . . . 136 A. General . . . . . . . . . . 13 6 B. Soviet Instructions Issued in 1940 . . . . . 138 The Importance of Taking Prisoners . . . . . . . 140 Procedure for Collecting and Evacuating Prisoners 141 Interrogation of Prisoners . . . . . . . . . . . 149 C. Red Army Adherence to Instructions Con- cerninr1 Prisoners. . . . . . . . . . . 159 D. The 1942 Soviet Field Regulation . . . . . . . 164 E. Subsequent Orders and Directives . . . . . . . . 166 F. Political Interrogation Directives . . . . . . . 170 G. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 VIII SELECTION AND TRAINING OF INTERROGATIONS AND INTERPRETERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 A. Interrogation Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 B. Selection and Training of Intelligence Officers. 182 C. Training in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 D. Soviet Air Force Intelligence Officers . . . . . 188 E. NKVD Interrogation Personnel . . . . . . . . 189 F. Selection and Training of Interpreters . . . . . 191 G. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 IX INSTRUCTIONS FOR SOVIET CAPTURED PERSONNEL AND TREATMENT OF REPATRIATED PRISONERS . . . . . 198 A. Indoctrination and Training. . . . . . . . . 198 B. Treatment of Repatriated Soviet Prisoners. . . . 202 C. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 A: Phases of Prisoner Treatment . . . . . . . . 208 B. Soviet Interrogation Methods as Applied in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 1. Some Aspects of Soviet Intelligence Doctrine 215 2.. Russian Characteristics Affecting Interrogation Methods . . . . . . . . 216 3. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red Army During the First Stake of the War. 220 4. Interrogation in Combat Echelons of the Red Army During the Second and Third Stages of he. War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233 , Approved For Release 20G /Q111(j: ;UA-RDP65&%1 6 6640 0001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 SECRET SECRET Chapter Page a. Military Interrogations in the Field. . . 233 b. Political Interrogations in the Field 244 c. Smersh Inter ogations in the Field .. . 248 C. Soviet Interrogation Methods Applied in Prisoner-of-War Camps . . . . . . . . . . 257 1. General Conditions in the Camps . . . . 257 Camp Interrogation Methods . . . . 275 a." The Five Phases of the Camp Interrogation P r o g r a m..... . . . . 275 b. Administration of the Camp Program. . 283 0. General Methods of Interrogation. . . 288 Coercive Techniques . . . . . . . 289 Indirect Techniques . . . . . 291 The Use of Informers Among Prisoners. 293 d. Specific Methods of Interrogation 295 First Phase of the War. . . . . . . . 295 Second and Subsequent Phases of the War 298 e. Interrogation Prisons . . . . . . . . 314 f. The Use of Drugs in Interrogations. . . 324 g. Interrogation of War Criminals. . . 332 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 XI SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATING JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR. . . . . . . . . 357 A. General Conditions in the Camps . . . . . 357 B. Camp Organization and Administration. . . . . . 360 C Camp Indoctrination Program . . ... . 362 D. Camp Interrogation Methods. . . - . . . . . 366 E. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 374 PART FOUR XII' CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376 S E C R E T 2) F CR T Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R00040 001-4 SECRET SECS Page Explanatory Note . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 383 Chapter I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388 Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 Chapter IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 Chapter V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399 Chapter VI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401 Chapter VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414 Chapter VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 Chapter IX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 423 Chapter X. . . . . . 426 Chapter XI . . . . 446 Chapter XII. v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449 Facing Page Figure 1, Prisoner Evacuation: Soviet Armed Forces, World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 Figure 2, State Administrative Structure, USSR (1945) . . . 70 Figure 3, Command and Administration of the Red Army . . . 82 Figure 4, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), 1945, . .86 Figure 5, Organization.--,l Pleen and Channels of Command, Red Army Formation (Army Group). . . . . . . . 94 Figure 6, Organization of the Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs ? . . . . . ... . . . 112 Figure 7, Organization of the Main Directorates of Prisoner-of-War Camps and Guard and Escort Troops of the MVD (Postwar -- 1947). . . . . . 114 NOTE: The Appendixes (1 - 9) are contained in a separate volume. L\IN Approved For Release 220J,/OC1/10 cIA-RDP65- 0 96 000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/1: FIFA,-R,D 6-00756R000AAg3r4 T PART I CHAPTER I SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY This is a study of Russian methods of interrogating captured personnel during and immediately after World War II. The discussion will be limited as nearly as possible to methods used in dealing with prisoners of war although some of the methods have been used more frequently with -,political and criminal offenders in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The importance of prisoner interrogation has been emphasized in Soviet military doctrine and practice. Explicit directions for processing prisoners have been found in practically all handbooks issued to the various arms and services of the Red Army. Soviet training films have emphasized that the "eyes and ears" of prisoners I should be used as much as possible in planning attack or defense. The capture of prisoners for purposes of interrogation has played such a prominent part in Soviet tactics that commanders have often specified in reconnaissance directives the sectors from which prisoners were to be taken. Soviet emphasis on the importance of prisoner interrogation is not unique. Prisoners have been considered valuable sources of 3 information by belli&:.rents throughout the history of warfare, and S E C R E T SICK 9711 RE T Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :, A-RDP65-00756ROO0400030001=4 r Approved For Release A0 /6`11 0 61A-RDP65-011 "UZ0001-4 during World War II all the major. powers carried on extensive prisoner-interrogation programs. The tremendous number of prisoners taken during y'Jorld War II If sErved to increase the importance of the interrogation program. Literally millions of Germans fell into Russian hands during the war, the exact number being held at the time of Germany's surrender will probably never be known. More than a million Japanese soldiers and civilians were captured by the Red Army during its eleven-day 5 war with Japan. Russia, in turn, lost millions of troops to the 6 Germans. France, Poland, England, the United States, and other powers engaged in the wax also experienced heavy losses of personnel 7 through capture. Additional millions of civilians suffered im- prisonment as internees and slave laborers or as political and. "racial" offenders in concentration camps. With huge quantities of the raw material of intelligence available iii the forma of prisoners, the various belligerents took steps to insure the fullest possible exploitation of prisoner in- formation. Field regulations and special orders issued to combat troops specified procedures for processing and evacuating prisoners in ways designed to insure their immediate and maximum utilization for intelligence purposes. Large numbers of military intelligence personnel were especially trained as interrogatoro and LS linguists. Specialized agencies such as translator and interrogation teams were 9 HE, Ci T Approved For Release 2002/01/1O-CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/O (1g ~C 4-9P65-00756 organized to exploit captured documents and to interrogate prisoners, and subdivisions were created within existing intelligence services to process prisoner information. The emphasis on the prisoner-interrogation program quite naturally led to the adoption of appropriate counterintelligence measures by the various belligerents. Troops were told of their rights as prisoners under international law, cautioned about known tricks and strategems employed by the enemy to secure information from prisoners, indoctrinated with principles of loyalty to be practiced when in captivity, and warned of punishment which would be inflicted if it were learned that an individual had deserted or willzngly'given information to the energy. In this study, Soviet methods of exploiting prisoners for intelligence purposes will be described in as much detail as possible. A brief discussion of the wartime organization of the government of the USSR and of the Soviet Armed Forces will be followed by a more extensive discussion of Soviet military intelligence services and the organizational changes which took place during the war. For most nations this would be sufficient background for an understanding of their prisoner-interrogation programs. The Soviet Union, however, had a highly centralized government and many intelligence organiza- tions with over-lapping functions. The discussion, therefore, cannot be confined to the military organization alone but must include S E C R E T 5 M C vIET Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 ~3- Approved For Release 20022/01/10 : CIA-RDP65' 0075GRd004d0030001-4 S E C R E T various para-military intelligence and security organizations, especia.ily the Peoples' Commissariat of the Interior (NKVD) which was responsible for the operation of prisoner-of-war camps and for the strategic interrogation program in those camps. Soviet field regulations and special directives pertaining to the handling and interrogation of prisoners, the selection and training of intelligence personnel, counterintelligence measures, specific methods and practices of Soviet interrogators, and other aspects of, the prisoner-interrogation program will be given as com- plete an, exposition as is possibly; within the limitations of research materials presently available. The general treatment of prisoners during evacuation and in the camps and the camp-propaganda program will be discussed in so far as these aspects of the life of a prisoner in Russia were related to interrogation proceaures. Since interrogations of prisoners in the field and in the camps were con- ducted by different agencies and for different purposes, separate treatment will be given to these two phases of interrogation. Separate treatment will also be given to Russian methods of in- terrogating Japanese prisoners since this was almost entirely a post-war development. Excerpts from a large number of documents upon which this study is based appear in the appendix. Many of these "ease histories" are spectacular in nature and, if included in the text, would tend Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756 S E C R E T T to focus the reader's attention on specific incidents rather than lead to a general understanding of method. In so far as possible, the text of this study will deal with methods of interrogation in general terms. The documentary excerpts in the appendix will be used to illustrate certain methods described and to support various conclusions and evaluations appearing in the text. In order to achieve a better understanding of Russian methods of interrogating prisoners, the first part of this study will deal with some broad aspects of the problems created by taking prisoners in modern warfare. Included will be a brief discussion of inter- national law as it pertains to prisoners of war; a short history of the treatment accorded prisoners from ancient times to the present; mention of the principal codes, treaties, and multipartite-conven- tions concerning prisoners which have been framed in the past two hundred years; and special mention of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929 with comments on the which the major belligerents of World War II adhered, or failed to adhere, to that treaty. Germany was signatory to the Geneva Convention of 1929, but the Soviet Union was not. Despite German offers to apply the pro- visions of the convention to Russian priscners on a reciprocal basis, the Russians persisted in refusing to make any commitments on the matter. The result was a state of lawlessness between these two Approved For Release 2002I11 &: IA-F DP65-00UL1 0001-4 Approved For Release 20B2,0y1R :ECI1-RDP65-00Qk0iB0'i01-4 powers in so far as their prisoners were concerned. Both nations were engaged in total war, a type of conflict which has become almost institutional in the twentieth century. They were also engaged in an ideological conflict, and the opposing, but equally fanatical, ideologies of Communism and Naziism transformed a chronic antagonism between the two peoples into a bitter hatred. Tiie combined effect of these aggravating circumstances was a noticeable deterioration in the field of humanitarianism and an 9 uptrend of brutalization. Some aspects of the effect of Communism on Soviet attitudes toward that portion of international law per- taining to prisoners of war will be given separate treatment in this study. Because of the place of the Soviet Union in world affairs and the nature of the Communist dictatorship, the Russians have become probably the most security conscious people on earth. They have been especially secretive about their methods of handling prisoners. As a result, there are many unfilled gaps in the information which is currently available and upon which this study is based. Iviost of the information has come, either directly or indirectly, from German sources. An important direct source has been the German Military Documents Section (GMDS), Departmental Records Branch, Office of the Adjutant General. These files, most of which were captured from the German Army at the close of Dorld guar II, have SECRET )EC1IT Approved For Release 2002/01/1P : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release.2002/01/10 : I RRDP65-00756 dad yielded not only information on Soviet methods but a number of Soviet documents concerning treatment of prisoners. A group of former German staff officers working in co-operation with the Historical Division of the United States European Command have also made an important contribution to this study in the form of monographs on Soviet methods of interrogating and propagandizing 10 prisoners of war. Some of these former officers who fought against the Russians during the war were captured by the Red Army. In. gathering material for their monographs they questioned many former German soldiers now returned from Russian captivity. Other information has been gleaned from these same returned prisoners and from Soviet deserters by United States Army and Air Force intelligence agencies in Europe and America. Soviet methods of handling Japanese prisoners have been learned from Japanese repatriates by United States intelligence agencies in Japan. The text is fully footnoted as to the sources of the information, with appropriate comments on the conjectures or conclusions which are based on an inadequate number of case histories or upon information of questionable reliability. This study, comprising both a historical review and a critical analysis of Russian methods of interrogating captured personnel, is written with a twofold purposes (1) to point out the successful methods that might well be adopted in future combat and at the same S E C R E T 9 ) 1 CI I Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CI P65-007j ?P65-4 S C RT time to v:or~d out 1'_ieff JC -Vt? Or and (2) to provide the planners;, c;SpccJ lly thoc?e concerned with l :.-terrogat7_Cn, C VUIl"~C;T''1.11+,i l _L :EJ:I.ce, troop-training, and t1:OO}~- in or rt :tion T'C)g Y'ams y 1th in OrI:1'. bion on ~, hich to Ix se cou'_';tE r 1TE uii s to b,; taken ann training programs to be 111:,11 toted 'i n t iE event C ': r with tho nc'] 11011 'ii11ose co lk~8t methods are canner study . rj l S E C R E T CRE .?. Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : C1-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R00040C~0030001-4 ~ TV E C R E T 2EC 11U F uc.)Itiiii ASPLCTE, OF INTEiNATIGi3,1L ?_,avc In ancient 't1.mes captive was, in most cas kes, completely subject to the mercy of his ilidiv.dun.l captor. The latter's Conduct as it affected his prisoner was limitod by xo restrictions other than those impi,sed by his personal. code of ethics or, society do velopod, by the code of the ':oc:; al group to which he belong(-,,d. As ci-viliza-tion progressed, however, a cons i'.i 'rab1.;) change took place in the status of a military captive. he became a captive of the Elation to which he had surrendered rather ..f the in,. d.)J_viduai who the capture, ;;aect rlntions, in turn, ':t,::copt: a vaY'Yi~ n'. degree of re ;.-?ur.,~ si.. Iiii ".e~ ?: r ty '~or G}.tc i,~: lfw of The rights which gradually _.ccrucc' t c: prisoners Included that of witlAic iwing certa.:_n inform :ti .ti from captors if pr isone:rr so do- sired. Rules which most nations nave accepted in regard to their treatment of priuonors, are among; that group of .Laws known a. the rules, of land warfare w ich, in turn, are a Dar V of the larger body of internatica j. maw. A Modern nation whether en ed in G"71?" or peac 7 e r. '. to certain ri#.;i is alic? hr: s ertaira duties to fulfill under inter_ ,vatic na 1 lam. T},-; s body of U?'t ais, guo, and rules ;?Jhicli affects ~a ~a SEC H.ET ti~~ Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CkA-RDP65-00756R00104 0 01-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-00 1-4 SECRET n1'~ r14 and to an extent governs the relations and intercourse of states with one another has been formulated as a result of commercial and political transformations which took place during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries vrlnen western civilization was undergoing the transition from the Middle Ages to the era of modern history. During that period the feudal system was transformed into a group of well-defined territorial states with the goveriu.ients of the latter assuming supreme authority within their boundaries. The process of change, it is generally agreed, was completed by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which securely established the terri- torial state as the characteristic feature of the modern political .system. Under current conceptions of internabiraal law, a state (or nation) has been defined as "the external personality or outward agency of an independent community" which has as its attributes "(a) pcssession of sovereign power to pledge the community in its relations with other similarly sovereign communities, (b) independence of all external control, and (c) dominion over a determinate terri- 2 tort'." Thus, while a state recognizes no higher lawgiving authority, it can still pledge itself to maintain certain specified relations with other states. Despite the fact that the old system of feudalism had evolved into a system of separate territorial states, these states maintained I-CII31E " Approved For Release 2002/01/i ctCIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 14-9 l a4 continuous relations with one another, and it was inevitable that Approved For Release 2002/Oj/'50 C CAZRpP65-00756R certain rules should be adopted which would assure a measure of order and mutual understanding in these relationships. By the very nature of the new order, it was necessary for states to agree on common fronti " _ diplomatic and trade relations, various forms of reprisal, the seizure of hostages, or w,tar. Within a state., public opinion can bring about a change of policy on the part of governmental officials, or it may bring about the fall of the government. In time of war, one of the most effective sanctions which can be eployed to enforce international law is the reprisal. Rules of warfare can exist only when belligerents find it to their mutual ad- vantage to adhere to those rules; non-adherence results in reprisals which negate both the rules and the advantages. Laws concerning the treatment of prisoners of war arc of a type which belligerents have found to be mutually advantageous from a mil-.tary standpoint and are more likely to command respect than laws limiting the use of weapons 9 or the destruction of enemy forces and resources. An example of how reprisals can negate both rules and advantages occurred early in World War II. During the attempted landing at Dieppe in 1942, Canadian troops handcuffed some captured Germans on the battlefield as a security measure. This was adjudged a technical violation of the Geneva Convention by German military authorities who proceeded to shackle a large number of Allied prisoners in re- taliation, thereby setting off a "chain-reaction" of reprisals which for a time threatened the existence of all rules of land warfare. The resultant diplomatic de a"dlcck was broken crily by tl.o International Red Cross Cot.aiittee vwhic;: , after much negotiation, was successful Approved 'For Release 2002/6111 (IV:1 IA-I DP65-007 9 db1-4 69 Approved For Release 2002/01/'01E (?JARRiPR65-00756R1T0e110T It 10 in bringing ai, end ,o the reprisals. This Committee, which has had much practical experience in persuading nations to uphold international law, observed in its World guar IT report: "General y speaking, the rules of international law are implemented only on the basis of reciprocity. Practical success depends, however, net only on legal reciprocity; but also on one national interest balancing with the other. Reciprocity in this sense may rest upon interest, unlike in kind, but existing at the same moment." .Fear of reprisals may have been the only factor which caused Germany toward the end of lidorld War II to maintain its adherence to the Geneva Convention in regard to Allied prisoners. Early in 1945 the Nazis, had seriously considered denouncing that Convention, but German military leaders feared reprisals against captured German 12 personnel. Adherence to interne tional law on the part of individual citizens of a state is ensured to a limited degree when that state officially ratifies a treaty or convention. The act of ratifying a treaty carries with it the implication that the ratifying states will require their citizens to obey the terms of that treaty. In the United States this implication is confirmed by law. Article Six of the Constitution of the United States provides., "This Constitution and the laws of the, United States shall be made in pursuance thereof and all treaties ma ;e, or which shall be made, under the SECRETCRdc3 I' Approved For Release 2002/01/10.1 1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65- 66 fll S E C R E T :-; ' ,40 4+0001-4 T4 authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land. . . Upon ratification by Congress, the Geneva Convention of 1929 became law for all citizens of the United States; the armed forces were obliged to incorporate its terms in their regulations, to instruct all military personnel as to their rights and duties under the Convention, and to treat prisoners who were citizens of - adhering 13 states in accordance with its provisions. Thus, international law which has been codified in treaties has at least some of the attri- butes of municipal law for citizens of the ratifying states. There are other factors inherent in the concept of treaty law, however, which tend to nullify the theory codification the problem of adherence is solved. The sovereign authority of states which, in theory, is the bulwark of treaty law, prcTres, in practice, to be a source of weakness. While sovereignty may confer authority to enter into a treaty, it also confers authority to release the state from that treaty since 1 sovereignty is incompatible with obligation. States have from time to time renounced or violated treaties for a variety of reasons: unfavorable treaties forced on wean or defeated nations have been renounced when those nations recovered sufficient strength to defy their oppressors; arrcgant or irresponsible governments of powerful states have forced their will on others in deliberate defiance of Approved For Release 2002M1416 IA-?DP65-007 RD Ol' DOO1-4 16- Approved For Release 2002/01/103 GWRDW5 00756RO r7l 1Z existing agreements; the realities an( dire necessities of war have often-voided idealistic, unrealistic, er outmoded rules of warfare ' a adopted in time of Peace or in previous wars Within a state, the status of municipal law is determined precisely by the courts. Herein lies the important difference between municipal law and treaty law: save for a few international courts which have had permissive and declaratory, rather than arbitrary, authority, no agency for the interpretation of treaty law exists on the international. level, and states are free to in- terpret the terms of treaties in the light of changing national interests, necessities, and ethics. It should also be remembered here that the threat of punishment for transgressors has never yet succeeded in preventing violations of municipal law. Finally, abstract theories regarding the sanctity and force of treaties give way to the hard fact that the terme of treaties are, in practice, based either upon the differences in strength between the contracting parties or upon the degree of usefulness of the treaty to all parties. Using this criterion, treaties may be divided into two groups: those forced on the weak by the strong and those 15 which.. are of mutual benefit to the contracting states. The rules of warfare in general, and particularly those applying to prisoners of war, belong to the second group. SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : G i-BDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10: CIA-RDP65-0075~F0 (f 4 Despite numerous attempts to codify the rule;.; in treaties and conventions, certain unwritten customs and' which are well defined and recognized by civilized nations remain in force. During a war, these unwritten rules are of special importance. War is a reversion to primitive methods of self-preservation which knows no law save that of survival, and to have any rules governing the con- duct of hostilities is something of a paradox. The weakness of treaties and conventions, the effect of new methods and weapons, and the other factors which,. tend to nullify the force of written rules during hostilities serve to increase the importance of certain customs of warfare. !among the unwritten rules of war recognized by most civilized nations are three it tordependent basic principles: (1) the ririe idle of military necessity under which a belligerent is jiustifica in applying any amount and kind of force to compel the submission of the enemy with the least expenditure of time, life, and money; (2) the T)rinci-ple of humanity prohibiting any violence not actually necessary for the purpose of war; and (3) the principle of chivalry which pro-- 16 hibits the resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or conduct. The rules of warfare are particularly susceptible to rapid change, and it is sometimes difficult to- determine whether variations are the result of violations or due to the effect of practical deve1-- opments. Rules codified in times of peace tend to emphasize humanitarian S) Z' C 11 E Approved For Release 200514lhcI 8lX-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/ 08 gPRF;PFJ65-00756R00 S1 IT" considerations to an unrealistic degree. Such rules quickly fall by the wayside as social ethics and morality change under the realities of war, and only necessity, humanity, and chivalry are left as guiding principles. Even these broad, general principle,, are subject to the more ruthless combatants. "Total war" as practiced by belligerents between 1939 and 1945 rendered obsolete many rules of long-standing, and belligerents fell back more and more on the unwritten rules of warfare to justify vio- lations of the written codes. Of these rules, the maxim of necessity was used to justify violations riore than any other as the importance of actions banned by treaties became so great as to warrant violation. No sanctions have as yet been devised or employed to enforce the rules 17 of warfare which can counterbalance; the force of military necessity. The treatment of prisoners is strongly influenced by necessity in warfare and cannot be considered apart from the current social, economic, and military situation existing. in the nation which is holding captives. It is only by reference to these conditions that treatment accorded to prisoners can be explained and evaluated. 4 brief summary of practices in the past and of' modern developments will provide a background for an evaluation of Russian practices during World War II. SECRET ~c~CCZ Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : EI RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 200g/T/10 RDP65-0075 -. 0 1.-4 [4 LA TE . GROWTH OF CUSTOMS j ID LlM RI^iGLRDIN P ISOL'IERS Despite many periods of regression, the treatment accorded prisoners of war, from. a humanitarian' stem.-?point, has gradually improved through the years. This is not to say that the behavior of captors has been consistent during any one period. The most fierce of ancient warriors occasionally indulged generous and merciful impulses toward their captives while certain of the World War II belligerents visited acts of utmost savagery on their captured foes. Duping the twentieth century several of the most idealistic conventions regarding prisoner treatment yet written have beep ratified by most of the nations of the world. This humanitarian advance has been countered by the rise of certain ideologies which have largely disregarded the acquired rights riot only of prisoners of war but also of free citizens, and there is evidence that humanity, in some quarters at least, is suffering a period of regression in regard to prisoner treatment. In ancient times there was no legal distinction between com- batant and non-combatant. Early tribal conflicts were usually wars of extermination. Warriors, farmers, tradesmen, women, and children fell into the same category so far as the belligerent was corlczrned; SECRET~~', Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 0- 1 Approved For Release 2002/01/1OE C 1P RDR65-00756R000 no quarter was expected, asked, or given. The individual was identified with the tribe or social group, and defeat meant loss 1 of life, liberty, and posuessions for all. Massacres of captives were often preceded by systematic or ceremonial torture. On occasions, captors disfigured prisoners by amputating or mutilating limbs and facial features and then set them free in order to warn or terrorize 2 others. A;s Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations began to flourish, a departure from the traditional practice of slaughtering or muti- lating captives is rioted in ancient writings; that is, the conquerors began to make slaves of defeated peoples.- The Old Testament, for instance, contains detailed accounts of Jewish bondage in Egypt and Babylon. The practice of enslaving rather than killing prisoners, though a great step forward, cannot be ascribed to the e.nierge~ice of new humanitarian concepts and ideals, but rather an economic inter- pre~;tation must bo given to this development. Complex, highly in- tegrated 1,;ocietie.3 such as those which rose in Mesopotamia and E;yp't wore made possible only by multitudes, of slaws who expanded agricul- tural facilities, raised herds, labored in shops, rowed the boats of commerce, built the walled cities and temples, and tended the physical neeIs of their riasters. The killing of prisoners became an uneconomical procedure in a society based on a slave economy. Qme of the captives taken in, vas r? became "state owned." slaves, but J 04CI~UET Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :-E A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 200a/(YlAa; Cl RDP65-019 the majority of them were the personal property of those who had captured them in battle,or who purchased them from the captors. In the Far East, barbaric methods of conducting warfare and handling prisoners have persisted, in some instances, to the present day. The custom of taking the heads of enemy soldiers as trophies w Ls practiced in China and Japan until late in the nineteenth century.4 The Japanese held the opinion that a soldier who surrendered was dishonored and deserving of death, a traditional idea which was maintained in all strictness in Japanese military regulations pub- 5 fished as. late as January 1942. Enemies captured by the Chinese were often induced to divulge combat information by means of bribes, 6 threats, or tortures. While a lack of respect for the lives of prisoners has characterized the behavior of most Asiatic peoples, .there have been notable exceptions. The Ayrans of India believed in giving quarter to a defeated enemy who asked for mercy, and Sun Tzu, a Chinese general of about 500 B.C., taught that prisoners should be treated kindly. The tatter's motivations for such conduct, however, 7 were based on. practical rather than humanitarian considerations. The early Greeks were little different from other primitive tribes in-their treatment of prisoners, but as their civilization progressed it became ageneral practice not to refuse quarter to other Greeks who surrendered in battle. They also made a practice of.ranpoming important or wealthy prisoners. As a rule, however, S E C R E T 2 T& CITY Approved For Release 2002/0'?6: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/'fib ~&R-RbPT65-00756 9T these humanitarian principles applied only to those of their own race ; even Plato considered barbarians outside the pale of civilized 9 obligations. Greek civilization at its height was based on a slave economy, and this, as in other early civilizatioris,.served to tem- porize the harshness which prisoners were made to suffer in the hands of earlier Greeks. The early Romans were as barbaric as other primitive peoples in regard to prisoners, but as their civilization developed their practices became less harsh on the whole than those of the Greeks. The latter were shut. off from imperial expansion which led factions of them to attempt assertions of supremacy frequently involving mutual slaughter. By the time the Roman Empire had. been consolidated under Emperor Augustus at the beginning of the Christian era, the imperialistic policy of the Romans had resulted in a considerable advance in the treatment of prisoners with only those who had borne 10 arms against Rome being made captives. As ar_ . ii,tperiaiistie power, it was in Rome's interests to populate, not depopulate, her "colonies," and for the first time a real distinction. began to-he made between combatants and noa-combatants. At home the enslavement of captives took precedence over other methods of treating prisoners. Many in- stances are reported of surrender terms which included cartel agree-- meats concerning ransom rates for various classes-of prisoners or 11 of slaves being made free men or Roman soldiers. Thus, economic SECRET R'J ,C I MI F4: 1t Approved For Release 2002/01/10-:7 FA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2021d1 R :.ECI --RDP65-00756 HOR0P'4 self-interest again served to improve the lot of captives. There were riaaiy exceptions, however, to Roman temperance in the treatment of prisoners, and no sort of barbaric cruelty was overlooked when the Romans were bent on revenge or determined to crush resistance. Eventually, Roman law stepped between master and slave, and the killing of the latter without reason was forbidden. In the latter days of the Empire, after armies began to consist of feudal levies, there was a tendency to consider prisoners of Par as cap- tives of the state rather than of the individuals who cadtured them. It was lo be more than a thousand years, however, before this concept 12 was to become clearly defined and accepted. As , Europe pa ssed through the Dark ages, there was no major change in the attitude toward captives. Few distinctions were riade between combatants and non-combatants; brutal treatment was the rule; 13, and prisoners had no legal rights. The body of manners, customs., and rules known as Chivalry which was developed by the knights of the Dark and Middle Ages represented a definite step forward in humani- tarianism; certain principles of the code are still venerated, exercising an important influence on the conduct of present day warfare.., The European knights, however, honored this code only among themselves, and those who participated in the Crusades against the "infidels" of the Near East or the heretics of southern France were notorious for the wholesale massacres and other atrocities which SECRET ECIm Approved For Release 200210tNfr: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 200210111O : PCI9k-kl#)di-00756R00040001 Q001 ftZT 14 they perpetrated. The Christians of the i)ark and Middle Ages excluded infidels and heretics from such humanitarian b3:nefits as were tendered to fellow Christians just as the Greeks and Romans had excluded bar- barians from treatment accorded captives of their own races. Victorious belligerents, however, persisted in the practice of en- slaving captives whether or not they were Christian. A canon of the Third Lateran Council, ordered by Pope alexander III in 1179, stated that it was unlawful to sell Christiana prisoners or keep 15 then as slaves. The institution of slavery, however, was so firmly entrenched in the social and economic life of the times that the admonition of.this Council had little imniediate effect, and the enslavement of Christian captives continued into the seventeenth century. The medieval Church was completely intolerant of heathens and heretics, and under the Theodosian code (438 A. D,) heretics could be fined, exiled, tortured, or killed, and slaves might be 16 beaten into the orthodox faith. The and of the Dark &ges was characterized by the Holy Inquisition, an instituticn credited with 17 some of the most unspeakable atrocities in all history. These exc(;ssos of religious zeal with their perversion of the true principles of Chriwtianity had a deterring rather t Kan a stimulating effect on the development of humanitarian concepts and, in turn, retarded G`IC R ET Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : t A RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2o12/EQ161p ,Fl~,-RDP65-00756 1 p Q ~4 humanitarian advances in attitudes toward prisoners of war. The Mussulrnen, for whose conversion the Clirictiuns alter- nately prayed and fought, set an example in the treatment of prisoners which Christians were slow to follow. its early as 805 A. D., the famous Khalif known as Haruoun al Raschid concluded an agreement with another sovereign under which prisoners of war 18 could be exchanged or ransomed. The period of the Renaissance and the Reformation witnessed a great variety of practices in regard ,h prisoners of war. An: increased use of mercenary troops resulted in a limited type of warfare which was at times almost blcondless and in which the taking of prisoners was only a part of what in some ways amounted to a friendly game between gentlemen. At the other extreme there were bloody massacres such as that which took place after the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 and the terrible atrocities committed during the religious wars. The last of -these, the so-called Thirty iToars r 19 War, reduced the population of some parts of Germany by half. The enslavement of such captives as were not killed was still general practice in England and Europe throughout the last part of the Middle Ages. A prisoner of war was considered the absolute property of his captor, and his lot was considerably worse than 20 that of an eighteenth century plantation slave in imerica. The practice of ransoming prisoners came more and more into general use Approved For Release 2002/Q1/1jQ Cil1 RDP65-007 kbil0 ~Ob~30001-4 Approved for Release 2002/011( : UCI~-"65-00756R( 0LM R, as the.Middle Ages came to a close. Ransoming, in fact, became so common that it was gradually systematized, and a scale of prices 21 for various classes of prisoners became more or less fixed by custom. Gradually the idea that all prisoners belonged to the sovereign replaced the old concept of individual ownership. During the seventeenth century, captives began to be ransomed at prices fixed by cartels at the beginning of a war or during its continuance. The last cartel of this nature seems to have been that between 22 England and France in 1780. Exchange and parole slowly replaced the ransoming of captives, but combinations of exchange and ransom were practiced as late as the nineteenth century. For instance, the United States and Tripoli concluded a treaty in 1805 in which the two countries agreed that prisoners should not be made slaves but exchanged rank for rank, and a monetary value for each rank was 23 established in case of a deficiency on either side. Some attempts were made to codify the conduct of hostilities during the late Middle Ages which presaged the later adoption of 24 elaborate codes by the military establishments of various nations. In actual practice, very few moral or legal inhibitions restricted belligerents in their conduct of hostilities throughout the Dark and Middle Ages. Enslavement of prisoners, massacres, and atrocities of all kinds were accepted as natural manifestations of war. From time to time, however, strong-minded individuals made their appearance SECRET t9- EC RR, 1 T -27- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756pfl SECRET ,Ui `O 8 L: r who did not accept current practices as ri ht and who dared to voice humanitarian ideals concerning the conduct of warfare With the bre.a.kddw&, of feudalism and the origin of nationalists, more an(' more thinkers attempted to analyze the phonouenon of war in the light of new relationships which were being established between individuals, between states, and between individuals and the state. New patterns of thought were translated into new practices and became the beginnings of international law on the subject of war. By the end of the sixteenth century a considerable body of literature had been written about the problem of regularizing war. Writers speculated and philosophized on the objectives of war and 25 on the means which could rightfully be used to achieve such ends. Nearly all of these writers were concerned with the plight of prisoners of war and urged that more humanitarian methods be adopted in dealing with teem. One of the first systematic writers on international law v .,,as Victoria whose works, lle hello and De Jure Soflo published in about 1550, were written in an attempt to evaluate the legality of warlike acts. Ee observed that it was illegal to do harmful acts not necessary' to the ' attainiqe nt of the military objectives of the war and that it wa illegal to injure note--combatants except where there was no other way to win. S E C R E T 2 1711 3~ C ~:. FE . Approved For Release 2002/01/102# IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01b1 E: CIA-l DP65-00756R0004 T It has become customary for writers on international law to divide historical periods by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). This Dutch scholar is generally acclaimed as "the father of international law," and his great work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis published in 1625, was the first text-book to have a profound influence on the practices of sovereigns and statesmen. Grotius was the first to appeal to the law of nature as a moderating influence on the conduct of hostilities. according to him, law had its sources in the nature of marl as a 27 social being. As a jurist, Grotius recognized the force of pre- vailing practice in determining the rules of warfare, and he regarded most of the current practices, including the enslavement of captives, .as justified in law and ethics, provided the war was waged for a "just" cause. Though he recognized the right of enslavement, Grotius 28 advocated exchange and ransom instead. Under the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia (which, concluded the Thirty Years' War in 1648), prisoners were released without ransom at the close of the war. This action marked the end of any extensive enslavement of captives. In the succeeding century, ex- change and parole largely replaced ransom during the course of hostilities, and release without ransom at the end of a war became 29 general practice. A declaration of war came to be regarded as obligatory, military occupation was modified by restraining rules, S E C R E T (7L~C1[~1lea Jt Approved For Release 2002/01/Tb~-ClA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 20g21 141q.: IfA-RDP65-007J .qpQ 1-4 limits were placed on ravaging, the lot of non-combatants unproved, 30 and atrocities became less fre uenta Growing concepts of humanitarianism brought about continued improvement in condition of prisonersliip and in the treatment of the sicl, wounded, and helpless in time of war. Beginning more or less with the time of Grotius, it became co7non practice for nations 32 twentieth centuries. The revival of learring, widespread literacy, and the printing press made it possible for abstract thinkers like Grotius to have a direct part in bringing about changes in actual practices of war including the treatment of prisoners Masses of man read and re- sponded favorably to humanitarian ideas which, in turn, caused them to modify their conduct on the field of battle. While it is im- possible t6 mak=e a precise evaluation of the part these writer-thinkers played in ameliorating the lot of prisoners, there is no doubt that, their role was a major one. A great many writers made contributions to conclude bilateral treaties which, in part, stipulated the treat- ment OAK would be accorded persons and property in time of war, includi the disposal of ships and crows captured on the high seas. Between 1581 and 1864. at least 291 international agreements were concluded which Were designed to afford the maximum protection of human life compm tible with a state of war. This trend culminated . in, th.e great multilateral treaties of the late nineteenth and early f 6-w S E CR ET 1175 J. 0- 4 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7 A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/Of41-b RONDE to the cause of humanism after Grotius, but only a very few of the 'most influential thinkers and their ideas can be mentioned here. Puffendorf (1632-16'97), Leibnitz (1646-1716), Bynkershoek (1673-1743), and de Vvolff (1679-1754) made important contributions to thought in the new field of international law. While differing in their approach to the subject and in their emphasis on the ethical basis of law, they all based their findings, as had Grotius, on a study of the actual practices of men and nations from which they attempted to generalize rnd systematize principles of inter- 33 national law. Three writers of the eighteenth century, Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755), Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1788), and Emeric de Vattel (1714-1767),-are chiefly responsible for the modern view of the proper treatment of prisoners. Montesquieu and Rousseau were French political philosophers whose ideas inspired men with a new sense of the dignity of the individual. They attempted to apply the principles of natural law and reason in determining the rights and duties of the individual clan in his relations with other men and with the state. They argued ti-,at individuals engaged in a war are enemies only acci- dentally since war is a relation between states, not between men, and that the right to kill exists only so long as defenders are bearing arms. According to Rousseau, when soldiers surrender, they cease to be enemies or instruments of the enemy state and merely become E T SECRET ~ Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :. C1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 ,11/1,0; CI47RPP65-00756R000N0~30J- 4 Approved For Release 2002/0S men whose life no one has any right to take since "war gives no 34 right which is not necessary to the gaining of its object." To both thinkers enslavement was the same as taking a captive's life; thyrefore, enslavement was unlawful. According to Montesquieu, "war given no other right over prisoners than to disable them from doing 35 any further harm, by securing their persons." Vattel, the Swiss diplomat and jurist,.was a popular writer whose work gave currency to enlightened theories of the time. he agreed with Rousseau that the aims of war restricted a belligerent to actions necessary to 36 attain those aims, all else being condemned as unlawful. In expounding these views, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Vattel virtually completed the theoretical foundation for the modern view on the subject of prisoners of war. Prisoners of the eighteenth century slowly began to benefit from mutually co-operative forces which were at work in their favor. As the ideas of hur_?anism began humans, men and nat:icns were prepared to accept more idealistic to exert their influence, a corresponding modification or practices in regard to prisoners took place, and as practices became more rules governing'the treatment of prisoners. The eighteenth century 'writings of these three writers give evidence of rules and practices which were unheard of in the time of Grotius; the nineteenth century became a period of steady progress. The principles of humanity as expressed by Rousseau are by this time so firmly established that. CIF C 17 FEE', ~. Approved For Release 2002/01/12-CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 20021(},11I0U 1,IAFPP65-00756R1 11? present day authorities seldom try to justify rules relating to 3.7 prisoners of war on a tneoretieal basis. One of the first formal agreements between nations not at war concerning the treatment of prisoners was incorporated in the Treaty of Peace and Amity between the United States anal Prussia which was concluded in 1785 and reaffirmed in another treaty of 38 1799. The two powers agreed that, in the event of war, prisoners would be held under healthful conditions and would be furnished barracks and rations equivalent to those furnished the troops of the captor power. There were a number of other enlightened pro- visions in this treaty including a statement to the effect that war could not annul the agreements concerning prisoners oince a state of war was precisely that for which such agreements were provided. The close of the eighteenth century saw at least one other enlightened step in favor of prisoners. In 1799 the French National Assembly, still under the spell of idea.Ls of the Revolution, decreed that prisoners of war were under the safeguard of the nation and the protection of its laws. Prisoners were to be placed on the same footing as the troops of the captor power so far as rations and 39 quarters were concerned. The French decree and the Prussia-United States treaty were, in many ways, ahead of their time, and general principles governing SECRET C Approved For Release 2002/01/10 :-d1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 20(2/161(1~-RDP65-007IQ~40l 1-4 the treatment of prisoners during this period wore nebulously defined and unevenly applied. Napoleon, for instance, largely ignorel the French. decree and his general. policy wa one of cruelty,' yet there were many cases of the hutaue treatment of pr ..sotier s during the Napoleonic wars. In 0rrieral, however, 40 prisoners continued to benefit from slowly improving practices during the first part of the nineteenth century. An increasing number of European powers adopted regulations for their armies to follow in dealing with prisoners of war. Probably the first comprehensive codification of iriternatioiia:. law published by a government for use by its own arsiies was the so- called Lieber Code adopted by the Union Arrn,sr and accepted in principle by the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Framed by Francis Lieber (1500-1872), the famous Prussian-born i-imerican publicist, this code wan incorporated in a War Department general order in 41 1863. The, o instructions were imitated by a number of European powers, and the many treaties, coiiveiitions, and national regulations relating to prisoner,: which, have been framed since 1863 have done little more than elaborate on the, basic principles enunciated by Lieber. This code made careful distinctions as to personnel who were entitled to treatment as prisoners of war and, in much detail, prescribed humane behavior on the Fart of captors'. Of special S E C R E T 2) LE C, 11,111) F.."Ilir, -31- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/03/'?G C lAERDP65-0075AITITIM04T interest to thial study are the instructions (Article 80) re- garding interrogation of prisoners: Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence against prisoners, in order to extort the desired information, or to punish them for having given false information. Following the appearance of the Lieber Code, practically all of the major powers issued rules of war for the guilance of their own military establishments. These have consisted of slightly varying interpretations of existing international law and have usually included by reference the various treaties, conventions, 42 or agreements to which each specific nation was signatory. I11 1863, the same year the Lieber Code was adopted in America, a committee of five citizens of Geneva gave first impulse to a movement which culminated in the Red Cross. The first accomplishment of the comt..ittee was the framing of a convention for the protection of sick aiiaivounded in time of war which was agreed upon by twelve payers at Geneva in 1864. The principle that a combatant dis- armed by wounds or sickness is simply a human being in need of help was thus formalized in an international convention. The next step was to apply this principle to prisoners. The Red Cross, by its demonstrated: impartiality, strict neutrality, and usefulness, 09 E C IR" 74 !r Approved For Release 2002/01/107iA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 202922OC1,,/W EC1A-RDP65-0 gradually won the confidence of the various nations and by 1870 was able, unofficially, to oxtcnd aid to prisoners by opening an information bureau on prisoners of war. In the international conferences of 1902, 1907, and 1912, the Red Cross won victories in securing the right to extend relief work to able-bodied prisoners and was tacitly recognized as a quasi-official agency to act as an intermediary in this work. The growth of the Red Cross was merely one aspect of the humanitarian: tendencies of the latter half of the nineteenth cen- tury. An increasing number of international meetings were hold in attempts to agree on rules of land warfare. The Russian Government called a conference in 1863 which resulted in the Declaration of St. Petersburg. In 1874, an association in Paris framed a code of 146 articles based largely on the Lieber Code. The Russian Government drafted a similar code which was submitted to the Brussels Convention later that year. Another code of the same nature was framed by the Institute de Droit international at Oxford in 1880. None of the latter three codes was ratified by any power, but they had much influence upon subsequent conventions and municipal legislation. A number of the articles from these codes found their way eventually into the Oeileva Convention of 44 1929, SECRET. CL Ell Approved For Release 20027 'PI0 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/6119W: CIA-R:1P65-00756F3g1 L M While leaving much to be desired, the conditions under which prisoners were taken and held continued to improve. The march of humanism during the nineteenth century reached its climax with the conventions concluded at the Hague in 1899. Tsar Nicholas of Russia took the initiative in calling together delegates from twenty-five 45 powers who concluded three conventions and issued one declaration. The third of these conventions, dealing with the laws and customs of war on land, made specific provisions for the human; treatment of prisoners for the first time in a multipartite treaty. These provisions were contained in seventeen broadly conceived and vague'_y worded articles which were based largely on the Brussels Convention and which embraced most of the principles of the Lieber 46 Code. Interrogation of prisoners was disposed of in on, short article: "Every prisoner of war, if questioned, is bound to declare his true name and rank, and if he disregards this rule, he is liable to a curtailment of the advantages accorded to the prisoners of war 47 his class." The inadequacy of disputes and wars which 1906, a new "Red Cross" the 1899 conventions became apparent in took place at the turn of the century. In Convention was framed and adopted by thirty- seven nations at Geneva. This convention extended anti clarified the 1864 Geneva Convention and was included by reference in the 48 Hague Convention No. IV a year later. SECRET 23) `x, C IL% E T Approved For Release 2002/01/4:/CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 290@/%1/I0 qlA-RDP65-00 6f 0 1fl 0 (~Qfl1-4 IJelegates from more that forty powers met at the Hague on June 15, 1907, and on October 18th signed thirteen separate 49 conventions, one declaration, and one final act. The -various conventions of 3.907 improved, extended, and clarified the 1899 convention,: regarding the settlement of international disputes and the conduct of hostilities. As for prisoners of war, the seventeen articles of the 1899 Convention were included, unchanged, 50 in the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. Both the 1899 and '1907 conventions had a serious defect in that the agreed upon rules of warfare did not apply except between contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents engaged 51 in a war were parties to the convention. Entry of the non- ratifying states of Montenegro and Serbia into World ~Jua,r I ren- dered the Hague and Geneva Conventions legally inoperative among the ratifying belligerents. Despite the legal aspect of the situation, most of the belligerents considered the conventions as declaratory of international law and, as such, hindirng 52 instrurients . The large number of prisoners taken during World War I created unforseen difficulties for all belligerents when they attempted to abide by the vaguely worded rules of the Hague Convention.. Violations of accepted rules occurred from time to time, and accusations of inhumane treatiient from both sides led SECRET rr r - -38- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0 /10 ~T?YP65-00756R000400030001-4 to a revival of the practice of reprisals. The International Committee of the Red Cross was able to adjust many of these difficulties and did much to maintain respect for international 53 law in regard to prisoners. All belligerents created bureaus of information concerning prisoners of war and, on the whole, adhered fairly sut;sfactori1y to the provisions of the Hague 54'r Convention No. IV. The non-binding aspect of the :Hague Conventions, in addition to their inac1e quC clr in pr. ov- for contingencies arising during the war, led to a new development. treaties concerning the rules of warfare were concluded between enemy states in time of war. Various belligerents entered into such agreements through inter- mediary representing powers in order to reach understandings on 55 specific points not covered by the conventions. The inadequacies of existing codes had been amply demon- strated during I7orld 'Jar I, and there was keen international interest in suggestion-. concerning a new convention proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross at the Tenth Inter- 56 national Conference in 1921. In the same year, a new draft convention concerning the rules of warfare was adopted by the International Law Association in its 30th Conference at the Hague, but the draft convention prepared by the Red Cross Committee, which had been approved by the Eleventh Conference of that T SEC~Rc~ET ~'CRE Approved For Release 2002/01/10 G1A-RDP65-007568000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2902/(M/AOI CIA-RDP65- Q 4$0 001-4 organization in 1923, was the document upon which world interest 547 centered. This text was submitted to the Swiss Government which undertgok. ,the responsibility of ca.llin5, together an inter- national confYrerice to consider the framing of a new convention i egsrd in:g the treatment of prisoners of war. The resulting treaty, the Geneva Convention of 1929, will be discussed in the next chap-,er, . es itc: t1he humanistic advances which have taken place in the past few coutu r .es, nations have conti,ued to use war as an instrent, of international politics. The advances, however, are witness to .tile existence and grownh of a moral conscience which is repelled by. the. idea of unrestricted violence. In some respects, Worl? War TI, was a period of regression so far as humanism was concerned. It was a "total war," and distinctions between com- batant~and non-combatants became less marked as weapons such as the 4irplane and guided missiles made possible attacks on the industrial centers of an ! nervy. It was an ideological war with a tendacy on the part of certain belligerents to revert to the old idea that members of other social groups were onts:i_de the pale of "civilized" obl.igatio'ns. It was a war which ~saUr ra considerable revive. of the practice of enslaving captives in both Germany and the Soviet Union, and the latter was reluctant to release prisoners SECRET 7 Ls E, -40- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01411: &L~-I D ?65-00756ROOO Oq, at the close of hostilities. Wholesale violations of the accepted codes by one or more powers, however, cannot invali- date- completely the progress that has been made in the humanizing of warfare. S E C R E T 8E c1JE Approved For Release 2002/01/l IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release.i0kO{/1b :TCIA-RDP6 i W40130001-4 CHAPTER IVV THE GENEVk (PRISONERS OF YEAR) CONVENTION OF 1929 A. Surimary of Certain Protective Provis ons o' the Convention Early in 1925, Switzerland circulated a note asking whether the various governments would be ready to take part in a conferonce for the revision of the Geneva Convention of 1906 and whether they would be willing in principle to join in the framing of ra, code for 1 prisoners of war. Repliers tc this note were, on the whole, favor- able. On 1 July 1929 delegates from forty-seven nations met in Geneva to act upon two conventions vihich had been framed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The convention con- cerning treatment of prisoners of war was signed twenty-nine days later; this code made rather than declared international law since, unlike the Hague Convention, it was to remain effective between ratifying states regardless of participation in a conflict by a 2 non-ratifying state. The other convention entitled The Amelioration of the Condition of ;founded and Sick of Armies in the Field enlarged and extended the scope of the Geneva Convention 3 of 1906. The convention concerning prisoners of war consisted of ninety-seven articles listed under eight titles: 1. General S E C R E T A =1 r -42- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/~1/E10C: FI~-F,DP65-00756 0~04000 Provision a, II. Capture, III. Captivity, IV. Termination of Captivity, V. Death of Prisoners of War, VI, Bureaus of Relief and Information Concerning Prisoners of uVar, VII. Application of the Convention to Certain Classes of Civilians, VIII. Execu- tion of the Convention. The provisions of the Geneva Convention applied to all persons captured by the enomy who were mentioned in the regulations annexed to the Hague Convention (1907) respectinC; the laws and customs of war on land. (Title I, Articles 1-4). In these regulations, the laws, rights, and duties of war applied not only to armies but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following con- ditions: 1. Commanded by. a person responsible for his subordir.nates; 2. Having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a 3. distance; Carrying arms openly; and Conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Inhabitants of a territory, as yet unoccupied, who spontaneously took up arms to resist the invading troops (levy n masse) and who had not had time to organize themselves into an "army" wero to be regarded as belligerents coming; under the o-Lection of the con- vention if they carried arras openly and respected the laws and customs of war. SECRET ' S M C R E T Approved For Release 2002/01/10-/+k:tA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2Off2/01ic11L:' IA-RDP65-00 O6 0 *1-4 Both combatants and non-combatants constituting the armed forces of a belligerent were, in case of capture, entitled-to the right to be treated as prisoners of war. The convention stipulated that its provisions would apply "to all persons be- to the armed forces of belligerent parties captured by the enemy in the course of military operations at see or in the air. . . ." Certain classes of civilians were, therefore, en- titled to treatment as prisoners of war. Those were defined in Article 81-as "individuals who follow armed forces without directly belonging thereto . . . provided they are in possession of a cer- tificate from the military authorities of -;.ie armed forces which they were accompanying. Articles 2, 3, and 4 specified that prisoners were in the power of the government of the captor, not of the individual or. corps who had captured them. Prisoners were to be humanely treated and protected, particularly against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity. They had the right to have their person and honor respected. Women were to be treated with all regard due to their sex. Prisoners retained their full civil status. The de- taining power was bound to provide for the maintenance of prisoners, and difference in treatment accorded them was lawful only when based on.military rank, state of health, professional qual::Lfications, or sex. Finally-- in a rule which was one of the most important. innovations of this document -- measures of reprisal against SECRET IT Approved For Release 200./,1110 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/(8I/100 CI1-RDP65-00756 prisoners of war were forbidden. The rules regarding information which a prisoner of war was required to give his captor were clear and unequivocal.. Article 5 of the Geneva Convention is-quoted here in its entirety: Every prisoner of war is bound to give, if he is questioned on the subject, his true name and rank, or else his regimental number. If he infringes this rule, he is liable to have the advantages given to prisoners of his class curtailed. No coercion may be used on prisoners to secure in- formation relative to the condition of their army or country. Prisoners who refuse to answer may not be threatened, in- sulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treat- ment of any kind whatever. If, because of his physical or mental condition, a prisoner is unable to identify himself, he shall be turned over to the medical corps. All that was attempted in Article 5 was to provide safe- guards for the personal dignity of a prisoner in his honorable intention to withhold information of value to the enemy. It will be noted that the framers of the convention made no unrealistic prohibitions regarding interrogation in that captors were left free to ask as many questions as they wished. Captives, in turn, were left free to answer questions if they wished, but they were granted the right to refuse to answer all questions save those concerning their name and rank or identifying number. Article 6 was concerned with the disposal of a prisoner's immediate personal possessions. Military papers, arms, and other military equipment discovered on or with a prisoner -- articles SECRET 5ECR T Approved For Release 2002/01/10 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release O .2Im111O :CIA-RDP65- 7 '6 IF4ff 90001-4 which are often of informational value to a captor -- could be confiscated. Gas masks, metal helmets, identification papers, insignia of rank, decorations, objects of value, and effects of personal use were to remain in the possession of the prisoner. Money could be taken from a captive only by order of an officer who was to give a receipt for the amount taken. The scope of this study does not permit a detailed dis- cussion of other provisions of the Geneva Convention. Generally speaking, they consisted of rules implementing and defining the general provisions of the second, third, and fourth articles. Prisoners were to be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in armies of the detaining power and, as such, were liable to disciplinary punishment for acts of insubordination and disobedience. Safeguards were provided, however, to protect prisoners from unjust or excessive punishments (Articles 45 through 67). As for repatriation, it was stated in Article 75 that "repatriation of prisoners shall be effected with the least possible delay after the conclusion of peace." The Soviet Union was not signatory to the Geneva Convention and was not, therefore, legally bound to observe its provisions. As has been noted, the force of international law is largely derived from consent, and an overwhelming majority of world powers assented to the Geneva Convention of 1929. Its provisions, E E Approved For Release 200 A1/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756 R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01/!0~t ?li-F D?65-00756R000400030001-4 SECRET cctioequently, represent a standard of human(; conduct against which the treatment .,;corded to prisoners of war by any nation, including the Soviet Union, might be evaluated. Status of the lvla*or Powers in Relation to the Geneva Convention During World War II Attending the diplomatic conference at Geneva in 1929 were delegates from forty-seven powers. All delegates signed the document, but not all of the states which they represented deposited official instruments of ratification with the Swiss Federal Council as required by the convention. States failing 'q to comply with this requirement cc:ul(: not be considered ao parties, .to the agreement or bound tc obey the rules except insofar as those rules were recognized as declaratory law. r number of state:3 having no delegates at the conference subsequently cave written notice of their adherence to the convention, which procedure autc)_, matically made them parties to the aagreement. The thirty-five states which had either ratified the convention or announced, ad- herence as of 7 December 1941 were: Belgium France Poland Brazil Germany Portugal Bolivia Groat Britain Rumania .Bulgaria Greece Spain Canada Hungary Sweden Chile I,.idia Switzerland China Italy Thailand Columbia Latvia. Turkey Czechoslovakia Mexico Union of South Africa Denmark Netherlands United States Egypt New Zealand Yugoslavia 4 Estonia Norway Approved For Release 2002/O1 16 : I ADP65-0075" " N -47- Approved For Release gO24911 q: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 During the war, six additional nations announced their adherence to the conventions, Adcn, Austr?1i_a, Burma, El Salvadore, Iraq, Lithuania. It will be noted that two of the major belli- gerents, Japan and Russia, are missing from the list of ratifying or adhering nations. Japan sent delegates to Geneva in 1929 but never formally ratified the convention. Immediately after Japan's declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain, the Inter- natior}al Committee of the Red Cross invited the three governments to make use of the Central Prisoners of War Agency at Geneva and urged them to declare themselves willing to apply de facto the provisions of the 1929 convention despite Tapan' e status as a 5 non-ratifying state. The United States immediately sent a f` vocable reply, but Japan hesitated for two months, meanwhile agreeing to communicate desired information concerning prisoners to Geneva and announcing the opening of an information office for prisoners i.n Tokyo. Finally, early in February 1942 after repeated. requests, the International Committee received the following state- ment through the Japanese Legation at Berne% Since the Japanese Government has not ratified the Convention. relative to th he treatmgnt of prisoners of war, signed at Geneva on July 27, 1929, it is therefore not. bound by the said Convention. Nevertheless, in so far as possible, it` intends to apply this Convention rluta.tis, - 7,7P to all prisoners of war who may fell into its hands; at i.i e same time taking into consideration the customs of each natiou and each race in respect of feeding and clothing of pri soners .6 Approved For Release 2002/41.0 CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01110 X1A-rR1;P65-007 0 1-4 the :ioto .ed that Japan had notified the Ux*i ed States, the various states of the British Commonwealth, and Netherlands of her intentions in regard to prisoners. As for application of the convention to civilian internees, the Japanese, on 14 February 1942, made a similar statement, "on condition that the belligerent States do not subject Japanese internee against their will to manual labor." In its World War II Report, the Red Cross states that negotiations with Japan "succeeded in principle, but the re"ult a proved unsatisfactory in practice:" The Red Cross experienced great difficulty in securing co-operation from the Japanese Government on matters relating to prisoners, and its repre- sentatives were regarded with suspicion and hampered in their 9 work at every turn. Evidence introduced in the Japanese War Crimes Trials after the war indicates that the military leaders of Japan consciously and deliberately ignored the Geneva Convention, particularly in regard to labor which prisoners wc;re required to perform, though the Japanese never formally denounced the convention. The Soviet Union was among the powers invited by the Swiss Government to send delegates to the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva in 1929. Despite this invitation, the Soviets slid not send representatives to Geneva, had no part in the framing of t lt-w document, and at no time announced adherence to the convention Approved For Release 2002/01/10-:'1A-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release ?,)0~/~1I OE: qlA-RDP65-00756R0 t~'04 ?030001-4 regarding pl: isomers of war. (Both Russia and Japan had announced adherence to the "Wounded and Sick" Convention of 1929 prior to World War II.) When G -many and her all-'.es invaded Russia on 22 June 1941, the International Committee of the Red Cross, according to its custom, ilm. odiatoly notified all belligerents that it, placed itself at their disposal to carry out its traditional activities and invited them to make use of the Prisoners of War Information Agency ',-.t Geneva. A f w- day ,3 later the commit tee, received a telegram from Molotov, Feeopless Coxn l ssar for Fr.) reig Affairs, indicating that the USSR would exchange information about -12 prisoners provided that the other belligerents did the same. Other favor able exchanges of communications gave rise : to the hope that Russia would adopt attitude similar to that of all other countries regarding prisoners of war. In July 1947., the Ttalio.n Goverrunent requested, t~,hrou?fi the Red Cross a statement from the USSR concerning the latter'.s attitude 'toviard a 'reciprocal application of the 1929 convention. In response the Committee received a telegram, dated 8 August 1941 and signed by Vyshinski, Assistant Peoples' Comm issar for Foreign Affairs, stating that Russia's policy regarding the tr:atment of prisoners' would be as follows S E C R E T _0- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002 OI110 RCFARDP65-0075lIF00 4008 00'01-4 The Soviet Government has already notified the Swedish Government, representing Soviet in- terests in Germany; that the Soviet Union considered binding upon itself the Rules of War which are set out .in the IVth Convention of the Hague of October 1$, 1907 concerning the laws and customs of war on land, subject to the obligatory condition that the above rules be ob- served during the war by Germany and her Allies. The Soviet Government agrees to the exchange of particulars about prisoners of war, wounded and sick, in the order provided for under. Article 14 of the Annex to the above Convention, and wader Article 4 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 for the relief of grounded and sick of armies in the field. Regarding your communication concerning the proposal . . to apply the other articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929, . . . the Soviet Government draws your attention to the fact that all the main questions of the regime of captivity are entirely covered by the above mentioned Annex to the Hague Convention.13 On the assumption that the Soviet Government would observe the established customs and usages, despite the vague wording of parts of the Hague Convention, the Red Cross proceeded to set up the administrative machinery whereby prisoner lists could be exchanged and mail and parcels be sent to prisoners held in the Soviet Union. On August 20th, the Germans submitted a list of 300 names of Soviet prisoners held in Germany, but the Soviets failed to reciprocate; this first list was also to be the last. Despite repeated promises to co-operate, the Russians never sub- mitted prisoner lists. Neither were Soviet-held prisoners per- mitted to exchange correspondence except in scattered instances and then not in a manner considered by'German authorities as 14 justifying reciprocal action. SECRET SICII~lE Approved For Release 2002/01/10 7bA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For. Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 SECRET 6C1R1. ,T On the basis of repeated offers of co-operation from Germany and other enemies of Russia., the International Committee continues: its efforts to ,contact Soviet authorities. Reports of these attempts to C.eal_ voitla the Soviets, however, alricst always ended with anti-climactic negatives: "There was no reply," 15 or "The Committee never received any ansi*.er." After August 1944, the Red Cross made no further attempt to secure Soviet co-operation. Because of Russia's attitude, Germany refused to apply the Geneva Convention in regard to Soviet prisoners, Consequently, all prisoners held by Russia and all Soviet prisoners held by Germany failed to benefit from supplies of relief goods which were made available from time to time by other powers.Mlail was not excha.ged,, and Red Cross representatives were not permitted to visit prisoner of war camps in Russia or camps for Soviet prisoners in Germany. In the first conference between President Roosevelt and Foreign Commissar Molotov which took place at the White House in May 1942, the President expressed a hope that arrangements might be made to exchange lists of names of prisoners of war. Molotov, having already stated that the Germans had been brutally inhumane in their treatment of Soviet prisoners, "replied with emphasis that his government was not disposed to negotiate any arrangement. with the Germans which would give the latter the e SECRET;(,, ``;' }?; _52- Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/91;19 :~PI -FftDP65-00756 Im MDT slightest pretext for claiming that they (the'Germans) were 16 observing any rules whatever." Mr. Harry Hopkin's notes on the same interview throw further light on difficulties experienced when attempting to deal with the Soviets on matters relating to prisoners: The State Department obviously wants Russia either to sign or adhere to the Geneva Convention of 1929 rela- tive to the care and treatment of prisoners of war. This agreement requf..:es that the adhering countries permit a neutral body . . to inspect the prison camps. You don't have to know very much about Russia, or for that matter Germany, to know there isn't a snowball's chance in hell for either Russia or Germany to permit the International Red"Cross really to inspect any prison camps. Molotov's final answer to that. "Why should we give the Germans the diplomatic advantage of pretending to adhere to in- ternational law. . . You can't trust them." Molotov indicated that it would be a mistake from a propaganda point of view to give Germany the chance to say that they were the people who upheld international law. . . . I gather this is going to be a pretty difficult nut to crack'for the State Department 17 The State Department never succeeded in "cracking the nut" referred to by Hopkins. At the beginning of the war Soviet authorities apparently had considered practicing limited ad- herence to the general body of international law concerning prisoners, but their subsequent policy of refusing to make any commitments indicates that there was a quick change of policy in this respect. Other members of the "Big Four," the United States, Great Britain, and China, were all ratifying states of the Geneva S E C R E T s "n C P, F, tal Approved For Release 2002/01/10 .-e i-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Appr6ved''1 or Release 2002101/tOI; qApRDP65-007 F T -4 Car_vention of 129214, in general, treated prisoners strictly in, accordance with its provisi.ons. The convention was not ob- se-ved in the.curflict between China .send aprzri because of the latter 1,s status as a Ion-ratifying state,, but after 11942 the CI:ur gl:ing Government applied the provisions oif the convention is dealing with German and Italian internees.. The :Lack of contra` lined autkiority in China, and the immense territory in- Vo;lved prevented, an effective.application of the rules in many irstarces., Germany and Italy, the zn a j or Axis, powers, in Europe, had ratified the Geneva Convention and, in general, applied its provisions .Nlho.i dealing with prisoners of war and internees ex cent, of course, with the Ruojaz,, Many alleged violai,ions grew out of Germanyrs arbitrary interpretation of rules regarding those who were to be treated as bona fide prisoners of war (for example, members of armed forces ofunrocognized governments such as Free France and Poland), and the forced. labor r~erfornied in Germany by prisoners was often in violation of orders from the German High Command. Such rules were in many cases enforced by the military authorities following protests by the Red Cross. S E C R E `.C , 17 , ,rR 7r -54- Approved For Release 2002/01/10`: CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01 1p :CCf4- L P65-0075 SOVIET PRACTICES IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL LAVi E The Constitution of the USSR opens with the declaration: "Since the time of the formation of the Soviet Republics,, the states of the world have been divided into two camps: the camp 1 of capitalism and the camp of socialism." It has been Soviet Russia's policy to stand alone. Obsessed by the idea of con- verting the world to Communism, Russia has tried since ly.lg to maintain her position as a "third power," with isolationism an underlying principle of her foreign policy. Even during World War II when the Soviets were forced into an unnatural alliance with the western democracies against the Axis, the Russians persisted in regarding themselves as a state apart which even- 2 tually would have to fight her erstwhile allies. They made stringent efforts to prevent their allies from learning any more than was absolutely necessary about the Soviet Union and its armed forces while maintaining an elaborate espionage pro- gram in the countries of their allies. During and after the war the Soviets conducted endless interrogations of prisoners of war who knew anything about the western democracies in order to collect all possible.types of information -- military, technical, SECRET S1C,RJEP, Approved For Release 2002/01/1055:IA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2O 1/ 0 C A-RDP65-00j 0 1-4 ~~, cam; ~ ~ ~ economic - - about those countries. At the beginning of the Communist regime, the Soviets loudly declared their denunciation of all treaties inherited from Tsarism and the Kerensky Government. This did not prevent them from demanding the execution of such agreements when it 3 suited their convenience. Despite their desire to remain isolated, it was nevertheless necessary for the Soviets to enter into treaties with other states, but in pursuing their policy of isolationism they showed a marked preference for bi-lateral treaties and individual agreements rather than multi-lateral treaties. Entering into treaties and agreements with capitalis- tic states on a large scale took place only after a fierce inner struggle in the Communist' Party (1924-25) whici? left Stalin in the ascendancy with his thesis of "socialism in a single country." Formerly, the theory that a proletarian state could exist in a capitalistic environment had been rejected by Soviet theorists 4 as "un-.Marxian and utterly utopian." Thus rationalizing their ideological differences with the "capitalistic" states, the Soviets became increasingly active in the diplomatic world. The moral basis for Soviet conceptions of international law, however, are based on the Communist's faith in the righteousness of the class strug ie, and this faith permits no humanitarian or chivalrous limitations. In 1921, Lenin wrote: SECRET aCC ti Approved For Release 200f A 710 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002101110E PI-FJe65-00756R00 T "The object of.the party is to exploit all and any conflicting interests among the surrounding capitalist groups-and governments with a view to the disintegration of capitalism. 115 'Stalin echoed Lenin's ideas in a speech three years later: "Contradiction, con- flicts, and wars among the bourgeois states hostile to the prole- 6 tarian state are the reserves of the revolution." The indoctri- nation program which the Soviets conducted in prisoner of war camps during and after World War II was a part of their continuing attempt to foment revolution in other countries and to hasten "the disintegration of capitalism." While Soviet diplomats concluded their pacts with various countries, the Moscow-directed Third International pursued its task of fostering revolution in those same countries, although the latter was kept somewhat in check after 1928 in order to 7 permit Soviet diplomacy more flexibility in its maneuvers. Thus, practical considerations and political necessity led the Soviets into international agreements and alliances, but opportunism has at all times outweighed any theories concerning 8 moral obligations to fulfill treaties. The Soviets entered into peaceful relations with other states without relinquishing the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that the "socialist" state, which Communists faithfully believe will envelope the earth, can be established ?only by force and violence, by 'war and SECRET Y CRJE OF Approved For Release 2002/01/10' 7CIA-RDP65-007568000400030001-4 Approved For Release 20Q2WIIIQ :jQl/.4-RDP65-00 00 01-4 revolution, and by savage reprisals against all dissenters. The ,drat de pure recognitions of tee Soviet Government began 9 in February 1924 with recognition by Groat Britain. As early as April 1922, the Treaty of Rappallo had been signed with the German Weimar Republic, a triumph for the Soviet diplomatic corps and one which enabled them to play on the dissensions between Germany and her former enemies throughout the. next decade. As European. states, hesitatingly, began to acknowledge the Soviet regime, a wide network of non-aggression, non-intervention, and 10 neutrality pacts was fabricated by the Soviets with many counties. Throughout the 1920's and until. Hitler had destroyed the Communist Party in Germany and secured complete contl'ol of the Third Reich in 1934, Communist thought in Russia had slung to the hope that Germany would be the scene of the next Communist revolution, and it was with difficulty that Soviet leaders relinquished this idea. After 1934, a rapid reorientation began and the new dip- lomatic policy included pacts, particularly with France, designed 11 to protect Russia from the growing Nazi menace. Among international agreements regarding warfare entered into by the Soviet Union were the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Washington treaties of 1922, the Geneva Protocol of 1928., tl:e Locarno Treaty of 1925, .the Driand-Kellogg Pact of 19289 the Hag'ze Conventions of 1907 on Hospital Ships and on the Rights and Duties SECRET 3IR,C '' 7-11 ', Approved For Release 2002/64/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/01i1"' lj-13Dp65-00756R Aw. 1W In-V of Neutral Powers in Naval Warfare, and the Gex.eva Conventions of 1906 and 1929 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 12 Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field. In the summer of 1918, very early in the Communist regime, the Soviet Government passed a decree by which it acceded to all international Red Cross conventions. Almost at the same time, another decree was passed by which the government took over the Russian Society of the Red Cross and made it an official organi- zation. Article 1 of the latter decree reads: "The Russian Society of the Red Cross is acting on the basis of the Geneva 13 Convention of 1864 and conventions subsequent thereto." The Soviets professed to attach considerable importance to the work of the Red Cross because, according to a Communist spokesman, the most valuable human material was found not only among the soldiers of the USSR but also among the soldiers, of the enemy. Since the latter were mostly proletarians and, therefore, "eventual allies of the Workers and Peasants Republic," the preservation of their lives and health were considered 'by the 14 Soviets to be of primary importance. Acceding to treaties of a humanitarian or social nature and co-operating with other nations in the preservation of human life and health has been in striking contrast to the Soviet policy of refraining from participating in agreements bearing on social SECRET SECRET Approved For Release 2002/01/1.CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/1L1/10P. CIA?-RDP65-0 QA QQ3d601-4 15 problem having political significance. For Soviet Russia, the taking of, prisoners has both economic and political iopli- cati:Jns -- they can be used to peT:i orm 1 '.'oor and they can be indoctrinated, and taught how to further the Communist mission in their native countries after repatriation. The failure to accede to the Geneva Convention of 1929 regarding prisoners and the renunciation in.practice of the Hague Convention of 1907 were perfectly consistent with Soviet foreign policy regarding co nitlnents of a political nature. As noted previously in this study, the Red Cross drafted a new code for prisoners of war in 1921 which was forwarded for _comment and criticism to all states party to the Red Gross Con- veations. The Russian Red Gross, with official sanction, pro- ceeded to draft a co r-ter-project which consisted, in the English trans.ation, of less than five hundred words. This proposal. was conservative in nature, and in no essential respect did it con-- flict with the Hague rules of 1907- or wi-: i the Geneva Convention of 1.92>. There was, however, at least one noticeable omiss _on in the counter-proposal. In the Hague and Geneva documents customary distinctions between officers and enlisted men were recognized, but the Soviets ignored such distinctions in their 15 document, the term "war prisoners" being used exclusively. S E C R T Approved For Release 2002/0/10 : CIA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/OY1q:CPtA-jR gP65-00756 ' ~yq X0 '4 Treaties of peace with the Soviet Union concluded with neighboring countries from 1920 to 1924 included many provisions for the disposition of prisoners. The lack of distinction between officers and enlisted men is a noticeable aspect of these treaties. Wars between the infant Soviet Union and her neighbors had been "class" as well as political conflicts, and in the treaties numerous provisions were made for the exchange or repatriation of civilian prisoners and hostages who had been detained for political or ideological rather than military reasons. In only one of the documents, the Hungarian Agreement of July 1921, were 17 distinctions made between officer and enlisted prisoners. Prior to World War II, the only concrete indications of the Communist attitude toward prisoners of war were contained in the Russian Red Cross draft proposal and the few treaties dis- cussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Upon analyzing these documents, it would seem that the Soviets agreed with the bourgeois statesmen on the principle that war is a relation between states and not be- tween individuals. This concept is the foundation upon which many of the principles concerning humane treatment of prisoners have been founded. For Communists, however, war is always a contest between classes, and the individuality of the person is always merged in his class. Since officers in the armies of "capitalistic" states are generally drawn from social classes which the Communists r7q rig ?#,e S E C R E T Approved For Release. 2002/01 /1 -~elA-RDP65-00756R000400030001-4 Approved For Release 2002/0/(1OF'F CIA RDP65-0 ,3'001-4 consider incorrigible ener," a,; of tl,oo pro-,eta~-ia` and since the Russians had attemptF to ? Icre c istor!